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Abstract
The initial hypothesis of this research was that
divergent reg iona 1 pe rspect ives on As ia- issues of
security, political alignment and economic models- were a
primary cause of the thirty-year Sino-Soviet Cold War.
This implied that future stable relations between Russia
and China would continue to be strongly influenced by the
compatibility of their regional perspectives. Sustaining
such compatibility would become increasingly complex,
however, due to change within Asia itself, particularly
with regard to Asia's emergence as one of the centres of
the new global economy. Asian modernisation is
significant for Russia and China not only in terms of
domestic development as they abandon the command economy,
but politically since the creation of a regional economy
is being promoted as a means of neutralising the tensions
in the region which arise from Asia's heterodox nature in
terms of culture, ethnicity and social system.
The cent ra1 chapt ers of the thes is are, therefore,
concerned with comparing Russian and Chinese assessments
of the Asian economy on several levels: Asia's place in
their foreign economic relations in the reform era;
Asia's role in their domestic development; and their
assessment of the significance of the Asian economy as an
economic model and as an emerging regional economy. These
assessments are then set against Russian and Chinese
perspectives on their role as Asian powers and their
security and diplomatic relations in Asia.
The conclusion of the paper is that Asia is rising
in importance for both states, though not equally. Russia
remains economically isolated from the most important
processes of the Asian economy, though political and
economic de-centralisation in Asiatic Russia raises the
prospect of these region's re-orientation towards the
Pac ific. The success of economi c reform inCh ina,
conversely, owes a considerable amount to the degree to
which China has participated in regional trade and
investment flows, although this has also promoted
domestic dislocation due to rapid changes in the patterns
of distribution of economic output and population.
The proposition that the imperative of economic
modernisation has neutral ised the potential for regional
con f1ict is found t0 be unproven. Economi cs can be as
much a source of conflict between nations as politics or
culture, and there remain many interests to be balanced
if Asia is to emerge as an integrated economy of common
purpose. Rather economic development has had its greatest
impact on Asian regional relations by effecting a re-
distribution of power between states. This is evident not
only in the rise of China and Japan as powers capable of
challenging and balancing the interests of the former
superpowers but in the much broader distribution amongst
other states. Russia and China do have complementary
economic interests within Asia, but it is by promoting
this greater equilibrium of power that economic
development has contributed most to regional stability,
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I Introduction: Issues and Definitions
According to the joint communique issued at the
Beijing summit of May 1989 between the Soviet Union and
China "both sides expressed the unanimous opinion that
the Soviet-Chinese summit signifies the normalisation of
interstate relations between the Soviet Union and China."
Future relations between the two states would be guided
by the five principles of peaceful coexistence- non-
aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, mutual
respect for sove re i gnt y, equal it y and peaceful co-
existence. Despite the fact that important differences
still existed between the two sides at both state and
party level, these pronouncements indicated how far the
circumstances which sustained the 30 year Sino-Soviet
Cold war had changed by the end of the 1980's.
One way of analysing the causes of both Sino-Soviet
host; 1it y, and t he subsequent rapprochement, is to
compar e the i r re 1at ion s hip wit h the 0 the r pi v0talon e 0 f
the Cold War, that between the Soviet Union and the
United States. In his essay 'The Long Peace', 1 John L.
Gaddis has argued that, in the absence of a supra-
national force capable of imposing authority on the
international arena, stability in the post-war era arose
from Soviet and US agreement to abide by a set of
unofficial rules, which were the product of custom,
precedent and
respect for
mut ua 1 i nt erest . These




territory that the opponent considered essential to its
economic or military security; avoidance of direct
confrontation- despite the unprecedented level of
military action since 1945, great care was taken to
ensure that Soviet and us forces did not come into direct
conflict; recognition of the qualitative difference that
nuc 1ear weapons imposed upon re 1at ions between st at es;
recognition of the legitimacy of the opposing leadership,
while retaining the right to question that of the
opposing system; a preference for predictability over
rat i ona 1it y- t he accept ance of many anoma 1i es and
irrationalities in the international order.
The absence both individually and collectively of
comparable rules in the Sino-Soviet relationship can be
used to explain much of the instability in relations
between the two states. Firstly, in the collective sense,
the Soviet Union's willingness from the fifties on to
abide by a set of rules which allowed so much to the
advanced capitalist states, provided they did not
challenge the national interests of the Soviet state
itself, was unacceptable to the Chinese. This led to a
shift in their perception of the aims of Soviet foreign
policy from being engaged in support and expansion of the
socialist world, to being primarily concerned with
pursuing partial interests, including sustaining
stability in the existing international order at the
expense of change, particularly in the Third World. The
rejection of the collective rules emerging in the
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international system led to the
during the sixties, a process
turmoil of the period.
Equally important was the inability to work out
comparable individual rules. Such rules should not be
seen as being of equal importance, particularly at
varying points in the history of the Sino-Soviet





opposing political leadership and China's refusal to
accept the changes that nuclear weapons had brought about
in international relations were more significant in the
initial stage of the conflict. This is also true of
China's attempt to end the anomaly of the separation of
Taiwan from the mainland by precipitate action.
However, the two other factors behind the dispute-
the inability to avoid direct confrontation and the
unwillingness to afford each other legitimate spheres of
influence- did not abate but rather increased in
intensity. Direct confrontation was unavoidable given the
proximity of the two states, the vulnerability of their
mutual border and the dispute as to its proper
demarcat ion. The des i re to deny each ot her support in
Asia grew from competition for influence among the non-
aligned in the fifties to the creation of outright
political and military alliances aimed against the other.
China's perception of its vulnerability on these issues
at the beginning of the seventies was the primary
motivating factor in bringing about the pivotal change in
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the course of the Sino-Soviet conflict: the development
of its strategic understanding with the US and Japan.
It is not possible to characterise the Sino-Soviet
conflict as being primarily a bi-lateral dispute before
1972 and a multilateral conflict thereafter. What is true
is that the balance of factors sustaining the dispute
changed from the former to the latter: China's perception
of its vulnerability moved from the direct threat to that
posed by what it deemed the Sovi et Uni on's pursu it of
hegemonism in Asia. From the Soviet perspective, the
emergence of the tripartite group opposing it in the East
necessitated an expansion of its military and political
prescence in Asia: the Far East military build-up, the
further expansion of the military relationship with India
and Vietnam, and ultimately the intervention in
Afghanistan.
China's decision to pursue collective security with
t he US was made poss i b1e by t he convergence of t hei r
interests in Asia with regard to the Soviet Union despite
the fact that it had few points of agreement with the US,
or of conflict with the Soviet Union, elsewhere, as this
assessment by a Hong Kong analyst at the time of Si no-
Soviet normalisation suggests:
As a regional rather than as a global power, China's
basic strategic interests are confined to the Asia-
Pacific region. Outside this region, conflicts of
interest between China and the Soviet Union are not
serious.. China's national security is related
directly to security issues limited to the Asian-
Pacific region. Sino-US relations are exactly the
opposite of Sino-Soviet relations in this regard.
Outside the Asian-Pacific region, China and the
United States have deeply divergent views regarding
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some issues (such as Central America, the Middle
East and South Africa), but these confli~ts do not
directly affect China's national security.
The emergence of Sino-Soviet rapprochement in the 1980's,
it can be argued, therefore, owed a considerable amount
to the reversal of previous factors and joint acceptance
of individual and collective rules of behaviour. While
the five principles were posited as the collective basis
of relations, more significant were the development of
individual rules. China had long-since abandoned its
obscu rant i st st ance on nuc 1ear det errence and embarked,
as one element in the four modernisations, on a long-term
effort to match the mi 1 itary structure and capacity of
the major industrial powers. Both the Soviet Union and
Ch ina embarked upon a reform process whi ch , whi 1e
marked 1y di f fe rent in terms of cont ent and success, was
premised on criticism of their respective Maoist and
Brezhnevite pasts, establishing the possibility of mutual
political legitimation. China showed itself prepared to
pursue resolution of outstanding issues- whether the
border dispute with the Soviet Union or the status of
Hong Kong and Macao- through predictable channels, and
where anomalies perSisted, as over Taiwan, showed
recognition of the need to resolve these through 10ng-
term diplomacy.
In strategic terms, China's avowal of an
'independent' foreign policy since 1982 indicated its
desire for balanced relations during the reform era and
the Soviet leadership's espousal of the 'New Political
Thinking', whose essence was the inadequacy of mi 1itary
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power to solve complex political and security issues,
established a framework for readjustment, including in
Asia. The declaration of May 1989 stated:
Both sides declare that neither of them- neither the
Soviet Union nor China- lays claim to hegemony in
any form in the Asian-Pacific region or other parts
of the world.
However, strategic opposition arose from, and was
sustained by, regional confrontation. Continued strategic
reconc i 1i at ion, equa 11y, must be dependent on compat i b 1e
regional policies. Normalisation was achieved by Soviet
compliance with the Chinese position on the two
'obstacles' (the third being the border dispute) relating
to its regional role- withdrawal from Afghanistan and the
end of support for t he Vi et namese ro 1e in Cambod i a. Yet
neit her t he Afghan nor the Cambod ian ci vi 1 war arose
directly from the behaviour of either power; rather they
sought advantage, and to avoid disadvantage, through
involvement in the conflicts. Future compatibility as
regional powers is, therefore, not solely dependent on
the extension of the bi-lateral relationship to regional
issues but on t he much. more complex i nt erp 1ay of that
relationship with the economic, political and security
reality of the region.
This complexity arises not least because Asia itself
is in the midst of considerable transformation, in terms
of internal political and economic structures and the
position it occupies in the international order. The
demise of the Soviet Union has accentuated both the
importance of multilateral factors in the Sino-Russian
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relationship, since the loss of superpower status has
increased the Russian government's need for collective
economic and security arrangements in Asia, and the
changes to the international order as a whole. Internal
change in the former Soviet Union, as in China, has
become yet another important variable in the changing
pattern of Asian relations, and of Asia's place in the
world.
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to exami ne
Sov iet/Russ ian and Ch inese reg iona 1 perspect ives on the
future of Asia, to ascertain the degree to which they are
compatible, offering the prospect for continued
stability, and the degree to which they diverge, with the
potential for the resumption of conflict. This will
involve assessment of their own role in Asia and of the
importance of Asia in both their domestic and foreign
policies.
Before a structure can be given to such an analysis,
howeve r, a numbe r of quest ions must be answered. 1ft he
changing nature of Asia is itself a determining factor in
future of Sino-Russian relations we must first define
Asia and identify the forces that will shape those
relatiionship
The reluctance to discuss Asia as anything other
than a geographical expression imposed largely from
without is a response to the diversity of the Asian past.
Unlike Europe whose differing cultures are seen as being
variants on a common origin, the differences between the
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cultures, peoples and societies of Asia are held to be of
root as well as of kind. Between the Confucian and Hindu
civilizations as well as the Islamic and Buddhist
traditions there is no perceived commonality. In order to
find a common trend which cuts across Asia's diversity
and gives some solidity to its boundaries it is necessary
to examine the Asian present. What this shows. according
to Lucian Pye,
is not that they [the Asian states] are variations
on a common past, as with the countries of Europe,
but rathe r that they share simi 1ar hopes for the
future. The common element in Asia is that it is a
continent in pursuit of economic growth, national
power, and all that can be lumped together under the
general label of modernisation. The unity of Europe
1ies in its history; the unity of Asia is in the
more subt 1e, but no 1ess real, shared consc iousness
of the desirability of c~ange and of making a future
different from the past.
This is especially the case since whereas in the past
Asian states faced enforced modernisation from foreign
cultures, modernisation is increasingly an internal Asian
phenomenon, with specific Asian characteristics. Asian
states have found thei r commona 1ity- they are vari ants
upon a particular form of economic development.
This process has proved so powerful that even the
most significant division between Asian economic cultures
in the post-war era- between those who looked to market-
based development and those who favoured a planned
economy- has become increasingly blurred. The planned
economy was pursued by the Asian socialist states out of
a belief in the success of the Soviet model and a desire
to combine modernisation with social restructuring. The
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market conversely was viewed as antithetical both to the
plan and to the political and social structures of
socialist society.
The limitations of planning became increasingly
evident, however, not least because they included not
only the distortions known within the Soviet system- the
imba 1ance between heavy indust ry and the consumer and
service sectors, the decline in growth and efficiency as
the industrial base expanded, isolation from the
international economy- but also specific distortions
arising from the inapplicability of the Soviet model to
the economic cultures of Asia. This was felt most
forcefully in agriculture, where Soviet-style
collectivisation as a means of accumulation had at best a
debilitating effect, and at worst, as during the Great
Leap Forward in Chi na, resu 1ted in the breakdown of food
supplies and widespread famine.
While some Asian socialist states were compensated
for their continued adherence to the Soviet economic
model by subsidy through trade with Moscow, this option
was not open to China. It was, moreover, faced with
enormous problems of economic logistics arising from the
inc reas ing tens ion between popu 1at ion and resou rces, the
only remedy for which was change of the economic
mechani sm. The process of economic reform begun at the
3rd Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party in 1978 has
moved through seve ra1 stages but the essent ia1
transformation has been the abolition of the thesis that
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the market and the plan are incompatible. While retaining
a socialist political model the CPC are attempting
economic transition through three modes of production-
from pre-capitalist to capitalist to socialist by means
of a hybrid system. A key component, as will be discussed
more fully below, has been the Open Door policy by which
important parts of the domestic economy have been made
compatible with the international market economy.
The sh i ft towards t he market on t he part of As ian
socialist states has a mirror image in the continued role
of state planning in the Asian market economies, leading
some commentators to argue that there is an increasing
degree of convergence in the developmental models of
As ian st at es. Gordon Whit e and Robe rt Wade have argued
that successful 1ate development- socialist or
capitalist- should be understood in terms of 'Listian
political economy' in which
states have played a strategic role in taming
domestic and international market forces and
harnessing them to a national economic interest.4
Thus the economies of Taiwan and South Korea are guided
market economies in which the initative and the profit
lies with the enterprise and in which the state achieves
national ends by manipulation of the market, rather than
by direct regulation or nationalised production. During
industrialisation the government intervenes in certain
sectors to bring about particular allocative effects, as
well as to protect those parts deemed to be se1f-
regulating. In particular while economic rationalism
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might argue against the creation of core industries such
as chemicals, iron and steel, and electronics, a
prog ramme of nat i ona 1 deve 1opment requ ires that these be
developed.
It can also be argued that t he po 1 it i ca 1 processes
in the capitalist and socialist states have certain
similarities. Cooptation and control within an
authoritarian structure have been the norm, in which the
emergence of social groups or classes capable of putting
their priorities before that of national development has
been most strongly resisted. Thus White and Wade conclude
that the East Asian socialist and capitalist countries,
share certain common features which cut across the
political divide. They share a common Confucian
heritage, a historical legacy of strong and
economically active states, traditions of social and
political hierarchy and strong nationalist
sent i ment sunde rp t nned by cu lt u ra 1 homogene i t y and
rei nforced by ext e rna 1 threat s. These fact ors have
conditioned both the degree and forms of state
intervention and the demogstrated developmental
success of East Asian states.
Thus the central division that has been held to exist
between Asian states, their supposed relationship to
competing forms of Western modernisation models-
capitalist or socialist- may be becoming less significant
as a specifically Asian model of development appears.
As the above discussion suggests the area which may
have proceeded furt hest in produci ng such a d i st i nct i ve
Asian political and economic model is that lying within
t he boundar i es of the Confuc i an he r it age of East As i a.
However the pattern of state-regulated economic
development combined with distinctive political cultures
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extends beyond this region to include the nations of
Southeast Asia and South Asia. Within these states common
processes and common concerns can be discerned which set
them off from other societies, including the states of
what was once Asia minor, and is now more usually
designated the Middle East. The degree to which Russian
and Chi nese commentat ors accept the i nf 1uence of
traditional cultures behind the developmental imperative
will be examined further in this paper.
The foregoi ng discuss i on makes it poss i b1e to set
limits both to the boundaries of Asia and to the forces
shaping its future. While much of the discussion will be
centred around the fast-developing economies of East
Asi a, t he processes of deve1opment are he1d to ext end
beyond the Pacific rim to South and Western Asia. The
Middle East is seen as distinctive both culturally and
economically. The term Asia-Pacific region (APR) is used
in the paper but reluctantly. For reasons which will be
discussed fu rt her t his remains a rat her amorphous
construct which is concerned with binding the countries
of Asia, Australasia and the Americas together regardless
of the cultural, economic and political differences
between them. It is nevertheless the chosen term for much
of the discussion considered in the paper.
As to the factors shaping Asia's future it is hoped
that enough has already been said to indicate that
economic deve1opment and i nt egrat i on has become a most
significant factor shaping future regional relations. In
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economic development many Asian states see the means not
only to secure domestic stability and well-being but also
the process by which to impose a system of common
interests upon the divisive and potentially unstable
political relations of the region. This must apply also
to Russia and China. Thus the central consideration of
the paper will be given to contrasting Russian and
Chinese perspectives on the economic future of Asia with
a subsequent sect ion attempt ing to place these in the
context of their perspectives on Asia's political future.
A problem which arises here is how far it is
possible to define a perspective on Asia with which the
Chinese or Soviet/Russian states can be identified: what
are the components which make up Russian and Chinese
perspectives on Asia? In the era of the Cold War this
would have led to tortuous discussion of the role of
ideology in the foreign policy of communist states.
Certainly more consideration would have been given to the
semantics of what constituted 'ideology' than to the
actual discussion conducted by Soviet and Chinese
ana 1yst s. Th is was a mi stake; for howeve r suscept ib1e
ideological formulations were to change under pressure of
domest ic and ext erna 1 circumst ance, they provi ded a
sou rce by wh ich Sov iet and Chi nese pe rcept ;ons 0f the
world could in part be charted. Moreover, they were, and
in the Chinese case are, rarely expressions of simple
doctrine. As Seweryn Bialer has argued Marxism-Leninism
13
was but one element in the 'practical' ideology of Soviet
leaders- the ideas, values and preferences that provided
the dominant conceptual framework of the elite.6
One further element in that framework which could
not be erased was the component of political culture:
Russian communists were still Russian and the product of
the society they sought to overthrow. Ideology was to
prove a weak cement for relations between socialist
states when faced with differences of political culture
and interest s of state. Because of the cont inued
import ance of the inhe ritance of t he past, two short
introductory sections using mainly secondary sources will
out 1ine comparat ive Russ ian and Ch inese pe rspect ives on
Asia in the imperial and communist eras, before an
att empt is made to present Chinese and Russian
perspectives on contemporary Asia in the main sections of
the paper.
As to the material used in those sections, this
comes from a variety of sources: the media, academic
discussion, as well as government statements of policy.
It is accepted that there is no uniformity of opinion on
the issues raised and where differences exist attempts
w i l be made to indicate institutional positions and
whether any trend can be said to predominate.
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II Comparative Historical Perpectives on Asia
i) Russia
Given the multi-faceted nature of Asia itself and
the variety of influences that have moulded Russian
historical perspectives of Asia, it is undoubtedly a
simplification to talk of one 'Asia' and one perception
of it. Yet there are long-standing elements of continuity
to Russian perceptions of Asia and it is possible to
outline the most predominant of these.
A major factor behind this continuity is geography.
Russian perceptions have been shaped by the proximity of
Asian societies, from which many migrations threatening
to the most Eastern of the Slavic peoples originated. For
much of Russian history this openness to the East
sustained a feeling of vulnerability and the Russian
advance into Asia from the 16th century onwards was
motivated in part by a desire to create secure and fixed
boundaries for the rising Russian state. While this
diminished the threat from Asia it created new problems
of identity since it became unclear how far the
boundaries of Asia had been pushed outward and how far
part of As i a had been absorbed into Russ i a. Th is
ambiguity persisted to modern times, as John Stephan has
pointed out:
Russia and Asia are not contiguous, as the term
Sino-Soviet frontier implies, but overlap spatially
and ethnically. Three-quarters of the Soviet Union
lies within Asia. One-third of Asia lies within the
USSR. Eighty million people (approximately 30% of
the Soviet population) live in Asiatic regions of
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the USSR. Fifty million Soviet citizens (about 20%
of the population) are of Asian nationalities.1
Thus while geographically and ethnically, Russia, and
then the Soviet Union, became Eurasian powers, with
enormous consequences for their history, it was less
obvious that a fusion of perceptions had taken place. It
wi 11 be argued that the predomi nant Russ ian and Sovi et
perceptions of Asia remained rooted in European culture
and that Eu rope shaped Russ ia I s pe rcept ion of the East
much more than the incorporation of Asian territory into
a European state changed those perceptions. This said,
consc iousness of Russ ia I s un ique dual ident ity has neve r
been far from the surface and has arisen particularly at
times of upheaval and change.
For the inhabitants of the first Russian state, that
of Kiev, there was no consciousness of 'Asia' as a
geographic or cultural entity. Rather there were the
different nomadic tribes of the steppe who threatened the
agricultural communities of the Dnieper valley. This
conflict of economics and culture was reinforced by that
of religion following the conversion to Christianity of
the Slavs of European Russia in the 10th century while
the pagan nomads were later converted to Islam. The wars
between the peoples of Kiev Rus and the different tribes
of the steppes- Khazars, Pechenegs, Po10vtsy- were fought
on a massive scale with considerable losses. It was in
the aftermath of such a war with the Po10vtsy that the
weakened Kiev state fell to the Mongol invasion of 1237-
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41. This is the only time that all of Russia has suffered
invasion but the devastation incurred and the subsequent
250 years of Mongol domination left abiding scars. Unlike
in China and Persia, however, the Mongols never succeeded
in establishing themselves as dynastic rulers and their
control weakened after after the 14th century as Muscovy
arose as the new Russian centre.
According to N.V. Riasanovsky,2 Imperial Russian
involvement in Asia before the nineteenth century falls
into two distinct periods in which the reforms of Peter
the Great mark the pivotal point. The earlier period is
marked by the steady progress eastward of Russian
colonists amd traders, in the wake of successive defeats
of indigenous Asian peoples. Following the subjugation of
the Khanat es of Kazan and Ast rakhan in the mid 16t h
century, the last major barrier to expansion eastward was
removed wi t h t he defeat of t he forces headed by Kuchum
Khan in 1598. Using the Siberian rivers and a system of
forts Russian settlers pushed east linking European
Russia with the Pacific by 1651, but leaving the southern
1ands of the Kazakhs, Ki rgh i z and Dzungar Mongo1s
untouched. Beyond the need to secure the eastern
approaches to the state the greatest impetus to this
colonisation was economic. The settlers sought the
mineral and natural wealth of the region and trade with
other states, most importantly with Imperial China. The
first codification of Sino-Russian
under the Treaty of Nerchinsk
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relations took place
in 1689, but the
instability of Inner Asia in this period prevented rapid
expansion of relations between the two great Eurasian
powers. In particular, the Qing were suspicious of the
role played by Russia in the challenge of the Dzungar
Mongols to their rule in Mongolia, Central Asia, and
Tibet. According to Mark Mancall, a formula for stability
was eventually found under which,
If Russia were prepared to pay the price of
noninterference in Central Asia for commerce with
Peking, Peking was prepared to pay the price of
comme5ce for Russian noninterference in Central
Asia.
This was embodied in the Treaty of Kiakhta of 1728 which
allowed increased Russian access to Peking but more
importantly permitted trade with the interior through
Kiakhta and other border towns. The Kiakhta system
successfully regulated Russian and Chinese relations for
ove r a hund red years and creat ed a stab 1e struct ure for
Russian relations with Asia as a whole.
While the economic benefits that Eastward expansion
brought were essent ia1 to the success of the reforms of
Peter the Great and the growth of Russian power in the
18th century, one of the major consequences of the
changes of the Petrine age was the opening of Russia to
the West and the establishment of European thought as the
primary intellectual influence in the country. Thus while
the amount of contact Russia had with Asian peoples
increased in the period after the death of Peter in 1725,
Asia played a diminished role in the Russian mind as the
fear of invasion from the East receded and consciousness
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of the advance of Eu ropean soci ety increased. Thus
Riasanovsky notes:
The superiority and even the unique validity of the
European development appeared to be the common
explicit and especially implicit assumption in
Russia as in other European countries. What is more,
the empi re of the Romanovs, whe re Eu rope and As ia
met, seemed to educat ed Russ ians to prov ide ideal
support for this view. Europeans could, and perhaps
were destined to, benefit mankind by carrying their
eni1ightenment to backward continents. Russian
intellectuals readily joined in the general European
ideology of imperia1;sm.
The rise of Europe became a double-edged sword for
Russia, however. As far as it was able to participate in
it, Russia was strengthened, not only securing the
east ern front ier but even def eat ins the 1ast maj or
obstacle to southern expansion, Turkey, in the reign of
Catherine. However, Russia's failure to match the pace
and scale of change in the maritime states- to build upon
the legacy of Peter- left it with the ideology of a
European empire but lacking the means commensurate to its
ambit ion s• Thus the we stern stat es we rea b1e top 1ace
limits on Russian power in Europe, particularly after the
Crimean war, while they increasingly penetrated into Asia
from the sea, dislocating the traditional societies there
and eroding Russia's unique position as a Eurasian power.
Consciousness of this led to a resurgence of interest in
the east wh ich reached its apogee in the vi ews of the
Slavophiles, who rejected Westernisation in part out of a
belief in Russia's special mission in the East, as
suggested most famously by Dostoyevsky's remarks:
Th; s [the conquest
Russia is not only
of As ia] is necessary because
in Europe, but also in Asia;
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because a Russ ian is not on 1y a Eu ropean, but also
an Asiatic. Not only that: in our coming destiny,
perhgps it is precisely Asia that represents our way
out.
Thus the interlinked phenomena of the ideology of
imperialism in its unique Russian form and the need to
stake Russia's special claim in Asia in the face of the
increased activity of the other European states propelled
Russia into further Asian expansion.
Th is was conduct ed on two separat e front s: Cent ra 1
Asi a and the Far East. In Central Asia Russia
success fu 11y subdued the Is1ami c peop 1es, found ing the
new state of Tu rkest an cent red on Tashkent in 1865. The
Khanates of Bukhara based around Samarkand, and Khiva to
the south of the Ara1 Sea, capitulated to Russian forces
in 1868 and 1875 respectively. This served the
traditional dual purpose of imperialism: economic control
and denial of the territory to another power, in this
case the British extending their influence northward from
India. An attempt to detach Xinjiang from Qing Empire
following a rebellion by the indigenous people failed, as
the Chinese re-established control in 1877, but this was
less than significant given the shift in attention to Far
East. Hauner points out that because,
of its ;nadequate communi cat ions and the enormous
distances involved, the Russian state could not
allocate the same resources to both places
simultaneously. Until the 1880's the government
could not decide which zone should be given
overriding priority: the Far East or Central Asia.6
While Russia's geographical position guaranteed it the
predominant trading position in Central Asia the same
could not be said of the Far East. The Kiakhta system had
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successfully limited Russian penetration into Manchuria,
but the arrival of the west had revolutionised the
conduct of trade with the east, as Rossabi points out:
The Kiakhta trade had been extremely valuable in the
early 19th century, the Russians principally
providing textiles and some furs and recelvlng
chiefly tea and some silk from the Qing. China's new
arrangements with the maritime powers, which could
transport bulkier goods more cheaply than those
states dependant on the land routes through Eurasia,
undermined Ru;sia's favourable economic relations
with the Qing.
After the Crimean war any restraint exercised upon Russia
from fear of alienating the French and British was
removed, and Russia pressed her claim to exclusive rights
to the right bank of the Amur river. 185,000 miles of
ter rit ory we re conceded by the Qi ng un de r the Treat y of
A igun of 1858, and a furt her 100,000 by the Treat y of
Peking of 1860. The policy of 'using barbarians to
regulate barbarians' under which concessions were made to
the Russians, who were long known and deemed to be most
interested in trade, in order to better resist the
demands of the other powers, had failed. Though this
allowed the Russians to found Vladivostok and expand into
the Far East, they were unable to make any significant
impact upon the important Chinese coastal trade since the
French and British had also won significant concessions.
Checked by the expand ing inf1uence of the West ern
European states, overland trade did not substantially
increase in the latter decades of the century and while
the level of settlement in the Russian Far East tripled,
the population of 7 million in 1900 was insignificant by
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the standards of East Asia. Following the pattern
employed in Central Asia of opening the region to
population and facilitating extraction of goods by rail
transport, t he Tsar aut hor i sed the const ruct i on of the
Trans-Siberian Railway in 1891. This was accompanied by
the growth of the Russian military presence on the
Pacific with an increase between 1892 and 1903 from 23 to
89 battalions, 13 to 35 squadrons, and from 8 to 25
batteries.8 A central cause of this military expansion
was the rise of a new threat to Russian ambitions in the
Far East in the form of imperial Japan.
Russo-Japanese relations had been established by the
Treaty of Edo of 1858 which authorised trade between the
two states, and the Treaty of Shimoda which began the
delineation of the frontier between the two states in
1855. The Kur i 1es had been di vi ded but no agreement was
made on Sakhalin which remained a joint possession. This
position was resolved by the 'final' agreement of 1875
which gave Japan sovereignty over the Kuriles in exchange
for Russian control of Sakhalin. Relations for the next
20 years were good, both states being primarily concerned
with domestic modernisation. Russia did not perceive
Japanese industrialisation as threatening and pursued a
largely passive policy in the Far East, at least partly
because of her continuing economic and military weakness
in t he reg i on. Moreove r , Chi na conti nued to be regarded
as the major regional power and Japan was encouraged as a
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counter-weight to the Qing empire, even in regard to its
ambitions in Korea.
Equally important may have been the affinity of
va 1ues and inst itut ions between the two states. Lensen
points out:
The Russians and the Japanese were both imbued with
respect for autocracy and government regulation, for
rank and protocol, and were equally disdainful of
merchants and money-makers. Both were troubled by a
pull in opposite cultural directions; both dreamed
of being the bridge between East and West, the
catalyst of a new and universal civilisation.9
It was the defeat of China in the war of 1894-95 which
disrupted this relationship by revealing the extent of
Japan's success in modernisation and of her ambitions in
mainland Asia. Russia succeeded, in consort with Germany
and France, in forcing Japan to renounce it's war gains
in Manchuria and thereafter greatly expanded her own
position along the whole of the northern frontier of the
Qing Empire and in Korea, particularly in the wake of the
Boxer Rebellion.
The opportunity for expansion that the
disintegration of the Qing empire presented, and Russian
confidence in their ability to beat an Asian people,
accounted in large part for the ascendancy in the Russian
court of those who refused to make any concessions to
Japan on rnain1and As ia. The Japanese, havi ng secu red a
diplomatic alliance with Britain in 1902 which would
ensu re that mi 1it ary vi cto ry was not followed by
political defeat as in 1895, struck in 1904. The Russian
forces we re def eat ed, weakened by poor planning,
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po 1itica 1 cor rupt ion and the revo 1ut ionar y upheaval of
1905 to which the military debacle itself contributed.
The consequences of the defeat varied.
Diplomatically they were limited: Korea and Sout h
Manchu ria we re recogn ised as be ing a Japanese sphe re of
influence but no territory was gained except for southern
Sakhalin and no indemnity was paid. The Russian military
vulnerability in the east the war exposed and the limited
nature of Japan's war gains led to the ascendancy in both
states of those who had argued for Russo-Japanese co-
operation. The years after 1907 saw increasing Japanese-
Russian convergence culminating in the alliance of 1916.
The basis of this alliance was economic as well as
military with Japan placing a considerable stake in
Imperial Russia, from government bonds to trade and
commerce in Manchuria and Eastern Siberia.
The political and strategic consequences of the
defeat were far more significant. Russian imperial
prest ige was damaged preci sel y because the defeat came
from a non-European people, as Seton Watson suggests:
The impact of the first victory of an Asian over a
European power in m8dern times was felt far beyond
the theatre of war.1
But it was perhaps the st rateg ic consequences that we re
to reverberate longest, as Milan Hauner argues:
Following the disaster of 1905, one can observe that
the trauma of the two-war front, to be fought
simultaneously at both of the Empire's extremes,
some 15,000 km apart and connect ed for most of the
distance by the then inefficient and vulnerable
Trans-Siberian Raiway, was to become the principal
geopolitical factor that the Soviet Eurasian
strategy inherited. Without bearing in mind this
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fundament a 1 st rat eg i c fact or, one cannot, for
instance, understand Stalin's balancing act between
East and West, right up to Hitler's attack, or the
underlying motives that led to the enormous Soviet
mi 1it ary and naval bu i 1d-up in t he Far East since
the 1960's.11
Thus Russian perceptions of Asia had in one sense come
full circle. Having successfully eliminated any serious
threat to its security from Asia by the 17th century,
Russia had enjoyed two centuries in which its economic
relations with the region, most notably with China, had
predominated. By the late 19th century, however, the
changi ng pat tern of economi c and soci a 1 deve 1opment had
re-established Asia as a region from which a threat to
the st at e mi ght ari se- eit her from i nd i genous or ext ra-
territorial powers, resurrecting dormant historical
concerns about the threat from the East.
What did not change, however, was the dominant
intellectual locus for perceptions of Asia. Despite the
diversity of Russian political thought, including the
division between those who rejected, and those who sought
to emulate, the West, the two centuries since the Petrine
reforms had established the dominant Russian perceptions
of Asia as variants upon the European tradition rather
than forging an alternative vision derived exclusively
from Russia's unique position- Riasanovsky is,
unable to cite a single Russian intellectual before
the 20th century who was consistantly w~lling to
identify himself or his country with Asia.1
Even t hose who cha 11 enged t he Tsar i st st at e, and were
eventually to overthrow it, did so under the influence of
rationalist Western political theory and of political and
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economi c deve 1opment sin t he West, rat her t han of ideas
and event s emanat i ng from t he East. The i r commi tment to
Marxism did not clash with the establishment of the
Soviet state on geographic lines as close to those of
imperial Russia as events- the peace treaty with Germany
and the allied intervention- would allow, and they thus
inherited many of the geopolitical concerns of the
Tsarist state: security on two continents and problems
ari sing from the uneveness of nat i ona 1 deve 1opment ina
vast mul t i-nat i ona 1 st at e. Thus the Sovi et st at e
developed its view of Asia almost as a mirror image to
that of Imperial Russia: from within the context of
European ideologies, though from one concerned with the
class, rather than state, divisions of Europe, but with a
cont i nu i ng commi tment tot he un i queness of t he Russ ian
experience, in its revolutionary, as opposed to imperial,
guise.
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i i ) China
Even 1ess than t he ear 1y Russi ans, t he Chi nese had
no historical view of 'Asia' as a geographic or cultural
entity. This stemmed from the pre-eminent position
Chinese culture held within East Asia and the lack of
knowledge or interest in societies outwith the Sinic
zone. The two themes which dominate the history of this
zone are sout hern expans i on and nort hern defence. C. p.
Fitzgerald has argued that,
Chinese influence, Chinese culture and Chinese power
have always moved southward.13
From the original confederacy of states based upon the
Yellow River, Chinese influence spread south
i ncorporat i ng the peop1es of the Yangt se vall ey by the
end of the first millennium BC. By the end of the Han
dynasty in 221 A.D. south China, what is now Guangdong
and Fujian, and northern Vietnam were within a Chinese
state, though modern south-western China was not. The
process of cont act, fo 11owed by set t 1ement, and event ua1
i ncorporat ion cont i nued, drawi ng in t he upper Yangt se by
the fourth to sixth centuries AD and with the Canton
region fully settled by the Tang period (seventh to tenth
centuries AD). From this area of political control
Chinese influence extended southward, to Vietnam which
was directly affected, and to Laos, Cambodia, Burma and
Thailand, which to varying degrees were influenced by
China. Beyond these states lay Malaya, Java, Sumatra and
Borneo which were less directly affected until the
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arrival in modern times of Chinese settlers created a
more tangible link with the mainland state.
The exc 1us ion of the soc iet ies of West and Sout h
Asia from this order and the predominance played by China
in it gave rise to a Sinocentrism in which the Chinese
emperor was not merely the Lord of the Middle Kingdom but
of all the known world. John King Fairbank argues,
The relations of the Chinese with surrounding areas,
and with non-Chinese peoples generally, were
coloured by this concept of Sinocentrism and an
assumption of Chinese superiority. The Chinese
tended to think of their foreign relations as giving
expression externally to the same principles of
social and political order that were manifested
internally within Chinese state and society. China's
foreign relations were accordingly hierarchical and
non-egalitarian, like Chinese society itse1f.14
The hie rarchy broad 1y fo 11owed the pat tern of Ch inese
expansion: firstly, the core region dominated by the Han
and those areas most direct 1y inf 1uenced by them: Korea
and Vietnam which were at one time within the Empire, the
islands of the Ryukyus, and, at times, Japan; secondly,
the Inner Asian zone consisting of tributary peoples who
were not ethnically Chinese and lay outside the the
Chinese cultural sphere; finally the Outer Asian Zone,
consisting of the barabarian peoples of South and
Southeast Asia, and, in later times, the Japanese.
The weakness of this structure was that its
concentrism did not operate equally in all directions. In
particular, Inner Asia remained for long periods outwith
Chinese cultural or political influence. Mark Mancal1
suggests this was primarily a consequence of economics:
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the reg ions to the east, sout heast and sout h of
China were sharply different from the northwestern
crescent. Like China they were dominated, or were
presumed to be dominated, by sedentary grain-growing
economies; they had adopted or were supposed to have
adopted Confucian principles for the organisation of
government ••• All the organised states in this
'southeastern crescent' that extended from Japan and
Korea through Southeast Asia to Burma shared with
China similarities in enviroment, grain-producing
techno logy, and intens ive 1and use and set t1ement ••
China proper, East Asia, and Southeast Asia appeared
to belong to one ecological system, and the only
region in East Asia that exhibited different
enviromenta1 characteristics was the northwestern
crescent of societies.15
The ability to regulate relations with these societies
was all the more import ant for the Ch inese because they
were highly conscious of the connection between external
and internal disorde r, Most Ch inese dynast ies had
collapsed because of the twin pressures of rebellion and
invasion, and fai lure to submit to the Chinese foreign
order was seen as a challenge to domestic stability.
Morris Rossabi argues that China's unique view of
international relations stems from its experience of
treating with the Inner Asian peoples.16 The fear of
attack from the steppe1ands of the North and west
preoccupied the early Chinese dynasties, the building of
the Great Wall being only the most enduring symbol of
this. Expeditions to subdue the periphery even by
powe rfu 1 dynast ies such as the Han and Tang fail ed: the
imperial cavalry was no match for that of the Mongols or
the Central Asian peoples and there were logistical
problems of supply from the Chinese core. Colonisation of
Mongolia, Manchuria and Central Asia proved fruitless in
the face of the problems of order, control from the
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centre and the difficulty in devloping agriculture as the
economic basis of the region.
It was in response to these difficulties that the
Chinese developed their methodology for dealing with
barbarian peoples. This included the use of gifts and
intermarriage, and the policy of 'using barbari ans to
fight barbarians', but the most common element, from the
time of the Han to the end of the Ming, was the tribute
system.
Under the tribute system those Inner Asian peoples
who wished to maintain relations with the Chinese court
were expected to adopt Chinese customs and use Chinese
diplomatic methods. In return for this the Emperor
conferred prestige on rulers and proferred aid in time of
trouble. In this way the tribute system allowed China to
conduct foreign relations on its own terms: gaining peace
in return for trade but limiting the contact between
Chinese and the external world at the same time.
According to Rossabi the official Chinese historians
c1aim- echoing the imperial systems disparagement of
commerce and assertions of Chinese se1f-sufficiency- that
the tribute system was exclusively concerned with defence
is over-stated.17 China required the import of certain
products and the tribute system, which was a prelude to
trade, can equa 11y be seen as a mechani sm for securi ng
economic, as well as strategic, advantage. At crucial
points, however, this system failed and China fell to
Inner Asian tribes- the Mongols from 1279-1368 and the
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Manchu in 1644. Such crises also demonstrate the strength
of the Sinocentric order, however, since the new
dynasties invariably found it worthwhile to adopt the
terminology and structure of China's traditional foreign
relations, just as they retained its social and state
order.
The Qing system of relations in Inner Asia was
part i cu 1ar 1y success fu 1 1ast i ng more than 200 years, all
the more so because the threat to the security of its
boundaries shifted from the disparate tribes of the
region to the expansion of a large and ambitious power-
Russia. While Russian and Chinese behaviour in Inner Asia
differed considerably- Russia favoured direct
colonisation and subordination to the centre while the
Qing sought not to overwhelm the region but control it
through their complex system of tribute and hierarchical
relations, there were also similarities. Both states held
themselves superior to the indigenous populations and
operated a bureaucratic system of control that was
equally open to corruption and incompetence. Both were
motivated by a mixture of defensive and economic aims and
sought to direct t he process of re 1at ions in ways that
benefitted the state, most notably by limiting the
abi lit y of merchant s to trade in ways t hat bypassed the
state. Moreover, both. sides had similar interests in
Inner Asia. Neither wished to see the nomadic peoples
disrupt the economic advantages of trade or a continuous
challenge to the frontiers they were trying to establish.
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Thus if spheres of influence in Inner Asia could be
established and the challenge of the indigenous
populations, particularly the Dzungars, contained, an
entente was possible. The reaching of this entente- the
Kiakhta system- demonstrates the flexibility of Qing
foreign relations since the early treaties accorded equal
st at us to t he Russ i ans and recogn i sed t he ex i st ence of
another power outwith the celestial empire. The gains
derived from the entente were considerable: with the
decline of Inner Asia and the divisions between its
indigenous peoples, the Qing were able to achieve what
previous dynasties had failed to do, subdueing and
colonising much of Inner Asia by 1760, most significantly
defeating the Dzungar Empire, to gain control of Tibet
and much of Central Asia.
The comb i nat i on of sout he rn expans i on and nort hern
defence described above had profound consequences for the
Chinese perspective on the world order. First and
foremost it deve loped an ext reme form of cont i nent ali srn
based exclusively on land-power and the evaluation of
threat based upon proximity to the centre. Thus as
Mancall suggests:
China's Inner Asian frontier markets and seacoast
ports were functionally equivalent, because both
were at the outer edge of imperial power. But
riverine China's failure to follow logically down
the rivers and early become a seagoing power and
thus secure better communication even with South
China than overland routes can be explained only by
an almost mesmerising continental orientation born
of constant danger from the nomads of Inner Asia.
The sea b0 re compar at i vel y 1 itt 1e dan gera nd
the refore was not equa 11 y an ob j ect of bu reauc rat i c
concern. Extraterritoriality developed on the coast
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at an early date, at least as early as the Arab
trade duri ng the Tang, but wi th mi nor except ions it
never really developed in Inner Asia. Dynastic
unconcern with the coast transformed it into a
frontier region under weak control in contrast to
the. ~t rong co,~t a1 cont ro1 among the West ern
mar,t,me powers.
This lack of regard for the sea meant that Chinese
expansion until modern times was overwhelmingly by land.
It was only with the penetration of the European powers
and the impact this had upon the cultures and economies
of Southeast Asia, that the Chinese population and
culture were transferred by sea to create the great
communities of the Nanyang. By the fifteenth century
China had seen an upsurge in technological and economic
progress that spilled over into maritime exploration.
Between 1402 and 1430 seven missions visited over 20
count ries from Kamchat ka to Zanz ibar but the rea fter the
Mi ng consc ious 1y sh ifted economi c concent rat ion back to
agrarianism and away from incipient industrialisation,
and, by corollary, back from the sea.
The reasons for this turn to an inward-looking,
self-stabilising society which saw sea trade banned were
both immediate and more longterm. The immediate ones were
the wish to deprive the pirates who had grown up with the
coastal trade their source of supply and to contain the
power of the Court eunuchs, who were responsible for the
organisation of overseas journeys. In terms of security,
the early Ming voyages confirmed that there was little
military threat from the sea at the time when that from
Inner Asia was rising once more, threatening the new
northern-based and northern-orientated dynasty.
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The long-term impulses for rejecting the maritime
development that would have brought China into closer
contact with the rest of Asia were ideological and
economic. The Confucian world view saw little merit in
cont act wi t h the barbarian societies outside the
celestial Empire and viewed trade as "an evil to be
tolerated rather than an activity to be encouraged" .19
Such views were part of a broader ideological structure
whi ch sust a i ned the economi c re 1at ions of Ch i nese
society. These functioned on the delicate balance between
regional agrarian elites and bureaucratic central rule, a
structure which did not allow for the emergence of
independant power bases which might challenge
economically or politically the existing relations. The
only threats to this stability lay in external challenges
or an internal imbalance in the growth of population and
t he means of sust enance. The Ch i nese sys t em was in the
main able to put off the latter by the growth of state-
sust a i ned rice cu 1t i vat ion sout hward and of g ra in
production in the north- internal expansion and
colonisation by demographic pressure took the place of
imperial conquest. Thus,
the empire survived and its absolute area and
absolute population continued to grow. Internal
tens ions that mi ght have f ract u red the loose 1y kn it
reality of a tightly worded centralism were avoided,
until the Taiping rebellion of the mid-nineteenth
century •• which has been called BrObably the
greatest Malthusian crisis in history.2
What the Chinese order was not prepared to withstand was
an external challenge from the sea. The naval forces
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which the European powers employed against the Qing gave
them an advantage they could never have achieved by
ground forces alone. Even aft er the experi ence of the
first Opium war the Qing did not recognise the importance
of naval power and cont i nued to vi ew cont ro 1 of t he sea
as being far inferior to control of the land. The belated
recognition of its importance came too late for China to
deve lop a navy capable of oppos i ns . e it he r t he European
powers, as in the Franco-Chinese war of 1883-5, or indeed
the Japanese in the Sino-Japanese war of 1895.
China's ability to withstand the assaults of the
Eu rope an powe rs was fu rt he r hampe red by he r cont i nu i ng
attempt to retain control of Inner Asia. Qing domination
of Xi n j i ang and West e rn Mongo 1i a- Kha 1ka- requ ired
enormous admi n i st rat i ve and mi 1 it ary ext ens i on and the
aims of isolating these regions from the expansionist
Russians to the north and from the Chinese core, at the
same time as exploiting them to provide the means to
sustain the expanded empire proved increasingly difficult
to sustain. Opposition to Qing rule grew from the early
19th century on, due to the excessive exploitation of the
territories by Chinese merchants and a decline in the
st andard of i mper i a 1
held to a policy of
administration, but the Qing still
retaining Sinkiang as a essential
defensive barrier- it
protected the core.
protected Mongol ia which in turn
The advisability of expending
enormous effort and resources to sustain imperial control
of the periphery- such as those involved in regaining the
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Western provinces in the 1870's following the rebellion
among the Muslim peoples and the encroachment of Russia,
at a time of internal rebellion- most obviously the
Ta ipings- and fore isn intervent ion, has been quest ioned
by historians.
John King Fairbank suggests that prior to the 1880's
the Qing were under little pressure to make radical
changes in their traditional thinking.21 In hindsight the
first op ium War may appear to be the wat ershed between
the old imperial order and modernisation, nationalism and
revolution but for the Chinese of the time, coming as it
did after a tradition of 2,000 years, the penetration of
the West seemed to advance only gradually up to the
1880's.
Yet this fails to explain why China held to her
traditional foreign relations, thereafter, despite its
marked failure to limit the assaults of the Europeans and
the Japanese. In particular the attempt to 'use
barbar ians to regul ate barbar ians' by mak ing concess ions
to the one power that might oppose complete dismemberment
of the country- Russia- failed. In 1860 under the Treaty
of Peking and again in 1894 following the defeat by
Japan, China made territorial and economic concessions to
Russia which only served to encourage the ambition of the
other powers. The maritime powers forced acceptance of
the Treaty system along the Chinese coast and excluded
<,
China from Southeast Asia, a process confirmed by French
victory in the Sino-French war of 1884-85. Japan
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reassert ed its cl a i m tot he Ryukyus and ext ended it s
in f 1uence in Korea from 1860 onward. Ch i nese defeat at
t he hands of Japan in 1894 1ed to Japanese cont ro 1 of
Korea and of Taiwan shortly thereafter. The increasing
Russian economic penetration and military influence in
the north-east, particularly in the wake of the Boxer
rebellion, precipitated the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05
and the division of north-east into spheres of control
between the two states. In Mongolia, China was unable to
sustain the isolation that was so favourable to the court
or prevent the exploitation of the local population by
Chinese merchants, and Russian influence increased, again
most notably after the defeat by Japan. By 1911 Russian
penetration and native hostility to the Qing had reached
a level where Mongol independence could be achieved for
the first time since 1691. This along with the tension
in Sinkiang, the Russo-Japanese consortium in Manchuria,
Japanese control of Korea and Taiwan, French dominance of
Indo-China and de facto British control of Tibet after
1903, meant t hat Ch ina had re 1i nqu i shed cont ro 1 of most
of her periphery prior to the fall of the Qing. After the
fall of the dynasty this dissolution did not halt but
rather accelerated as control of the core of China was
contested by different warring parties, indigenous and
foreign. Despite the World War which distracted and
weakened the Western powers, China was unable to reassert
control on the periphery or check Japanese ambitions.
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The historical experience of China thus bequeathed a
varied tradition to the 20th century governments of the
country. On the Confucian tradition of hierarchy and
stability within East Asia, the demise of the imperial
syst em imposed a conf 1 i ct or y i nt ernat i ona 1 order based
upon equality of sovereign states competing on the basis
of unequa 1 economi c and m; 1it ary powe r. The resu lt was a
a prolonged and painful readjustment of ideological
values with the new reality. China's consciousness of her
cultural superiority to the younger civilisations of
Europe, America and Japan persisted and as far as she was
prepared to accept the existence of equal sovereign
st at es, it was these newl y deve loped powe rs rat he r than
the societies of Asia, other than Japan. The impact of
the west was to make China's relationship with them and
their culture the paramount political issue rather than
China's relationship with the rest of Asia.
That said foreign intervention had a number of 10ng-
term consequences for China's Asian relations. It played
a part in triggering a last surge of demographic
expans i on ism into East As i a and hencefort h Ch i nese
governments would have a living, practical link with
other Asian countries along with cultural and historical
associations, a connection that Asian states with
sizeable Chinese populations have not always welcomed.
The encroachment on the Sinic zone by the imperialist
powers heightened the age-old concerns with the security
of the boundaries of the state which were defined at the
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maximum extent of Qing control- while demographic
colonisation may have accounted for the inclusion of
Inner Mongolia and Manchuria into a modern Chinese state,
bot h Nat iona 1ist and Commun ist gove rnment s have assumed
Han control of the western and southern peripheries where
the Central Asian and Tibetan peoples remained the
majority.
The methods used to sustain the integrity of this
state varied as they had in the past. Despite the
emphas is that historiography has placed upon the
Confucian-based tribute system, Chinese foreign relations
were considerably more pragmatic than has been assumed.
The Qing accord with Russia in Inner Asia and the
willingness to trade (under certain controls) were but
examp1es 0f Chi nese f1ex ibi1ityin ext ern a1 re1at ion s •
Thus in the 20th century political co-optation and
economic ties continued to be used while the resort to
mi 1itary force was neve r neg 1ect ed if this seemed the
most effective course. Chinese willingness to project its
authority beyond its borders has led some commentators to
draw parallels between contemporary policy and the
Sinocentric imperial order:
This policy towards the periphery, imperial in its
genesis, is also clearly imperial in its fundamental
impulse toward exercising control over neighbouring
peoples consonant with available Chinese power. Like
all imperial policies, it thus has had its risks as
well as its reasons. It has bred resentment and
revolt, opened opportunities for meddling by outside
powers, and even led to serious international
confrontations. The clash of arms with the United
States in Korea, ma intenance of an occupat ion army
in Tibet and Xinjiang, the border war with India,
and the headache of a Soviet-aligned Vietnam must be
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count ed as but some of the cost 1y by-product s of
contemporary China's inherited strategic po1icy.22
A further area where the Confucian order seems to have
had a decisive effect upon Chinese foreign relations is
in regard to the development of maritime power. Expansion
into the sea might have established China as the
paramount Asian power in terms of the economic and
mi 1itary capability she needed to wi thst and the
depredations of the Europeans and, perhaps more
importantly, ma intain her traditional ascendancy over
Japan, but desp ite such cons ide rat ions unt i1 the recent
past China has remained overwhelmingly a land power. That
dependence on secu rityin geog raph ic size and popu 1at ion
numbers is now being abandoned in favour of force
pro j ect ion, inc 1ud ing nava 1 powe r, must be account ed a
break with a very lengthy tradition, occasioned by
significant changes in risk perception.
As suggested above, howeve r, the cent ra1 issue in
the modernisation debate was how far China should cleave
to a recognisably Sinic tradition and how far she should
be influenced by external ideas and culture, most
obviously those of the west. This was not an unknown
issue, there being a long intellectual tradition in China
of interest in the external world. Although in imperial
times this had been invariably suppressed in favour of
Confucian orthodoxy, it still existed in sufficient force
at the time of Western penetration to motivate
intellectuals such as Xu Jiyu and, at the turn of the
century, Liang Qichao. This group understood the Western
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concept i on of i nt e r-st at e re 1at ions and compared it to
other periods in China's own past,
States period (403-221 B.C.).
such as the Warring
In the political
independence and economi c st rengt h of ot her st at es they
saw the means by which China might overcome the Western
powers. What was difficult for such intellectuals was to
ascribe blame to groups within Chinese society for the
pre d i camen tin wh i chi t f 0un d its elf • Pol it i cal ch an ge
on 1y became i nevi t ab 1e wi t h the eme rgence of t hose who
were prepared to link foreign dominance with the existing
institutions- for Sun Vat-sen independence would be
achieved by creating a modern political and economic
orde r upon West ern 1 i nes. For t he Ch i nese Communi st s ,
however, the collaboration of sections of Chinese society
with the imperialists meant that the struggle for
independence was a 1so the st rugg 1e for a popul ar
revolution. It was left to Mao Zedong to synthesize
foreign ideas on the nature of imperialism and class
society with Chinese populist culture derived from
movement s such as t he Ta i pi ng and Boxe r rebe 11 ions, and
create a viable ideological structure to supplant the old
Confucian order.
iii) Comparative historical perspectives
Russian and Chinese historical perspectives on Asia
shared a number of common features which formed the basis
of a stable relationship between them until the
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penetration of the Western maritime states and Japan's
overtaking of China as the major indigenous power. Both
states sought to eliminate the threat to their security
in Inner Asia and at the same time valued the economic
benefits to be gained by trade through this region.
Moreover, the difference in their approach to controlling
Inner As ia narrowed as the Qing sought to incorporat e
Central Asia and Tibet within the Empire from the 18th
century onward- in essence they were both imperial
powers. Where they differed was in the place accorded to
Asian societies within their broader world view. That
both countries felt superior to other Asian peoples
should not disguise the fact that the roots of that
superiority were profoundly different. Chinese
Sinocentrism did not allow the existence of any other
states, indeed. their world-view can hardly be counted an
international perspective since it recognised no
political structures other than their own: there was only
order within the sphere of imperial authority, and chaos
beyond. The incorporation of Russia within the mainstream
of European intellectual thought from the 17th century on
meant that it accept ed the ideo logy of compet itive
nationalism on which the European states system was
founded. Russian uniqueness did not stem from its view of
the Asian states but from its unique position as a
Eurasian power. However, the assumption of a special
relationship with the east was to be broken by the
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penetration of the maritime states and the rise of modern
Japan.
In this respect, the Qing were probably right to
think that Russia was their best hope in offsetting the
assaults on the empi re by other powers- Russia was the
only other state that stood to lose from the division of
Asia into spheres of control since this would inhibit its
own economic expansion and create security threats on its
eastern frontier. Japan especially, after it had secured
itself from western penetration, stood to benefit from
the dismemberment of the Sinocentric East Asian order.
Unfortunately for the Qing, the Russians saw in their
participation in the spread of modern imperialism to the
east t he means by whi ch they mi ght make up t he gap in
economic and social development that had opened between
themselves and the other European powers, and which
threat ened to open between t hemse 1ves and Japan. They
were mistaken in this. The east did not present Russia
wi t h 'a way out' as Dostoyevsky had hoped and t he same
pressures arising from uneven development which ended the
Qing dynasty in 1911 brought down the Russian imperial
order six years later. Thereafter, it was the Bolshevik
revolution which was to be presented as the basis of a
new special relationship with Asia- not with the states
or rulers but with those who sought in the culture of the
west the means by which the west itself could be
resisted.
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III Comparative Ideological Perspectives on Asia
i) The Soviet Union
The Soviet ideological attitude to Asia was
developed within wider arguments about the non-capitalist
world derived from Marx and Lenin. Marx's view of
undeveloped societies had to be frequently re-interpreted
by Soviet ideologists since his theory of progressive
social and economic development led him to denigrate
lower levels of development and support the impact of
capitalism and imperialism as developmental forces. Thus
in his essay on 'the Consequences of British Rule in
India', Marx commented:
English interference having placed the spinner in
Lancashi re and the weaver in Bengal, or sweeping
away both Hindu spinner and weaver, dissolved these
small semi-barbarian, semi-civilised communities, by
blowing up their economical basis, and thus produced
the greatest, and, to speak the truth, the only
social revolution ever heard of in Asia.1
Marx be 1i eved t hat human soci et i es passed through five
broad stages of social development- primitive-communal,
slaveholding, feudal, capitalist and communist- with each
emerging from the previous stage. Thus the societies
outside the capitalist world were at a lower level of
historical development. Similarly their class structures
were also less developed, though Marx did allow the
classes of the undeve loped wor 1d a prog ress i ve nat i ona 1
role if this led to the undermining of the colonial
powers.
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It was left to Lenin and Trotsky, by means of their
theory of uneven development, to rescue Marxism from this
Euro-centricism where it might have languished without
applicability to the Third World. Lenin held that
imperialism exported the social relations of capitalism
as well as capital itself. These relations could coexist
with those of earlier stages until they reached a level
of deve 1opment that wou 1d allow revo 1ut ionary change to
occur, thus avoiding a prolonged and dominant capitalist
stage. Lenin's primary concern was with the revolution to
come in Russia but this theory was clearly applicable to
the colonially dominated states, and when combined with a
commitment to national self-determination, provided a
potent ideological structure.
This dual element of social and national liberation
was to present persistent problems in policy terms,
however, since it became a matter of interpretation, and
not inf requent 1y exped iency on the part of the Sovi et
state, as to which revolution should be pursued: the
national democratic or the revolutionary socialist.2 This
was evident from the earliest days of international
communism. At the 2nd Congress of the Third International
in 1920 Lenin's Thesis on the anti-imperialist struggle,
which argued for the cooperation of socialists with
national revolutionary movements and the se1f-
determination of all nations, prevailed over another put
forward by the Indian Marxist N.M.Roy, which argued that
the effect of imperialism was to forge a bond between the
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nationalist bourgeoisie and the West, and that socialists
must therefore unite the peasantry and the proletariat to
fight imperialism. Such differences of interpretation
were to become a persistent source of friction within the
communist movement, including between the CPSU and the
CPC at the time of the Sino-Soviet schism.
A contributory factor was the belief of the CPSU
that its position within the communist movement gave it
the right to interpret and guide the political struggle
in the colonial world. This was particularly the case
under Stalin, when Soviet attitudes to change in the
developing world were increasingly subordinated to its
state relations with the cao t t a l t st powers. At the same
time as an ort hodoxy was imposed on Sovi et st udy, based
upon the universality of Marx's characterisation of the
f i ve s tag e s 0 f his tor y , po 1icy nee dsin c rea sin g 1Y
dictated ideological position. Thus the disastrous
failure in 1927 of the United Front policy in China
between the Guomindang and the CPC, with which Stalin had
been directly associated, led to the rejection of
collaboration with reformist parties at the 6th Comintern
Congress of 1928. Thereafter, however, the Comintern
returned to a policy of united front as the threat from
fascism in Europe increased: it was possible to call for
revolutionary front in China where the imperiaHst enemy
was also the Soviet enemy, Japan, but elsewhere the
imperialists were the very states with which the Soviet
Union was trying to form an alliance against Germany. The
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overwhelming need for collective security in Europe
outweighed considerations of the anti-imperialist
struggle in Asia and the rest of the colonial world,
reaching its logical culmination in the abolition of the
Comintern in 1943.
In the immediate postwar period, events in the
developing world were largely disregarded as being
outside the struggle with the West to establish spheres
of i nf 1uence. The Uni ted Front po 1icy cont i nued unt i 1
1947 when the deterioration of relations with the
capitalist powers prompted the outbreak of ultraleftism
under the Zhdanovshchina. The call to break with
bou rgeoi s nat i ona 1i st part i es and 1auch i nsu rrect i onary
campaigns could only lead to isolation and failure, but
had the merit of distracting attention from the Soviet
Union's primary aim of securing its immediate periphery.
One Communist Party in the developing world did,
however, stand on the brink of victory though it had
achieved this position largely by developing an
ideological and organisational structure derived from its
own revolutionary experience. The Soviet Union paid
little notice to events in post-war China until the
mi dd 1e of 1946 and even t hen because of t he changed
relationship between the 'Two Camps' rather than the
possibility of achieving Lenin's vision of revolution in
the East. In this regard the attempt to unify the Korean
peninsula under a Soviet client regime, in response to
the United State's success in reviving and re-integrating
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Japan into the capitalist economy, is more instructive as
to the aims and means of Stalin's Asian policy than the
caut i ous recognit i on and support accorded tot he Ch i nese
revolution.
The revolutionary theory developed by the Chinese-
the Chinese Way- differed from the Soviet position in two
ways: the Chinese insisted that armed struggle was the
only way to defeat the forces of imperialism; however,
because of the weakness of the proletariat in the
colonies it had to unite with whatever other forces were
prepared to challenge the imperialist powers, including
the national bourgeoisie. This not only contradicted the
current Soviet position as to the usefulness of united
fronts but proposed a revolutionary force- a peasant
army- which had played no part in official Soviet
history. The CPSU thus questioned the value of the
Chinese restructuring of Marxism to suit Asian
conditions, and continued to view its own experience as
universally applicable.
This said, of the three central tenets of the
Zhdanovshch i na- that t he successes of t he nat i ona 1
liberation movements were a result of the changed
correlation of forces between the Two Camps; condemnation
of reformism and nationalism in the developing world; and
the belief that the communist parties in the developing
world should aim directly at the creation of socialism-
only the first was to survive into the post-Stalin era.
The Soviet Union was to continue to claim that the
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socialist world played a vital role in the colonial
struggle by act ing as a restraining force upon
imperialism but the two other proposHions became
untenable as the Soviet Union sought good relations with
nationalist movements in the developing world and revised
the role of communist parties accordingly.
To an extent this was due to the development of the
fraternal relationship with the CPC. The post-Stalin
Soviet leadership was considerably more supportive and
approving of the Chinese revolution and, in view of the
close economic and political co-operation of this period,
it is not surprising that regional perspectives also drew
closer. Thus, the Soviet Union revised its view of the
ro1e for the nat iona 1 bou rgeoi sie in the wake of the
Sino-Indian elaboration of the five principles of the
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peaceful coexistence in 1954. This indicates the central
stimulus to the abandonment of the hostility towards
reformist parties: the emergence of the post-colonial
nationalist regimes in the Third World in the nineteen-
fifties.
The tilt of these count ries towards the West, as
exemplified by the creation of regional military pacts
such as SEATO and the Baghdad Pact and the suppression of
their indigenous communist parties, was inevitable given
the revolutionary activism of the Zhdanovshchina. The
success of the Chinese at Bandung only served to
dramatise the gap that had been allowed to develop
between Soviet theory and the international situation. At
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the 20th Party Congress significant revisions of the
Soviet position were announced by Khrushchev, notably the
recognition of an intermediate zone of nationalist
reg i mes whi ch we re prog ress i ve in that they challenged
the power of monopoly capitalism and the imperialist
states:
Unlike the situation in the pre-war period, the
great majority of the countries of Asia now take
their place on the world stage as sovereign states
t enac ious 1y def end i ng the i r right to an independent
fore i gn pol icy. •• I n order to c reat e an independent
nat i ona 1 economy and to raise the 1i vi ng st andards
of their peoples, these countries, though not part
of the world socialist system, can benefit by its
achievements.3
The national bourgeoisie was also recognised as being
capable of playing a progressive role within a united
front led by the proletariat. Thus by the mid-fifties the
Soviet Union had moved on the tactical level to a
position not dissimilar to that of the Chinese. It was on
the strategic level that differences were to remain and
deepen: the CPC support of t he all i ance wi t h the
bourgeoisie was based upon t he weakness of the
revolutionary classes in the developing world, but
changes in the strength of the socialist camp, and their
own success in building socialism in the fifties, led
them to conc 1ude that t he prospect s for revo 1ut i onary
armed struggle were increasing, at the same time as the
CPSU was establishing peaceful coexistence with the
imperialist states as the corner stone of its strategic
outloook.
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Schram and Carrere D'Encausse attribute the basis of
this strategic disagreement between the Soviet Union and
China to their "different historical, geographic and
cultural worlds":
For Moscow, imperialism would ultimately be defeated
primarily by the socialist camp. Despite the
victories of the national movements in the
underdeveloped countries, in the final analysis the
destinies of these countries continued to depend, in
the Soviet view, on changes in the world scene, and
above all on t he pro 1et ar i at of t he advanced
countries of the socialist camp, and on the
proletariat of Western Europe and North America.
Such a concept ion, it soon became clear, was not
acceptable to China either as a former viclim of
Western domination, or as a great Asian power.
Thus strategic divergence on the nature of change in the
developing world, and particularly in Asia where the two
st at es met, became a cent ra 1 issue in t he Si no-Sovi et
schism. Ideological constructs and strategic alignments
became impossible to separate.
With the end of Stalinst ideological orthodoxy and
the re-orientation of Soviet policy, Soviet theorists had
to come to terms with the diversity of the developing
world and the difficulty of transferring to it
ideological constructs developed from European society
and culutre. Marx's view of the five distinct stages of
human society was abandoned in favour of a multi-
structural (mnogouk7adnyi) view. Thus, in 1961, B.N.
Ponomarev could assert:
The class structures of society in the
underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin
America are ext raord i nari 1y complex, for t hey bear
the imprint of different epochs ••• Many of these
countries did not have a developed slave-owning
sys t em or a deve loped feudal syst em, 1et alone a
high degree of development of capitalist
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relationships.. As a result, socioeconomic
relationships that are different in their historical
significance and essence formed layer upon layer on
each other, 'coexisting' tOgeth~r for centuries and
only slowly subjected to change.
Linked to this recognition of the complexity of Third
World societies was a move away from simplistic economic
determinism in social relations and toward the importance
of cultural and historical factors. In an attempt to
explain such events as the overthrow of radical regimes
in Ghana and Mali or the rise of fundamentalist Islam,
increasing reliance was put on the persistance of
traditional culture and behaviour.
But the major difficulty for Soviet ideologists
given the neccessity of balancing strategic alignments
with ideological precepts was in the transferral of class
characterisations based upon developed European societies
to those of the developing world. In the abscence of a
class-conscious proletariat, political leadership of the
primarily peasant societies passed to the nationalist
bourgeoisie, who since the the time of Khrushchev's
opening to the Third World were viewed as a positive
force for change. But this class was an inconstant ally:
The policy of the national bourgeoisie is
contradictory. It participates in the struggle
against colonialism and tries to weaken the control
of fore i gn monopo 1i es ove r t he nat i ona 1 economy but
at t he same time it support s re 1at ions wi t h the
imperialist powers and makes possible the further
inflow of its capital •••• Exhorting the people to
cooperate in fulfilling the tasks of economic
deve 1opment, at t he same time it st rengt hens the
bu reaucrat i c apparat us, refuses to ext end democ racy
or to take measures to improve the condition of the
people.6
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Attempts to identify revolutionary potential in other
groups such as the 'revo 1ut i onary democrat s' who opposed
capitalism and
and economic
imperialism but whose class
role differed greatly from
composition
country to
country, and could include military regimes, fared little
bet t er, wit h count r i es such as Egypt and Somali a
returning to the capitalist path.
Apart from the instability of political alliances,
the developing world's capacity to make the transition to
socialism in economic conditions so different from those
envisaged by Marx raised the most doubts. A variety of
terms were employed to suggest the pol icy embarked upon
by radical Third World regimes- national democracy, non-
capitalist development, socialist-orientation- but the
view increasingly taken was that economic and social
transformation was a long-term aim and that these states
would remain dependent on the capitalist economic order
in the immediate future. This was all the more the case
given the inefficacy of aid from the socialist world in
breaking the cycle of underdevelopment. Soviet financial
aid, after a period of largesse in the Khrushchev era,
became more 1i mi t ed and direct ed towards spec if i c
targets, with financial returns as well as political
support for the Soviet Union a consideration. The Soviet
economy conspicuously failed to meet the needs of
emerging nations either as a successful model, or a
trading partner, except in the export of mi 1 t t ar y
hardware.
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The outcome was that the Soviet Union had adjusted
the balance between ideological characterisation and
strategic alignment to the point where the political
orientation of developing states determined the former
rather than ideology providing the criteria for Soviet
support:
The dominant school, throughout the 1970's and early
80's, endorsed eventually by Brezhnev and
subseQuently by Andropov and Gorbachev was the
pragmatic school. Offering a more real istic view of
the ideological nature of Third World movements (and
societies), this school eschewed the demand for
ideological purity. Thus, the dominant view might be
summed up by Ul'ianovskii's [Deputy Director of the
I nt ernat i ona 1 Department of the CPSU] comment that
Marxism-Leninism 'did not reject out of hand 'any
other ideological trends and social theories,.7
In Asian terms this implied Soviet willingness to enter
into both bi-lateral and multi-lateral relationships with
st at es of di f f erent soci a 1 syst ems provi ded t hey shared
common strategic goals.
While the Soviet Union continued to offer
considerable financial and military support to communist
regimes in Asia- Mongolia, North Korea, Vietnam, and
Laos- its relations with the non-a 1i gned assumed
increasing importance in the struggle to achieve its aim
of 'collective peace and security in Asia'. This attempt
to i nt roduce t he values and st ruct u res of the Eu rope an
post-war settlement to the conditions of Asia was
regarded wi t h suspi cion by most As ian st at es regard 1ess
of whether they shared Soviet concerns about the United
States or China. Thus India with which the Soviet Union
enjoyed its most successful non-communist bi-latera1
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relations due to India's championship of non-alignment,
their economic complementarity, and shared strategic
concerns about Sino-Pakistani alignment, was never more
than lukewarm about collective security. This stemmed
from doubts about allowing extra-territorial powers to
adjudicate between Asian states- and set limits upon
their military strengths. Thus, in this regard as in its
revolutionary aspirations, the Soviet Union's conception
fell short of the Asian reality,
The broad movement for the consol i dat i on of peace
and security in Asia by collective effort unites
millions of people belonging to diverse political
parties and organisations and professing different
political views and religions.8
Ironically, it was the Soviet Union itself which was to
finally undermine the search for multi-lateral security
in the region. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, coming
as it did in the wake of Vietnam's intervention in
Kampuchea and the Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979, ended any
prospect of a breakthrough for Soviet regional aims.
There were regional causes for the invasion- the possible
defeat of a client government; regional instability
following the fall of Shah of Iran and the overthrow of
the Z.A Bhutto in Pakistan; the threat of the spread of
Islamic fundamentalism to the Soviet Central Asian
repub1ics- but ultimately the motive was defence of the
Soviet strategic position, as John Erickson suggested in
1981 :
To allow Afghanistan to slip from their grasp would
mean accepting total encirclement running from Japan
to Norway- the ri ng wou 1d snap shut. Rat he r than
embarking on a new expansionist process, the Soviet
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Union has 'drawn the line' over Afghanistan and in
terms of Asian politics the Chinese application of
force against Vietnam- another Soviet al~y- had to
be matched by a show of Soviet resolution.
In Asian terms the invasion of Afghanistan represented
the final abandonment of Soviet attempts to construct a
political basis for its external relations outside the
dependent communist states. It was in this sense both the
ultimate expression of the Brezhnevite policy of security
through military strength and the final abandonment of a
belief in the capacity of Soviet ideology to affect
change in Asia.
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t i ) China
As with the Soviet Union, China's thinking on Asia
has for much of its post-revolutionary period been tied
to ideological interpretations of the position of the
developing world as a whole. Differences with the Soviet
view arose from China's consciousness of colonial
domination and her low 1evel of economic and
technological development which led her to identify with
the developing world. This has been mixed, however, with
a countervailing belief in her own position as a great
As ian powe r and a revo 1ut ionary state wh ich encou raged
China to regard herself as the equal of the major powers.
China's shifting view of her position in the world has
reflected this gap between developmental reality and
political aspiration. In the past, the gap was closed by
overcoming,
the handicap of weakness based on tangible
capabilities (population, military forces,
technological level, and so forth) by mobilising the
intangible capabilities (such as will, diplomacy,
strategy, political strength) so as to break out of
the box of bi-polarity.10 .
Ideology played an important role, therefore, not only
interpreting, but seeking to change, international
reality to meet the twin imperatives of independance and
development. For most of China's post-liberation history
the chief resonsibility for the elaboration of that
ideology lay with one man, Mao Zedong. However, the
factionalism which dominated China's politics and the
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changing international environment resulted in near-
constant shifts in ideological interpretation.
Acc0rdin g t0 Sam ue1 S . Kim, 11 the cent rali de a in
the thought of Mao Zedong is that of contradiction, which
is inherent in life, society and the world.
Contradictions differ, however, in nature and category,
particularly between non-antagonistic and antagonistic,
and also contain dualistic elements. Thus within each
contradiction there are co-operative (interdependent) and
conflictive elements; universal and particular elements;
and principal and secondary elements. The relative status
of these elements are ever-changing and the key to
understanding them lies through experience in the process
of st rugg1 e and the refore pract ice must cont inua 11y be
re-interpreted to match shifts in the environment. This
can be held to explain many of the major changes in
Chinese foreign policy. The major shift of the post-war
period- the split with Moscow and alignment with the US-
arose due changes in the nature of the contradiction with
the Soviet Union from non-antagonistic- temporary and
conditional- to antagonistic- absolute and permanent- due
to perceived changes in the nature and behaviour of the
Soviet Union itself. This then became the prinicipal
contradiction of the contemporary world rather than the
secondary one with the capitalist states.
This belief in the dialectical




contribution that Mao made to the Chinese image of the
world order:
Mao made a fundamental break from the traditional
Chinese world order by substituting the value of
st rugg 1e for the Confuc i an value of harmony. Indeed
for him struggle was sine qua non, because without
it no contradiction could be resolved. Struggle is
not on 1y des i rab 1e because it acce 1e rat es prog ress
(social change), but also inevitable because the
world, in the vision of Mao, is characterised by
d i sequ i 1i b r i um- that is, uneven deve 1opment and
distribution of contradiction.12
The prevalence of contradiction and the inevitability of
change in the ; nt e rnat i ona 1 envi roment was t he bas is of
Mao's essential optimism about China's prospects since
even though it was weak, its enemies were divided and
change in the international order would be in its favour.
However, Mao's interpretation encouraged a Manichaean
view of the world, dominated by the major powers with
little attention paid to the lesser states and no place
for the non-aligned. This did not sit easily with the
CPC's claims for the applicability of the 'Chinese way'
to the rest of the developing world.
There was to remain a fundamental contradiction in
the CPC's claim that they had 'Sinicised' Marxism and yet
at the same time the 'Chinese way' was also the route to
be taken by other countries in the developing world, as
Li Shaoqi suggested:
The way of taken by the Chinese people in defeating
imperialism and its lackeys and in founding the
People's Republic of China is the way that should be
taken by the peoples of many co 1on i a 1 and semi-
colonial countries in their fight for national
independance and people's demoCracy.13
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Th is as sumpt ion that the st at es of As i a and t he rest of
the developing world would follow the course of the
Chinese revolution was only partially met. With the
exception of the divided states of Korea and Vietnam, the
emerging post-colonial regimes were largely nationalist.
It was not unt i 1 t he emergence of these st at es t hat any
serious recognition was made of those lying between the
socialist and imperialist camps. This evolved through the
enunciation of the five principles of peaceful
coexistence in 1954, which del ineated the correct
relations between socialist and non-socialist states, and
China's success in the Bandung process the following
year.
Following on the favourable perception of the PRC
created by Zhou Enlai at Bandung, China had been able to
expand its influence in Asia and Africa. In 1956-57 Zhou
visited no less than eight Asian states promoting the
five principles of peaceful coexistence as the basis of
China's relations with her neighbours. By this means
China began to rebuild her position as an Asian power
which had been lost during the period of revolution and
war. However, domestic upheaval was to limit China's
ability to playa regional role. Perceiving a decisive
shift in favour of the soc t e l is t camp in the late
fifties, the Chinese became more assertive as to the
legitimacy of their form of revolutionary struggle. Under
the banner of the Great Leap Forward a 'theory of
permanent revolution' was advanced under which the masses
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would continue to transform society after the political
revolution, by technical and cultural revolutions. The
bas is of the GLF was that the masses of Ch ina, and by
implication the rest of the Third World, were at the
central point of revolutionary change. This became a key
element in the disagreement with the Soviet Union.
The Moscow conference of 1960 attempted to heal the
rifts in the world Communist movement but the compromise
statement that emerged could not disguise continuing
ideological differences, as well as those on
organisational and strategic questions. In organisational
terms the Ch inese we re unwi 11ing to accept a cont inued
uni-polar communist bloc based upon Moscow, and the
accept ance by the Sovi et Un ion of the Ch inese speci a1
role in the Asia, Africa and Latin America was not enough
to offset this. In strategic terms the failure of the
Soviet Union to uphold the principles of proletarian
internationalism by siding with China against India or to
actively support Chinese claims to Taiwan encouraged the
Chinese leadership to view the Soviet leadership as
revisionist. The escalation of the rift between Beijing
and Moscow cu 1mi nat ed in the famous exchange of 1etters
of 1963 and open express ion of the Ch inese be 1ief that
the Soviet Union stood opposed to the central process of
revolutionary change- that in the developing world:
The storm of the people's revolution in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America requires every political
force in the cont emporary wor 1d to take a stand •••
An important line of demarcation between Marxist-
Leninists and the modern revisionists is the
attit ude taken towards the issue, the sharpest of
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contemporary politics .••• In their words the leaders
of the CPSU do not dare as yet to discard completely
the slogans of support for the national liberation
movement, and at times, for t he sake of the i r own
interests, they even take certain measures which
create the appearance of support. But if we probe to
the essence and consider their views and policies as
a whole over a number of years, we see clearly that
their attitude towards the liberation struggles of
the oppressed nations of Asia, Africa and Latin
Ame ric a i sap ass i ve 0 r s cor n f u lor neg at i ve 0ne,
~~~onitahtitsm. ~~~y serve as apologists for neo-
As Si no-Sovi et relations deteriorated a period of
uncertainty began in the Chinese image of the world
order. A succession of elaborations were advanced in
which cross-cutting contradictions were suggested which
divided the socialist world, as well as the capitalist
one. In his speech to 10th Plenum of the Eighth Central
Committee in 1962 Mao said the three major forces of the
international system were imperialism, nationalism and
revisionism and that the principal contradiction was
between the peoples of the entire world and imperialism.
This somewhat imprecise categorisation was to gell into a
view of the world, as stated most notably in Renmin Ribao
in January 1964, in which two intermediate zones- Asia,
Africa and Latin America the first, Western Europe,
Canada and Aust r a 1as i a, the second- ex i st ed between the
two major powers.
The place of China in this structure was ill-
def i ned, however, and the 1ack of firm pe rspect i ve at
this period is exemplified by the prominence of a further
interpretation of the world order that stressed the
division between the revolutionary developing world and
the deve loped wor 1d. Th is was most forcefu 11 y expressed
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in Lin Biao's essay on 'People's War' in 1965 in which
the principal contradiction was identified as being that
between the countryside and the towns.15 The position
adopted in this essay represents the resurgence of Maoist
rad ica 1ism occas i oned in part by i nt ernat i ona 1 event s-
the failure of two Chinese clients- Nkrumah in Ghana and
the PKI in Indonesia and the escalation of US involvement
in Indochina. This combination of domestic factionalism
and international tension precipitated the plunge into
the Cultural Revolution.
By the time of the First Plenum of the 9th Party
Congress in Ap r t l 1969 a major re-interpretation of the
world structure had been achieved by the characterisation
of the Soviet Union as social-imperialist. The major
contradictions of the world were between the oppressed
nations and imperialism and social imperialism; between
the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the imperialist
and the revisionist countries; between the imperialist
and social-imperialist countries, and among the
imperialists; and between the socialist countries and the
imperialist and social imperialist countries.
This perspective highlights both China's growing
concern at the consequences of Soviet revisionism for the
world order and recognition of the emerging multi-
polarity in the system. The belief that the Soviet Union
presented the major threat to China and that a united
front would have to be created between states of
differing social systems to deter it, led to the last
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definHive interpretation of the Maoist era: that of the
Three Worlds. This retains the categorisation of the US
and the USSR as belonging to the same superpower group
but divides the intermediate zone along developmental
lines rather than form of social system. The socialist
zone no longer stands extant but forms part of either the
Second or Third Worlds. A major elaboration of this view
was present ed by Deng Xi aop ing wh i1e add ress ing the UN
General Assembly on April 10 1974:
As a result of the emergence of social-imperialism,
the socialist camp which for a time after World War
II is no longer in existence. Owing to the law of
the uneven development of capitalism, the Western
imperialist bloc, too, is disintegrating. Judging
from the changes in international relations, the
world today actually consists of three parts, or
three worlds, that are both interconnected and in
contradiction to one another. The United States and
the Soviet Union make up the First World. The
developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin
America and other regions make up the Third World.
~~~o~~v~~~f~~l~ountries between the two make up the
During the t rans t t icna l period following the death of
Mao, Hamrin perceives an initial attempt to sustain
Maoist radicalism without Mao, receding with the return
to power of Deng Xiaoping in 1977.17 Thus the reiteration
of the Three Worlds theory in November 1977 in a major
article entitled "Chairman Mao's Theory of the the
Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major
Contribution to Marxism-Leninism" was an attempt to marry
the ideology of Mao with the pragmatism of the new
leadership. Most notable in this exposition was the
position accorded to the Soviet Union:
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The conduct of the Soviet Union in international
affairs is quintessential imperialism and
hegemonism, without a trace of a socialist
proletarian spirit; nor is that all. Of the two
imperialist superpowers, the Soviet Union is the
more ferocious, the more reckless, the more
treacherous, and the most dangerous source of war.18
Ch i nese concerns about the st rengt hen i ng of the Sovi et
Union following on the United State's retreat from
Southeast Asia and the economic crises of the seventies,
led to a strategic convergence aimed at containing Moscow
not only with Washington but Tokyo as well. Thus while
China continued to view t t s e l f as having close ties to
the socialist world, particularly those states which had
evolved economic programmes and foreign policy positions
distinctive from the Soviet Union, it no longer regarded
the world as being divided along systemic lines.
Moreover, despite China's location of itself within the
Third World, the necessity of forming a united front
aga i nst t he USSR meant that the pos it i on of the maj or
powers continued to play the greatest part in its
perspective of the world order.
This was all the moret he cas e , g i ve nth esc ale 0 f
the developmental task that st ill confronted it and a
continuing commitment to the restructuring of the world
order in favour of the developing states, since China was
no more incl ined to accept that it was unequal in
political terms, as opposed to economic ones, than it had
been in the past. The countries of the Third World,
moreover, had some difficulty in recognising China as a




WUh the reform era and the confidence U brought,
China further re-adjusted Us foreign policy. The lean
its economic, pol U i cal and mi 1i t ar y
towards t he West was mod if i ed by a ret u rn to a neut ra 1
st ance between the superpowe rs. An inc reas i ng st ress on
the importance of peaceful solution to the world's
problems heralded a return of the five principles .of
peacefu 1 coex i st ence as t he cent re of Ch i nese forei gn
policy, under which correct relations were seen as
possible wUh any power irrespective of social system or
developmental level. The need for long-term cooperation
with the West to build China's economy led to the
1essen i ng of of t he need for ant i hegemony po 1i c i es and
Third World unity. A stable international enviroment was
held to take precedence over ideological concerns of the
past.
iii) Comparative ideological perspectives
Whne Lenin's advocacy of the national bourgeoisie
as the natural allies of the Communist movement in the
developing world was long adhered to by the Soviet Union
the basis of Soviet support changed radically over time.
From a class-based conception derived from Marxist
precepts on the role of the emerging bourgeoisie as a
revolutionary class, Soviet concerns, particularly after
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the appearance of the post-colonial regimes in the
ninteen-fifties, shifted to inter-state relations. The
nationalist regimes of the Third World were valued as
players in the international order and not as potential
members of the socialist camp. Increasing pessimism as to
the capacity of underdeveloped states to make the
transition to a Soviet-type system contributed to this.
What did not change bet ween the time of Len in and
t hat of Brezhnev was t hat pol it i ca 1 and economi c
developments in the Third World were seen primarily in
the context of the First. As the potential for
revolutionary change in the capitalist states diminished,
the importance of the colonial states similarly declined,
accounting for their virtual neglect during the Stalin
years. It was only with the emergence of the global,
post-war order that they resumed thei r importance and
then primarily within the context of bi-polarity. The
Soviet Union's willingness to subordinate change in the
developing world to the dictates of the bi-polar system
was a central cause of the Sino-Soviet conflict.
As suggest ed, differences between the 'Ch i nese way'
and Soviet policy did not derive solely from historical
experience and revolutionary practice but from the
cultural inheritance of the respective leaderships. In
particular Mao Zedong's synthesis of Marxist-Leninist
constructs of contradiction and uneven development with
traditional Chinese concepts to form an ideological
structure which was not only the vehicle for Chinese
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nationalism, but for radical change throughout Asia and
the Third World, was never going to sit easily with the
Russian belief in the primacy of their experience.
The most ; mport ant cht nese cu Itu ra 1 concept s that
Mao employed were the belief ; n the power of
consciousness to change reality and the inter-
relationship between internal and external political
order. Thus China's attempt to shape its internal reality
by force of wi 11- du ring t he Great Leap Forward and the
Cultural Revolution- was also an attempt to influence the
external order at a time of isolation from the Soviet
Union and US intervention in Southeast Asia.
China's attempt to place itself in the world shifted
between a systemic orientation- its relationship with the
socialist camp- and a developmental one- its relationship
with the Third World. But neither of these could prove
permanment given its division from the Soviet Union and
its self-conception as a major power. China's
concent rat i on upon the maj or powers since the t ; me of
imperial intervention has meant that its perception of
regional affai rs has been domi nat ed by st rat eg i c
concerns. This led one commentator to suggest as recently
as 1976 that "to a significant degree, China has been a
regional power without a regional policy ... 19 It was only
with the balancing of China's strategic relationship
under the reform leadership that it was able to bring its
perspectives on Asia into proper focus. This was
accompanied by a significant diminution in ideological
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elaboration as the five principles were enshrined as the
bas is of Ch inese re1at ions wit h any stat e regardl ess of
social system or developmental level.
Both the Soviet Union and China found their
ideological characterisation of Asia, and the rest of the
developing world, of limited practical value when set
aga inst the impe rat ives of nat iona 1 int erest. Bot h states
shaped their evaluation of the region on the basis of
strategic alignments, and ignored ideological precepts
where these clashed policy demands: thus China had
h0stil e 0r am big u0us re1at ion ship s wit h the 0the r As ian
Communist states and the Soviet Union sought friendly
relations with independent Asian states regardless of
their path of social development. By the end of the 80's
bot h 1eadersh ips had come to accept that forei gn
relations must be de-ideologised.
Such de-ideologisation did not imply the absence of
a va 1ue sys t em by wh ich po 1itica 1 and economi c change in
Asia was evaluated, however. Rather it indicated a
willingness of both states to seek to balance their
foreign policy needs with the Asian reality rather than
seeking to impose their perspectives on it as they had in
the past. How that balance is bei ng sought, and the new
perspect ives wh ieh suppo rt it, ;s the cent ra 1 sub j ect of
this paper.
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IV: Soviet and Russian Economic Relations with Asia
In discussing the foreign economic relations [FER]
of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation with the
countries of Asia the following structure will be
pursued:
I the nature of FER during the Soviet period, including
the structure of Soviet foreign trade with Asia;
II the role of Siberia and the Far East in the national
economy and FER;
III Soviet/ Russian perceptions of the economic future of
Asia: economic models, regional organisation and bi-
lateral relations.
I FER during the Soviet period
Evidently the nature of the USSR's foreign economic
relations [FER] is most closely bound up with the
economic model pursued for most of the 74 years of the
state's existence. From the time of the first FYP in
1928, that model had at its core two assumptions that
dictated the nature of FER- firstly, that it was possible
to build a self-sustaining socialist economy within the
Soviet Union, and secondly, that this economy was in its
most fundamental features incompatible with the
capitalist world economy beyond. This was sustainable
initially only because of the great size of the Soviet
Uni on and it slow deve 1opment all eve 1 but even when the
Soviet economy had reached a level of some maturity and
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the possibility of internationalisation of the economy
arose in the years after the second world war with the
emergence of the socialist camp, the belief that foreign
trade should be pursued only to fill those gaps that
cou 1d not be met
economy, and even
retained.
The primary limitation of the Soviet economic model
mi ght be said to be that ; twas const ruct ed around the
meet; ng of quant it at i ve out put target s, and thus
institutionalised an imbalance within the economy in
favour of production over consumption, or in sectoral
terms, of t he heavy i ndust ria 1 sector ove r t he consume r
and light industrial sectors. The lack of goods available
on the domestic market significantly curtailed the
effectiveness of offering productivity incentives to the
f rom wi t hi n
then with
the great autarkic state
great circumspection, was
labour force and encouraged the accumulation of savings.
Declining productivity in industry was matched by falling
agricultural output with potentially serious human and
political consequences. These problems of over-
concent rat i on on heavy i ndust ry, dec 1 in i ng product i vit y
and agricultural shortfall were apparent by the 1960's,
but any attempt to use the international economy as a
means of reso 1vi ng these was rest r i ct ed by the Sovi et
Union's exclusion from the major international economic
regimes and the incompatibility of the Soviet economic
system with the international economy. This
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incompatibility took two major forms: institutional and
financial. 1
The inst ituti 0nall imit iat ion was the dom ination 0f
one organisation- the Ministry of Foreign Trade- over 90%
of the country's trade. Relations between this Ministry
and the various industries were conducted by a series of
foreign trade organisations (FTO's). This created a
system in which enterprises, whet he r export ing or
importing, had little contact with the overseas partner
and this gave rise to numerous problems of supply,
qual it y control, as well as those arising from the vast
bureaucratic system. For exporters, even if their
products successfully met the needs of an overseas buyer,
the rewards were directed back to the central ministry
for re-distribution, fundamentally discouraging
production for export. Rather, export targets were set by
the state planning agency, Gosplan, but primarily to meet
the gaps in the economy, as Geron notes:
The most important plan was that for export, since
foreign-currency receipts depended on it. This,
howeve r, shou 1d not be taken as evi dence that the
Soviet economy was export-led. In fact it was the
country's import requirements which dictated the
amoun~ that had to be exported in a particular
year.
The other domestic limitation arose from the Soviet
pr icing sys t em whi ch necess it ated separat ion of domest ic
and foreign trade prices. When dealing on international
markets Soviet traders used the US dollar, rendering them
vulnerable to changes in its value, notably against the
currencies of the other major industrial countries. Trade
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in CMEAwas conducted in convertible roubles, but since
the value of the rouble was artificially fixed, this
amount ed to bart e r trade. Thus, any Sovi et good traded
had at least three prices: a dollar, or other hard
currency, price; a foreign-trade rouble price set by
Moscow; and a domest i c pr ice pa id tot he produce r of an
export good or the recipient of an imported good.
Because of the problems arising from this variable
pricing system it was always difficult to ascertain the
exact importance of foreign trade for the Soviet economy,
a problem greatly compounded by the whole question of the
reliability of Soviet statistical methods. What is not in
doubt is that whilst figures vary as to the ratio of
foreign trade to national income depending on source, all
indicate that trade became more important from the
1970's, as attempts were made to use the international
economy to alleviate the increasing problems of the
domest i c syst em. Thus, Tab 1e 1 shows that trade near 1y
halved as a proportion of NI in the 20 years after 1952
(10.97% down to 5.82%) but trebled its share in the ten
years thereafter, averaging around 18% for the first half
of the 1980's, before declining somewhat in the latter
half. The increase in trade turnover in absolute terms in
this period was similarly marked: ten-fold, from 11.29bn
roubles in 1970 to 113.4bn in 1990. This overall increase
was prompt ed, as has been suggest ed, by demand in the
Soviet economy, but was possible primarily because of
76
changes in the international economy which lay largely
outwith the control of the Soviet Union itself.
The reason for this lay not only in the Soviet
Union's exclusion from the international economic regimes
but the level of influence it exercised in world trade
as whole. Thus Table 2 shows that even during the period
of considerable growth in foreign trade in the 1980's,
the world's third largest industrial power accounted at
its highest point for less than 3% of world trade, and
contributed an average of only 2% of world exports. This
gave the Soviet Union a negligible base from which to
in f 1uence the i nt e rnat i ona 1 economy, and the inc rease in
the Soviet Union's trade and terms of trade (export
prices in relation to import prices) arose fortuitously
due to changes in world prices of fuel and energy
supplies which constituted around half of all Soviet
exports, (see Table 9 for composition of trade), and the
strong dollar this gave rise to. Equally, however, the
fall in energy prices and the weakening of the dollar as
a hard currency in the latter half of the 80's undermined
the Soviet Union's trading position and was the primary
cause of the deteriorating trade balance.
A supplementary cause was that the Soviet Union had
failed to use the' windfall from its improved trading
position to significantly restructure its economy in a
way that would have made its manufactures more
exportable, diminished its reliance on primary products
as exports, and closed the gap between its rates of
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growth and those of the world economy as a whole. This is
not to say the Soviet Union did not attempt to modernise
its industrial base: Table 9 shows that the primary
cat egory of import was indust ria 1 goods, since despit e
the gearing of much of the Soviet economy to heavy
industrial production, the low quality of Soviet
industrial equipment forced many enterprises to seek
foreign equipment. Rather it was the institutional and
financial barriers which prevented significant
restructuring.
As the Soviet Union used different accounting
systems and currencies for the three sectors of the
international economy shown in Table 7, it was not
possible to use surpluses from one sector to purchase
goods from another. Thus surplus from CMEA trade or with
the developing world could not be used to finance trade
with the western countries, and imports of foodstuffs or
machinery, from the United States or Japan, were
dependent on sales of gas and oil, particularly to
Western Europe.
Thus, even without the decline in hard currency
revenue in the second half of the 1980' s, the Sovi et
Union's trade structure was increasingly unviable being
based upon dependence on imported industrial products and
foodstuffs, financed primarily by extraction and export
of raw materials. FER inevitably became a central issue
in the Gorbachev reform agenda, ref 1ect ins the chang ing
pattern of politics in the six years of perestroika- from
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initial thinking that all the Soviet economy needed was
re-vitalising to the far reaching debates of the late
80's which called into question the viability of the
economic model that the Soviet Union had pursued since
the first FYP. The expectation of the wide role that FER
could play in the perestroika process is expressed by I.
Ivanov, Deputy Chairman of the State Foreign Economic
Commission, one of the new bodies created following the
abolition of the Ministry of Foreign Trade in 1988:
A component part of the reconst ruct i on of the
gove rnment of t he nat i ona 1 economy is the rad i ca 1
reform of the activity of the Soviet foreign
economic complex. Moreover the sub s t ant t a l increase
of its contribution to the economic and social
development of the country, follows at the same time
the course of reform of creating in the Soviet Union
an economy of an open type, developing interelation
and competition with the world. In the contemporary
interdependent world foreign economic relations also
appear as a way of conso 1 i dat i ng trust,
materialising new political thinking.3
The political and economic reality proved much more
intractable, however, as reform of FER became a paradigm
for the limitations of the perestroika process as whole.
The legislative overkill on FER in 1987/88, based on
substania1 de-centralisation through a shift to self-
account; ng, se 1f-management and se 1 f-f i nanc ; ng, had dual
negative effects. It removed the traditional source of
fore i gn exchange and the mechan ism of di st r i but i ng it-
the central ministry- without adequately providing a
substitute, and led to a balance of payments crisis as
t he new-found access to the i nt ernat i ona 1 economy was
used to purchase from abroad rather than sell. This
provided ammunition for the real oPPosition to the reform
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of FER whi ch was not economi c but po 1it i ca 1 and cent red
on how the Sovi et economy cou 1d be made compat i b 1e wi t h
the international economy without moving towards a market
economy and whether this would not entail loss of
economic sovereignty. A central plank of those seeking to
radically reform the Soviet Union's FER was that
i nt erdependence of count ri es, and of economi c secu r i t y
wi t h ot her forms of security, was an inevitable
consequence of current trends in the world economy. Thus
Konstantin Ovchinnikov of the Department of International
Economic Relations, MID could argue that:
We occasionally here talk about the need to
guarantee technological independence against the
capitalist countries. Is that right or possible
today when it is an axiom that no country is equal
to developing on its own all the costly and science-
intensive lines of scientific and technological
progress •.. The objectively existing interdependence
of international and national economic security as
well as its interests call for steps to develop and
ensu re the funct ion i ng of an i nt eract ion mechani sm
making interdependence control1able.4
Even more t han fears of loss of economi c independence,
conse rvat i ve oppos it i on to FER refo rm was based on the
correct assumption that the Soviet economy could not be
integrated into the internat iona1 economy without
significant marketisation 5. The political struggle over
market reform had the i nevi t ab 1e ef f ect of d i scou rag i ng
the level of inward investment and linkage to
internat iona1 economic regimes which mi ght have
alleviated the worsening crisis in the economy. Thus as
political and economic obstacles to radical reform of the
economy continued to mount, FER were embraced as a
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primary means by which these could be overcome. If
marketisation could not be achieved from within it would
come from outside, as Ivanov was to argue in 1990:
[FER] can turn the foreign market into a catalyst
for the formation of the domestic one, bringing in
such fundamental elements as cooperation, freeing of
prices, consumer orientation, and also business
experience. Finally, out of international practice
can be created borrowed analogs to those
entrepreneurial structures (goods and financial
exchanges, mortgage and commmercial credit, currency
markets, etc.) which are missing from the USSR, but
wh ich must be formed in the cou rse of marketreforms.6
While the demise of the Soviet Union was precipitated by
political pressures arising between the central
aut hor ities represent ing the Un ion and the const ituent
repub 1 ics, economi c forces, and the fail ure to make the
domestic economy compatible with the international
economy or to attract the 1eve 1 of inward investment
necessary to revitalise the economy significant among
these, played a critical role in generating those
po 1 it ica 1 pressures. Whi 1e the collapse of Soviet
commun isrn may have cast the balance of powe r dec isive 1y
towards those who favoured marketisation and
internationalisation of the economy, this only served to
expand the discussion as to what model of economic
development Russia, and the other successor states,
should follow and in which direction they should look for
economic partnerships. This was made more complex by the
end of the last vestiges of the ideology of the old
regime, leaving policy-makers searching for a va1ue-
system on which to found their thinking 7 An initial
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resu 1t has been t he adopt i on of a concept of nat i ona 1
interest, closely allied to a geopolitical analysis of
the country's position:
The g rowt h of general i nt erdependence in the
contemporary world does not lead to the exclusion of
geopolitical interests as the predominant influence
on the policies of this or any country. They are
significant, for contemporary Russia, in particular.
Setting about the formation of inter-state
relations, founded on objective reality, it must
work out geopolitical orientations, conforming to
its own scale, possibilities, and true interests.
This demand relates to all aspects of policy,
including the foreign economic one.S
Wider discussion of the implications of such a
geopolitical analysis will be given when considering the
political relations of the new Russia. What is most
significant for FER and the purpose of this paper is that
desp it e t he cons i derab 1e pole of at tract i on represent ed
by the European Community9, the alternative pole to the
East has not diminished with the end of the Soviet Union
but increased:
Taking into account the unfolding circumstances the
process of common European integration, clearly,
will not be quick or simple, especially for Russia.
It is impossible not to take into account that as a
result of the break-up of the USSR and CEMA, Russia
has moved further away from Europe, its route to the
sea to t he west and sout hare subst ani all y
narrower, and from western Europe it is now a
separat ed count ry, wi t h whi ch it must approach anew
the resolution of problems of transit, under
conditions which are significantly more onerous for
it, than in the recent past.
In such conditions the geopolitical interests
and position of Russia make it objectively essential
for it to devote greater attention to cooperation in
an easterly and south-easterly direction,
particularly with the near abroad and its Asiatic
nei ghbou rs. Bes ides the ve ry st ruct u re of Russ ian
exports and the location of its basic resources
indicate the benefit of such an orientation, the
better appreciation of the Eurasian disposition of
the country, its wide exit to the Pacific Ocean, and
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the role of its poteniallr; most rich and still least
settled eastern regions •• 0
The determination of the Eurasian state to build anew its
relations with the east is constrained, as was the
reforming policy of the Gorbachev regime in this
direction, by the inheritance of the past. For this
reason this paper will also consider first two key areas-
the nature of FER with Asia in the Soviet period and the
economi c deve 1opment of the Asiatic USSR- before
examining the prospects for change.
The structure of Soviet foreign trade with Asia.
A statistical analysis of Soviet trade with Asia, as
shown in Table 4, shows that trade turnover with Asia
grew steadily in the first half of the 80's, from just
under 13bn roubles in 1981 to 16.3bn in 1985, before
falling back sharply by 10.1% in 1986, in the wake of the
fall of the world oil price. After 1987, the upward trend
resumed, wi t h a sudden upsu rge towards t he end of the
decade reaching a peak of 19.3bn roubles in 1990. This
was at t he expense of the trade ba 1ance, howeve r , whi ch
registered a close to lbn rouble deficit in that year, as
imports were sucked into the ailing domestic economy.
This was in contrast to the main trend of the period in
which the Soviet Union showed a trade surplus in 7 out of
the 10 years under consideration.
The overa 11 g rowt h of As i a trade bet ween 1981 and
1990 was 36.7%, an average annual increase of 4.1%. This
was considerably faster than the Soviet Union's trade
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g rowt h as a who1e: 16.6%, 1.8% p. a., and whi 1e t he As ian
figures also show faster growth in imports than exports,
the disparity between the two figures is not so great:
38.9% imports, 32.1% exports in Asia; 27.5% imports, 4.5%
exports in world trade. Despite this faster growth in
Asia trade, however, the share of Asia trade in total
trade rema i ned remarkab 1y canst ant throughout t he decade
only increasing slightly towards the end of the period.
This is because Soviet Asian trade comprised a relatively
small proportion of total trade and thus its growth
impact took place upon a limited base. Soviet Asian trade
averaged 11.9% share of total trade over the ten years,
with Asian imports and exports taking an equal share of
total imports and exports. This represented a low
proportion given the size of the region involved and its
increasing economic importance. This view is only
heightened when we consider the distribution of Soviet
trade within Asia which shows that it was concentrated on
specific groups of countries and individual states.
The first thing that should be noted is the
important role of the Asian socialist states in Soviet
trade. The socialist states have been defined for this
exercise as being not only those with which the Soviet
Union had formal or long-standing economic agreements-
most notably Mongolia, Vietnam and the North Korea- but
also those to which it had some degree of political
affi1iation- most obviously Afghanistan, but also Laos,
Cambodia, and North Yemen. (China, while recognised as a
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socialist state by the USSR, held an anomalous position
and wi 11 be treat ed separat e l y , ) These st at es account ed
for over a quarter of Soviet Asian trade turnover in 1981
but their importance increased throughout the 80's,
achieving a peak of 38.8% in 1987 as Soviet trade in the
hard currency sector was affected by the collapse in the
world oil price. The total increase over the decade was
45.5%, an average of 5.1% p.a. Moreover, Soviet trade
with the socialist states was deeply imbalanced- in no
year did Soviet imports from these countries reach half
the level of Soviet exports to them. Imports did in fact
grow faster than exports over the decade, but the gap was
effectively unbridegeable. Thus the Soviet surplus
wid ened f rom 1. 3bn r 0ub 1e sin 1981 to ape a k 0 f 2. 8 bn i n
1988. In that year, as in the two previous years, more
than 50% of Soviet exports to Asia were going to this
group of states.
Moreover distribution of trade was not even within
this group. Three states- Mongolia, Vietnam and the DPRK
accounted for 19% of total Asian trade in 1981, and 30.7%
in the peak year for socialist state trade, 1988. Soviet
exports to these countries in that year comprised 44% of
total Asian exports, though following the over all
pattern, only 18.4% of imports. If one takes into account
that a further three states, India, China and Japan which
will be considered in detail below, accounted for a
further 45% of trade turnover in 1988, it is possible to
see that, at this point at least, only six states
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account ed for three-quart ers of the Sovi et As ian trade
turnover, while the remaining 24 accounted for the final
quarter.
The two largest blocs




Asia both of which
accounted for about a quarter of trade turnover in 1981.
Thereafter similarities between the two diminish. The
Middle East turnover declined from 3bn roubles in 1981 to
2.5bn in 1988 before registering an increase, due to 24%
and 18% p.a increases in imports, in the final two years.
The overall decline was around -1% p.a. on average,
accounted for by the halving of Soviet exports to the
region in real terms, which resulted in a fall from 32.4%
in 1981 to 11.9% in 1988 in terms of share of total Asian
exports. Even the effects of the fall in the price of oil
which severely curtailed the Soviet Union's ability to
import from the region- imports fell 71.6% in 1986 alone-
did not restore the balance of trade, and a healthy
sur p1us in the first years of the decade was convert ed
into a persistent deficit. While the Soviet Union's
direction of trade in the Middle East was more widely
spread than in general in Asia, three states contributed
more than others to this decline: comparing 1981 and
1990, Iran's share of Soviet Asian exports declined by
5.3%, Iraq's by 10.7%, and Syria's by 2.6%.
The role of South Asia in Soviet Asian trade differs
from the Middle East in two inter-related features:
firstly, it changed much less dramatically throughout the
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80's, and secondly, this was due to the predominance of
one state, India, as the Soviet Union's primary trading
partner in the region. Broadly the decade splits into two
five-year periods with trade turnover with South Asia
averaging 25.4% of the Asian total in the first half, and
falling to 20.5% in the second. Again the source of the
decline in turnover was a result of the oil price
collapse, which led the value of exports to decline by
40.5% in 1986, with a knock-on effect of 31% decline in
imports from the sub-continent in the following year.
While imports from the SUb-continent were to recover
their share of the Soviet Asian total, exports did not.
Export share to South Asia declined from 30.9% of total
Asian exports in 1984, to 18.3% in 1990. This overall
t rend of st agnat i ng trade wi t h i ncreas i ng pressu re upon
Soviet exports with the subcontinent as a whole, was
effectively a reflection of problems arising in the trade
relationship with India. India accounted for an average
16.7% p.a.share of total Asian trade over the decade and
thus close to three quarters of the average South Asian
total of 23%. The trend thus reflected India's declining
ability to match the Soviet Union's willingness to trade,
part 1y because of changes in demand for Sovi et goods,
partly because of problems arising from methods of
payment. That said the place of Soviet trade in Indian
foreign economic relations weakened rather than fell away
as it had in the Middle East.
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The ability to sell Soviet goods, combined with the
lack of political ties, also effectively restrained
Soviet trade with one of the key developing groups in
Asia- the ASEAN, which constituted an average of only 3.6
p.a. share of Soviet Asian trade turnover. While Soviet
exports actually grew at an average of 1.8% p.a. over the
period, such was the trading deficit- ASEAN contributed
an average 6% p.a. share of Asian imports while taking
only a 1.2% share of exports- that this made little
impact. Rather imports from this key economic region fell
in all but two years during the 1980's as the Soviet
Union struggled to find a degree of complementarity with
their high technology, low-resource expenditure
economies.
It remains to consider Soviet economic relations
with the two East Asian giants- Japan and China. Such is
the importance of these two powers that it is neccessary
to consider them both within the Asian and the world
context.
Japan was the Sovi et Uni on's most import ant As ian
trading partner throughout the period, contributing an
average 20.7% p.a. share of Asian trade turnover. That
said what is most remarkable about the figures is the
degree of inflexibility in real terms,- Soviet imports
had a high of 2.9bn roubles in 1982 and a low of 1.6bn in
1986 but at ot he r times st ayed remarkab 1y const ant at
around the 2.1- 2.2bn rouble level. This meant that in
terms of share as Soviet Asian trade grew, Japan's share
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of Soviet imports fell dramatically. If one accepts that
the 1982 figures are somewhat out of norm, even the
preceding 1981 figure would give a 60% decline in import
share by 1990. Similarly, Soviet exports to Japan grew
only steadily in real terms, enough to remain constant in
terms of share of Asian exports, in the seven years up to
1987, before accelerating in the last three years of the
decade. As a result of the export increase and the import
stagnation, the Soviet Union halved its trade deficit
with Japan from 1.4bn roubles in 1981 to 700m roubles in
1990, and reduced by three-quarters the gap between
Japan's share of Asian imports and exports in the same
period.
Explanations for the changes in Soviet-Japanese
trade must, of course, include the decl ine in the Soviet
Union's hard currency purchasing power and the declining
complementarity between the two economies. That said if
one examines the economic relations of the two countries
in world terms, other causes are identifiable. Table 6
which covers a longer period confirms the growth of
Soviet exports to Japan but at an average share of only
5.2% p.a. of Soviet world exports, hardly constitutes a
high degree of interdependence with the world's strongest
economy. From the Japanese side the isolation of the two
states is even more pronounced. While Japan's world trade
grew three-fold in the period under consideration to
US$314bn, its exports to the USSR stagnated, reducing
Soviet share of exports to an insignificant 0.7% in 1991.
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The US$2.1bn worth of goods Japan exported to the Soviet
Union in that year, placed the USSR below the level of
importance as a trading partner for Japan, of the United
Arab Emirates (US$2.15bn), Mexico (US$2.8bn), or
Switzerland (US$3bn). The conclusion that can be drawn is
that while the trade between the states was not
unimportant, particularly for the Soviet Union which
gained a degree of technology transfer from it, the
Soviet and Japanese economies, though adjacent, were
increasingly isolated from one another.
The Soviet Union's trade with China, conversely, was
one of the few areas of genuine growth in its Asian
foreign economic relations. The rate of growth between
1981 and 1990- a 17-fold increase in real terms and 11-
fold increase in China's share of Soviet trade turnover
in Asia- owes a considerable amount, of course, to the
end of the political isolation between the two states.
That said, its importance for the Soviet Union lay in two
features. Firstly, the trade was largely balanced and
while this was a feature of the barter system used for
Sino-Soviet trade in which goods of equal value in Swiss
francs we re exchanged, Ch ina's wi 11 i ngness to increase
its share of Soviet exports was in considerable contrast
to the Soviet Unions's foreign economic performance as a
whole. Thus Table 5 shows that, in marked contrast to its
Japanese relations, the Soviet Union was able to increase
and hold its share of China's world imports at a time
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when China's trading role internationally was greatly
expanding.
The second significant feature for the Soviet Union,
was the impact of China's growing importance as a trading
partner within Asia. China's share of Asian trade
turnover in 1990- 15.7%- placed it within 1% of India's
share and 2.6% behind Japan. Moreover its share of Soviet
export sal ready exceeded t hat of I nd i a by 2.1 % and was
within 0.6% of that of Japan. Clearly there were
particular positive influences on Sino-Soviet trade such
as its low starting point, or the desire to use trade as
a means to improving political relations, but these can
be balanced with negative inf1uences- the dislocation of
the Soviet, and subsequently CIS, economies, the proposed
transfer to hard currency trade in 1991. More importantly
they do not contradict the general conclusion that China
appeared to be on the t h resho 1d of becomi ng the maj or
Asian economic partner for the Soviet Union. Given that
Asia trade as a whole was growing relative to the Soviet
Union's total trade turnover, this also indicated that
the economic importance of China was growing
exponentially for the Soviet Union, making China a key
trading partner in world terms.
Overall, however, the Soviet Union was faced with a
dynamically growing regional economy to its south and
east with which its economic interaction was limited and
imbalanced. Moreover, even though Gorbachev was to
recognise the growing importance of the region in his
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key-not e speeches at Vl ad ivostok in 1986 and Krasnoyarsk
two years later, these are notable for the predominance
given at the official level to traditional Soviet
political and military concerns and only passing
recognition of the influence economic processes were
having on these.
Recognition of the significance of Asian economic
deve 1opment and i nt eg rat i on was g rowi ng, however, as was
the nature of the obstacles to the Soviet Union's
involvement in these processes. Thus Izvestiya
cor respondant St an is 1av Kond rashov at the time of
Gorbachev's Krasnoyarsk speech in September 1988:
Trade and economic ties create the strongest fabric
of cooperation, although they also are not of devoid
of conflicts and competition. We lag far behind in
t his respect - and what causes t his 1ag above all is
the absence of dynamism in the development of
Siberia and the Soviet Far East that is demanded by
the approach of the 21st century and the advance of
the Asian-Pacific region to a leading position in
international economic life.11
Given the repeated Soviet, and now Russian, assertion
that the country's economic profile in Asia cannot be
reformed without a transformation in the economic profile
of the Asiatic regions, it is necessary next to consider
the position of Siberia and. the Far East in the economy
of the country.
92
1. For general discussion of FER in the Soviet
see: L.Geron, Soviet Foreign Economic Policy
Perestroika, Pinter, London. 1990; Shmelev, Nand
V, The Turning Point, Tauris, London. 1990.
2. Geron, op.cit. p.2.
3. Ivanov, I. "Pe rest r o ika vneshneekonomi chesk i kh svyazey
v SSSR: pe rv iye Hogi osnoviye problemy". MEiMO,
October 1989, p.5.
4. "What are we t ak i ng i nt 0 the i nt ernat i ona 1 economy?",
International Affairs Roundtable. International Affairs,
June 1989. p. 146.
5. For discussion on the beneficial impact on the
domest i c economy of the i nt ernat i ona1 market see, for
example, Kireev, A. "Litsom k mirovomu khozyaystvu."
Kommunist, No.17. 1990; Spandaryan, V. and Shmelev, N•
....Otkrytaya Ekonomika" na slovakh i de t ye ;." Kommunist,
No.12. 1990.
6. Ivanov, I. "Vneshneekonomicheskiy kompleks v
us 1ovi yakh regyu 1 i remoy r i nochnoy ekonomki ..• MEiMO,
October 1990. p.16.
7. For discuss i on of Russ i a's forei gn economi c st rat egy
see, among many others: Portnoy, M.A. "Konturi
Vneshneekonomi cheskoy st rat eg i y Ross i i .., SShA, No.9.
1992.Spandar'yan, V. "Na puti k liberalizatsii
vneshneekonomi chesk i kh svyaz ey Ross i i ..• SShA. No.1 O.
1992.
8. Bykov, A. "Rossiya, SNG, Evraziya: Geopoliticheskiye
aspekti vneshneekonomicheskikh svyazey". Vneshnaya
Torgov7ia, November 1992. p.2.
9. For Eurocentric views of Russia's foreign economic
policy see, for example: Pichyugin, B. "Formirovaniye
vneshneekonomi cheskoy po1it i k i Ross i i ..• Vneshnaya
Torgovlia. No.3. 1992; Belayev, N; Chichkanov, V,
"Russia's Foreign Economic Strategy", International
Affairs, February 1992.
10. Bykov, op.cit. p.4.
11. Kondrashov, S. "The USSR and the Asia-Pacific





II The Role of Siberia and the Far East in FER
The Asiatic USSR comprised 74% of the landmass of
t he count ry, cons i st i ng of the Kazakh and cent ra 1 As ian
Republics (17.7% of the USSR) and the Asiatic part of the
RSFSR (56.5%), the latter divided into three main
administrative regions- West Siberia, East Siberia and
t he Far East (see map). These reg ions vary great 1yin
their climatic, natural, spatial, and human
characteristics, and from the European USSR to the west,
but Soviet planners, in theory, applied priniciples of
regional development aimed . at equalising economic
activity throughout the territory of the USSR. These
, 1aws of deve 1opment' are expressed in var i ous forms but
might in general be summarised in five points:
1 enterprises should be located as near as possible to
sources of raw materials and production;
2 economic activity should be distributed throughout the
who 1e count ry and the economi cleve 1 of the 1east
advanced regions raised to that of the highest;
3 the d i st i nct i on bet ween town and count ry shou 1d be
abolished;
4 there should rational distribution of labour between
regions and the 'complex development' of the economy
within each region;
5 the nat ional security of the state, and the
international division of labour within the socialist
countries, should be advanced.
How rigidly these principles should or could be
app 1i ed to the deve 1opment of Si beri a and t he Far East
remai ned a cont ent i ous issue for Sovi et p 1anne rs 1. The
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advantages of the region's natural wealth and its
strategic importance had to be balanced with the fact
that higher levels of capital and labour allocation were
required in order to achieve anything like comparable
levels of development with the European USSR. The outcome
was that the commitment to Siberian development varied
due to exogenous pol itical and economic pressures. Thus
strategic considerations such as the transfer of economic
product i on beyond the Urals du ring t he Second Wor 1d War
and the deve 1opment of i nf rast ruct u re due tot he
heightened militarisation of the Asian Cold War in the
seventies, played as significant a role in Siberian
development as economic principles.
unquest i onab 1y true t hat a key ro 1e in
development was played by penal labour. 2






enormous resources expended in the creat ion of
Territorial Production Complexes (TPC's) under the
principle of complex development, the development of the
West Siberia oil and gas fields, and the commitment to
strengthening access to the Pacific in the BAM project.
Even given t he harsh cond it ions it mi ght be argued that
the major limitation to the operation of these grand
projects lay not in Siberia but in the faltering command
economy in the European heartland. The inevitable
pressure on resources meant that central ministries were
loath to commit funds to new and expensive Siberian
projects while the core industrial regions were so
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critically in need of funding. From this perspective some
commentators were inclined to see Gorbachev's concept of
regional self-sufficiency as yet another step in the
centre's declining commitment to equal ity of
development.3
While commitment to principles of regional equality
waned from the end of the seventies, the need for
Siberian resources, particularly oil and gas, continued
to grow. Assertaining the precise role of Siberia in FER
is difficult since Soviet statistics do not indicate
contribution to foreign trade on a regional basis, quite
possibly for political reasons. Thus contribution to
exports has to be assumed to be the same as contribution
to national production and receipt of consumer imports as
equivalent to population distribution.
Bradshaw concludes from an examination of the
commodity structure of Soviet exports and the geography
of resource industries in the Soviet Union that Siberia
and the Far East were key regions for export production4•
While six major product groups are identified- cork and
wood, coal, diamonds, non-ferrous metals, oil,and gas- it
is clearly the last two whi ch account for the
dramatically increased contribution of Siberia,
particularly Western Siberia, to exports. Thus Granberg
and Rubenstein conclude that:
The decisive significance of the region lies in the
production of oil-energy and natural resources.
Close to 60% of all the country's oil is extracted
here. The region supplies not only the growing
demand for oi 1 in the USSR but al so compensates for
the declining extraction in all other localities •••
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Siberia possesses considerable export potential
in oil and gas, petro-chemical products, timber,
coal production, and precious metals. On the world
market separat e types of i ndust ri a 1 goods produced
in t he reg i on recommend t hemse 1ves. Bes ides
immediate export-import operations, Siberian
enterprises through a system of internal intra-
regional relations playa broad role in integrated
products, which are exported from other regions of
the country.5
Granbe rg and Rubenst e ina 1so poi nt out t hat est i mat i ng
contribution to export from domestic production alone is
flawed because of the price differentials:
It is possible to measure exports of Siberia by
domestic wholesale prices or foreign trade prices,
in different values. Depending on which of these is
used provides markedly differing evaluations. Thus
the share of direct exports of Siberia in foreign
trade prices is more than two times greater than the
corresponding indicators measured in domestic
wholesale prices. This makes clear that Siberia
exports products the prices of which are higher on
the world market than on the domestic.6
If Siberia's contribution to exports is calculated in
foreign trade prices the delivery of these resources from
Siberia provides a fifth of all currency receipts and
more than a third of hard currency. In the 80's more than
a third of the growth in the currency receipts of the
count ry was account ed for by t he export of oi l-energy
resources on the part of Siberia.
As regards distribution of imports, consumer goods
have to be assumed to follow population distribution.
According to the 1989 census 11.2% of the USSR's
population lived in Siberia and the Far East, with 66.1%
in the European regions; 17.2% in Kazakhstan and Central
Asia; and 5.5% in the Transcaucasus. While Siberia fared
somewhat better in distribution of technology imports
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these were aimed at the extractive industries rather than
at complex development projects.
Thus it is possible to establish that under the old
system, there was a long-term, and, given the centre's
growing reluctance to commit itself to Siberian
development, increasing transfer of resources and
earnings from Siberia to the European regions of the
country. Foreign currency earnings from Siberia and the
FE were used to meet the European USSR's import needs,
and in terms of economic development benefitted the
industrial base of the latter while increasing the
dependance of the Si be r i an and Far East economi es on
resource extraction.
This process also had a significant impact upon the
social and spatial development of the region. One of the
most marked features of Siberian economic growth in the
past 30 years has been the rapidly increasing
urbanisation. Thus Siberian population grew by 35%
overall but with a 18% increase in urban population
between 1959 and 1985 compared wi t h 19% and 66%
respect i ve inc rease fo r Eu ropean Russ i a on its own. 1
These changes ref 1ect the dual roles that the cit i es of
Siberia have developed:
On the one hand, they evolve as growth poles for
i nt eg rat ed reg i ona 1 deve 1opment. On the ot he r hand
they simply become company towns for resource
exploitation.8
The reform of the forei gn trade syst em of t he USSR did
little to change this reality. The transfer of the
majority of FTO's from the new Ministry of Foreign
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Economic Relations (MFER) to other ministries actually
involved in production took place only in the
manufacturing sector. The MFER in Moscow retained control
over energy and raw material products -the core of Soviet
currency-earning power- and the key sectors of the
Siberian and Far Eastern economies. Moreover, the
important right to foreign currency retention was allowed
in far greater measure to the producers of manufactures
than to those of primary products, exacerbating tensions
between the territorially based energy industry and the
central ministries. Even in the manufacturing sector,
however, there was little evidence of a significant shift
towards external markets. Granberg and Rubenstein's study
revealed that,
the majority of Siberian enterprises had still not
felt the impact of the new mechanism of governing
foreign economic activity and displayed significant
passivity in the development of international
economic activity. The 'getting closer' to the world
market was not happen ing. The ent erpri ses did not
feel a specifically different market, causing, in
particular, weakly orientated international economic
relations with the geographically more convenient
Asian market.9
Thus in 1987 only 28% of Siberian exports, excluding oil
and gas, went to Asia, with three countries- China
(26.3%),Mongolia (19.4%) and Japan (17.9%), taking more
than three-fifths of all Asian exports10 If this
direction of trade was to be altered and a greater
diversity of FER developed significant changes would have
to take place in the Siberian economy, most critically in
that region closest to the Pacific economies- the Far
East.
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The Far East [FE] constituted about 28% of the
territory of the former USSR but with a population of
only 7.9m was one of the least densely populated regions.
Moreover, harsh natural and climatic conditions mean that
population is far from evenly distributed, and the Amur
region and the Primorye which have the most favourable
conditions are the most populated and provide a third of
industrial production. This means that one of the most
serious obstacles to development is spatial:
Development of the vast territories of the region
can be actually referred to as "control of space".
One must const ant 1y cove r enormous d i st ances, first
to tie up the territory with low density of
population into one economic unit, and second, to
connect t he Far East wi t h ot her part s of t he USSR
and with foreign countries.11
The FE was thus heavi 1y dependent on the i nf rast ruct u re
linking it to the rest of the country, especially the
Baikal Amur Mainline (BAM) and the Arctic sea-route,
since t he road syst em ; sunde rdeve loped and oft en
inoperable, and air transport is impractical for large-
scale economic operation.
Beyond the development of this transport
infrastructure, the central economic problems lie, as
with Siberia, in shifting the regional economy away from
extractive industries towards advanced production
processes, with all this entails in terms of increased
energy supplies and higher capital costs.
Stolyarov estimates the Far East accounted for 2.9%
of the industrial production of the USSR, 1% of
agricultural output and 2.9% of National Income in 1988.
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However, the deep structural prob 1ems of economi c
development in the region meant that this share of
industrial production had been unchanged for 15 years and
rates of economic growth were lower than for comparable
un ion sect ors, as Gorbachev st ressed in his Vl ad ivost ok
speech:
The strategic course aimed at the acceleration of
social and economic development also requires the
implementation of a new regional policy. The Party
has assigned a prominent place in this policy to the
priority development of the eastern regions. In this
connection, we must look carefully at the prospects
for the Far East's economy. And this must be done
quickly, in view of the region's special
significance. It is also important to carry this out
wi thout de 1ay because the economy of the Far East
has started to develop more slowly than the national
economy as a whole. 12
To rectify this, a highly ambitious development plan- the
Long-Term State Programme for the Complex Development of
the Far East (LTSP), was proposed in 1987. This envisaged
the spending of 232 billion roubles to ensure 2.4 or 2.5-
fold increase in output of marketable produce by the year
2000. The key to the development was to be both an
inc rease in the out put of ext ract ive indust ries but also
the re-st ruct uri ng and modern isat ion of the process ing
sector in the region to boost exports.
Doubts regarding the realism of this plan were two-
fold- institutional, relating to the continued
predominance of the centre, and perhaps more importantly,
structural- relating to the economic model pursued by the
Far East Economic Region [FEER].
Despite the move to regional cost-effective
management, the cent re wou 1d remain the most import ant
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economic actor in the region, which meant there could be
no rad i ca 1 trans format; on of t he reg i ona 1 economy before
t he set t 1ement of the on-goi ns debat e on reform at the
national level:
t he reg i ona 1 cost -ef fect i ve management does not and
will not change anything in terms of production
re 1at ions, si nce at present t hey are domi nat ed by
state monopoly. This situation will persist until
the problem of property in our country has been
solved. We should legalise various kinds of
property, including private.13
The fail u re to move towards d if fe rent ownersh i p syst ems
that met the needs of the peri phery was deemed to be
symptomatic of a general failure to grant geniune
economic autonomy. This combined with the restriction of
resources- very little of the 232 billion roubles for the
LTSP was delivered- to increase the attraction of
external sources of investment and trade.
In terms of trade the FE's contribution to total
Soviet exports- 4.4%- was proportionately higher than its
cont r i but ion to nat i ona 1 product ion, suggest i ng t hat it
was already more externally orientated than other
regions. Of these exports over 80% went to Pacific
countries constituting about 20% of total USSR exports to
the region, 14 though this has to be set against the
overall low level of Soviet trade with Asia. What such
figures disguised, however, was,
the qualitative, structural discrepancy between the
economic, scientific and technological development
of the Soviet eastern regions and the principal
trends contributing to the APR system of division of
labour.15
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According to this analysis, the economic development
model of the Far East was in obvious contradiction to
that of the APR itself, a process which the Long Term
State Programme was not aimed at reversing. In calling
for the development of energy resources and capital-
intensive industries it would be inclined to make the
economy of the Far East less compatible with the
economies of East Asia with their emphasis on high-tech,
low-energy and low-material consumption industries:
The retention of the current organisational approach
to the realisation of the programme might only
strengthen the orientation of the leading branches
of the Far East on obtaining income from export of
resources ••• The division in export potential with
the neighbouring countries is significant not only
in quantitative terms, but also especially in
qualitative and organisational characteristics.16
Proposals for remodelling the economy of the FE in order
that it could meet its target of developmental
compatibility with the APR, had to resolve these dual
problems of institutional and structural reform.
While the Soviet Union still existed, some saw
inst itut ional reform as being based around the creat ion
of a dual system. Thus Aliev proposed full economic
autonomy of the Far East from the USSR and int eg rat ion
with the APR- 'the opposite of the current model '- and
the creation of a 'multi-structural economy' akin to the
role of Guangdong and Fujian in China where market
re 1at ions predomi nat e. Such de-cent ra 1 isat ion wou 1d not
imply secession, but rather the application of Deng
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Xiaoping's formula 'one country, two systems' to the
Soviet Union and the FE.17
Bak 1anov proposed anot her mode 1 of 1oca 1 economi c
autonomy, placing tasks of regional significance in the
hands of a FE Regional Association. This would be a
voluntary structure designed to establish links within
the the region, and to develop a common external
both within the Union and overseas. Tasks it
policy
would
pe rform inc 1uded deve 1opment of a gene ra1 st rategy, and
concent rat ion of resou rces, for the exploit at ion of the
region's wealth; coordination of a common policy on
pricing and the enviroment; and the creation of financial
institutions for the pooling of funds for specific
regional development projects. 18
In theory the fai lure of the August coup and the
triumph of the republican forces over the centre in 1991
should have made possible a new type of relationship
between centre and Siberia and the FE, with the centre of
gravity in shaping social, structural, and investment
policies shifted to regional and even local government
level.
While regional structures for both Siberia and the
FE have been created- the Siberian Agreement Association
and the Far Eastern Association for Economic Cooperation-
these exist to conduct the struggle against the centre as
much as to coordinate regional activities. Pavlenko
descr ibes the st rugg 1e between cent re and reg ions
underway in 1993:
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The August 1991 event s, though obvi ous 1y
facilitating Russia's transition to civilised
development, have not, as matter of fact, led to an
expansion of real democracy. The only effect to
speak of has been to redistribute the powers between
the various elite groups ••
The integrated position of the local elites
boils down to the following:
- the centre regularly devolves fewer rights than
responsibility to the regions;
- the centre discriminates against the 'Russian'
regions and areas by means of a totally unjustified
enlargement of the rights of the so-called
republics;
- the 1aws bei ng enact ed do not meet the i nt erest s
of Siberia but rather keep it in the position a raw
materials adjunct of central Russia;
- the economi c reform imp 1ement ed by t he cent ra 1
government is impairing the situation more precisely
in Siberia, causing a landslide fall in the living
standards of the region and faster production slump;
- the central government ignores the opinion of the
local elites of the Siberian districts and regions
and bars them from the process of meaningful
decision-making.19
Such tensions have inevitably raised the spectre of
separatism within the Russian Federation but for some
commentators, such as Muradyan and Vorontsov, these
processes of 'regionalisation' are natural to democratic
societies and a phenomenon arising from the weakening of
vertical links in domestic and international life and the
growth of hori zontal ones and as such were not
'synonymous with a disintegration and break-up of a
nation or a state,20. Political separatism was rather a
product of the crisis conditions within the country and
in Siberia and the FE, in particular. Such trends were
unproductive for two reasons: firstly, they exacerbated
rather than alleviated the crucial economic problems
faced by the region, as recognised in a report by MP's
from the FE cited by Muradyan and Vorontsov:
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Th is is the log ica lout come of what we have been
doing throughout the last few years. We have allowed
ourselves to be carried away with political battles,
striving for sovere ignty , dream ingab 0uta Far
Eastern Republic, building castles in the air, while
fOrgettin~ about the most important thing- theeconomy.2
Secondl y, separat ism ran counter to the trend of
,int ernat iona 1 reg iona 1ism' wh ich was apparent in East
Asia, as elsewhere. One of the outcomes of the increased
powe rs of the reg ions has been the deve 1opment of a new
project at regional level aimed at breaking down the
structural barriers between the Siberian and FE economies
and those of the APR by the beginning of the next
century:
On the initiative of the administration and business
quarters of Siberia and the RFE an idea is now being
elaborated of setting up a qualitatively new
cooperation mechanism for Russia's territories
beyond the Urals and the APR nations on the basis of
an international corporation, tentatively called
Integrator-21 Programme, for their joint
development. The implementation of such a programme
requires a flexible combination of state
participation, economic autonomy of the territories
and active foreign participation.22
What shou 1d not be assumed is that such inst itut iona 1
changes can radically alter the structure of the
economies of Siberia and the Far East in the short-term.
The problems of infrastructure, labour supply and energy
costs are just as real for foreign investors as they were
for the central ministries of the past; nor is it simply
a quest ion of open ing the economy for the investment to
flood in:
International economic ties in Asia and the Pacific,
apart from the developed and mutually complementing
economic structures of APR states, are characterised
by an increasingly bitter competition tor export
markets and spheres of capital investment.23
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The short-term implications of this for Siberia and the
FE are twofold. Firstly, those searching for export
market sin t he Russi an Federat i on are most 1 ike 1y to be
attracted to the European core, reversing the assumption
that Siberia and the Far East would be the natural locus
of attention of the Asia-Pacific economies:
As to Russian participation in the APR, officials
and scholars tend to pay particular attention to
Siberia and the Far East. They say this is the major
element in our relations with the Asia-Pacific
countries, and maybe the only element. I think that
Siberia will playa great role in the long-run
perspective but now we have no resources to develop
this area •.. On the other hand the integration of
the European part will play an +mpor t ant role in our
penetration into the Pacific area.24
Secondly, the Siberian and Far East economies will
initially continue to be regarded chiefly as sources of
below-world price primary materials, with foreign
enterprises engaging in traditional forms of resource
explotiation activities. Thus Izvestia revealed that only
0.5% of the produce of the 500 joint ventures created in
t he FE in 1992-93 was aimed at the domest i c market - the
timber and fish produce that constituted the overwhelming
bulk of these enterprises output were aimed at foreign
markets- particularly China and Japan.25
However, such factors do not point exclusively to
Asiatic Russia remaining a resource-centred hinterland.
Firstly, trade between European Russia and the APR
imp 1i es the deve 1opment of 1anes of commun i cat ion, and
thus Siberia's emergence as a land-bridge between the two
continents. Secondly, raw material exploitation cannot
remain the dominant form of economic activity, not only
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because 1oca 1 processi ng makes more economi c sense but
because of the const ra i nt s whi ch ex i st even upon the
abundance of Siberian resources, as revealed most clearly
by the current position of the energy sector:
For all the import ance of export i ng energy
resources, their exports should be minimised in each
given period, for our fuel industry is at a stage of
development where we must reduce the load put on it
to ensure effective energy supply over a longer
period in the future. The idea of making the fuel
and energy complex the main supplier of hard
~~rrency over the long term is therefore doubtful.
The economic future of Asiatic Russia is dependent on two
interlocking factors, therefore. The first is internal
and relates to the distribution of economic and political
responsibilities between the centre and the regions. The
weakness of the centre, currently, and for the
foreseeable future, is encouraging both greater autonomy
and the search for external sources of investment and
trade. This in turn is strengthening the impact of the
ext erna 1 factor- in part i cu 1ar the i nt eg rat i ve forces of
the APR beyond, raising the prospect of realising the
scenario outlined by Ivanov and Minakir in 1988:
In order to make the Far East a full-weight economic
partner of the leading Asian-Pacific countries, a
we 11 thought -out st rat egy is essent i a 1, aimed at a
guarded entry into the international division of
labour, determined both by sectoral and geographical
priorities, and using a wide set of methods and
forms of fore i gn economi c ties. The work i ng out of
such a st rat egy bot h to t he search for a mode 1 of
long-term specialisation of the Far Eastern region,
and t he use of coope rat i on wi t h forei sn count r i es
for the solution to problems of the f~7st order,
above all the social and infrastructura1.
This leads directly on to the nature of the economic
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III Soviet/ Russian perceptions of the economic future of
Asia.
There are perhaps three different aspects to
Soviet/Russian perceptions of economic change in Asia.
The first is consideration of the nature of the economic
processes unde rway in As i a- to what ext ent these are
distinctive to the region and how relevant an Asian
economic model, if such a thing exists, could be to the
reform of the domestic economy. Following from this,
because of the evi dent and essent i a 1 role t hat reg i ana 1
forces have played in the development of the individual
economies of Asia, is consideration of the operation of
transnational economic forces within Asia and the attempt
to promote multi-lateral institutions which will give
structure
different
and continuity to the economic
states. Related to this is the
interests of
impact that
Asian economic regionalism will have on the international
economy as a whole.
Lastly, given the low economic profile that Russia
has inherited from the Soviet Union in the region,
consideration can be given to the development of bi-
lateral economic relations which will be the primary form
of Russ ian economi c re 1at ions in t he reg i on unt i 1 such
time as it achieves a sufficient profile to warrant full
participation at the multi-lateral level.
These might be summarised as:
i: the relevance of the Asian economic model;
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ii: internat iona 1 causes and consequences of As; an
economic regionalism;
iii: prospects for the development of bi-lateral economic
relations in Asia.
i The Asian economic model.
The first consciousness within the Soviet Union that
there might exist an Asian economic model arose, of
course, with the emergence of Japan as a major economic
force in the sixt ies and sevent ies, but unde rstand ing of
the changes that were taking place in Asia were distorted
by the control of policy analysis under the old regime.
Traditionally, policy analysis of Asian affairs in the
Sovi et Uni on was count ry-based, even to the ext ent of
individual institutes being assigned countries. Thus
Japan was studied primarily by the Institute of Oriental
Studies, and China by the Institute of the Far East.
Critical roles were also played by high-ranking
ideologues from within the CPSU International Department.
Thus policy towards Japan and China was dominated,
respectively, by figures such as I. Kovalenko and M.
Kapitsa, who were repsonsible for elaborating policy
stances adopted at the highest level. It was only with
the Gorbachev era, that analysis was both diversified and
rationalised- more sources of analyses studying Asian
economi c and po 1itica 1 processes as an int eg rat ed
discipline. Charateristic of this development was the
creat ion of the Cent re for Japanese and Pac ifie Stud ies
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at the Institute of World Economy and International
Re 1at ions (IMEMO), in 1985, on the initiative of
Alexander Yakovlev, one of the primary architects of
Gorbachev's 'new political thinking'.
However, it was not simply the structure of policy
ana 1ys is in t he pre-Go rbachev years that 1 i mi t ed Sovi et
un de rst and i ng of As i a. Sovi et pe rcept ions of t he changes
taking place in Japan, and other Asian countries, were
constrained by a particular perspective of what
constituted a major power, as suggested by S.I Verbitsky
of IMEMO:
the rise of Japan as a major world power only with
difficulty established itself in the consciousness
of Soviet people. How do we explain this? Probably,
that our understanding of 'great power' has usually
been associated with states enjoying vast territory,
significant population, and, primarily, military
might. Hence the underestimation of the role of
economic and especially technological potential as
important factors of the 'strength' and 'authority'
of the state in our time. But thanks to the
formation of new political thinking, which made a
priority out of economic and social development
before all other long-term aims and problems of the
state, this state of affairs began to change.1
That this lack of attention to the pace and nature of
economic development in the east was reversed, both in
public information sources and the work of political
analysts, was also a response, therefore, to the crisis
of Soviet society. But the east was not the first choice
in the search for alternative social models:
1990 for soc i a 1 consci ousness mi ght be ca 11 ed the
year of the basic search for new models of social
development with increasing attention to the
experience of foreign countries. The fundamental
attention in this thinking up to the present time
has been paid to Western European social democratic
2models ••
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In this the desire for certain provisions of social
security combined with economic effectiveness was seen as
the principle cause influencing the Soviet thinking away
from acceptance of laissez-faire liberalism. But did
social democracy offer the sole, or best, example of this
combination?
Studyi ng the much higher economi c effect iveness of
the Japanese system in comparison with the social-
democrat ic mode 1, it mi ght wi th proper foundat ion be
considered to deserve attention as a starting point
for the discussion of the optimal combination of
strong social policies and high economic
effectiveness.3
The distinctive nature of the Japanese model for Zagorsky
centres around two features: firstly, the de-
personalisation of capital in which large corporations
rather than individual cap ital iststake investment
decisions; and secondly, the related question of the
wider distribution of social wealth. Zagorsky holds that
these two features mean that the Japanese economic model
does not fit traditional Marxist sociological models, in
which there is an ever greater concentration of private
wealth and ever wider class divisions, but rather
achieves ends- the removal of key economic decisions from
the hands of private individuals and the more equal
distribution of social wealth- which parallel those of
social-democracy without consciously aiming at it:
The Japanese model graphically shows that effective
resolution of the social problems of contemporary
society are possible in no way only within the
limits of the social-democratic model. Of course,
historically the social organisation of Japanese
soc iety was not formed wi thout the inf 1uence of the
social-democratic element, but above all its
formative leading role was played by the pattern of
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deve 1opment of cont emporary cap i tal ism, in essence
by the natural way of outgrowing the essential
limits of its own understanding of capitalist
exploitation. Along with this it is important to
note that to a greater or lesser degree such
tendencies are taking place in all western
countries. In this regard the Japanese example is of
interest not in the role of the exception to a
general rule, but as the most advanced model on this
path, as an example demonstrating the socially
positive potential of contemporary capitalism.4
The quest i on of how d i st i nct i ve t he Japanese expe r i ence
has been is clearly of great significance for Soviet and
Russian analysts. One of t he most enthustiastic
commentators on the Japanese model, Victor Spandaryan, is
aware of Japan's unique political and economic condition
at the end of the last war. Defeat gave significant
impetus to Japan's development by sweeping away the old
economic and political order and placing the economy in
hands of foreign planners in its initial years. The very
dependence of Japan on trade in energy and foodstuffs
necessitated a swift and efficient integration into the
international division of labour. Thi s meant that
industrial development had to aim at meeting internal
demand but a 1so reach i ng the highest st andards ; neve ry
aspect for the export market. But in order to benefit
from these potentialities Japan had to develop and
implement a flexible and long-term economic policy,
combining governmental regulation and planning with an
advanced technology-led market economy:
At the various stages of Japan's post-war
development these two components were combined in
different doses, but it is their combination in the
proportions required by the concrete development
period that made it possible to conduct an optimal
and effective economic policy both in remodelling
individual enterprises and in restructuring the
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economy along the lines most rational for the whole
country, ie. on both the microlevel and the
macro1eve1.5
For other commentators, however, the distinctiveness of
what has become an East Asian model as other states have
fo 11owed the Japanese pat tern of rap id technology-based
economic growth, lies not simply in the operation of
common economic strategies:
An analysis of the path the new industrialised
countries of Eastern Asia have traversed should not
boil down to a study of the economic development
st rat egy t hey have se 1ect ed. Of cou rse, the
experience of countries which have managed to
successfu 11y negot i at e the st age of st ruct u ra 1
changes and economi c moderni sat i on deserves
attention and study in and of itself. However, the
problem should be viewed more broadly. No matter how
successful the experience of a country or group of
countries, attempts to travel the paths others have
done are senseless. Therefore, in examining the
development specifics of the East Asian NIC's it is
much more important to call attention to another
point. For all the diversity of methods and paths of
resolving socio-economic problems the ruling regimes
have exhibited an understanding of what
cond it i ona 11y cou 1d be def i ned as a ' ph i l osophy of
development', ie. a realisation of the entirety of
society as an integrated organism developing
according to ceratin laws and not subservient to
wilful regulation, to dictat. 6
Thus Russia's economic model cannot be chosen on a purely
utilitarian basis, but must give due consideration to all
societal factors, including the contribution that
oriental culture and ethnic cohesion have made to the
economic success of the East Asian model:
It is useful to get acquainted with the South Korean
economic model or the Taiwanese model but we have to
come through all these st ages by ou rse 1ves so I do
not tend to overvalue the i r exper i ence- t hey have
different 'che1ovecheskii material' [human make-
up].7
This said there remains a unifying link between Russia
and one group of Asian economies- the Asian communist
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states. Given the degree to which these states,
particularly China, Vietnam and the DPRK, based their
economi es on t hat of the Sovi et Uni on and also recei ved
considerable transfers of goods and equipment, there
should be no surprise that they share common
charact er i st i cs. But the ve ry success of Ch ina, and to
some ext ent Vi et nam, has been ach i eved by the consc i ous
rejection of the validity of the Soviet model to their
circumstances in favour of integration into East Asian
economic processes, and it is by no means clear that the
same option is available to Russia. One of the sceptics
is Alexander Fedorovsky of IMEMO:
We have tried better to understand the situation in
China which has seen great success in economic
development. Some specialists in my country and
abroad stress that there are common features between
Russia and China- the role of the communist party
and the state- but I think that there are a great
deal of differences- labour supply, the organisation
of society, the geo-political position and even the
organisation of economics is different. If we
examine the reforms in China we see that they have
been ve ry success fu 1 in the ag rar ian sector but in
the industrial sector there are serious problems. if
we look at the sea-coast area we see great progress
in industry but this is a Pacific area and I don't
see the same opportunities to organise such areas in
my count r y , We must exami ne the experi ence [of the
APR] ver~ carefully but we can only select some
elements.S
Thus t here wi 11 be part i cu 1ar feat u res of t he reform
process in the Asian communist states that Russia will
want to try and emulate, but there can no more be a
successful full-scale replication than there was when
these states sought to learn from the Soviet experience.
Notable among these features will be the practice of
opening the country to the international economy, in
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particular the creation of special economic zones and the
formation of joint ventures; the problems of increasing
the effectiveness of state industry and its relation to
the growing market sector; and the change from
administrative to economic methods- fiscal policy, price
de-regulation, state subsidy, etc.- of controlling the
economy. 9 Scept i ci sm on the possibility of adapting
agrarian reform from Asian socialist states is if
anything higher than in the industrial sector.10
The fact that there seems little prospect of rapidly
reproduc i ng t he success of t he Ch i nese reform p rog ramme
from purely economic factors, as well as the continued
political instability within Russia, has served to
heighten the significance of a further aspect of the
Asian model- the relationship between economic change and
political power:
We have advocates of authoritarianism as an
essential condition of fast economic reform. The
type of authoritarian power might be different:
military dictatorship (as in Chile) which we have
obviously not passed through, and the strong
Presidential power which is currently unfolding in
Russia. It is interesting to analyse the experience
of China is this regard, which has a mechanism of
power lying in the hands of the CPC, different to
those mentioned. We already understand that the
ruling communist parties in the USSR and the other
former socialist countries in essence were not
political parties, but more a basic type and
structure of power. The CPC continues to remain such
a structure. And here a question arises: were the
event s of 1989 a trag i c acc i dent, wh i ch need not
have happened, or were they the natural consequences
of the collision of two interlocking principles-
market reform and authoritarian power. The answer to
this question might also help to decipher our
weighty problems: might strong Presidential power
with its own structures permeate the whole of
society ••• really consistently leading to democratic
market reform or to inevitable collision and maybe
119
becoming destructive. Of course, the Chinese variant
is not the sole model of authoritarian reforr' but
it is the most interesting for our experience. 1
Thus, if Russia does attempt to create a hybrid model
combining elements of both European and Asian systems, it
seems unlikely that the influence of either will be
confined to one sphere of activity- a European political
syst em but an As ian economi c mode 1, for examp 1e. Rat he r
there will be elements of both in each area.
For some commentators, however, such hybridism
seems to fly in the f ace of cont emporary trends, whi ch
indicate the divergence of the two models rather than
their convergence:
Yet another logical construction based upon the
thesis of the hidden conflict in relations between
'conse rvat i ve Europe' and 'dynami c As i a', concerns
the collision of two economic cultures and even
civilisational models. Thus Asian counties place in
first place among their priorities economic growth,
actively encourage accumulation, make unceasing
efforts to increase their international
competitiveness, form a social climate, favourable
to labour returns and labour motivation of the
people. Encouraging entrepreneurship, they at the
same time widely resort to measures of government
support of the economy and utilise the advantages of
collective economic conduct. In Europe economic
growth and increasing exports does not occupy so
important a place among priorities of development,
i nnovat i ve processes are proceed i ng 1ess act i ve 1y,
rates of accumulation are lower, greater emphasis is
placed upon consumpt i on and st at e soc i a 1 se rv ices,
and individuality openly prediminates over
collectivism. In conditions of growing
i nt e rdependence such d if fe rences in mode 1sand
priorities of development are fraught with
confl ict. 12
In this scenario if Russia eschews one model exclusively
in favour of the other they may be taking sides in an
incipient confrontation between two economic, and
ultimately social and political, models.
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Thus a combination of factors are lending a note of
caution to Russian analysis of the applicability of the
East Asian experience to their own circumstances. This
reflects both consciousness of the operation of different
economic forces, and the role that cultural and ethnic
factors play in these, but also the contradictory role of
the Asian pol itica 1 model: on the one hand
authoritarianism may be essential for rapid and
success fu1 economi c change; on the ot her it may magn ify
once more the differences between Russian political
culture and that of the West, at a time when divisions in
the international arena appear to widening, due to the
end of the Cold War and the acceleration of the pace of
economic change.
Apart from such contentious issues, Asia's
importance for Russia may well lie in its example to the
currently ailing Russian economy that late economic
development is still possible, as Yelena Leont'eva
suggests:
As far as the unique Russian situation is concerned
although "every unhappy family is unhappy in its own
way", objective laws of economics and society
operate everwhere and experience of '~iraculous'
reform is becoming common human property.1
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i i Internat ional causes and consequences of As ian
economic regionalism.
There are two interconnected facets to Russian
perspectives on Asian economic regionalism- the external
facet places Asian regionalism in the context of changes
in the global economy as a whole; the internal facet
examines the forces wi thin the region driving
integration. Both of these are seen as combining to
determine the structure and pace of Asian regionalism.
(i) External pressures generating Asian integration;
Before considering Russian perspectives on the
internal forces wh ich are driving Asian economic
regionalism, consideration must be given to the impact of
changes in the global economy as whole. Asian regional
integration is not taking place in a vacuum, but is only
one form of inter-connected regionalisation which is
recognised as being part of a much wider process:
A distinguishing feature of contemporary development
of international economic cooperation is its global
and simultaneous regionalisation. International
relations are everywhere more fully filling up the
world economic space •••
Regional cooperation supposes ever higher
degrees of economic interdependence, indissoluble
ties with mutually open economic and social
st ruct ures, wit h the format; on of un iform means of
activity of the economic subjects.1
In contrast to the comments of the last paragraph, other
commentators, particularly in the Soviet era, see one of
the key features of economic regionalism as being its
uneven, and possibly conflictory,
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character- most
obviously between the centre- the major economic powers-
and the periphery, but also between the advanced
capitalist economies themselves:
However in the capitalist economy at the current
time there exist also those influences which appear
in the opposing direction, counter to globa1-
integratory processes. It is a question of
regionalism, observable in the most differing
corners of the earth, expressing the desire of
number of states to form local groupings, the
members of whi ch to a greater or 1esser degree are
coordinating the government of their economic lives,
jointly defending their material interests and
granting each other preferential regimes.2
Cent ra1 quest ions for the new Russ ian state are,
therefore, which regional structure or structures with
which to seek integration, at what level and what will be
the consequences for their relationships with other
groups. These questions have been made all the more
complex by the dissolution of the USSR which has meant
that the border between internal/external regionalisation
has become blurred and a first priority will be the
rationalisation of economic relations within the states
of the former Union. But how will the newly constituted
Eurasian economic space interact with the emerging
regional groupings to its west and east?
The attraction of the European Community is clearly
very strong but there are significant obstacles to
Russia's integration with it. Firstly, there were over-
optimistic appraisals of Russia's economic status. Thus
an assessment of Russia's foreign economic potential in
ear 1y 1992 cou 1d propose a st rategy that was to prove
contentious for the existing members of the EC:
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To begin with we plan to establish close ties with
the European Community in order to join its single
monetary system and participate in the free movement
of goods, capital and people across frontiers.3
Secondly, as suggested earlier, Russia's geo-po1itica1
and economic interests argue against an exclusively
Atlantic orientated foreign policy:
Russia enjoys favourable preconditions for inclusion
in the processes of regionalisation of international
cooperation. These follow from its geo-political
position. The Russian Federation occupies a vast
part of the Eu ras ian 1andmass, havi ng an ex it to
three oceans, great land and sea borders with a wide
number of immediate neighbours. It is especially
important that it is located between the major
cent res of the cont emporary wor 1d economy: the USA,
Japan, Europe and Western Europe, lengthily
borde ring Ch ina wh ich seve ra1 prognoses ag ree wi 11
be a ma;or world economic power in the 21st
Century. '
The difficulty with this perspective is that it
underest imat es the ext ent to wh ich integ ratory processes
in one area of the world are a response to those taking
place in another- an attempt to control, and for some, to
resist, the movement toward global interdependence. This
is not lost on some Russian analysts, for whom Russia's
very value to the rest of Europe will be the advantage it
provides in the coming economic competition between
regional groups:
Attached to all this complexity arises the common
denominator of the meaning of 'greater Europe'
namely that configuration of future economic unity
which would be the greatest result from the
introduction of Russia into the common European
integratory processes, immeasurably widening the
resou rce and market capac ity of the cont inent by
using the connection to its huge natural, labour and
scientific and technical potentials, realising its
possibilities. This would provide Europe with a much
stronger position for long-term competition with the
USA and Japan, part icu 1ar 1y if we take account of
the desire of the latter also to widen their
economic space (respectively, by using the North
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Americgn Common Market and cooperation with SE
Asia).
However, the contradiction here with the thesis of Russia
as a bri dge between East and West is obvi ous- Russ ia
cannot simultaneously seek full integration into the
European Community and become a central player in the
regional economic processes in Asia. There are
significant internal economic factors promoting economic
integration in Asia, which will be discussed below, but
it is also a response to the emergence of other regional
blocs:
It is no exaggeration to say that most often first
place among the reasons, or at least the catalyst of
interstate cooperation in the APR, remains external,
relating to regional factors. Attention is above all
paid to the tendency of forming economic blocs in
Europe and America .••. Here the threat is that the
Eu ropean economy wi 11 become more shut to re1at ions
with outsiders, that the dynamic growth and ever
greater competitiveness of the Asian states will
become the primary object of tough protectionist
measures.6
While it might appear that the current economic position
of Russia hardly qualifies it to be viewed as an economic
rival by Asian countries, there is already one aspect of
its relations with the West that raises concern in Asia.
This is that in their desire to integrate the former
European communist states into the international economy,
the industrial powers will commit both commercial and
governmental funds to these states to the det riment of
Asian economic development. While the pattern of
investment flows do not as yet show any prefe rence for
the unstable Russian economy over the vibrant Asian
economies, this will remain a concern particularly
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against an expected backgound in the 1990's of increasing
competitiveness for available capital resources. It will
a 1so encourage re 1i ance on reg i ona 1 sources of finance
within Asia as insurance against possible vagaries in the
supply of international funds.
It is clear, therefore, that Russia's current
equilibrial stance between the two continents is as a
much a product of t he weakness of its economi c ties as
anything else. In seeking regional partners it must be
aware that its exclusive
say towards Europe- may
integration in one direction-
well provoke protectionist
measures in the other. Rather its geo-political interests
demand that it deve lop ties to bot h East and West at an
equal pace and level, while its size, and potential
economic strength, may make its full integration in
either impossible. Whether this balanced development is
possible depends to a considerable degree on which form
of regionalism best suits its developmental needs. A
cons i de rat i on of t he nat u re of t he forces shapi ng As ian
regionalism is not merely an academic task for Russians,
the refore, but an assessment of t he re 1at i ve value of
Asian integration, as opposed to that of Europe.
(ii) Internal forces driving Asian regional integration;
Asian economic integration is a product of
particular forces operating in the regional economy.
These forces, most not ab 1y i nt e rna 1 and ext e rna 1 trade
patterns, direct investment and trans-national
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partnerships, are both economic, in that private
corporations and financial institutions are the prime
movers behind them, but also political since decisions on
the pace, direction and structure of economic cooperation
are being taken at the highest governmental levels. In
other words, there is interaction between state and
market forces at t he reg i ona 1 1eve 1 comparab 1e to that
operating in the East Asian economic model at the
domest i cleve 1.
The differing levels of interaction of the various
private and governmental bodies with their counterparts
in other countries has created an economic structure of
extraordinary diversity and mobility:
International relations in that part of the world,
now called the Asia-Pacific region, have acquired in
the past decade the greatest dynamism and mobility.
Barriers are being liquidated, passing watersheds in
bringing together former antagonists. Earlier
unassailable borders are becoming permeable (it is
sufficient to cast a glance at the Vietnamese-
Chinese border or, for example, the South Kuriles).
In different subregions of the APR re-grouping and
red i st r ibut i on of forces, t he search for new
partners and 'community members' [soobshinkov] the
re-appraisal of national and regional priorities,
are taking place. New regional combinations are
being drawn up. In this respect, the political and
economic fa1ette is significantly richer than the
European.
Part of the difficulty arising from the complexity and
variety of these relations is in deciding exactly where
the boundaries of the region lie. The term 'Asia-Pacific'
is most commonly used because it is the most inclusive,
incorporating the North American economies of the USA and
Canada, the Aust r a 1as ian g roup cent red on Aust ra 1i a and
New Zealand, and the dynamic economies of East Asia-
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Japan, China, the ASEAN (Brunei, Thailand, Singapore,
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Phillipines) and what are
still referred to as the Newly Industrialised Countries
(NIC's)- South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, as well as
Singapore, which also falls into this classification.
There are two limitations to this schema, however:
the first is that the extension of the region to the
eastern rim of the Pacific is primarily to ensure the
inclusion of one country- the USA. While the importance
of the Ameri can economy as t radi ns part ner and investor
in the western rim of the Pacific cannot be under-
estimated, it is clear that none of the countries of that
area, except Japan, have a comparable level of
involvement in the Americas, especially outside the USA,
and thus the pattern of economic interaction is
i mba 1anced. There ; s moreove r t he quest; on of t he USA's
existing membership of a regional economic grouping,
largely of it's own making, the North American Free Trade
Area, which may well be extended to Latin America.
The second 1imit at ion is that whil e t he concept of
APR cooperation is based on economic foundations there is
little doubt that many participants foresee that any
emerging regional organisation will have political
functions also. This means that some way must be found of
including key Asian sub-regions such as South Asia and
Central Asia, which are crucial for regional stability
but which currently lie outside the economically based
APR concept.
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These limitations have contributed some of the
pressures which have ensured that there are a number of
overlapping and contending proposals for regional
cooperation which reflect both the pattern of economic
interaction but also the political agendas of regional
governments. These models of regional cooperation operate
at all different levels: there are proposals, such as for
the Sea of Japan cooperation area, which amount to little
more than integrated development across adjacent border
areas; above these, t he re is discuss i on of sub- reg i ona 1
groupings, perhaps the most contentious of which is the
East Asian Economic Group (or Caucus), which aim at
combining the economies of particular countries in a
common market; and at the highest poi nt in the scale
there are the plans for the Asia-Pacific as a whole in
which multilateral bodies such as the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation forum, or the non-governmental
Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, may provide the
institutional framework for regional integration. There
are also a numbe r of key t ransnat i ona 1 act ors- such as
the United Nations Economic and Social Committee on Asia
and the Pacific (ESCAP) and the Asian Development Bank-
who are playing important roles in building mu1itlateral
contacts.
The Russian response to the alternative levels of
cooperat ; on will be di scussed in det ail be low, but what
must be noted initially is that while the first and third
forms of coope rat i on wi 11 be we 1come, t he second wi 11
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not. By this is meant that while both cross-border
development, providing much desired trade and technology
transfer into Asiatic Russia, and the all-inclusive
concept of APR coope rat ion, whi ch ensu res Russ i a- whi ch
is still viewed as lying on the periphery of regional
affairs- will be involved, are favourable to Russia's
economic integration, the trend towards the concentration
of economic and political interaction on an exclusively
Asian level is not, and yet there exist significant
pressures pushing Asian regionalism in this direction.:
The st rengt heni ng of economi c cooperat i on and
interaction above all can be seen in an inner group
of transferrance states. These take a particular,
self-supporting role, playing a kind of 'asiatic
sub-system': Japan, the NIC's, ASEAN, China. This
role is caused by the highest, over-taking pace of
widening mutual relations, including the gradual
transfer of position of future importer of goods of
the Asian states from the USA to Japan. There also
exists at present a clear strengthening of the
attitude in favour of Asian solidarity, the search
for a common As i an values, and t he appearance of
proposa 1s on t he format i on in reg i ona 1 sect ors of
Asia (above all South and Southeast) of new
interstate unity.S
This means that while the economy of Asia and the Pacific
can be viewed as a series of overlapping and interlocking
circles there is little doubt that East Asia is emerging
as the fulcrum upon which the system turns.
Tselishchev's important study of regional
cooperation reveals the key economic indicators in this
process. An exami nat i on of trade shows bot h an inc rease
within this sub-region as well as its growing importance
for Japan and the USA. The highest levels of trade growth
are taking place between the NIC's, and between the NIC's
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and the ASEAN st at es. Ch ina has become the maj or trade
partner for both Japan and the NIC's.
Another crucial factor is the dynamic growth of
foreign direct investment. While Japanese capital
continues to be important in this respect, a significant
new feature is the role of investment from the NIC's into
ASEAN and China, which is growing at a faster rate than
that of Japan. This has attracted considerable attention
in Japan not least because it indicates a qualitative
change in the economi es of these count ri es. They ope rat e
pos it i ve balances of trade wi t h Japan and cont i nue to
develop technological and scientific resources. Moreover,
a changeover is taking place from orientation above
all on industrial development to the accelerated
growth of the 'thi rd sphere'. In this in one form or
another there is an increase in the capacity to
export capital, especially in the industrial
branches where NIC technological relations are
a 1ready we 11 est ab 1i shed, and whi ch are now
receiving development in the countries of ASEAN, and
following them in China.9
The third important factor is the intensification of
d if fe rent forms of re 1at i onsh i ps between corporat ions in
the region. Tselishchev cites Ohata's figures that the
share of foreign economic activity of Japanese companies
directed to exports has fallen from 46% to 23% in recent
years. Rat her t he pe rcent age of those firms whi ch have
pursued the aim of creating international partnerships
has reached 50% and will continue to grow:
In a word, the companies of the NIC's and ASEAN have
become important participants in the process of
forming wide sets of inner-regional inter-firm
partnerships. The geographical sphere of their
activity is spreading out from the boundaries of
their own countries, .in a tendency to expand into
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all East and Southeast Asia. Their interests demand
the strengthening of cooperation in the 'asiatic
sub-system', and this is demonstrated in the
extremely vital political and economic processes
taking place in Asia and the APR, including at the
inter-state level.10
If these three elements- trade, FOI and the integration
of economic actors across national boundaries- are the
core elements of the new Asian economic system as a
whole, it remains to be considered which states and which
combinations of states are best able to bring these
forces into play. The contending models of Asian economic
integration are essentially a reflection of this process,
substanially modified by the political agendas of Asian
governments.
Whi le most commentators have noted the shared
Confucian heritage of many of the successful East Asian
countries, one of the possible bases for regional
integration lies in the re-generation of the social
system that disseminated Confucianism: the 'Chinese
commonwealth':
The success and achievements of China, Taiwan,
Singapore and Hong Kong has given impetus to
discuss i on on the exped iency of formi ng a 'Ch i nese
common market'. The realisation of this idea would
be made possible by uniting the financial resources
of Taiwan (first in the world in terms of size of
gold and currency reserves); the administrative
capabilities and far-flung relations ties of Hong
Kong; t he market network and sphere of servi ces of
Singapore (financial, mediation, information;
transport), wi t h the great pot ent i a 1 of cont i nent a 1
China (labour force, resources .. sell ing market, and
sphere of capital application).11
While Grebenshchikov points out that the underpinning for
the eme rgence of such a syst em of ties i s all economi c ,
its political implications are clear- the re-emergence of
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a single China. Yet it is in these political terms that
the largest obstacle to 'Greater China' becoming the
basis of broader regional integration lies.
Whi 1e many in Hong Kong and Ta i wan are conf i dent
that the outcome of closer ties with China would be the
growth of their influence on the mainland- they can cite
the growing autonomy of the major trading provinces of
Guangdong and Fujian- rather than their incorporation
into a Greater China, there are significant forces in
Ta iwan and Hong Kong push i ng for comp 1et e independence.
In the main this stems from recognition that the separate
i dent it y of t he Ch i nese ove rseas has been a key element
in the i r success, not 1east because of t he at tit ude of
other non-Chinese populations and countries in Asia. If
this is true of Hong Kong and Taiwan, it is doubly so of
the Chinese in SE Asia. Goncharenko highlights the
characteristics of this group:
The Chinese community in the countries of SE Asia
possesses in generally similar terms a stable
part i cu 1ar cu 1tu re, 1anguage and psychology, a
consc i ousness of its un it y; it demonst rat es a high
degree of political self-consciousness, desiring to
place itself in an indepedant position in relation
to China and to the local power of the new country
of residence. The distinguishing particularity of
the overseas Chinese community has become the
movement of Chinese capital as a permanent element
in the social and economic structure of the
countries of SE Asia. An integral feature of their
hi storical development has become the appearance of
national (within the limits of a given country) and
supra-national (outwith these limits) regional
Chinese capital. 12
For the overseas Chinese to pursue political integration
it would be necessary not only for them to overcome their
own doubts concerning this, but also allay the fears of
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thei r host commun it ies and reg iona 1 part ne rs about re-
establishing a Sinocentric order in Asia- an unlikely
prospect.
There are, moreover, difficulties even with the
proposed economic integration- there remain doubts as to
whether the mainland Chinese labour force have the skills
for advanced product ion, the ove rseas commun ities- Hong
Kong, Taiwan and Si ngapore- are as much in compet ition
wi t h one another, for markets and finance, as
cooperation. Above all, there remains the central
question of how Japan fits into this hypothesis, as
Grebenshchikov suggests:
Sinocentrism does not easily combine with the
immutable fact that the major locomotive of
deve 1opment of the count ries of the Paci fic Ocean
basi n is the Japanese supereconomy. Though, in
principle, the economically mighty community of
foreign Chinese has cooperated, and continues to
cooperate, with the superpowerful Japanese
corporations.13
The limitations of the Chinese cultural sphere to form
the basis of an Asian regional economy are exemplified by
Singapore. Despite its 75% Chinese-origin population and
considerable economic ties with China, Singapore pursues
a policy of studied independence with regard to mainland
China, establishing full diplomatic relations only in
1991. If Singapore sees a future economic grouping at the
sub-regional level, it is undoubtedly in the expansion of
ASEAN from a purely political bloc into an economic
association.
ASEAN's capacity to form the basis of regional
economic integration rests upon its success in unifying
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the diverse i nt erest s of it s members and the dynami c
growt h of it s domest i c economi es. That growt h has been
based upon quality low-cost labour supply, technology
transfer, and FOI. While both Japan and the USA, which
have viewed economic cooperation with ASEAN states as a
way of easing their own fractious economic relationship,
have been important, it is the interaction of the ASEAN
states with the economies of the NIe's that is now most
dynamic, so that some commentators have begun to talk of
NIC-ASEAN as an integral unit 14 Such classifications
tend to blur the uneven level of interaction between
these states, however. Thus Grebenshchikov points out
that while ASEAN's trade has expanded greatly the
proport i on of i nt er-ASEAN trade has remai ned st at i c for
the length of its existence:
the absence of weighty results in the economic
convergence of the countries of ASEAN has not
hindered the fast and st ab1e economi c prog ress of
each of them separat ely, to t he ext ent that they
have ever closer relations with the economies of
Japan, t he USA, and ot her count r i es of advanced or
middle-rank capitalism, than with their economic
neighbours. There has neither been, nor is now,
mutual complementarity between countries of ASEAN.15
Thus despi te ca 11s from ASEAN 1eaders- t hose of
Singapore, Tha i1and and Malaysia have been most
enthusiastic- for economic convergence, ASEAN's diversity
continues to inhibit its full integration. Moreover, if
suggestions that membership might be extended to the
I ndochi nese st at es in t he wake of t he end of t he Cold
War- Vietnam or Laos, for example- are implemented then
this will further weaken ASEAN's economic cohesion,
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though contradictorily increasing its status as a
political body.
This said ASEAN's willingness to discuss regional
integration is a considerable departure from its previous
stance, held up to mid-80's, which viewed Pacific
coope rat ion as a;m;ng at subme rging, and subord inat ing,
the Association's interests to those of the larger
powers. It was the recognition that those interests
demanded closer coordination within East Asian, comibined
with a latent distrust of non-Asian regional powers, that
led Malysia to propose the most controversial of models
for regional cooperation to date- the East Asian Economic
Grouping.
It would have been strange indeed, given Japan's
dominance within the Asian economy, if among the
competing models for regional integration, one had not
proposed an exclusive Asian economic community which
would have Japan as its centre. Thus in December 1990
Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia, in a speech at a
banquet given for visiting Premier Li Peng of China,
proposed the formation of an East Asian Economic Grouping
comprising ASEAN, Japan, China, South Korea, Hong Kong
and Taiwan.
While this proposal met with at best an ambiguous
response, even from those who would constitute the EAEG,
and has' since been substanially modified so that Malaysia
currently proposes only an East Asian Economic Caucus
(EAEC) within the broader APEC, its importance lay in the
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fact that it gave voice to three central concerns
regarding the future of Asian economic relations.
Fi rst 1v , it was t he most out spoken call yet for Asi an
count r i es to respond tot he eme rgence of reg i ona 1 blocs
in Europe and America; secondly, it proposed economic
integration should be based on common cultural or ethnic
root s- thus whi 1e t he USA mi ght be exc 1uded for reasons
of geography or membership of NAFTA, the reasons for
excluding Australia, New Zealand, and Russia, could only
be ethnic; thirdly, it addressed the crucial Question of
Japan's role in the region. These can be considered in
turn in more detail.
While the integration of Europe is an important
element in Asian regionalisation, both as catalyst and
model, the most radical aspect of the EAEG proposa1- the
exclusion of America from the regional economic
organisation- was in the first instance a response to the
changed political situation in the region itself:
The projection to Asia of the problems of the world
economy 1ed to an i nt ens i ve search by t he As ian
countries for new models of international and, above
all, regional relations. An important factor in
favour of reviewing established stereotypes is the
formation in Asia of a new political landscape. The
favourab1 e development of thi s process was promoted
by the transformation of the previous bi-po1ar power
st ruct u re of the wor1 d, the disappearance of the
'commun i st threat' and chang i os mi 1 it ary-st rat eg i c
aspects of the world policies of economic
strategists ••••
Inevitable factors in shaping conditions are
the shrinking ability of the USA to influence the
situation in Asia, and the growing rivalry with
Japan. It is undeniable that the USA has an
important role in Asian affairs, the countries of
East Asia interrelating with it both as a power in
opposition to Japan, and having interests in
cooperation with it. In its turn the USA is seeking
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possibilities for creating new, non-Rolitical
mechanisms of retaining its own influence. 16
As t his suggest s t he post -Co 1d War cl i mat e has exposed
the relationship between the United States and Asia to
the full pressu res of mut ua 1 interdependence. One
scenar i 0 poi nt s to t he management of t his process by
bilateral- most obviously US-Japanese- and multilateral
co-operation. According to Parkansky, the US wanted to
base the eme rg i ng APR organ i sat i on on three key
principles, as outlined by then Secretary of State James
Baker in 1989:
t ) the sphere of its activity would include a wide
circle of questions- from economic relations to
cultural exchange and security of Pacific Ocean
natural resources; ii) the new organisation would
promot e t he wi den i ng of trade, investment, and the
interaction with such forces as GATT, the OECD, and
regional groupings such as ASEAN; iii) the Pan-
Pacific organisation would recognise the differences
in socio-economic system and level of economic
deve 1opment, but at t he head of the 1 i st wou 1d be
put prirfiPles of private initiative and free
markets.
However, an alternative, though not mutually exclusive,
scenario argues that the weakening of the US position in
the region means that it must widen its own economic base
in order to reduce its vulnerabil ity to the East Asian
economies. This in part was the logic behind NAFTA:
The activisation of integratory processes between
t he USA, Canada and Mexi co mi ght prompt Japan (and
t he reg i on around it) to show great er preparedness
to participate in ineraction with the North American
integrated complex. It is doubtful that the
formation of the three-sided closed group will
reduce the corresponding interests of the USA,
~~~a~~R~~S Mexico in participation in integration in
I f as seems 1 ike 1y t he US conduct s a dual st rat egy of
forc i ng open t he APR economy and st ruct uri ng the Nort h
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American economy to resist penetration from Asia, both
elements will have the same result- increased Asian co-
ordination. However, the distinctiveness of the Malaysian
proposal 1ay in that it represent ed a call for a
reciprocal move towards the second scenario, through the
development of an exclusively Asian protectionism. Most
states viewed this as precipitous and premature, as well
as dangerous politically, though ot he rs we re 1ess
concerned about displaying their lack of political
affinitity with the US- China and Vietnam both stated
they would participate, though would not be bound by any
such organisation. What is not in Question is the
genuineness of the changes in the Asian states perception
of themselves that the proposal sought to harness:
The backg round, against whi eh the st rengt hen i ng of
centralising tendencies in Asia is taking place, is
complex and contradictory. Its catalyst in many ways
is the result of a protective reaction of the fast
growing Asian economies to the sharp turn in world
development. It especially is marked by politico-
psychological, emotional factor as in the growth of
a attitude in favour of Asian solidarity. Listening
to a whole range of pronouncements by prominent
experts from the Asian developing countries,
politicians and representatives of the business
world, the sounding of the common Asian chord can
ever more distinctly be sensed.19
It is also true that such chords could be heard within
the country which held the key to the success of
Mahathir's proposal- Japan- though these became much less
audible in the wake of the vocal us opposition to the
EAEG.
While Malaysia made clear that it did not anticipate
any 'Japanisation' of the region, the proposal made clear
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that many Asian states would welcome Japan supplementing
its economic diplomacy with a wider political role. This
meant t hat As ian st at es whi 1e res i st i ng any new at tempt
by Japan to est ab 1 ish reg i ona 1 hegemony, wou 1d encou rage
Japan to use its leverage at the international level for
the benefit of all Asian states, under the thesis of the
'common fate' of these countries.
PM Kaifu's trip to the ASEAN states in spring of
1991 responded to this call by re-defining Japan's role
as both a political and an economic-financial power in
the region. What was equally clear however was that Japan
was not prepared to face economi c or pol it i ca 1 rupt u re
with the US and that it saw its role both as chief
architect of the Asian regional economy but also of
guarantor of its openness to the wider international
economi c syst em. Th is meant t hat Japan did not yet see
the threat of protectionism as coming equally from Europe
and America and that it would continue to favour a
condominium with the latter, both in bilateral terms and
within the bounds of the widest regional organisation-
APEC.
As for Russia's attitude to the EAEG it should be
clear that it has little to gain from the proposal: it
wou 1d excl ude Russ i a f rom reg i ona 1 economi c processes,
including with two of its most important partners, China
and Vietnam. Moreover it is unlkely that the new Central
Asian states with which Russia has many common economic
interests would meet the criteria for membership either.
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Rather the formation of the EAEG would represent a
significant shift towards regional, and thus global,
economic protectionism which would leave Russia lying
out wi t h any forma 1 organ i sat ion, save its quest i onab 1e
ability to meet the membership criteria of the EC.
Russia, therefore, has a central interest in the
deve 1opment of the APEC concept, though it cannot aspi re
to full membership unt t l it expands its economic profile
in the region, and must content itself with membership of
the non-governmental business and scientific body, PECC.
APEC's importance derives not simply from its
inclusiveness- drawing together all the major economic
powers in the region- but from its distinctive character.
Tselishchev believes this distinctiveness lies in three
areas. Firstly, APEC is committed to a liberal trade
policy both within the region and the international
system as whole. This 'open regionalism' [otkrity
regionalizm] is a conscious response to the European
model.
Second, is the flexible and diverse nature of the
regional relationships:
It is even possible to speak of a net-like [setevoy]
organ; sat i on of cooperat ion, wi t hi n t he bounds of
which each participant takes upon itself the supply
of that part of the activity of the association,
where it has the best possibilities, and coordinates
the activity of the association, in this, its own,
area •••
Access to cooperation within the bounds of
APEC, as proposed, mi ght a 1so be open to count r i es,
not entering into the association. Network
organ; sat i on and 'open reg; ona 1i srn I, are, at 1east
10giCal126 conceptually indissoluble from oneanother.
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The third distinctive factor is the stimulus to
integration within APEC which is being provided by the
private enterprise sector:
The syst em of i nt e rgovernment a 1 re 1at ions wi 11
remain as if soft, intentionally relaxed. States,
agreed on the given approach, will not be able to
excessively intefere in the process of economic
interaction and must in any case avoid the
i nt roduct i on of any kind of general regu 1at i on by
the association, of the natural freedom of
enterprises.21
While the advantages for Russia of inclusion in such an
economic structure are evident- freer trade, diverse
levels and forms of economic interaction, access to
private capital, technologies and expertise- it should
not be thought that the forces generating integration are
entirely positive or universally welcomed by those
experiencing them.
Firstly, it should be said that the differing forms
and levels of economic interaction in Asia are not a
des i red end but rat he r a ref 1ect i on of ex i st i ng economi c
reality in which the distribution of economic resources
and development is extremely uneven. From this
perspective regional cooperation can appear to those
countries at the lower levels of economic development to
be an attempt to sustain by a multilateral mechanism the
dependence on the more advanced countries so long
resisted in bilateral terms.
Equally, the pressures driving the major powers to
regional integration are as much competitive as
cooperative. While in their desire to present a positive
view of Pacific integration, Russian analysts have moved
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away from the emphasis of the Soviet era on the divisions
and antagonisms between the regional powers, these still
bear consideration. The contradictory nature of economic
interdependence was held to be particularly strong
between Japan and the USA:
The many years of tension in economic relations with
Japan, the deficit in trade with it, at times
greatly exceeding the $50 million mark, the feeling
that the Asia-Pacific market is slipping from its
hands under the conditions of succesful competition
on the part of Tokyo- all this gives a serious
foundation to the belief of the leaders and business
circles of the USA that an economic community is
arlslng in the APR, the leadership of Japanese
capital in which iS
2
making the American position
ever more difficult.2
According to Shevchenko, America attempted to bolster its
declining economic postion in the region by demanding
that Japan liberalise its financial markets, support the
do 11ar standard, and open its domest ic economy to
international competition. The Japanese response was two-
fold. Firstly, in line with the 'conception of complex
security' Japan embarked on a course to convert the
country into a 'technological power' , and secure
independence from the USA in the spheres of sc ience and
technology. Secondly, from the mid-aD's Japan consciously
transferred the emphasis of its economic development from
the domestic to the foreign market. This
had the objective capacity to lower Japanese
dependence on the American market, and,
consequently, the influence of America. This was
advant ageous to the format ion of a syst em of deep
economic relations between Japan and the countries
1ocat ed on he r pe riphery- in the Far East and SE
As ia, a maj or market wh ich for JaRan exceeded the
significance of the American market.23
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Thus bilateral frictions had important implications for
Japan and the USA's relations with other Asian states,
and with regard to the proposed multilateral forum::
The attempts by the USA and Japan in the recent past
to form an exclusive Pacific Ocean group at the
super-national level is a manifestation of the
centralising tendency in the approach to growing and
deepe rant agont ist ic cont rad ict ions in the reg iona 1
capitalist division of labour. These attempts are
also explicable by the natural strengthening of
fears at the possibility of democratic
transformation in the countries of the Pacific Ocean
and the weakening of the imperialist position in
this region of the world.24
While most predictions for the future model of US-
Japanese relations- Pax Americana II, Pax Consortium-
continue to stress the interdependence of the two states,
the prognoses for Pacific multilateral interaction must
remain contradictory. The two powers may view regional
cooperation- most likely through APEC- as a means of
cementing their relationship given its declining
bilateral base. Conversely, they may use the multilateral
st ruct ure to seek out ot her economi c part ners, as
leverage in their relationship with each other.
For Russ ia, this at 1east opens the prospect that
either power may see the new state as a possible regional
partner, if only as a political counterweight if not yet
a major economic actor. This has been evident since the
Soviet era:
For ourselves in the Soviet Union •• it is important
firstly to establish some sort of corner stone on
which the USA can count on leaning in the formation
of the system of 'Amerippon'. Secondly, to give
thought to def ining the general tendency of
development of foreign economic relations with
Japan: its future all relates to the development of
horizontal trade and technology co-operation in the
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East Asian region, from which it also follows that
it take into acccount in its calculations, that the
economic and political imperatives defining the
behaviour of Japan in the current period may appear
complet~JY different in the sufficiently near
future.
This prognosis still holds true but since Russia's role
in Asian multilateral forums will also be a reflection of
its bilateral relationship's, the failure to achieve the
qualitative shift in relations with Japan, even after the
demise of the Soviet Union, is having a particular impact
on Russia's overall economic profile. Firstly, it is
damaging the one form of concrete multilateral economic
cooperation that Russia may be able to pursue in the
current conditions- sub-regional cooperation in the Sea
of Japan; secondly, it is having a distinctive impact on
Russia's search for other economic partners on the
bilateral level, as will be discussed below.
As was suggested, one of the most obvious forms of
economic cooperation in the region is that taking place
between adjacent regions:
In the countries of the APR ideas are being advanced
as to the laying out of multi-sided cooperation on
the separat e sub reg i ona 1 scale. Among those ga in i ng
at tent i on are t he concept i on of coope rat i on wi t hi n
the limits of the Yellow Sea with the participation
of the PRC, South Korea, and the DPRK; the strategy
of forming a 'far eastern golden ring' (South Korea,
Taiwan, the southern regions of Japan, the coastal
part of the PRC); the idea of integration of the
South Pacific region (Australia, New Zealand, the
count r i es of Oceani a) ; t he concept i on of economi c
cooperation in Northwest Asia (MPR, the Northwestern
provinces of the PRC, Eastern Siberia and the Far
~~~~).~~ the USSR, South Korea, Japan and the
For Russia the most significant form of this cooperation
is clearly the possibility of linking the financial and
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t echn i ca 1 resou rces of Japan and Sout h Korea, the 1abou r
resources of the PRC and the DPRK, and the natural
resu rces of t he Russ i an Far East ina 'Sea of Japan
Cooperation Zone'. However certain business, and indeed
political, circles in Japan, do not believe that economic
relations should be postponed until after the resolution
of outstanding political problems, there has been little
Japanese commitment to concrete projects. An example is
the UN proposed Tyumen river delta scheme which would
c reat e a mu1t i nat i ona 1 port and economi c zone at the
point where the borders of Russia, the DPRK and China's
Jilin province meet, providing access to the NE Asian
interior as well as developing a processing centre for
its resources. Japanese investment is critical to this
project and yet the Japanese response to date has been at
best non-commital. What is true, however, is that Japan
cannot afford to let other Asian countries gain a
predominant role in developing economic relations with
Russia. This means that it will be possible for Russia to
use the development of its bilateral economic relations-
the primary form in the abscence of commitment of Japan's
financial resources to multilateral projects- to exercise
leverage upon Japan. It remains to be considered where
the prospects lie for other economic partners in Asia.
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iii Russia's bilateral economic relations in Asia.
Attempting to assess Russia's future economic
relations in Asia from its current position is a
difficult task given the low level of economic inter-
action with the region which the Russian Federation
inherited from the Soviet era and the distortions in FER
as a whole as a result of the domestic reform programme.
What follows, therefore, is an attempt to chart possible
lines of development in the region from the rather
rudimentary economic ties that Russia currently enjoys.
Of the governental decisions on FER the shift to
trade in hard currency after 1991 has had the single most
important influence, curtailing the ability of the Soviet
Union's major Asian trading partners, especially the
socialist states such as Vietnam and North Korea, but
also states such as India- to purchase from Russia, but
also placing considerable strain on Russia's obligations
to foreign exporters as hard currency reserves have
declined. The outcome has been constraint in trade
relations with those states which are only trading in
hard cu rrency inc 1ud i ng some, such as Sout h Korea, on
which great store was set only a few years ago and the
expansion of trade with those who are prepared to operate
with the maximum flexibility in terms of forms of
exchange and types of goods,
mos t 0bvi 0us ins tan ceo f the
including arms sales. The
latter case, is that of
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China, which is perhaps the sole Asian state with which
Russia's economic relations are expanding.
Thus Russia's search for Asian economic partners has
shifted emphasis even within a relatively short period of
time. Initial assumptions that South Korea and Japan
should be the natural locus of attention given their
capital resources, technological levels, and resource
limitations has had to give way to a pragmatism
necessitated by the country's weak economic position.
It is important to note, however, that economics is
not the sole factor influencing the development of
Russia's FER in Asia. It is hoped that enough has already
been said to indicate that economic relations in Asia are
being pursued as part of a complex agenda in which
economic interdependence is being encouraged in order to
build across the cultural, ethnic and ideological
divisions of the region, as well as to allow it to assume
an important role in the global economy of the next
century. Russia's success, or lack of it, in FER will
thus also reflect the perceptions of other governments as
to the role- positive or negative- that Russia can play
in these processes.
Any consideration of Russian FER in Asia must begin
with Japan, for obvious reasons:
Japan is very rapidly forming a Japan-centred model
of economic interdependence where almost all
count ries are much more dependent on relat ions with
Japan than Japan is on relations with them. It is
quite evident in relations with Russia because in
the past many here thought that there was a very
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high degree of economic complimentarity between
Japan and Russia under which we could supply natural
resources and receive finance and advanced
technology from Japan. Now the situation has changed
greatly. Japan is not so interested in importing
natual resources from Russia, not in absolute terms
but in growing quantities. So we cannot rely on the
Japanese market as a vast market for absorbi ng our
natural resources.1
The decline in the complementarity between the Russian
and Japanese market sis all the more marked because oi 1
and natural gas are decreasing in production, so that if
Russia is to build economic ties with Japan it must be on
the basis of new forms of economic co-operation, such as
joint ventures, SEZ's, and interaction with the Japanese
large trade companies which have world-wide distribution
networks which can be used to increase exports to third
countries.
Outwith the domestic situation within Russia the
most common 1y cit ed reason for the fail ure of economi c
relations to develop rapidly is the failure of the two
sides to reach a resolution of the territorial question
between them.2 The full implications of this will be
discussed elsewhere but it should be noted here that the
problem is worsening rather than improving. The failure
of the August 1991 coup prompted Tokyo to change its
position on aid to Moscow, announcing that US$2.5bn could
be made available if progress was made on the Kuriles
issue. To date, however, only modest emergency aid
packages have been produced- aimed, for example, at
maintaining the safety and administration standards in
Russia's nuclear facilities.
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In theory the end of the Soviet Union should have
made the resolution of the issue easier and expectations
of a breakthrough increased as the time of Yeltsin's
proposed visit to Tokyo in September 1992 approached.3
The abrupt cancellation of that visit indicated the
degree to which both sides had allowed themselves to
become hostage to popular opionion, particularly from
their respective nationalist wings, but it also indicated
t he chasm in terms of mut ua 1 unde rst and i ng bet ween the
two countries. The Japanese clearly thought that the
weakness of the Russian domestic economy made concessions
inevitable, whereas in fact it encouraged Yeltsin to
stand firm in one of the limited number of areas where he
could display his authority. Russia, a continental power,
in turn failed to appreciate the significance of four
small islands for an island state in which constraint of
space is a fact of everyday life and in which Russian
control of the islands is a reminder of the humiliation
of the Pacific war.
Yeltsin's ability to conduct diplomacy at the
national level is also being hampered by the increasing
autonomy of the regions. Thus one of the most vocal
opponent s of t he ret u rn of the is 1ands has been the
governor of Sakhalin, Valentin Fedorov, has effectively
been making his own foreign economic policy around the
islands- granting the Koreans fishing rights and
propos i ng that t hey be made a SEZ- bot h of whi ch moves
provoked a sharp response from Tokyo.
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While certain business circles are in favour of
expanding economic ties prior to an offical settlement
and those who wish to see Japan reform its foreign policy
in response to t he recent changes in the i nt e rnat i ona 1
order have been successful in gaining power in the 1993
election, t t seems clear that reversing the decline in
Russo-Japanese economic relations will be a slow and
difficult process. Russia's hopes of encouraging Japan to
be more amenable are based on two lines of thinking-
first 1y, t hey appear to have been successfu 1 in
persuad i ng t he west ern powers that t he success of the
Russian reform process is a far higher priority than the
meeting of Tokyo's demand for return of the islands;
second 1y, t hey are seek i ng out ot her economi c part ne rs
wHhin Asia.
As suggest ed, at one time Sout h Korea was ad judged
to be the ideal counterweight to Japan. Of all the
economic nationalists of East Asia, South Korea is most
aware of t he need to keep pace w it h Japan. The
establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR in
Sept embe r 1990 and the January 1991 ag reement on US$3bn
in credits, to be paid in
allowed South Korea to steal
establishing ties with Moscow.
two roughly equal parts,
the march on Tokyo in
The wisdom of President
Roh's Nordpolitik, the attempt to bring presure to bear
upon the DPRK by building ties with the other socialist
states, became a source of domestic contention, however.
Russia, the Soviet Union's legal successor, failed to
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meet its i nt e rest payment s on the first tranche of the
credits, leading to the second tranche being postponed.
This was all the more controversial because the
political interest that South Korea hoped for, in the
form of Soviet pressure on North Korea to match the
reform processes of the ot her soc i ali st st at es, became
less forseeab1e with the demise of the Soviet Union. With
trade already in rapid decline due to the shift to hard
currency, Russia's main influence on North Korea was in
terms of transfer of arms and advanced, particularly
nuclear, technology. At the time of Yeltsin's visit to
South Korea in December 1992, Russia assured South Korea
that such transfers would cease and that it would support
nuclear inspection on the peninsula. In return Roh agreed
to review the payment of the second tranche of credits
and assess the cooperation projects, 23 in all, which
Yeltsin proposed, including development of the Russian
Far East's energy potential.
This said South Korea's establishment of diplomatic
relations with China, at the price of the severance of
its ties with Taiwan, was indicative both of China's
rising importance as a regional economic power, but also
that the Nordpo1itik might now well be better pursued via
Beijing than Moscow. Thus along with doubts as to South
Korea's ability to match the financial power of Japan,
the changes to the political balance in East Asia may be
weaken i ng the import ance of Moscow and Seou 1, for each
other.
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A similar mix of weak economic bonds and political
constraint infect Russia's relationship with the other
NIC's. Taiwan has shown Hself anxious to establish a
foothold in the Russian market but knows that its
relationship with Moscow is overcast by the shadow of the
growing economic relationship between Russia and the
PRC.4 Economic ties with ASEAN remain so underdeveloped
that the six ASEAN ambassadors in Moscow felt impelled to
tell Foreign Minister Kozyrev in October 1992 that Russia
must make greater efforts its economic relations with
Asia.5 Here also the concern is not solely with economics
but to ensure that the retreat from superpower status in
the Pacific does not adversely affect the regional
balance: hence, ASEAN's unexpected support for retaining
the Russian military prescence at Cam Ranh, in Vietnam.
While the shift to hard currency has had a
debilitating influence on Russia's relationship with the
Indochinese socialist states- most notably Vietnam- there
remain those who advocate retaining a close relationship
with Hanoi.6 This is because the break in relations with
the Soviet Union forced Vietnam into an open door policy
in East Asia which has led some commentators to believe
that it may be t he next in 1i ne for economi c expans ion.
Thus Russia could build on its knowledge of Vietnam in
developing both bilateral relations, and those with third
parties. Equally, however, the shift in Sino-Russian
relations has not completely eradicated the view that
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Vietnam must be sustained as a buffer to Chinese
influence in SE Asia.
Perhaps the economic relationship that Russians most
regret losing as a result of the change in the conduct of
FER is that with India, but even here economic pragmatism
and strategic realities point to a looser relationship:
With regard to India, there are two schools of
thought. One is that India is a close ally, we
should make it our foremost partner; the other is
that we must conduct ou r re1at ions on a pragmat ic
basis •• But the importance of India has visibly
lessened quite unavoidably and naturally because the
very important strategic relations with India were
due to the China factor •• Moreover, we always
pref erred Ind ian goods irrespect ive of value, maybe
Pakistan can provide better and cheaper goods.7
In purely economic terms the shift in relations between
Moscow and New Delhi preceded the demise of the Soviet
Union as India marketised its economic system and
diversified its trading pattern, in effect becoming a
more sophisticated international economic player than the
Soviet Union. The attempt to impose hard currency as the
bas is of trade between the two states proved ext reme 1y
damaging to trade and there has been an interim agreement
re-establishing the non-convertible rupee as the basis of
trade.8 If India continues to value trade with Russia,
the area of defence development may be most important, as
India attempts to build a self-sustaining defence
establishment. This indicates the continuing concern of
India with its security enviroment, not least in regard
to China, whose relationship with Pakistan, Iran and the
new Central Asian states, and its relationship with Burma
which extends far beyond simple influence, look
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suspiciously like encirclement to New Delhi. While
tentatively attempting to improve relations, including
economic ties, with China, India really looks to those
with whom it shares cultural traditions or regional
objectives in Southeast Asia to balance China's regional
power ambitions. It is in this connection particularly
that the economi ca 11 y-based concept ions of As i a-Pac if i c
cooperation centred on East Asia are inadequate as
potential foundations of regional stability.
It is hoped that enough has been said in the
foregoing to indicate that, despite the economic
predomi nance of Japan in As i a, when most As ian st at es
come to assess the balance of their economic and
political interests, it is with China that they are
increasingly concerned. For Russia this means that there
will be an ever closer inter-relationship between its
relations with China and its relations with the other
countries of Asia. In particular, the prospect of the
development of a close relationship between Moscow and
Beijing may be the only form of bilateral leverage that
will persuade Tokyo to revise its scepticism as to
Russia's role in the region.
The reasons why China might become such a partner in
economic terms are three-fold. Firstly, there is a good....,
degree of economic complimentarity:
China and, perhaps South Korea, are the only two
countries in the region with which our economic
re 1at ions are expand i ng and on t he move and we are
very much interested in developing economic
relations with China because it is not only the
source of supply for neccessary commodities to
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Russ i a more cheaply and of accept ab 1e qual it y than
other countries •• but a country which is trg'ing to
buy from Russia, including military supplies.
Secondly, China meets several of the critical
requirements for intervention in the Russian economy:
experience of reforming a socialist economy; the ability
to operate as go-between in tri-partite projects with
other Asian states; cultural ties, including Russian
1anguage dat i ng from t he all i ance of the 50' s; abundant
labour supply, including those prepared to work in hard
cond Hi ons; est ab 1 i shed access to maj 0 r i nt ernat i ona 1 and
bilateral sources of finance.
Thirdly, from China's standpoint expansion to the
North and West is becoming a pressing political and
economic necessity:
When I had a talk with my Chinese colleagues, they
told me frankly that the Chinese leadership see
their great problem as their relations with the
southern part of the country. There is a process of
de-centralisation in China which is the result of
the economic development- integration with Hong Kong
and Taiwan, as opposed to Soviet de-centralisation
whi ch was the resu lt of economi c st agnat ion. So to
some ext ent the i nt egrat i on of Ch ina is not based
upon economic structures but political and military
ones. This problem may be the most significant one
for foreign economic relations in the Asia-Pacific
as a whole.10
China's common interest with Russia in stable relations
with the states of Central Asia is age-old 11 and re-
establishing the trade patterns of Inner Asia w;11 play
an important part in this but there t s little doubt that
the key border area currently ;s that between the
Northeastern Chinese provinces and the Russ;an Far East.
Of the US$5bn dollars of trade turnover between Russia
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and China in 1992, perhaps as much as US$2bn derived from
border trade- the vast majority of it in the Northeast.12
Of course, it cannot be argued that Russian economic
ties with China have a purely positive side. Firstly, in
the circumstances out1ined- economic de-centralisation in
Russia and the political and economic obstacles to other
states playing a major role in the region- it is not
impossible to envisage Chinese economic predominance over
the Russian Far East- raising the spectre of the
revocation of the Treaty of Peking.
Secondly, the current balance of trade slightly in
Russia's favour has only been achieved by the inclusion
of US$1.5bn in arms sales: a situation which cannot be
endlessly sustained without raising Questions in the
region about a possible mt l t t ar y understanding, in
cont ravent ion of the dec 1arat ion of bot h sides at the
time of Ye1tsin's visit in December 1992 that their
relationship is not directed at third parties.13 To date
Ministers, such as Pyotr Aven, insist that arms sales are
purely commercial:
Now we must by all means support exports. This will
include military supplies but only on a commercial
basis- Weapons are also goods, special but goods.
China is asking that supplies under the old protocol
should be seen through to the logical end, and are
interested in new supplies. 14
Such assertions underestimate the complex and
contradictory role of t hi rd parties in bilateral
relations in Asia. When the Deputy Foreign Minister for
Asian Affairs was asked at the time of Yeltsin's visit,
if "our relations with China will become such that
159
temptations will arise for third countries to use them
against Russia, as equally China will use the 'Russian
card' in its relations with other countries", he
dismissed the use of the terminology and the thinking
behind it. 15 But the pace of development behind
relations with China, and to some extent South Korea,
cannot be construed as having bilateral significance
alone, espec iall y since the reve rsa 1 in Russo-J apanese
relations of September 1992- within days of the
cancellation of the visit Moscow was deemed to be
'emphasizing rapprochement with Seoul and Beijing'. 16
It is, given the low-level of Russian economic
involvement in Asia less a question of Russia's ability
to play the 'China card' but of Beijing, or Seoul, to
play the 'Russia card':
If we look at the foreign trade statistics, and not
only trade but different kinds of economic exchange-
technology transfers, financial flows and jOint
ventures, then of course the level of economic
relations between China and Japan is much higher
than between Japan and Russia,- perhaps 5-6 times
higher. So the value of maintaining normal relations
with China for Japan, and with Japan for China is of
course of great significance and any serious damage
in these relations are mutually unacceptable.
The possibilities of Russia influencing greatly
the relations between China and Japan are very
limited... Of course, politically the situation is
more complicated because China has its own vision of
the Asia-Pacific with a very significant role played
by themselves. Politically China can use the closer
relations with Russia in developing their strategy
in the7 region- the use of the Russian card byChina.1
Russia will be correct to think, therefore, that while
it's own level of participation in the Asian economy
currently restricts it ability to use bilateral relations
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to influence third parties, the high level of economic
interdepedence between certain other states make them
particularly vulnerable to shifts towards third parties.
This means that Japan will be highly conscious of the
pace of development of the Sino-Russian relationship and
can be influenced in its own bilateral relations with
both powers by this.
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V Chin~se foreign economic relations with Asia.
In orde r to re-i nforce the comparat ive element the
study of Chinese foreign economic relations with Asia
will follow a similar structure to the preceding section
on the Soviet Union/ Russia. That is, it will consist of
an analysis of the structure of FER, particularly in the
reform era, including a statistical analysis of Chinese
FER with Asia; a discussion of the role of FER in the
domestic economy, particularly as it effects regional
development; and an assessment of Chinese perspectives on







relations in the future.
These, as previously, can be summarised as:
I FER in the reform era;
II The role of FER in China's regional development;
III Chinese perspectives on the future of the Asian
economy.
I FER in the reform era.
China's FER before the beginning of the reform
process were constrained by the interconnected factors of
the domestic political agenda and China's relations with
the outside world, most notably its changing position
bet ween the Communi st and capi tal ist wor 1ds. 1 Thus, the
policy of self-reliance initiated at the time of the
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Great Leap Forward was 1inked to t he breach wi t h the
socialist camp at the end of the 50's; and the first
promotion of the four principles of modernisation
accompan i ed the st rat eg i c ad j ustment wi t h Japan and the
United States in the early seventies. These shifts
indicate that however much China may have been, or felt,
isolated during the first thirty years after the
revolution, it was never completely detached from
international circumstances. Just as the adoption of an
Open Door policy since 1978 does not mean that China is
'open', merely that it is more open than it has been in
the past, so China was never entirely isolated in the
earlier era.
This is revealed in Table 1 which shows China's
trade as a proportion of national income and can be
considered a barometer of China's openness. The years of
a l ignment with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European
communist states saw trade more than double in real terms
and increase as a proportion of national income. The
repercussions of the GLF and the break with the Soviet
Union are evident in the catastrophic fall in national
income and the decline in trade. Since national income
resumed an upward path in the sixties, with the exception
of the two worst years of the Cultural Revolution, the
st agnat i on of trade saw it dec 1i ne as a proport i on of
national income, reaching its lowest point in the early
seventies. The roots of this isolationism are described
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by Chen Gongyen, an economist from a research centre
attached to the State Council:
If the imperialist blockade in the early days of the
republ ic closed the door to the West for us, the
deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations closed the
door tot he East. Economi c blockades by East and
West closed the door from the outside, while our own
self-reliant policy closed the door from the inside.
In the process we moved from an externally imposed
blockade to self isolation. We started with our
traditional society and, through self-reliance,
created an internally circulating economic system.
The results were isolation and economic stagnation
const ra i ned by 1i mi t s on domest i c resou rces. Such
was the economic development model that prevailed in
China for almost 30 years after 1949. 2
As this indicates, the growth in China's trade in the
70's did not arise from any changes in the way China
conducted trade- as will be discussed below China held to
the trade syt em adopt ed from the Sovi et Uni on in the
fifties- but from China's changed perceptions.
Internally, this meant a desire to reconstruct after the
the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, made possible by
the concomitant weakening of the left within the CPC
1eadersh i p; ext erna 11 y, it meant a preparedness to use
the international enviroment to meet strategic needs in
the domestic economy and in foreign policy. In either
case, the concept of self-reliance ceased to be an
absolute.
The level of growth between 1972 and 1978- trade
trebling in real terms and doubling as a proportion of
national income-indicated the extent to which growth in
both trade and the domestic economy had been held back by
the Cultural Revolution. As such this rate of growth was
unsust a i nab 1e but it was nevert he 1ess import ant ; n
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providing momentum to the Open Door policy which was
adopted upon final defeat of the left in 1977.
Before consideration is given to China's FER in the
reform era, it is important to point out that initially
the Chinese reform process had no explicit target model.
Discussion of the influences shaping Chinese views of
economic reform, particularly the influence of change in
Asia, will be given later, but it should be recognised at
this point that reform, particularly in the inita1 period
between 1978 and October 1984, was opened-ended and
exploratory.
With this noted, consideration can be given to the
change in the two main spheres of China's FER: foreign
trade and foreign direct investment (FOI). To divide
these is somewhat arbitrary since, to begin with at
1east, the domi nant form of FOI was compensat ion
agreements where goods were exchanged rather than capital
investment transfers, and the most dramatic growth in
trade in the 1980's was achieved by the sectors which
were based on foreign investment or had access to foreign
funds. Neve rt he 1ess t hey wi 11 be cons i de red separat ely,
beginning with trade.
Prior to the reform of the trading system in 1979,
China's foreign trade structure was closely modelled on
that of the Soviet Union. Almost all transactions were
conducted through a central ministry, the Ministry of
Foreign Trade, (MOFT) with 12 foreign trade corporations
(FTC's) having responsibility for particular sectors. In
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1979 a systemic reform of the foreign trade system was
1aunched, aimed at end ing the predomi nance of the MOFT
which was criticised by the reform faction in the
leadership of bureaucracy and inefficiency in meeting
Ch ina' s needs. A prog ramme of 1arge-sca 1e de-
cent ra1isat ion was int roduced, aimed part icu 1ar 1y at
enterprises in the export sector. Enterprises could
est ab 1ish direct cont act wi th fore ign part ne rs and most
importantly from the viewpoint of establishing incentives
we re ab 1e toga in access to fore ign exchange earn ings.
The admi nist rat ive procedu res for bot h Ch inese and
foreign partners in negotiating imports and exports were
also significantly modified.
A new ministry was created, the Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT), which was to
oversee all important elements of FER: supervision of the
FTC's, the quality of export goods; the customs and
tariffs system; the approval of all FOI in China outwith
the SEZ's and access to foreign exchange earnings;
cont ro1 of expo rt and import 1icenses for st rat eg ic and
essential materials; the setting of export prices for
those goods for which it was directly responsible and the
issu ing of a schedu 1e of export pr ices to prevent undue
competition bet wen enterprises producing similar goods.
Thus MOFERT, even though it did not have a monopoly
of trade, exercised considerable influence over FER,
particularly over the all-important FTC's. This led to
continued conflict between MOFERT and regional
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authorHies and calls for further de-centralisation. The
result was a second round of reform beginning in
September 1984 which saw greater de-centralisation of
trade to lower levels: FTC's became fully independent of
their administrative departments; enterprises acquired
the right to handle trade, including reponsibility for
profits and losses; FTC's would become more like agencies
hand 1i ng trade between Ch i nese and fore i gn part ne rs. As
with the earlier round of reform the initital result of
the centre's concession of control was a sharp expansion
of imports leading to a trade deficit, especially in
1985, so that some central controls had to be re-imposed:
the type of activities in which FTC's could engage were
restricted; the issuing of licences became more elaborate
and trade in part i cu 1ar product s was pl aced under the
direct control of MOFERT.
The t hi rd round of reform began in 1988 wi t h the
adoption of the plan for Restructuring the Foreign Trade
Syst em whi ch i nt roduced a cont ract respons i bi 1it y syst em
and increased reg i ona 1 aut onomy yet again. A key element
was t he deepen i ng i nt eg rat i on of product i on and trade
activities in which the central authoritities encouraged
the merging of production, trading and finance in certain
sectors.
The resulting
i nst i t ut i ona 1 reforms
growth in trade that these
un 1eashed const it ut es one of the
most remarkable phenemena in the current world economy.
Tab 1e 2 shows t hat Ch ina's trade inc reased more than
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five-fold in real terms between 1979 and 1992 with
exports increasing at an even higher rate: average annual
growth rates were 19.5% and 20.5% respectively. Since
this was more than twice the rates of growth in the world
economy as a whole, China's share of world trade
inc reased ina short time ina way that few economi es
have eve r ach ieved. Japan's ernergence as a trad ing power
between the sixties and the seventies is perhaps the only
modern parallel. However, success at the international
level should not be allowed to disguise the complex and
sometimes contradictory relationship between the rapidly
developing externally-oriented economy which supported
much of this growth and the state regulated economy
developed over the preceding forty years.
China's primary method of increasing the external
orientation of it's economy has been geographic and
sectoral targeting. Geographic targeting saw the creation
of spec ia1 economi c zones (Shenz en, Shantou and Zhuha i
SEZ's in Guandong, Xiamen in Fujian, Hainan island) which
along with an increasing number of coastal cities were
given preferential status. This allowed the concentration
of domestic and foreign investment activity, so that
enterprises sustained each other and permitted
development of infrastructure and services within a fixed
sca 1e. The ;mpor t ance of concent rat ing forei gn economi c
activity was proven when the attempt was made to target
particular sectors: the broad base of this strategy,
which covered most of the industrial sectors, meant lower
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and less effective use of investment and much more uneven
resu 1ts. Some sect ors showed an inc rease in the ir share
of export s- text i1es and 1ight indust ria1 goods, for
examp1e- but this was not true of all, particularly the
heavy industrial sector whose share declined.
This imbalanced development gave rise to two
problems which were the direct consequence of the
target ing po 1icy: the first was the impact of the Open
Door policies on regional development within China, which
wi 11 be di scussed in the next sect ion; the second
concerned the nature of the relationship between the new
economy and the 01d- were Ch ina's deve 1opment a1 needs
best met by allowing the rapid, but also apparently
separate, growth of the externally oriented economy or by
the cont inued prot ect ion and gradua 1 deve 1opment of the
domestically based economy? Clearly the answer to this
question would determine the nature of China's trade
strategy, as was recognised by Chinese foreign trade
specialists:
Trade protection clearly differs from trade policy
under a system of trade liberalisation. The
strategies of trade protectionism and trade
liberalisation are ultimately the greatest issue in
economic development and international economics.
They not only relate to the level of a country's
economic development, foreign economic development
pat tern and st rategy, the 1eve 1 of domest ic
productivity development and differences between
internat iona 1 ones, issues of the int ernat iona 1
development environment and domestic economic
conditions at different time periods, but
furthermore also relate to the complex nature of the
antagoni sm and transformat ion between the two
different trade strategies at different periods.3
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During the years of self-reliance China's primary trade
strategy was necessarily one of import substitution:
since China lacked the exports to pay for imports from
abroad, domestic demand had to be suppressed and key
sectors of i ndust ry target ed for import subst it ut ion.
Th is arrangement s reproduced all the fau 1t s of t hat of
the Soviet Union on which it was based: the outstripping
of supply by demand and the lag in the life-cycle of
product s meant t here was 1 itt 1e scope for export i ng and
institutionalised import substitution. Yet imports needed
for t he product; on of subst i t ut es had to be pa id for by
traditional exports, mainly primary products, and thus
China exported to import, rather than imported to export.
The liberalisation of trade begun in 1978 could not
change t he fundament a 1 st ruct u re of Ch ina's trade: the
low level of China's development constrained the ability
to export manuf act u res and thus the expans i on of import s
to meet domestic demand could only be met by increasing
export of raw materials. Table 8 shows that export of
primary goods increased up to 1985 to meet soaring
imports of manufactures and only declined thereafter as
export of manufactures took off. This indicates that
China continued to operate an import substitution trade
strategy after the Open Door policy was introduced, and
that the initial purpose in creating the externally
oriented zones was to increase the production of exports
to pay for imports. It is not until the mid-80's when the
impact of FDI came into play that it was possible to
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argue that China was moving away from import substitution
towards export orientation. The problem then became that
China was pursuing a dual policy to meet the needs of
both the old and new economies with little crossover
between the two, as argued by Chen:
A trade st ruct u re whi ch makes raw mat er i a 1s
substitution and exchange as the nucleus illustrates
that in the course of the expansion of our country's
trade the slow st ruct ura 1 changes are main 1y caused
by the restrictions imposed by the slow up-grading
process of the domest i c i ndust ria 1 st ruct u re; and
that, conversely. the trade expansion in recent
years has obviously played no promotional role in
t he changes in the domest i c i ndust ria 1 st ruct u re.
Hence the phenomenon of trade expansion and
indust ria 1 st ruct u r a 1 changes promot i ng each ot her
that are seen in certain newly rising industrialised
countries or regions did not fully appear in the
course of trade expansion in the 1980's in our
country.4
The failure of the Open Door policy to significantly
alter the structure of the pre-reform economy, and the
geographic and sectoral imbalances arising from the
incipient dual economy, underlay the significant changes
in the 8t h FYP and the 10-year prog ramme adopt ed by the
8th National Peoples Congress in 1991. The shift from the
theory of a 'planned commodity economy' dominant in the
80's to a socialist market economy in the 90's was aimed
at further liberating the productive forces from the
restrictions of the old system. The key to this was to be
the introduction of market practices in the state sector
and a further shift in the balance between the state
sector and non-state sectors (around equal size in 1991)
in favour of the latter. The other main change was the
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expansion of the Open Door policy to the interior, the
implication of which will be discussed below.
Key areas of growth identified were China's tertiary
i ndust ry- comme rce, trade, finance, transport at i on- and
science and technology. How successful these policies
will be both economically, in raising the productive
capacity of the old economy, and politically, given the
impact of market i sat ion on pri ces and the 1abour market,
remains to be seen. What is not in doubt is that the Open
Door policy as it operated at the end of the first decade
was not considered an uncritical success. As suggested, a
central criticism was whether trade, and in particular
trade in high volumes of labour-intensive products,
represent ed the pri mary answe r to Ch i na' s deve 1opment a 1
problems.
China's major trade problem in the 80's was the
declining macroeconomic benefit derived from exports.
Thus while in the initial years of the open door, 1978-
81, macroeconomic values derived from exports rose 114%
compared to volume increase of 55%, over the following
six years to 1987 economi c values rose on 1y 66% despit e
an increase of volume of 125%. There were several reasons
for this: the de-centralisation of trade, changes in the
market and currency values, but the primary one was the
attempt to expand earnings by increasing volume rather
t hen by i nt ens i fyi ng export Qual it y. Among t he dangers
inherent in t his were the unproduct i ve use of Ch i na' s
limited domestic resources and the fact that it fell foul
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of the protectionism practised by China's export
partners:
It is a special characteristic of trade
protectionism, as practiced by the developed
countries of the western world, that they frequently
restrict the volume of import commodities, but do
not restrict the unit prices of imported
commodities. Export intensification will raise
forei gn exchange earn i ngs of the sing 1e un its of
export products through improved qual ity and higher
grades of products, and may thus be able to
circumvent the trade p'rot ect ion i st rest r i ct ions of
the Western countries. 5
But even more than this, the attempt to increase export
earnings through volume encouraged the belief that China
could find a secure and permanent place in the
i nt ernat i ona 1 economy simp 1y by harness i ng its enormous
labour power, yet this ran contrary to all the evidence
which suggested that labour power was declining in
import ance. Luo Long of the Int ernat i ona 1 Trade Research
Institute:
This objective trend tells us that the nature of the
world economic enviroment is no longer as it was in
the 1950's and 1960's when the 'four little dragons'
of Asia enjoyed their success. The fact that others
were successful in following a certain road
yest e rday does not mean t hat we wi 11 en j oy success
by following the same road today. In particular we
are such a 1arge nat ion, and t he re is no way we
could ever rely on 'exploiting advantages' to fill
in market gaps like other small nations have. If we
devote our future primarily to labour intensive
i ndust ry, it 'wi 11 neve r support us, and it cou 1d put
us in a terminal condition. Moreover, we cannot rely
on even simple labour force alone, aided by cheap
prices and quantity. The key lies in the quality of
labour and productivity.6
These limitations to the Open Door po l f cy mean that the
whole issue of China's trade strategy remains
contentious: in effect, the question of how reliant China
should be on its international economic relations and how
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much it should remain self-reliant remains very much
alive. For some the fact that trade can never by itself
generate sufficient growth in a country the size of China
is an argument for 9iving precedence tot he deve 1opment
of the domest ic economy, though aided by the ext erna 1
economy, which can accelerate structural transformation,
develop comparative advantage, and increase resource
ut i1i sat ion and management ef ficiency. Zhang Yansheng of
the Central College of Finance and Monetary Studies:
In sum, the core of the matter is continued
improvement of resource efficiency in China's
economi c syst em, not just highe r income from trade,
nor even worse, having everything serve income
generation from exports. After turning China into a
re 1at ive 1y open economy, we cannot be high 1y trade
dependent like smaller countries. 7
For others, however, the converse is true: the limited
impact of the Open Door pol icy is prec ise 1y the product
of the attempt to confine FER to trade and inward
investment in the export sect or and in turn ra ises the
whole Question of how open China really is.
Luo, for example, is concerned unless the
considerable expansion in China's foreign trade be taken
for the predomi nant form of open ing to the internat iona 1
economy. Thus while China's position as a world trading
power improved greatly since 1979 and its degree of
openness (imports and exports as a proportion of GNP) was
greater than the US, the Soviet Union, and even Japan, it
still lagged behind in crucial respects. China
participated very little in the international division of
1abour, in either intra-departmental or inter-
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departmental forms; China's involvement in labour trade
accounted for only 4% of total trade, while it comprised
20% of India's; China's FDI was minimal- at $700m it
represented less than 0.1% of world FDI. These indicate
that in terms of a comprehensive index of openness China
had yet to reach the level attained by India, a country
of comparable size and development level, close to 20
years ago. Thus,
AIthough fore i gn trade is one element t hat goes to
make up openness in the whole economy and
development in this area can bring about higher
deg rees of openness in t he economy as a who 1e, if
foreign trade is an isolated vehicle and the other
areas are i d1 e, then the overa 11 1eve 1 of openess in
the national economy will suffer.8
For those who favour further liberalisation China's
economic development demands greater internationalisation
of economic activity by expanding into areas such as
1abou r trade and technology exchange but t he key f act or
had to be greater participation in the international
division of labour, so that China ceased to be solely a
buyer and se 11 er of product s and became a fu 11
participant in international production systems. This
will mean ever more complex forms of international
cooperation in which China must become a supplier as well
as a rec i pi ent of overseas investment and develop it's
own international corporations. This will mean not only a
change in trade strategy but in how China interacts with
the international economy. This leads directly on to
consideration of the second cr t t t ca l component in the
Open Door policy- foreign capital.
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The immense capit a1 requ ired to finance the reform
programme could never have been generated by the domestic
economy or from foreign aid. Thus China moved to attract
international capital in two major forms: foreign
investment and internat iona 1 loans. These we re
indivisibly linked since only by generating income from
exports could loan repayments be met. Thus China's
ability to take on international loans depended on its
ability to attract foreign investors to the export-
oriented sector. The slow initial growth in the use of
foreign capital shown in Table 9 is evidence of the time
lag in this relationship and also the caution with which
bot h Ch ina and forei gn invest ors and inst itut ions
initially approached one another. Thus in the first four
years of the Open Door China used over $US10bn in foreign
loans but received only $US1.7bn in FOI; in the next four
years fore ign loans were s1ight 1y 1ess at $US9. 8bn but
FOI grew to $US6.5bn and this made possible the faster
uptake of foreign loans -$US25.1bn- between 1987 and
1990. However, what is most noteworthy of the years 1988-
91 is that while foreign loans uptake levelled off around
the US$6-7bn p.a. level, FO! continued to rise despite
the convulsions 1989-90, reaching $US4.3bn in 1991.
This indicates that China's ability to repay its
debts continued to improve. According to Beijing Review,







proprotion to earnings from exports) and debt ratio
(loans in proportion to GOP) China's rating of 10% and
11% respectively are well below accepted high-risk levels
of 25% and 20%. China's effective management of its loans
are said to be indicated by the increase in foreign
currency reserves to US$40bn in 1992.9
However, this may lead to a situation in the near
future where China, due to growth of export earnings, GOP
and reserves, fails to meet the criteria for preferential
loans from international institutions. China has used the
long-term and low-interest loans from the World Bank and
the Asian Development Bank to develop key sectors of the
national economy





governments and commercial credits have been used mainly
to buy equipment from lender countries and to increase
the technology levels of Chinese industry. As China's
ability to qualify for preferential loans declines
fund ing for st ruct ura1 investment wi 11 have to be found
from within the domestic budget and in the form of
commercial loans.
The most striking change in the structure of China's
commercial loans in the latter part of the 80's has been
the decline in importance of Japan, as shown in Table 9.
While still the most important single source of loans in
1991 China had diversified its debt structure to avoid
dependence on Japan and to take account of it's trading
st ruct ure: Ch ina had to repay Japanese loans in Yen- an
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increasingly strong currency- despite the fact that most
of its export earnings were in dollars.
As suggested, China's ability to sustain loans was
increasing primarily because of the growth of the export-
oriented sector which was being created with the backing
of the second form of overseas capital- direct
investment. The deci si on to allow fore i gn access tot he
domestic economy for the first time since the breach with
the Sovi et Uni on was remarkab 1e not 1east because the
economi c zones echoed the old, and much-hat ed, canton
system of the past, even to geographic location, being
cent red in areas t hat had been treat y port s (Shant ou,
Xi amen) or near enc1 aves t hat were the 1ast remnant s of
the era of foreign domination (Hong Kong, Macao). While,
clearly, the difference with the SEZ's is that they would
remain under China's jurisdiction, retaining
macroeconomic control over overseas investment has proved
as difficult as controlling trade. Thus while the basic
structure of the open economy still has both origin and
end ove rseas- fore i gn investment d r i vi ng an export
or i ent ed sect or- t here has been i ncreas i ng pressu re for
access to the domestic market.
Thus, the slow inita1 growth in foreign investment
reflected both the absence of a commercial and legal
framework but also the reluctance of the Chinese to allow
fu 11 access tot he domest i c market or the conversi on of
renminbi into foreign currency, which would allow export
of profits. Conversely the rapid expansion in FDI in
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recent years is not on1y evi dence of growi ns invest or
conf i dence but of t he be1i ef that the openi ng of the
Chi nese economy is i r reversi b1e and wi 11 be ext ended to
the domestic market in time.
Between 1979 and 1992 90,109 enterprises were
approved with foreign investment of $108.9bn, $34.16bn of
which was realised. Of these 58,374 (64.8% of national
total) were equity JV's, in which Chinese and foreign
partners share prof its, losses and risks,
requiring$50.36bn (46.2% of funds pledged), of which
$17.55bn (51.4% of funds realised) was invested; 16,784
(18.6%) were Sino-foreign contractual JV's, in which the
foreign investor provides technology or finance and China
provides land, labour, materials, and so on, requiring
$31.3bn (28.7%) of which $8.19bn (24%) was invested; and
14,870 (16.5%) were wholly foreign owned, requiring
$23.76bn (21.8%) of which $5.03bn (14.7%) was invested.
There have been ot her, 1esse r, forms such as cooperat i ve
developments and the compensation agreements mentioned
earlier in which foreign partners provide the resources
in exchange for a share of t he product s, but the sanz i-
"three foreign-founded"- forms above have predominated.10
By the end of 1991 more than 40,000 foreign funded
enterprises had been approved with capital of $50bn
involved. In the first half of 1992 a further $10.4bn had
been committed, close to three times the level of the
same period -in the previous year. An estimated 3.25
million people were employed in FOI entreprises. 11
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As well as varying considerably in scale since the
start of the Open Door policy, the location and impact of
FOI have changed considerably. As of 1992, as well as the
the five SEZ's, there were fifteen open cities, with 18
development zones within them; 61 prefectural level
cities, 43 county-level cities and 186 counties, in the
Liaodong peninsula, the Bohai Bay, the Yangtse and
Zhujiang river deltas and southern Fujian, were
designated open areas; eight interior cities- Harbin,
Chanchun, Shenyang, Xian, Nanjing, Wuhan, Chengdu and
chonq i ng- were des i gnat ed as havi ng independent p1ann i ng
power and the same status as provinces in terms of FOI;
and, of cou rse, cons ide rab 1e emphas is was made of the
development of the Pudong Project. But the available
evidence does not suggest that all these areas are either
equal recpients of FOI or contribute equally to exports
and GOP.
I n an import ant st udy of t he re 1at i onshi p between
foreign investment and economic change in China, Y.Y.
Kueh est i mat ed that the 11 Open coast a 1 reg ions took
close to an average of 80% share of FOI throughout the
80's but with this was far from equally distributed, with
Guangdong in particular taking a predominant position.12
While the pioneer areas for FOI experienced a relative
decline in their share of FOI as new areas were opened
up, Guangdong's 46% of national total in 1990 (1985: 60%)
and of its three SEZ's- 18% (1985: 29%) still gave it a
commanding position. The leading SEZ, Shenzen, never took
181
a lesser share of FOI than any other province or
municipality, including Beijing and Shanghai, and has
been consistantly twice as high as Guangzhou, only 60
miles away. The general shift in the direction of FOI
1ocat i on has been nort hwards along t he coast rat he r than
into the interior despite the desire of inland provinces
to attract investment.
In sectoral terms there was a significant shift
during the 80's between services and construction which
were the preferred sectors for investment in the initial
period towards manufacturing. This is not true of all
areas, however: some of the ' 1at e-comers' such as
Shanghai and Hainan are still service oriented and it is
overwhelmingly the case with Beijing which has attracted
little in the way of manufacturing. The areas which have
experienced the shift to manufacturing investment have
been those with good access to world markets such as
Guangdong and Fujian, indicating the primary purpose of
FOI in pursuing export markets.
As with receipt of FOI, however, contribution to
exports and to ouput as a whole has varied widely.
According to Kueh, sanzi's nationally contributed 17% of
total GVIO and more than half of exported GVIO by the
beginning of the 1990's but with SEZ sanzi's contributing
a much higher proportion in their areas- 55% of GVIO and
76% of exports- compared to those in the coastal cties-
9% and 37% respectively. When considered in terms of
export earnings sanzi's share rose from 5% in 1988 to 17%
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in 1991 but again with significant variation between
regions: SEZ sanzi's- 46%, Fujian- 41%, Guangdong- 29%,
Shangha i and Be ij ing- 11s , There was above all a marked
bias towards Guangdong and its SEZ's, which contributed
66% of all sanz i export s, though the gap between the
regions did narrow as the newer areas began to establish
themselves. The same pattern was apparent in sanzi
imports with the ratio of exports to imports much closer
for SEZ's (1:1.15) than for the open coastal cities
(1:2.68) and with Guangdong and its SEZ's having a
predominant position among the open coastal provinces.
The imbalance in location of FOI and contribution to
output and exports is a serious problem with political
and demographic implications as well as the obvious
economi cones, as wi 11 be discussed in the fort hcomi ng
section on regional development. This said, however, the
success of the sanz i's has been remarkab 1e and if the
newer coastal area's can close the gap on the established
areas, then sanzi exports may rise to a third of the
national total by the mid-90's. However, this will be
dependant not only on internal political and economic
stability and China's standing in the international
economy, particularly its readmission to GATT and its MFN
status, but also on the availability of investment. Table
9 indicates that Hong Kong, which contributed less than
half China's FOI in only one year and approached two-
thirds in others, has long played the crucial role. While




the desi re of
in China, the
Hong Kong capital to
possibility funds from
other sources is less clear.
The most promising prospect may be Taiwan,
particularly if political detente can lead to the lifting
of Taipei's ban on direct commercial, navigational and
postal links with the mainland. With a population three
times that of Hong Kong (20m), exports over twice that of
Hong Kong, and comparable per capita income, Taiwan would
be well placed to emulate Hong Kong in transferring its
labour intensive export production to the mainland. The
significant difference arises in Taiwan's foreign
exchange reserves, at US$80bn the largest in the world.
The est ab 1ishment of formal re1at ions wi th Sout h
Korea opens the prospect of expanding direct investment,
particularly in northern coastal provinces such as
Shandong. But no other country has the resources of
Japan, and yet it is Japan's role that is most ambiguous.
Japan's FOI into China in the latter 80's was no greater
than its investment into Indonesia and remained
relatively constant while other countries expanded
theirs. This may indicate that Japan considers itself
suitably compensated by the purchase of its technology
either by Chinese enterprises using state loans or
overseas investors setting up sanzi's in China, but
equa 11y there may be 1ess comfort ab 1e expl anat ions. The
first is that Japanese investors regard the Chinese
domestic market, still protected and regulated, as being
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the main prize. Yet if China is sensitive to external
control of its core economy, then it must be considered
doubly so when the country seeking that control is Japan.
Japanese desire to penetrate the Chinese domestic economy
wi 11 cont inue to be an argument against 1ibe ra1isat ion
rather than for it for many years to come. Secondly, the
expansion of Japanese investment into the Southeast Asian
states may indicate not only that Japan favours economic
relationships that it controls, but also the prospect for
competitive, as well as cooperative, economic relations
in the Asia-Pacific region. In essence, will the Asia-
Pacific economy of the future be based upon Sino-Japanese
partnership or Sino-Japanese rivalry? Neither power knows
the answer to this but it is likely that they are
preparing for either outcome. Such considerations are
also apparent if consideration is given to China's trade
relations with Asia which will be considered next.
The nature of China's trade with Asia has been
determined by shifting political relations with other
Asian states and China's desire to harness the changes in
the regional economy in order to achieve the aims of the
domestic reform programme.
As shown in Table 3, by 1978 China's trade with Asia
already comprised over 40% of its total trade, and had
done so for a number of years. As trade expanded in the
years after the Cultural Revolution, China's trade with
Asia became ever more important. This is particularly
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clear if China's trade with Hong Kong is excluded. Thus
Asia's share of China's trade without the Hong Kong
factor rose from an average of 20.7% in the 1960's to
29.3% in the 1970's. If the Middle East countries are
included then China's Asia trade already comprised half
its total trade by the time the Open Door policies began
to take effect.
What Table 4 shows, however, is that while China's
Asia trade as a whole trebled in the 1980's, from
US$23.5bn in 1981 to US$68.7bn in 1990, reaching close to
60% of total trade in that year, Asia trade excluding
Hong Kong, increased at a slower rate in real terms, and
thus declined as a share of total trade. While in the
first half of the 80's Asia trade less Hong Kong averaged
37% of world total, this declined to an average of 28% in
the second half of the decade. Moreover, while the
. balance of China's Asia trade as a whole showed a surplus
in 8 out of the 10 years under consideration,
particularly at either end of the decade, without Hong
Kong the balance shows five deficit years and five
surplus, with the surpluses much less significant. The
explanation for this lay in two areas- firstly and most
obviously, the trade relationship with Hong Kong;
secondly, the shifting nature of China's relationship
with other Asian partners.
The relationship with Hong Kong is by far the most
important for China's foreign trade but how it operates
is far from clear from statistics alone. This is because
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China, and also other powers with which China did not
have official relations in the period under
consideration, used Hong Kong to disguise the direction
of trade. In China's case Hong Kong has also been used to
disguise surpluses and circumvent restrictions,
particularly with the industrial powers. From the point
of China's statistical records, as shown in Table 4, Hong
Kong doubled its share of China's Asia trade between 1981
and 1990 to over 60%, increasing six-fold in real terms
from US$6.9bn to US$41.5bn. Both imports and exports rose
rapidly but there was a disproportionate rise in imports
which meant that China's surplus with Hong Kong shrank
from an average 44.8% p.a. of total trade between 1981
and 1985, to 26.8% p, a. between 1986 and 1990, as Hong
Kong became the primary conduit for goods and materials
into the new sectors of the economy.
Thi s i ndi cat es t he real meani ns of Hong Kong for
China under the Open Door- that it increasingly ceased to
be an independent factor in foreign economic relations
comparable to China's other Asian trade partners and
developed a symbiotic relationship with the Chinese
economy. In this sense the SEZ's and coastal cities
developed under the Open Door policy, predominantly in
the South, were mirror images of Hong Kong- both operated
as control valves between the international economy and
the still predominantly state regulated Chinese economy.
The role of Hong Kong is indicated more clearly by
the st at i st i cs of t he Hong Kong gove rnment in Tab1e 5.
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These show that as an economic partner proper China
doub 1ed its share of Hong Kong's trade between 1979 and
1989, providing a third of Hong Kong's imports by the
latter year, establishing itself as Hong Kong's main
supplier ahead of Japan (17%) and Taiwan (11%). But China
also established itself as a market-place for Hong Kong's
goods. From what had been a very low level in 1979, China
rose to second place (19.3%) behind the US, (32%). This
was all the more significant because Hong Kong's trade
with the rest of Asia remained proportionately constant.
Thus imports from China rose to within 5% of the combined
total of the rest of Asia by 1989, while exports to China
superceded other Asian exports by a similar figure.
While such trade would have made China and Hong Kong
important partners in any circumstance, this growth was
compounded by the expansi on of re-export trade- the re-
export of products which have not undergone a
manuf acturing process whi ch has changed pe rmanent 1y the
shape, nature, form or utility of the basic materials.
Re-exports expanded from 14.4% share of Hong Kong's total
trade in 1979 to 30.5% in 1989, ensuring a surplus in
trade which would have been impossible from standard
trade alone. China played by far the most significant
role in the expansion of this form of trade. In 1979
already 28.3% of re-exports originated in China
comprising 3.5% of Hong Kong's total trade; by 1989 54.3%
of re-exports originated in the PRC constituting 16.6% of
tot a1 trade. As for the dest ;nat; on for re-export s the
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expansion of China's role was even more marked: from 6.6%
(or less than 1% of total trade) in 1979 to 34.5% (9.5%
of total trade) in 1988, the decline in 1989 being due to
the domestic crisis of that year which will be discussed
below.
Since the proportion of Hong Kong's re-exports
dest ined for As ia rema ined const ant throughout the
period, the expansion of China's role meant that it
overtook the rest of Asia combined as the destination for
the bulk of Hong Kong's re-exports. Three Asian countries
were responsible for more than half this re-export trade
into China: Japan (22.6%), Taiwan (21.9%), and South
Korea (7.5%), with the US (9.8%) the most important of
the western powers. China also used Hong Kong as a port
for transportation to other parts of the PRC: this
accounted for 11% of Hong Kong's re-export trade in 1989,
for example. The flow of re-exports is reversed, however,
when considering the destination of re-exports from China
to other countries.
Complete figures for re-exports originating in Asia
as a whole are not available, only for selected
countries. The 54.3% of Hong Kong's re-export trade
originating in China in 1989 significantly exceded that
of Japan (11%), Taiwan (7.7%), or the US (6.4%). In
contrast to Asia's role as the the main source of re-
exports into China the three major Asian states- Japan,
Taiwan and South Korea- took only 14% of re-exports
originating in China with western industrialised
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countries- the US, the UK, Germany and Canada- accounting
for 48%. By far the biggest share was taken by the US
(35%), a source of considerable friction between the two
powers.
Thus it is possible to delineate Hong Kong's
importance for China: it is an important trading partner
in its own right but equally it has allowed China to
conduct trade which would have been either politically or
economically sensitive if conducted directly, not least
the predominance of Asia as the source of re-exports into
China but the western countries as their predominant
dest inat ion.
While the importance of the west both in direct and
indirect trade is undeniable, China's trade relationships
are not immutable, as the attempt to impose economic
sanctions upon China after the events of 4 June 1989
showed. The impact of the industrialised countries'
attempt to bring economic pressure to bear on China and
China's response to it are shown in the figures in Table
10. Clearly China's economic rectification and in
particular the devalution of the Renminbi at the end of
1989 had a considerable impact on imports and the overall
decline in 1990 is particularly noticeable if Hong Kong
imports are excluded. However, this change was far from
evenly distributed: imports from the industrialised
states declined by US$4.9bn but imports from Asian
countries actually increased by US$2.3bn- an increase of
over 50% on 1989. This trend was maintained in 1991: even
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though imports from the industrialised countries returned
to their 1989 mark, those from Asia increased twice as
fast, leaving China imports from Asia more than double
what they had been in 1989.
A si mil ar pat t ern appears wi t h regard to export s.
While the industrialised countries could not halt the
growth of China's exports, there seems to have been a
consc i ous at tempt to seek export market sin As i a for
Chinese goods after 1989: exports to the industrialised
states grew 15% in 1990 and 14% in 1991 but the increases
to Asia were 49.9% and 20.9% in the respective years. As
a result, China's exports to Asia excluding Japan and
Hong Kong increased from 15% to 22% of China's exports.
Two significant implications arise from this. Firstly
while Asia cannot yet provide a substitute for the
industrialised countries, particularly as export markets,
China sought and found economic partners in Asia when
faced with pressure from the major industrial powers.
This is a lesson which will not have been lost, not only
on Beijing, but on other Asian governments. Secondly,
with the Hong Kong factor excluded, the difference in the
declining share of all Asian countries in China's trade
indicated in Table 4 and the increasing share indicated
in Table 10 can only be due to one country- Japan- which
was designated in the first instance as an Asian country
but in the second as an industrial power.
Japan has been an import ant trade partner for the
PRC since the the time of the breach with the Soviet
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Union and the crisis of the GLF but it was the
normalisation of relations in the 1970's that saw trade
turnover expand consistantly between 1972 and 1978, from
just over US$1bn to US$4.8bn, before doubling to US$9.2
in the first two years of the Open Door policy. What has
occurred in trade relations since, however, indicates a
more tortuous relationship, as indicated in Table 6.
Japan's share of China's trade continued to expand up to
the mid-80's but with an ever widening gap in the balance
of trade. The US$9bn deficit with Japan in 1985
constituted close to two-thirds of China's total deficit
that year and represented the high water mark in China's
willingness to trade on unequal terms with Japan. After
1985 imports from Japan were curtailed and had not
regained their 1985 level in real terms even by 1992.
While China's exports to Japan continued to increase in
real terms they did so less quickly than exports as a
whole and as a result Japan's share of China's total
exports also declined.
The change in Japan's importance as an economic
partner for China- a halving of share of total trade in
five years- is noticeable even when placed in a solely
Asian context as indicated by Table 4. This shows that in
1985 Japan accounted for half of all China's Asia trade
and a staggering 69% of all Asia imports. By 1990 these
figures had been more than halved to 24% and 29.3%
respectively, while Japan's share of China's Asia exports
fell by a third. Clearly Hong Kong's re-export trade
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accounts in part for this but if Hong Kong is removed as
a factor and only China's direct trade with Asia is
considered Japan's share of total trade still fell from
75% to 61% and Asia imports from 89% to 65%. Japan's
share of this form of China's Asia exports stayed around
the same at over 50%.
What these figures indicate is that while there is
st i 11 an import ant re 1at i onsh i p between Ch ina and Japan,
it is becomi ng a much 1ess unequal one and not on 1y
because Japan's trade volume was only three times greater
than China's by 1992 rather seven times as it was in
1980. The balance in China's trade is shifting from the
industrial powers to Asia, reflected in the Asian context
by ash i f t from J a pan too the r As ian s tat e s , and it i s
this which accounts for the apparent decline in China's
Asia trade share of total trade. It remains to be
considered which are the area's of growth in China's Asia
trade.
This is complicated because the figures do not
indicate China's relations with a number of countries
with which it did not have official relations, including
two of the four NIC's, South Korea and Taiwan. These,
along with the Soviet Union and its successor states, can
only be considered under the section on future bi-1atera1
relations. If the other two NIC's are taken as
indicators, however, then their increasing importance
both as markets and sources of technology can be judged.
Hong Kong has been considered but China's total trade
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with Singapore increased four-fold in ten years with
considerable surpluses in all years. This paralleled
growth with ASEAN as a whole, which more than trebled in
real terms over the period retaining a constant share of
China's trade. Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia all rose
in promimence to just under 2% of total trade each,
though China commonly ran a deficit with them. Trade with
the Philippines also expanded, if more modestly.
Chi na' s success in expandi ng in East Asi a was not
matched outwith it, however, where it's trade re1at ions
were constrained by economic and political factors. The
Middle East which must have seemed a promising region at
the beginning of the Open Door policy remained constant
in real terms and thus fell in terms of share of Asia
trade with export share in particular halving to an
average of less than 1% in the second half of the decade.
There was no clear political factor in this with trade
declining with countries as diverse as Saudia, Syria and
Jordan. The one exception to the trend in the Middle East
was Iran with wh ich Ch ina sought to inc rease trade and
political contacts.
In South Asia, China faced both political and
economic constraints, the former primarily with regard to
India and the latter with the other South Asian states'
ability to pay for exports. Despite rising to US$264m in
1990 as relations between the two powers improved towards
the end of the 80's, trade between China and India
remained low given the enormous export potential of the
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two markets. China's most important South Asian trade
partner was Pakistan which took half of all China's
exports to the region, but as with the other South Asian
countries, this was at the expense of its trade balance
indicating that the major obstacle to further expansion
of trade was economic.
No figures have been given for China's economic
relations with the socialist states since these were
negligible. Only the DPRK ranked as a significant partner
and even here since trade did not increase in real terms
over the period its share of China's trade fell by two-
thirds to less than 1% by 1990.
It is therefore possible to conclude that while
China is seeking to develop its economic relations
towards Asia both to gain economic advantage and to avoid
over-dependence on the indust ria 1 powe rs, inc 1ud i ng
Japan, this process is still in an embryonic stage. The
role of the Asian NIC's may be particularly significant
given their potential as markets, as sources of
technology transfer, and as links into Southeast Asia.
Two provisos must be added to this, however. Firstly,
trade is only one form of economic relations and must be
considered within the wider context of economic exchange
including, most importantly, direct investment; secondly,
statistics reveal little about political concerns and it
must be recognised that China and its economic partners
see the i r economi c re 1at ions as not separat e but
complementary to their political interests. How this will
195
influence China's ability to become a major Asian
economic power remains to be considered.
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II The impact of FER on China's regional development.
The balance of reg i ona 1 deve 1opment whi ch the CPC
inherited on coming to power was extremely uneven. The
coast a 1 provi nces had always been t he most deve loped and
there were significant disparities in distribution of
economic acitvity and settlement between the eastern and
western areas of the country. Changing this imbalance
became one of China's major goals of post-revolutionary
development. The achievement of a geographically balanced
distribution of production was in accordance not only
with the CPC's ideological commitments, particularly in
end i ng the cont r ad i ct i on bet ween t own and count ry, but
also with the political, economic and strategic demands
of building a strong nation. Thus the First FYP (1953-56)
stated:
the unbalanced concent rat i on of ou r i ndust ri es in
t he east coast is ve ry un reasonab 1e in terms of
economic efficiency as well as national defence. The
regional distribution of industrial construction
should be based on long-term national interest.
Industry should be located rationally, close to
areas producing raw materials and fuel or the areas
of highest consumption in the country, and for the
benefit of the consolidation of national defence, so
as gradually to improve this unreasonable situation
and raise the economic level of those backward
regions. 1
For thirty years after the revolution, therefore, one of
the principle objectives of the planned economy was the
reduct i on of the extreme differences in reg i ona 1
development. The monopoly the state enjoyed in matters of
economic development gave it considerable powers to
achieve this. Equally, however, the reform policy of the
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80' s, based as it was on de-cent r a 1i sat i on of economi c
management and all owi ng ext e rna 1 economi c forces access
to the domestic economy, was to break this monopoly. Thus
the impact of the reforms on China's regional development
has become a crucial issue, and once again not only in
economic terms but because of its political and security
implications. First, however, the conduct of China's
regional policy in the preceding thirty years must be
considered. According to Guo Wanqing, a specialist in
China's regional development, the state employed four
major instruments in regional policy:
t ) d i st r i but i on of st at e canst ruct i on and deve 1opment :
during the period 1953-80, 57% of state investment was
made in the central and western regions. Most new large-
scale iron and steel complexes, manufacturing projects,
chemical plants, power stations, and coal mines were
located in the central and western regions and formed the
basis of new industrial centres and new cities. As a
resu It , t he cent ra 1 and west ern reg ions share of
industrial fixed assets, labour force and GVIO all grew.
t i ) state finance: this was the most important instrument
for reduc i ng
revenue and
regional disparities. A unified system of
expend it u re target s was creat ed unde r the
central government but without a functional link between
the two beneath this level. Thus, those areas unable to
meet revenue 1eve 1s we re subs id i sed f rom cent ra 1 funds.
The bulk of these lay in the central and western regions:
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this in 1983 14 out of 18 were net beneficiaries to the
tune of 10bn yuan.
iii) all ocat i on of 1abou r fo rce: cent ra 1 government has
been able to transfer population to meet economic and
other objectives. During the period 1949-79 inter-
provincial migration amounted to 25-30 million with 50%-
60% of this to Heilongjiang, Qinhai, Inner Mongolia,
Xinjiang and Ningxia.
t v ) income distribution: from an early date China has
pursued a policy aimed at equalisation of income levels.
For industrial workers this involved the adoption of
national income levels which guaranteed wage levels for
the same work throughout the country. For peasants there
was a syst em of t ax reduct ions and subs id i es to poorer
areas. While there were fluctuations in the central
governments commitment to this principle, in the main
China made considerable progress toward income
equalisation.
This regional policy had a number of positive
results: the creation of industrial bases in the central
and western regions; a reduction in the inter-regional
rat e of deve 1opment; and the equal i sat i on of income at
the national level. However, the overall results in
reducing the developmental gap between east and west were
not significant: while the rate of development was
equalised the levels of development as whole remained
const ant. Thus in 1983, seven of the ni ne west ern




on central funding for




Moreover, this regional policy had the effect of
depressing growth in the coastal regions. These
cont r i but ed 90% of st at e revenue but ave rage expend it u re
amounted to only half of the revenue collected. As a
resu It, east coast provi nces we re unab 1e to ret a in and
commit the sort of funds needed to renew their industrial
structure. It also prevented the development of the
infrastructure essential to future growth, particularly
in the energy and transport sectors, and in social
const ruct ion. Thus Guo argues that the ach i evement sin
reg i ona 1 equa 1 i sat i on had been at t he expense of the
overall growth in the national economy attainable if the
eastern coast had been allowed to retain and commit it's
revenues in industrial and social development.
Thus, it was the imperative of securing national
economic growth under the reform policy which led to the
modification of regional policy. The reform policy has
impact ed on reg i ona 1 deve 1opment ina numbe r of ways.
Firstly, the transition from a planned economy to a
soc i ali st market economy has eroded t he scope for the
plan to influence economic distribution. De-
centralisation of economic management has been
accompanied by changes in the financial relationship
between cent re and provi nces. Whi 1e the provi nces st i 11
cont r i but e and rece i ve fund i ng from t he cent ra 1 budget,
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there has been considerable increase in the amount and
sources of other funds available to provinces, dependent
on the extent of their involvement in the externally
ori ent ed economy. As wi 11 be discussed in more det ail
below, the centering of the Open Door policy on the East
coast, while rational given its external ties, industrial
base, infrastructure, and higher scientific and
technological level, has significantly contributed to
expanding differential growth rates.
The changes in regional policy announced in the
Seventh FYP in 1986 were only belated recognition of the
changes the reform policy was bringing about in regional
development. These did not mean that China has abandoned
the aim of achieving full development but the abandonment
of equal development as the means to do so. Moreover, the
new regional policy did not mean that the plan will cease
to be a factor in regional development rather that it
will be complemented by spontaneous transmission of
economic activity from within the expanding market
sector. The principal model advanced is that of the
staircase theory, in wh ieh deve 1opment in the east wi 11
be naturally transmitted to the west. It is therefore
assumed that there will be a point in the future at which
the growth in regional disparities will cease and start
to be reversed.3
To identify the prospects for closing the gap in
regional development the current forms and sources of
disparity in growth rat es must first be studied.
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Moreover, these are not solely economic factors.
Consideration must be given to a crucial factor which has
not yet been discussed: China's population.
The size of China's population- 1.17 billion as of
1992- and its cont i nued g rowt h means t hat all economi c
and social indictors must be examined in two ways: as
national totals but, thereafter, in per capita terms.
Thus while China's national income grew 4.8 fold between
1979 and 1991 its per capita national income grew only
four-fold due to population growth. This effect has led
t he Ch i nese gove rnment to regard popu 1at ion g rowt h as a
break upon social and economic development and to pursue
increasingly intensive methods of population control.
The fact that China seemed to achieve extremely good
results in lowering its population growth rate from 2.58%
in 1970 to 1.19% in 1980 (growth rates are perhaps easier
understood as the length of period taken to double
population ie. 1%- 69.3 year; 2%- 34.7 years; 3%- 23.1
years, etc.) encouraged the government to believe that it
could restrict China's population to 1.2 billion by the
year to 2,000. This entailed setting a target growth rate
of 0.98% and implementing a One Child policy backed by
considerable incentives and disincentives.
However, far from continuing its decline the growth
rate actually increased during the 1980's to an average
of 1.55%, necessitating upward estimations of China's
future population.4 Since mortality remained constant,
explanations for this increase must be sought in the
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birth rate. The first factor causing the rise in the
growth rate has been the increase in the relative size of
the female population of child-bearing age as those born
in an earlier period of high births- 1962 to 1975- reach
maturity. There is little that government can do about
this element, other than wait for the declining growth
rate of the 70's to work its way through the population
structure.
More worryi ng has been the lack of change in the
second factor: the total fertility rate (TFR). The TFR
can be considered the number of births a women would have
during her reproductive life (15-49) if her fertility
cor responded tot he sum of bi rt h r ate s in he r own, and
all other, age groups within that range at one specific
time. As such it is a reflection of all factors
contributing to births- socio-economic and cultural
factors, as we11 as the ope rat i on of f ami 1y p1ann i ng
systems. China's TFR has declined dramatically from over
6 births per woman in the fities and sixties, but its
average of 2.5 per woman in the 80's is still above the
natural replacement rate.5 While this indicates that at
national level the forces encouraging population growth
continue to outweigh those discouraging it, including the
One Child policy, the real source of the continuing rise
in China's population is the disparity in the way these
forces operate throughout the country. Thus China's
national TFR in 1990 of 2.31 disguises variations between
Shanghai of 1.42 and Tibet of 3.81.
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Table 1: China's Total Fertility Rate by region, 1990.
TFR Regions Population (m) , Percent




2< - <2.2 Sichuan, Shandong, Jiangsu, 280 24.71%
and Inner Mongolia.




~3 Hainan, Guizhou, Xinjiang, 280 2.8%
Tibet.
Special: Xinjiang, Tibet. 17 1.5%
It is at this point that demographic structure and
regional development interact, since demography clearly
indicates a connection between urbanisation and fertility
decline. Socio-economic factors such as health, housing,
employment and education, particularly as they effect
women, should all contribute to fertility decline,
whereas rural areas typically support higher birth rates.
China's problem is not only that the differences in
developmental level between regions make this process
very uneven, so that it has fertility rates comparable to
several different stages of development, but also that
the pace of development in the reform era is producing
contradictory results.
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Thus Table 1 shows not only the scale of difference
in TFR between China's provinces but the existence of
several anomalies. Urbanisation clearly plays a part in
the municipalities- Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai- and in
t he heavy i ndust ria 1 areas of the nort h whi ch have been
less affected by the Open Door. Here the TFR is actually
lower than in developed countries. Equally, the least
developed areas of the country, the autonomous regions of
Xinjiang and Tibet, have the highest TFR, aided by the
fact that national minorities under 10m are not governed
by the population regulations. But the national TFR is
sustained by the 55% of the population who live in
provinces with TFR between 2.2 and 3.0. These include 5
of the 11 coastal provinces while a sixth, Hainan, has a
TFR of over 3. The remainder are central provinces with
more traditional industrial and agricultural roles. What
this indicates is that the reform process itself may be
an obstacle to fertility decline. While it has generated
t he des ired deve 1opment
gains and practices
government's ability to
it has a 1so gene rat ed economi c
which militate against the
further reduce fertility.6 In
rural areas this is directly so, since basing income and
production on the household has reinforced a preference
for male children. In the expanding areas of the coast
t he fundament a 1 cant rad i ct i on may be between t he success
gained from encouraging self-reliance and initiative in
economic matters and the state's belief that it retains
the prerogative to determine the size of families.
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The changes whi ch t he reform po1icy have brought
about in population structure are further revealed in
Table 2. This shows that the population of the 11 coastal
areas inc reased by 21.2% bet ween 1981 and 1990 compared
with 11.3% and 13.5% for the 12 central and 7 border
provi nces and reg ions. As a resu It 40.1 % of t he Chi nese
population lived on only 13.2% of the country's
territory, an increase of 2.2% in only ten years, with
the bulk of the shift in population coming from the
central states. As a result of this shift to the coastal
areas, popu1at i on dens it y t here rose by ove r 60 persons
per sq.km., compared to 20 per sq.km in central areas and
less than four per sq.km. in border areas. Since we know
that birth rates were not significantly different in many
coast a1 and cent ra 1 areas, it can on1y be assumed t hat a
large part of the shift in population was due to economic
migration. This is supported by figures cited by Yeh
which reveal that China had a transient population of 70
million in 1991. It must next be considered how far these
demographic changes are reflections of changes in the
pattern of economic activity.
Tab1e 3 shows t he changes t hat have occu r red in
China's Gross Value of Industrial and Agricultural Output
(GVIAO) between 1981 and 1990. The GVIAO of the 11
coastal areas increased an average of over 5% p.a. faster
than the central provinces and over 8% p.a. faster than
the border provinces and regions. As a result their share
of nat i ona1 GVIAO rose by 3.6%, at t he expense of bot h
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Tab le 2
National Coastal Percent Central Percent Border Percent
Area (I sqkl) 9.448 1.247 13.2S 2.721 28.8S 5.48 58.0S
Population (II
1981 996.22 377 .86 37.9S m.13 48.0S 140.23 14.IS
1990 1143.33 458.31 40. IS 532.39 46.6S 159.26 13.9S
Density
1981 105.4 303.0 175.7 25.6
1990 121.0 367.5 195.7 29.1
Increase 14.771 21.29S 11.35S 13.57S
Table 3
GVIAO National Coastal Percent Centra 1 Percent Border Percent
Total
1981 749 393.9 52.6S 257.5 34.4S 97.5 13.0S
1990 3158 1773.9 56.2S 1026 32.5S 358.7 11.4S
Increase p.a. 32.2S 35.0S 29.8S 26.8S
Agriculture
1981 231 102.4 44.3S 104 45.0S 24.7 10.7S
1990 766 346.6 45.2S 312.9 4O.8S 106.1 13.9S
Increase p.a. 23.2S 23.8S 20.1S 33.2S
Industry
1981 517 291.5 56.41 153.5 29.7S 72.84 14.1S
1990 2392 1421.3 59.7S 713.1 29.8S 252 10.5S
Increase p.a. 36.3S 39.0S 36.5S 24.6S
Notes:
Definitions of which category- coastal, central, border- each province should be in vary. For the
purpose of these figures Guangxi and liaoning which light be considered border provinces are defined
as coastal, along with Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Hainan, and Tianjin
and Shanghai municipalities. Border provinces are Heilongjiang, Jilin, Nei Mongol, Gansu, Xinjiang,
Tibet and Yunnan.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China, 1981-91.
interior regions. Moreover this increase was due to
expansion in both agriculture and industry. Thus the
coast a1 areas inc reased the i r share of i ndust ria lout put
by 3.3%, while the share of output of the central
provi nces remai ned const ant and t hat of t he border areas
dec1i ned; t hey also succeeded in inc reas i ng the i r share
of agricultural output by close to 1%, overtaking the
central provinces as the main area of agricultural
product ion. The border areas showed an even more marked
increase in agricultural output.
Thus, the coastal provinces comprising only 13.2% of
the area of the country contributed 45% of national
agricultural output and close to 60% of industrial
production by 1990, compared to 40.8% and 29.8% from the
central provinces which make up 28.8% of the country, and
14% and 10.5% from the border areas which constitute 58%
of China's territory. As with population structure, to
which it was clearly linked, the difficulty with this
imbalance of regional development was that it was growing
rather than diminishing.
This problem, its causes and possible solutions, has
clearly attracted the attention of Chinese analysts. One
such anal ys t s is provided by Ma and Zou.7 They estimate
that the GNP of the border provinces (in which they
inc 1ude Guangxi but exc 1ude Liaon ing) grew at an annual
ave rage of 8.9% bet ween 1979 and 1988, compared tot he
coast a1 zones 10.5%, bot h set agai nst a nat iona1 ave rage
9.8% p.a •• Ma and Zou attribute the disparity of the
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growth rates to the operation of the Open Door policy
since when t hey re-ca 1cu 1at ed reg i ona 1 GNP growt h rat es
excluding exports, this revealed that inland, coastal and
national averages were all very close: 7.95%, 7.90%,
7.93%. respectively:
Excluding the part of GNP accounted for by exports,
t he ave rage annual g rowt h rat e is a 1most t he same
for the coastal zone as it is for other zones •.•
Thus, we can infer that the special open policy is
the key factor in its higher growth rates.8
Thus Ma and Zou believe that the solution to the growing
imbalance in China's regional development is the
extension of the Open Door policies to the border
prov i nces and aut onomous reg ions and go on to cons i der
the likely prospects for growth in FER for these areas.
In 1988 the foreign trade turnover of the eight
in 1and prov i nces and aut onomous reg ions was $4. 52bn or
6.01% of China's trade turnover. Most of this trade was
carried out with Europe, USA and East Asia, with border
trade [defined as trade between border provinces, trade
taking place below the provincial level, and trade
between border inhabiting peoples] constituting only
11.79% of their trade total. Border trade accounted for
the largest proportion in Yunnan and Tibet [38%], then
Inner Mongolia [24.35%], Jilin, Helongjiang and Xinjiang
next [8.66%, 7.51%, 8.68%], with Guangxi and Gansu having
practically no official border trade. Border trade is
particularly important, however, because of the stimilus
it provides to industrial development. This is reflected
in the fact that whereas less than 30% of the total
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exports of these regions are in manufactures, reflecting
the predomi nance of primary products, manufactures
contributed a far higher share of border exports: 62.2%.
As well as providing a stimulus to development, changing
the export structure of the border regions would also be
beneficial to China given the decline in the prices of
primary products on the international market and the
increasing demand for such products in the domestic
economy.
The need to further expand the Open Door policy was
addressed in the Ten-Year Programme:
While consolidating and developing existing economic
and technological zones, coastal open cities and
open zones, it is necessary tog radua 11y expand the
opening up of inland and border areas. Provinces and
cit ies and the Nort heast , nort hwest and sout hwest
China in particular should actively explore the
development of economic and trade relations with
neighbouring countries in order to effectively
promote the socio-economic development of min<§rity
areas and backward and poverty-stricken places.
Explaining the change in China's regional policy at the
time Vice-Premi er Zou J iahua argued that deve 1opment of
regional economies is both a major international trend
and an essential step in China's economic growth.10
Chi na' s economy had two part s- the nat iona 1 sector in
which the state makes unified plans for the development
of a comprehens ive economi c syst em, and the dist inct ive
reg iona 1 economi es. During the 50's and 60's the
government attempted to create some regional economies on
geog raph ic and admi nist rat ive bases, but the old syst em
did not allow effective co-ordination along the lines of
economic geography and priority. The system implmented in
210
the 80' s has a11owed t he east ern coast a1 areas of the
country to expand rapidly, but t hey must now be
integrated with other regional economies:
The idea of regional economy which is stressed today
is to integrate the geographical superiority of the
east ern coast a1 areas wit h the resou rce advant ages
and economi c and t echn i ca 1 foundat ions of the
central and western parts of the country and, with a
view to promoting economic integration and opening
up to the world, to map out plans for a huge region
on a much larger scope to accord with different
f eat ur es , thus injecting more vigour into China's
economy. 11
Seven sphe res of act i vi t y were env i saged: the Yangt se
river including the Pudong project; the Pearl River
Delta; the Bohai sea, (Beijing, T'i an j in , Hebei, Shandong
and Liaoning); Southwest and Southeast China; Northwest
China, including Inner Mongolia; Central China; and
Nort heast China. The exapansion of complementary
re 1at ions bet ween these reg i ona 1 economi es wou1d allow
deve 1opment of as yet unt apped nat ura 1 resou rces in the
i nt er i or prov i nces and reg ions and expand access to the
outside world.
By 1992 t here was already ev i dence of expans i on of
cross-border cooperation, based on increased diversity
and flexibility in terms of types of goods and forms of
exchange, with the northern border experiencing the most
rapid development.12 China signed 409 labour contracts
with the former Soviet Union in 1991 and as of 1992 2,300
trade organisations and enterprises were operating there.
MOFERT agreed to the opening of 10 joint or sole
investement ventures in Mongolia and Korea. In March
1992, four border cities, Heihe, Suifenhe, Huichun and
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Manzhou1i were declared open by the State Council and had
preferential FER policies conferred on them. Three








continued to expand, showing a five-fold increase over
1985 at US$128m. China's border trade with Pakistan and
Laos was developing steadily and China signed a
memorandum with India allowing border trade in 1991.
Guanxi's trade with Vietnam has grown from a very low
initial level and there were signs of breakthrough in
other forms of FER such as JV's.
Whether the opening of the border areas can by
itself reverse the imbalance in China's regional
development remains open to question. In particular if
FER do constitute the major factor creating regional
differences then it seems likely that the rapid expansion
of FOI into the coastal provinces since 1992 will provide
new impetus to the imbalance. Further discussion on the
possibility of expanding trade with countries bordering
China will be given in the section on China's future bi-
lateral economic relations.
What remains to be pointed out here is that China's
regional development remains far from being simply an
economic issue. While China's new regional theory assumes
a point at which the growth in regional disparities will
cease and be reversed there are considerable dangers
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inherent now in an unbalanced deve 1opment st rat egy. For
Guo, the ultimate safeguard against disunity is the
continuing role of the Chinese government:
Although theoretically the possibility exists that
the polarised effects could cause serious social
conflict, it is very improbable, since assisting
backward regions is still an important part of
Ch i nese reg i ona 1 po 1icy. The cent ra 1 government
still keeps a powerful hold on income distribution
and economic activities. A socialist central
government could never tolerate such an extension of
the interregional gap that it would threaten
political unity and economic integration. 13
Thus the necessity of retaining stability and unity
during the the reform era has particular implications for
Chinese politics. Morover, there is a vital international
dimension to this. China's neighbours are aware that in
t he past soc i a 1 upheaval and demog raphi c pressu re have
been the primary causes of the expansion of the Chinese
community abroad. Then Asian cultures were flexible and
the Chinese immigrants came in waves over several
generations. Now Asian political and cultural boundaries
are much more fixed and yet the doub 1 i ng of t he Ch i nese
population in fifty years creates the image of a single
tidal wave currently being held back by the economy of
the coastal provinces. Thus, there are few countries in
Asia which are indifferent to China's attempt to make its
domestic demographic and economic structures compatible.
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III Chinese perceptions of the economic future of Asia.
As with the Soviet Union/Russia, Chinese perceptions
of Asia's economic future will be examined in three
aspect s: the re1evance of the As ian economi c mode 1 to
domest ic economi c change;
transnational forces in
regional economy and the
economy; and 1ast 1y, the
analysis of the operation of
the development of an Asian
consequences for the global
future shape of China's bi-
lateral economic relations in Asia.
These can be summarised as:
i: the Asian economic model;
ii: international causes and consequences of Asian
economic regionalism;
iii: prospects for the development of bi-lateral economic
relations.
i the Asian economic model
Discussion of the Asian economic model remains








China's economy and others in Asia; secondly, because it
raises questions as to the model that China itself should
be pursuing in the reform era. In effect, doubts about
the validity of other countries economies as established
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models are intermixed with discussion of developmental
strategies.
This dual character was revealed in a debate held in
the city of Weihei, Shan dong in August 1988, between the
Shan dong Academy of Soc i a 1 Sc i ences, the Shandong trade
committee, and the Weihei city government, on the
external orientation of the coastal region, which
continues to be the most recognised symbol of China's
Asian economy.1 While allparticipation
participants
in the East
supported the concept of an externally
or i ent ed economy, t his was not 1east because t hey he 1d
differing interpretations of what it meant. For some it
implied only an economy which was interconnected with the
world economy, while others argued it signified a country
whose economy was dependent on its foreign economic
relations, for example in which trade accounted for half
of national output value. By the second definition, even
such trading countries as Japan and America turned out to
be domestically oriented and only small states such as
Singapore were truly dependent on external relations.
These differing definitions meant that the
externally oriented economy could be viewed as either a
strategy aimed at using the international economy to
develop the domestic economy or as a distinct economic
model. Participants held that China could only consider
it as a strategy rather than as a model for a variety of
reasons. The first was was the sca 1e of t he Ch i nese
economy and the uneveness of it s economi c deve 1opment •
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Thus even pursuing the development of the externally
oriented economy as a strategy carried the inherent risk
of instability, though this was one regard in which the
experience of other countries could be relevant:
Rapid development of the externally oriented economy
is at the cost of instability of economic potential.
China is a big country. Great risk and tremors in
the economi c deve 1opment process are inadv isab 1e. In
order to develop the coastal regions's externally
oriented economy with stability, we must flexibly
use the ext erna 11y or ient ed economy expe rience of
Asia's 'four little tigers' in China's coastal
region in an organic two-sided strategy of
imbalanced and mu1tifarous deve10pment.2
An imbalanced development strategy would not require that
every department and industry in the national economy
move forward at the same pace but rat her ident ifies key
sectors and uses their development to spur on the
progress of others. It would entail the following points:
i ) st ress deve 1opment of the coast a1 reg ion to spur
on the in1and; ii) st ress deve 1opment of export
industries in the coastal region to spur on the
development of non-export industries and upgrade the
industrial mix; iii) medium- and large-scale
enterprises should constitute the network of export
industries in the coastal region, with small-scale
and rural enterprises as the goal; iv) technology
and equ ipment shou 1d be the focus of the coast a1
region import mix, supplemented by secondary
commodities and raw materials, while strictly
limiting volume consumer goods imports; v) the Asia-
Pacific region should be the main choice for the
coastal regions's international market, along with
promoting trade in all directions.3
Thus, participants agreed that a multiple development
strategy was necessary given the dual structure of
China's economy in regional and sectoral terms, and that
this reduced and dispersed the risk of instability.
What this implied was that every country's economic
strategy and its target model must be a reflection of its
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own national conditions. Strategies from other countries
could be adopted but models could not. This is a
recurrent theme in Chinese analysis of the relationship
between the reform policy and the changes taking place in
the rest of the Asian economy. Thus a study group of the
Institute of Economics, CASS in a paper titled
'Reflections on the Theory of Socialist Economic
Structural Reform' concluded,
•• we believe that we should proceed from China's
basic national conditions and explore the course of
reform in order to establish an economic reform
theory with Chinese characteristics, rather than
simply imitating and copying the experience of
others.4
As the title of the paper suggests, one element in
understanding the specifically Chinese characteristics
lay in the fact that the economy would remain socialist.
According to this thesis, Chinese reform was faced
with three lines of thinking in 1979: the first favoured
centralised management with the ministries playing the
central role but with some expansion of the powers of the
localities and enterprises; the second favoured
decentralisation of management to the provinces,
autonomous regions, and municipalities under the
supervision of the centre; the third favoured integration
of planning with the market, the enlargement of the
dec is ion-mak ing powe rs of the ent erpr ises and the
division of powers between the central and local
gove rnment s , It was not unt i1 the 3rd Pl enary sessi on of
the 12 CPC CC in October 1984 that a programme was put in
place that would develop a socialist commodity economy:
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'market coordination through macro-economic control under
the guidance of state planning'. This represented the
most fundamental achievement of China's new economic
theory: that the market and state planning are not
exclusive and opposed as the traditional theory supposed:
The traditional theory of socialist noncommodity
economy sets socialism against the commodity economy
and confuses soc iali sm wit h the nat u ra1 economy; it
a1so desc ribes the planned economy and the 1aw of
value as mutually exclusive and equates planned
economy with mandatory targets. The theory of the
socialist commodity economy is at once the
cornerstone of China's reform theory gnd the
cornerstone of China's new economic theory.
Thus Ch ina was deemed to be in the primary stage of
socialism with underdeveloped productive forces and
commodity economy. Changes in the production relations
would not by themselves bring about improvements in the
productive forces, as was believed in the past, and
development of the productive forces became a crucial
task.
Such an analysis was reinforced with the shift from
the theory of a planned commodity economy to a socialist
market economy in 1991. This represents a further attempt
to harness the market to develop the productive forces of
the economy but, according to Chinese scholars, does not
mean that the economy is less socialist. Under socialist
structural reform there would be no attempt to privatise
the property of the people, though there would be changes
in the ownership structure, and planning would continue
to play a crucial role through the integration of
microeconomic initiative with macro-economic control, and
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of short-term measures with long-term goals. Thus some
analysts claim that the relevance of other Asian
count r i es expe r i ence is not on 1y 1essened by the
differences in scale and level of development between
them and China but also by China's continued adherence to
a socialist model.
Clearly, however, China's use of the market as a
developmental strategy and the fact that some elements of
p 1ann i ng are present in ot her As ian economi es mean that
it is possible to argue that there is a degree of
convergence between them. This is particularly evident if
China's attitudes to the two Asian economies that have
most i nf 1uenced t he reform po 1icy are cons ide red- Japan
and Hong Kong.
In a discussion arising from a round table organised
by the Japan Research Institute of the CASS, participants
expressed their views on what China might learn from the
developed capitalist countries.6 Capitalism was
re cog n i sed as not be i ng t he same t h i ng at all tim e s and
in all places and Japan's importance was that it shared
some features with China which neither share with the
other developed countries:
For China, the special significance of Japan's
experience lies in certain features common to the
economic development of both countries that only
Ch ina and Japan share. Ch ina does not share them
with other developed western capitalist nations. For
example: China's economy today is catching up with
the economically developed countries in the same way
that Japan's economy did following World War II and
even following the Meiji Restoration. It is in the
process of transition from an economy closed to the
outside world to an economy open to the outside
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world, and from an economy that either rejected or
disdained markets to a market economy.7
Given that China and Japan also possess a similar
cultural tradition, the two countries were seen as being
not that distant from one another in either cultural or
historical terms.
As to the common features of the development of the
economy, these derived from the use of both plan and
market, though clearly China was moving from a planned
economy to one led by the market, while Japan had
introduced elements of planning into an existing market
syst em in orde r to ach i eve ce rt a in nat i ona1 deve 1opment
goals:
The special character of Japan's post-war
development experience is manifested in its greater
use of 'planning' in comparison with an overwhelming
majority of developed capitalist countries, even
through Japan itself already had a capitalist market
economy. Government planning in Japan consisted not
only of framing over a period time of more than 10
successive medium and long-term plans, but also the
formulation of plans for individual sectors, trades,
industries, and land development.S
The main aim of the plans was to unify government policy
with business policy. Thus, beyond the creation of
enterprise blocs which encouraged coordination within
economic sectors and the offer of 'administrative
gui dance', t he pr i mary means of enforc i ng plans was the
system of inducements to which the market would be
susceptible. It was this dovetailing of the industrial
po1icy of gove rnment wi t h t he needs and' methods of the
market that might be considered to be the key to Japan's
success and also the primary lesson that China may choose
to study.
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Not all Asian economies have used macroeconomic
planning as a key in their development, however, and,
ironically, the one which has used it least is the Asian
economy which may have had most influence on China's
reforms- Hong Kong. Accord ing to Feng Bangyan, a
researcher, at the Southeast Economic Information Centre,
Hong Kong's role as a trading partner and investor is
much discussed but its ro1e as an economi c mode 1 is oft en
overlooked. The development of Hong Kong-mainland
rel at ions has not only strengthened Hong Kong's
international position and been significant in creating
an externally orientated economy in the coastal region of
the mainland but has created a model for Chinese economic
development:
Following the swift development of Chinese-Hong Kong
economi c re1at ions and the close exchanges between
the personnel of the two sides, Hong Kong, as a
sucessful model for economic development in the
Asia-Pacific region and as a community with a highly
developed modern commodity economy and a fairly
complete legal system, has had an increasingly
obvious role as a model and as a catalyst for China.
and espec iall y for Guangdong and the open coast a1
regions. 9
Fen g bel ;eve s that this dua1 role as mo del and cat a1yst
is evident in two areas in particular. Firstly, the
introduction of the market mechanism so that a process of
osmosis impacting on the traditional economy has begun:
the economic activities that have been produced as a
result of the drawing in of foreign funds •.• are an
extension and appendage of the modern world's
commodity economy and especially Hong Kong. These
requ ire ope rat ing in accordance wi th market economy
patterns, and this demand, correspondingly, brings
with it long-formed international conventions and
enterprise management systems that are in accord
with the development of a modern commodity economy
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as well as the pressures of the market economy.
Although, in the overall Chinese economy, these
act ions that have been formed by the d rawi ng in of
fore isn funds are ins ign ificant, because they are
relatively centralised in the open coastal
regions, ... they have greatly increased the market
economy factors in this region. 10
The result has been the decentralisation of economic
decision-making and the development of embryonic markets
in 1abou r, forei gn exchange, capit a1, technology and
information.
Secondly, Hong Kong has become a reference point for
the development of the mainland economy, particularly the
coastal region which increasingly has used Hong Kong as a
model. Significantly, this does not relate exclusively to
economic management. Feng cites the example of Hainan
which referred not only to Hong Kong's tax laws, share
and bond regu 1at ions, 1and sale ru1es, and so on, when
structuring its SEZ status but also to its civil service
and legal system. For Feng, this indicates,
that the reference made to Hong Kong in recent years
has changed from individual economic developmentexperiences to overall models. 11
Thus while the differences in terms of economic scale and
developmental level mean that Hong Kong's experience
cannot be dup 1icat ed, the 1eve 1 of interact ion bet ween
the two sides has meant not only changes in the economic
mechanism and the. degree of openness of the Chinese
economy but changed pe rcept ions of the deve 1opment
patterns and mechanisms of the international economy,
with Hong Kong as its most obvious model.
As the above discussion suggests, a further factor
which might encourage the Chinese to view their social
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and economi c deve 1opment as conve rgent wi t h ot he r As ian
societies is the cultural and historical ties between
them. In the past, discussion of the contribution that
traditional Chinese culture could make to social and
economic development ran counter to ideological
restrictions; and in particular Confucian thought was
condemned as the product of a feudal class society. There
has, however, been an ideological relaxation concerning
this subject, largely as the product of the confidence
that economic success has brought.
This was evident in a speech by Li Shenzi, Vice-
Pres i dent of the CASS, at a con f e rence of East As ian
s cho 1ars he 1din Tokyo in 1988, at whi ch academi cs from
China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam and Hong Kong aired
their views on the significance of East Asian culture,
particularly in regard to economic development.12 Li said
the belief that Western culture was superior to that of
the East had faded with the dynamic success of a number
of East As i an nat ions in the fields of economi cs and
science. Moreover, the re-eva 1uat i on of East As ian
culture was not only due to economic factors but because
it might also contain important social lessons which were
not available in Western culture:
China's current objective is modernisation. We not
only must seek a point of convergence at which both
West ern and East ern cu lt u re can be used to deve lop
the economy, we must also set ourselves higher
objectives. The West, which claims to have achieved
modernisation first, can by no means shake off
various material and spiritual crises. With respect
tot hese, some As ian scho 1ars have suggest ed that
traditional East Asian culture may be able to
provide solutions. 13
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The key to understanding China's reappraisal of the
cultural ties between itself and other Asian countries is
partially revealed by the reaction of the other
participants. While there was
worth of East Asian culture,
consensus on the overa 11
the question of what
contribution traditional culture had made to East Asia's
economic success remained contentious. The most
pronounced support for Confucianism as the basis for
social and economic organisation came from South Korea
while contributors from Hong Kong and Taiwan opposed
this. Their opposition derived mainly from doubts about
the relevance of what was a spiritual
from feudal society to the demands
doctrine derived
and practice of
economics and science in modern societies.
This desire to separate the achievements of their
societies from their roots in traditional Chinese society
indicates the differing appraisal between China and
certain other East Asian countries. When China talks of
an East Asian culture it is referring to one that it
largely holds itself responsible for creating. Thus the
re-eva 1uat i on of the import ance of Ch i nese cu 1t u re in
East Asia is not recognition that China is moving closer
to other Asian societies but an attempt to reclaim
China's place as the source of East Asian culture as
whole, after the rejection of this role and the attempt
to substitute the revolutionary ethos in its place in the
Maoist years. To countries such as Korea and Japan,
confident in their own identities, this may not represent
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a threat. But to Hong Kong and Ta iwan it represent s a
further element in the attempt by the Chinese core to re-
assert its authority over the diaspora. Whatever doubts
may exist within China about the validity of traditional
Ch inese cu Itu re as a mode 1 fo r cont emporary East As ian
society, this will clearly not inhibit China from
reclaiming its rightful place at the centre of that
society.
Thus, while China will continue to express its
distinctiveness from East Asia whether it be due to size
or political and economic system, when an East Asian
model is discussed China clearly believes that this must
in part refer to its own achievements.
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ii International causes and consequences of Asian
economic regionalism.
Asian regionalism is seen as being driven by two
inter-connected forces: changes in the world economy as a
whole; and changes within Asia which are in part a
response tog 1oba 1
separately.
shifts. These wi 11 be viewed
(i) external forces driving Asian regionalism;
Changes in t he As i an economy are seen in part as be i ng
driven by, and a response to, changes in the world
economy. Ch i nese scholars have devot ed cons i derab 1e
at tent ion to these changes since t hey suggest rad i ca 1
change in China's political, as well as economic,
position. Wang Hexing's analysis is typical in this
regard, in its charact e ri sat i on of the maj or forces at
work:
The formation of regional economic groupings is a
new issue which has ~appeared in world economic
development. The following factors are spurring the
formation of regional economic groupings: The
world's economic activities are being globalised;
the scientific and technological revolution is
causing production to become internationalised;
protectionism is growing more and more virulent all
the time; the internatina1 arms race is shifting
toward ri va 1ry focused on ove ra 11 nat i ona 1 powe r.
The formation of regional economic groupings touches
upon the economic pol icies of every country, and it
affects the future of world politics and economics.1
The fundamental cause of the changes in the world economy
is seen as being changes in the forces of production:
The format; on of reg i ona 1 economi c g roupi nss is in
rea 1it y a great read j ustment whe reby the
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international relations of production are being
adapt ed tot he forces of product ion. Reg iona 1
economic groupings are being established in order to
achieve economies of scale and division of labour
within a given region, and to enable more rational
all ocat ion and ut i1iisat ion of funds, techno logy,
labour and natural resources cutting circulation
expenses, lowering production costs, and raising the
competitiveness of products.2
However, such developments have not altered the
fundament a1 nat ure of capi tal ism. A key to underst and ing
the Chinese interpretation of the changes in the world
economy is that they are seen as containing complementary
and contradictory elements, beneficial and detrimental
aspects. These derive primarily from the unbalanced
development and distribution of economic power in the
international economy, as suggested by Chen Dezhao:
The unbalanced deve 1opment between the var ious
countries and various sectors made the inherent
market contradictions of capitalism even more
prominent. On the one hand, with the growth of
productive forces and the ever-increasing
internat iona 1isat ion of product ion, the demand for
cross borde r commod ities and capi tal became great er
with each passing day. On the other hand,
international market competition became more and
more intense, and since the sevent ies, trade
protectionism again reared its head, manifested
mainly by barriers erected by the developed
capitalist countries, especially the United States,
western Europe, and Japan, against each other. 3
The growth of regional economies is, therefore, an
attempt to use the d ifferences in economi c deve 1opment
within fixed areas to restructure production and increase
competitiveness in relation to other emerging blocs. It
is this impetus towards coope rat ion and economic
development at the same as increasing inter-regional
rivalry that provides the complementary and contradictory
elements. Thus Xu Shougan:
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western Europe, North America and the Asian-Pacific
Region have already, or are about to become, trade
and economic blocs. Each of the three regions is
intensifying cooperation within itself in matters of
trade, technology, and qualified personnel,
particularly in free circulation, thereby enhancing
their economic vitality and raising the efficiency
of their cooperative mechanisms. This benefits the
rapid economic development of these regions and
contributes to the growth of the world's economy.
However, this trend also entails the danger of
protectionism, a move that would run counter to the
further opening up of the international trade system
and to imparting a multilateral character to it.4
It is particularly with regard to trade that the
cont rad i ct ions between the eme rg i ng blocs are apparent.
Thus two of the four major characteristics in
international trade identified by Du Qiang are clearly
antagonistic: the increase in trade protectionism as the
deve loped count r i es in part i cu 1ar have sought to gain
market access at the same time as defending their
domestic markets, frequently through state intervention;
and the growth of monopolistic competition as cartels and
multi-national corporations have come to dominate world
trade, with internal trade within MNC's now accounting
for a t h i r d 0 f all t r a de. The 0 the r t wo are e f f e c t i vel y
consequences of the i nt ernat i ona 1 i sat i on of product ion:
the growth of the service sector, which will soon reach a
ratio of 1:2 with standard commodity trade; and the
continuing shift away from primary products towards
va 1ue-added indust ri a 1 goods unde r the impact of changes
in science and technology upon the industrial structure.
Both of these sectors are dominated by the developed
countries.5
230
The beneficial and detrimental elements have their
effect in the way these changes in the international
trade and production structure will effect the
relationship between the developed and developing
countries. Thus while unequal development within regions
is a key factor behind the emergence of regional
economies, it is not at all clear that the benefits
derived from regional growth will be equally distributed.
According to Shi Min:
The invest ment of t ransnat i ona 1 compan i es and
transnational management have accelerated
internationalisation and the improvement of labour
product i vit y. Th is is conduc i ve to the deve 1opment
of world economy and trade. It is also conducive to
the up-grading of the industrial structure and the
improvement of economic technological levels in some
developing countries. However, in the new
international division of labour formed through the
transfer of industrial structures, developing
countries will still fall in an unfavourable
position. Unequal exchanges will concentrate a large
amount of profits in developed countries and the
overwhelming majority of the 'base camps' of the
'borde r 1ess economy' pract i sed by t ransnat i ona 1
financial groups are still located in developed
capitalist countries.6
Shi Min believes that the economic and technological gaps
between North and South wi 11 expand further, increasing
the internal divisions inside developing countries, for a
numbe r of reasons: the mono po 1y of S&T research in the
developed countries; the debt burden of developing
countries; rising protectionism will further weaknen the
export capability of developing countries; developing
countries may encounter new obstacles or make errors in
their development strategy. While the gaps between
developed and developing countries will expand this too
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will be an uneven process. Thus the APR has demonstrated
greater developmental capability than southern ASia, and
certainly more than Africa, while Latin America will
remain constrained by its debt burden.
This does not mean, however, that the APR will
become an economic bloc within the near future. This is
because the cont inu ing sub-reg iona 1 differences in
economic development make integration unlikely. Wang
points out that economic integration involves both a
quantitative and a qualitative change in a country's
economic structure and this differentiates it from
economic cooperation which is more limited in both
respects. Regional economic groupings are accordingly
formed through four progressive stages:
i) free trade regions, in which particular nations lower
tariff regulations between themselves while maintaining
them against others;
ii) tariff alliances, in which member nations adopt
common regulations against non-members;
iii) common markets, in which not only goods, but also
capital and labour, are freely exchangeable;
iv) an economic commumity is developed with unified
policies, including on fiscal and banking matters,
adopt ed by means of a supranat iona 1 organi sat ion,
reflecting the high degree of economic integration.
The differences in sub-regional development which
restrict the scope for integration within the APR will be
discussed in the next sect ion but it must be poi nted out
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that the shift to a multi-polar economy also has
i mmed i ate po 1i tic a 1 implications. According to Chen
Dezhao, this has resulted, firstly, in a new definition
of national power:
In order to adapt to changing international
conditions, all countries, whether developed
capitalist or socialist countries are carrying out
economic reforms and strategic readjustment. They
are abandoning military standoffs in favour of a
rivalry focused on overall national power, at the
core of which is high technology. The contest for
overall national power not only will influence the
deve 1opment of t he forces of product ion, it wi 11
br i ng about deep changes in eve ry nat ions economy,
sc i ence and techno logy, management, educat ion, and
labour systems and structures. 7
This raises the prospect that an attempt will be made to
integrate not only economic systems but social systems as
well. In the Chinese view this will be particularly
harmful if the developed capitalist powers use the
unequa 1 economi c i nf 1uence they cu rrent 1y en j oy to seek
to impose their value systems on developing countries. Xu
Shougan says:
Recently, the western countries have again raised
the political demand for 'structural
democratisation', which in fact amounts to the
proposition of forcing their own economic patterns
and value concepts on Third World countries, thus
interfering in the internal political affairs of
other countries. The developing countries have
criticised these moves and have tried at the same
time to explore developmental roads that would be
suited to their specific national conditions. 8
Therefore the Chinese view of the way the changes in the
international economy will influence Asia's economic
future contains several different elements. On the one
hand there is confidence in Asia's ability to compete
internationally but concern that the world may be heading
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towards compe t t ng econom ic blocs. The
that coming about- the differences
main obstacle to
in economic level
within regions, including the APR- is also a source of
contention since the continuing inequality in the
i nt e rnat i ona 1 economi c orde r wi 11 mean that the
developing countries may benefit least from the economic
growth generated by regionalisation. Lastly, there is the
conce rn that in an era in whi ch economi c st rengt h has
become a key factor in national power that what is being
constructed is not only an international




(ii) internal forces driving Asian economic regionalism;
The growth of the Asian-Pacific economy is the source of
considerable discussion and comment within China. There
are, perhaps, two primary aspects to this discussion: the
first concerns the nature of the forces which are driving
economic integration; the second, and more contentious,
aspect is what this implies for the future pattern of
regional integration and cooperation. Given China's
assessment that economi c power wi 11 be a key element in
determining national power in the coming century, the
distribution of economic influence within the APR is of
foremost concern.
As to the forces driving economic development and
integration these are seen as arising from a qualitative
shift in the economic relationships within Asia and thus
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between Asian economies and others in the world. Cheng
Yun describes the old systen of relationships under which
Japan rose to prominence:
Technology flowed from the United states to Japan,
and from Japan to Asia's 'four tigers' and the ASEAN
nations, while merchandise flowed to the United
States from Japan, the 'four tigers', and the ASEAN
nations. Under these conditions, Japan was in an
especially advantageous position. For the United
States, Japan was the supplier of the final goods;
for Asia's 'four dragons' and the ASEAN states Japan
was the supplier of intermediate products.
The refore, Japan ma i nt a i ned trade su r p 1uses vi s-a-
vis all of these trading partners.9
In the ten years after 1975 this system allowed the
volume of trade between Japan and the NIC's and ASEAN to
increase five-fold, resulting in a qualitative change in
the economic structure by the mid-80's from a vertical to
a horizontal division of labour. In the 80's, with the
appreciation of the Japanese Yen, a new economic cycle
began in which Japan relied on its great financial
strength and technological and managerial superiority to
move directly into the NIC's and ASEAN. These countries
greatly increased their exports to Japan with the NIC's
becoming the region's supplier of intermediate and
capital goods and ASEAN providing low-cost, labour-
intensive products.
Yang Jiemian argues that the shift away from a trade
and investment relationship with the industrialised world
towards developing intra-regional relations has been the
most significant trend in 80's.10 In this stage countries
such as South Korea and Taiwan have followed Japan into
becoming exporters of capital and goods, and thus in
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d r i vi ng one of t he most pronounced fact ors beh i nd
regional integration and cooperation, the creation of a
regional division of labour:
Intraregional division of labour is both necessary
and feasible. Labour-intensive, technology-
intensive, capital-intensive, and high-tech
industrial structure and commodity exchange shift
from one level to another. Competition within a
single level has become one of the main factors
behind the continued dynamism of the East Asian
economy. Prob 1ems encount e red as a resu 1t of
economic development and interaction have generally
transcended t he scope of b i 1at era 1 re 1at ions, so
only multilateral consultation and cooperation can
be effective. 11
While most attention has been given to Japan's role in
the creation of the regional economy, as will be
discussed below, the NIC's have also attracted attention
because of their success in revolutionising their
economic structures and international standing. China
hopes to emulate this success although this will mean
increasing competition as well as cooperation with the
NIC's. Huang Xianrong identifies the crucial stages in
the development of NIC's as being the shift from
concentration on labour intensive export-processing
industries in the 1960's, to capital and technology
intensive industry, particularly sectors such as
chemicals in the 1970's, culminating in an upsurge in
high technology development in the 1980's.12 Huang
identifies the primary force driving the strategy of
techno log i ca 1 deve 1opment as be i ng the dange rs posed by
changes in the international economy:
With the steady application of results of the new
technology in developed countries, their production
equipment and production capabilities became
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stronger for a vast increase in their productivity.
At the same time, the advantage of abundant labour
that developing countries enjoyed steadily weakened,
and their production methods seemed even more
backward. This further widened the inherent gap
between the developed countries and developing
count ries. Thus, it was out of a profound sense of
imminent danger that the four NIE's repeatedly
emphas ized the urgency to deve lop sci ence and
technology. They gave important strategic position
to the deve 1opment of new technology indust ries in
an effort to use the new technological revolution as
a turning point for drawing close to the advanced
countries of the world. 13
Huang sees the key elements in the programme of
technolgical changeover as: the creation of national
plans (with the exception of Hong Kong) allowing
coordination of business, science and government to
achieve common goals; the foundation of organisations to
develop 8&T; the identification of key sectors for 8&T
development, microeclectronics in particular; state
support for research deve 1opment and the cruc ia1 area of
the development of human resources; and the use of
foreign technology and investment.
Thus China's interpretation of the forces driving
regional development and integration has stressed the
emergence of an int ra-regi ona 1 economy based on shared
production, markets and technology. However, while China
is aware of the opport un ities this provides for
generating its own domestic development, it should not be
thought that the changes in the Asian-Pacific economy are
seen as being wholly beneficial. One of the most
consistent themes in Chinese studies of the regional
economy is how far these represent challenges as well as
opportunities, with there being a noticeable division
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between those who might be called pessimists, who see the
changes primarily in terms of potential threats, and
optimists, who are confidant of China's ability to turn
the changes to its advantage.
The very success of the NIC's is a prominent example
of a development which is open to more than one
interpretation. On the one hand it has provided an
important example of the potential for rapid development
within Asia, but it has also highlighted one
characteristic of the Asian-Pacific economy which is of
particular concern to China: the extreme disparity in
levels of economic development within the region. China
has repeat ed 1y expressed the concern that reg iona 1
economic development and integration is not being pursued
to the equal benefit of all countries. Thus Gu Yuanyang:
We would be hard put to say that North-South
relations in the region have been totally harmonious
in the wake of economic growth and that a picture of
'co-prospe rity' has been creat ed. On the cont rary ,
disparities between North and South are rife in the
areas of production, marketing, and technology. Most
of the economic and technological gaps between
developing countries and developed countries are not
narrowing but widening.14
Thus the promot ion of regional cooperat ion as a
deve 1opment a1 force has been a key Chi nese demand. When
add ress ing the 46t h Annual Sess ion of the UN ESCAP in
June 1990, Chinese Foreign Minister, Liu Huaoqiu said
that the aim of Asia-Pacific economic cooperation should
be to nar row the gap caused by reg iona 1 imba 1ance and
promot e common prosperity and development of all
countries in the region.15 The present scope of
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cooperation in the region was incommensurate with its
vast territories and large number of developing
countries. The depth of cooperation was disproportionate
with its existing economic strength and tremendous
potential and the channels for cooperation fell short of
the requ i rement of promot i ng t he common deve 1opment of
the countries in the region.
Moreover, China's doubts about the current direction
of regional development and cooperat ion are not confined
solely to economics. According to some Chinese analyses,
fut u re reg i ona 1 coope rat ion wou 1d not be predomi naant 1y
determined by economic activity, as suggetsed by Zhao
Wendou, Tokyo cor respondent for Shanghai's Sh i j e J jngj j
Daobao:
Establishing some kind of economic group is by no
means an express i on of economi c coope rat i on a lone,
it is first and foremost a political matter. The
essential difference between the APR and the EEC is
that in this region there are very great differences
in terms of politics, social systems, nationalities,
history, culture, customs and stage of economic
deve 1opment. What eve r group is to be est ab 1i shed,
the first issues to be encountered will be sensitive
politicalones.16
Thus China's support for an open, multi-lateral regional
body is not on 1y based upon t he need to encompass all
economic levels but the great political diversity of the
region also. Clearly from China's point of view the
greatest difference is between socialist and capitalist
syst ems. A key quest ion thus becomes how i nt eg rat ed a
pan-PaCific regional organisation could become if based
upon differing social 'sys t ems , Yang Jiemian is one of the
sceptics:
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In fact, even though there are quite close economic
relations between countries with different social
systems, as with the socialist and capitalist
nations of the East Asian region whose economic and
trade relations have far surpassed interaction among
the socialist nations, all relatively successful
reg i ona 1 coope rat i ve organ i sat ions so far have
wi t hout except i on been composed of nat ions of the
same political category, such as the EEC, CEMA,
ASEAN, etc. The fact that the influence of politics
and ideology has been lessene~ and diluted does not
mean it has been eliminated. 1
Thus both the political and economic diversity of the APR
is, in the Chinese view, militating against rapid
prog ress towards reg i ona 1 i nt eg rat ion. Rat her, t he need
to balance the levels of economic development within the
region and to move towards limited multi-lateral ism on
political issues is encouraging sub-regional integration
far more than pan-regional. Wu Lianyou of the Institute
of Northeast Asian Studies:
While the effort to form a regional bloc in the
Asian-Pacific region is now proceeding slowly,
various sub-regional economic cooperations are
booming in the region. Bilateral and multilateral
regional cooperation among the countries (areas) are
in an even more robust state. Consequently, while
paying attention to European and American countries,
we should seize all favourable opportunities in the
Asian-Pacific region, and actively participate in
the economic cooperation in the Asian-Pacific
region, especially such sub-regional economic
cooperations as those of the Northeast Asian region,
the Yellow Sea rim region, and the Southeast Asian
region. 18
What should be made clear at this po int is that China's
hesitancy about pan-regionalism is based on solid self-
interest as well as its interpretation of current trends
which favour sub-regionalism. This sel f-interest
recognises that at its current level of development if
China becomes involved in a broad regional organisation
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it will only be one power amongst many- there will be an
equalising tendency within such an organisation. At the
sub-regional level China's influence will be much more
effective in pursuing national ends and there will be
much less likelihood of its interests being out-weighed
by those of others.
This said, there is also an inherent danger in sub-
regionalism. While China cannot be excluded from a pan-
regional organisation, there will always be a danger that
it might be from a sub-regional organisation. Indeed a
sub-regional organisation might partly arise from other
states desire to create a body which might balance their
interests with those of China. There are four major
candidates for such an organisation- an East Asian
economic sphere, a Southeast Asian economic sphere, a
Nort heast As ian economi c sphe re, and a Ch i nese economi c
sphere. Discussion should begin with the East Asian
economi c sphe re, prec i se 1y because it is seen by some
Ch i nese analyst s as embody i ng the type of sub- reg i ona 1
organisation from which China might find itself excluded.
Japan has the longest history of examining and
promot i ng t he est ab 1i shment of an economi c cooperat i ve
body in East Asia, mirroring its rise as the major
reg i ona 1 economi c powe r. What has i ncreas i ng 1y conce rned
Chinese analysts is the purpose to which Japan would put
such an organ i sat i on and the fact that it may no longer
be merely a blueprint but actually in the process of
creation given the economic forces at work in East Asia.
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Thus Japan's concept of reg; ona 1 coope rat i on has changed
since it was first advanced in the 60's as its economic
relationship with other East Asian states has evolved:
Japan seems to be concent rat i ng on an East Asi an
Economic Circle which would have Japan as leader and
include Asia's 'four little tigers' as well as the
ASEAN nations. Having gone from being pan-Pacific to
being East Asian, the organisation has shrunk in
terms of territory, but in terms of feasibility it
has gained much. Howeve r, t he East As ian Economi c
Circle would not include China.19
Chinese analysts are in little doubt that in promoting
such an organisation Japan is primarily motivated by
self-interest: seeking to enlarge its markets, assure its
sources of supply and add to its overall national
strength by peaceful means. While Japan has said that it
has no intention of creating an exclusive economic
circle, it is feared that the combination of external
pressure from closed regionalisation in the world economy
and the increasing ties within East Asia may be
inexorably driving Japan in this direction.
Thus Wei Lin of the CASS argues t hat As ian
countries, particularly the newly-industrialised, export-
oriented countries, will be the first to be effected by
the creation of economic blocs in Europe and North
America. As part of a response to increased regionalism,
the Japanese economic planning agency in 1988 considered,
estab 1 ish i ng an open market in t he reg i on of East
Asia and at the same time to cope with such
regionalism as the growing integration within the
EEC and the sign i ng of t he US-Canada free trade
agreement.20
The economi c zone envi saged at that time woul d have had
Japan at its centre in conjunction with the four NIC's
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and the ASEAN. In order to expand its economic ties with
these countries Japan would adopt a 'three-in-one'
strategy: lower tariffs, expand investments, and increase
trade set t 1ement sin Yen. Any re 1uct ance on t he part of
the Japan's Asian partners would be eroded by economic
pressures:
since the middle of the 1980's, Japan shifted
the key target of its Asian investments to Southeast
Asia, planning to establish an international
production cooperative system by means of direct
investments. The newly industrialised countries and
territories, for which trade is the economic
lifeline, will find themselves under pressure when
the United States and Europe abolish favourable
customs tariffs and force the value of their
currencies up to retrict imports, and they will
therefore have no other way than to shift toward the
Japanese market, striving to gain 'relative economic
profits' from economic cooperation with Japan •••
This is a division of labour in production and
a cooperative scheme of benefit to Japan, even
though outwardly not yet an organisation formally
integra~fd and established by the government
itself.
Chinese assessments as to whether Japan would consider
allowing it membership of an East Asian economic circle
are based both on interpretation of their bi-lateral
relationship and the position of third parties. By far
the most complex aspect of this arises from the need to
balance economic and political factors. As an example of
this, and the division between pessimists and optimists,
it is possible to cite a discussion conducted in
Shanghai's Shije Jingji Daobao at the beginning of 1989,
which reflected an upsurge in interest in an East Asian
circle within Japan itself. Peng Puzhang, a member of the
pessimist wing, while noting the waning economic
relationship between China and Japan, stresses primarily
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political factors: China would pose an obstacle to
Japan's desire to play the leading role in such a group;
China's social institutions, economic system, and
ideology were not compatible with those of other member
nations.22 Writing in 1989, he also felt the improving
Sino-Soviet relationship posed an obstacle:
Although the Japanese welcome improvement in the
Sino-Soviet relationship, they are also afraid that
normalisation and the restoration of party
relationships between China and the Soviet Union may
pose a threat to Japan. The Japanese government s
purpose for providing China with loans in Japanese
Yen is to keep China from turning to the Soviets.
The Japanese do not rest easy at the prospect of
Sino-Soviet relations.
While the triangular relationship between the three
powers has obviously changed with the demise of the
Soviet Union, there is no reason to believe that Japan
now favours a close relationship between Russia and
China. Peng thus summarises China's prospects if an East
Asian economic circle is formed without it:
The circumstances under which we may import foreign
capital will grow more grim, prospects for importing
technology will be bleak, expanding exports to Japan
will be all the more difficult, and the disparity
between China and the East Asia economic circle's
member nations will grow. All these facts require us
to use every count ermeasure at our command to meet
this challenge. 23
In a response to Peng' s art icle Chen Hongb inquest ions
whet he r the creat ion of an East As ian economi c circ 1e
need necessarily be a bad thing and whether China can be
excluded.24 This conclusion is again based on both
economic and political arguments. Economically it is
possible to argue that while there are exclusivist
tendencies to the regionalisation
244
process, the
fundament a1 trend is one of economi c coord inat ion wh ich
demands the opening up of domestic economies to economic
partners. This has been true even of Japan which opened
its economy more to the four little dragons in the second
half of the 80's. This form of cooperation has a highly
competitive element but there is no reason why China
cannot also compete for markets and investment within the
East Asian circle. Regional integration may represent
Ch ina's best chance of mak ing the economi c trans ition
under gone by the NIC's:
A characteristic of the East Asian economy is its
competitive mechanism of mutual overtaking on many
1eve 1s. Those concerned are bot hint erdepedent in
one respect but also independent in another respect.
As Japan expands exports of funds and technology to
develop markets, Asia's four little dragons have
also begun to invest abroad, relocate plants and
import labour-intensive products. This creates
advantageous conditions for China's implementation
of overall opening to the outside world through
multichannel introduction of foreign investment.25
As to whether an East Asian circle could be created
without China, Chen comes to different conclusions as to
the attitude of Japan and the other Asian states. He
argues that Japan's attitude to China is extremely
complex in both bilateral and multilateral terms.
Although it wants to let China become a little
stronger, Japan does not want to let China become
too strong as to pose a threat the reby imped ing it
from using its great economic nation status to
become a great political nation. Japan's basic
po 1icies towards Ch ina are 'steady cont ainment' and
'const raint '•••
It may be that Japan's fundament a1 advant age
lies in using an East Asian economic circle and
other regional cooperation patterns to make
bilateral relations even more intimate. This is
evidenced in Japanese scholars present concentration
of a huge amount of effort on studying China's
coastal development strategy and rural enterprises.
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They feel that these are the contact points by which
the Chinese economy can enter the East Asian
economic circle. 26
Thus while Japan may use its regional cooperation
structure as part of its strategy of containment, it is
also clear that this structure is still only partially
formed and the advanced sectors of Chi na' s economy may
yet be a crucial part of this, giving China leverage over
other countries, including Japan. Moreover, this position
is shared by other East Asian states who would not accept
China's exclusion since this would give Japan
predominance:
Whether it is Asia's 'four little dragons' or the
Eastern bloc, while hoping to receive additional
Japanese investment, technology and markets, each
one is very much on guard against a Japanese plot to
bring them on its track. South Korea actively sought
relations with China in this manner. One reason was
its desire to share ch~9a's status and influence in
contending with Japan.
Thi s argument is support ed wi th regard to ASEAN by Yang
Jiemian, who points out that while they desire the
benefits in terms of technology, capital and markets that
would come with regional cooperation, they also fear the
predominance that Japan would gain over their own
economies. Moreover, ASEAN itself would see its status
diminish if it was subsumed within a larger organisation.
For the NIC's, Singapore wi 11 follow the ASEAN 1ine and
Hong Kong will return to China in 1997. This leaves
Taiwan and South Korea which are in unique political and
geographical situations, while economically they both
depend and compete with Japan. South Korea will depend on
China to resist proposals for regional organisation that
246
would give Japan predominant power, while Taiwan will
tend to favour an economic circle of Chinese or Confucian
states. Yang does not believe that resistance to a Japan-
centred economic circle is influenced more by history
rather than by concerns about the futureo28
It is clear, therefore, that the inhibitions to
formal regional integration arising from the political
and economic diversity of the APR extend even to the sub-
regional level. Thus, the sensitivity of the Southeast
Asian countries to subsuming their economic and political
soverignty within larger organisations meant that there
was little enthusiasm for even the limited regional
coordination proposed by one of their own number,
Ma 1ays ian PM Mahat hir 0 In Oecembe r 1990 he suggest ed the
creation of an East Asian Economic Group, comprising
ASEAN, the NIE's, Japan, China, Myanmar, and Indochinao29
In order to encompass the increasingly important
Aust ra1ian economy, Ocean ia was subsequent 1y added 0 Th is
organisation would not detract from the operation of
other regional organisations, most obviously APEC, but
would operate as a multilateral consultative body:
00 the bloc intends to keep the East Asian region's
status as a region with expanding trade and
investment, and will play an important role in world
trade, including contributing to expanding trading
in the en 1arged Eu ropean market and the market of
the Americas; that is, no weakening of ASEAN
economic and trade relations with external markets,
much 1ess advocat ing prot ect ion ism on the part ofthe EAEG. 30
However the hostility of the US and the lack of
enthusiasm of the proposed members meant that this scheme
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has not yet seen any conc ret e form. For some count r i es,
ASEAN's i nt egrat i on must be the foundat ion st one for any
Southeast Asian economic sphere. Thus Thai PM Anand
Panyarachun proposed t he concept of an ASEAN Free Trade
Area (AFTA) in June 1991. A meeting of the economics
ministers of ASEAN in October 1991 called for the
creation of such an area within 15 years while calling
for the creation of an East Asian Economic Conference to
help coordinate regional economic activity. Subregional
ASEAN cooperation is emerging, but more due to economic
integration, such as that combining the financial and
technical resources of Singapore with the land and
nat ura 1 resou rces of I ndones i a and Malays i a, than
governmental intent.
Comparable problems of political and economi c
sensitivity surround a further sub-region with which
China is increasingly concerned: Northeast Asia. During
the Cold War Northeast Asia was the region of the
greatest political division and lowest economic
integration in Pacific Asia. This meant there was little
common out look on proposals for reg iona1 economi c
cooperation. In the past, for example, Japanese proposals
for a Sea of Japan cooperation zone omitted the Soviet
Union, while more recent blueprints sought to avoid the
problem of the division of the Korean peninsula by
excluding it altogether. The countries of Northeast Asia
now face the challenge of re-shaping the pattern of their
i nt erna 1 and ext erba 1 deve1opment to take advant age of
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the lowering of barriers, while seeking to settle the
political conflicts left over from the past, most
obviously the Russo-Japanese territioria1 dispute and the
confrontation on the Korean peninsula.
Domestic development has become so important because
Cold War divi sions se rved to creat e shadow economi es in
those areas of the countries of Northeast Asia located or
ori ent ated to the Nort heast. Problems of internal
development have been discussed with regard to the Soviet
Union and China but this is true even of Japan and South
Korea- the Japanese coast facing onto the Sea of Japan is
known as the 'Ura Ni hon', the back of Japan, as opposed
to the heavily developed face of Japan which looks south
and east onto the Pac ific; the west ern coast of Sout h
Korea facing onto the Yellow Sea is similarly
unde rdeve loped. Fo r those count ries whose ma in fore ign
economic ties were with the Soviet Union- Mongolia and
North Korea- the loss of political ties and the shift to
hard cur rency trade has meant sign ificant re-o rient at ion
of the entire economy.
The standard formu 1at ion for Nort heast ern reg iona 1
cooperation is outlined by Wu Lianyou:
Ch inese scho 1ars put forward the idea of
establishing a 'Northeast Asian economic sphere'
mainly designed to take advantage of the significant
complementarity among the parties in the region in
terms of economic structures by forming a system of
regional economic cooperation based on combining the
enormous financial and technological capabilities of
Japan and South Korea, the rich natural resources of
the Far East region of the former Soviet Union and
the abundant 1abou r resou rces of Ch ina, Nort h Korea
and Mongolia. 31
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The re has also been much di scuss i on of genu i ne 1y
transnational projects such as the Tyumen River project.
With an area of 10,000 square kilometres, this SEZ, which
wi 11 take 20 years to deve 1op and wi 11 cost US$30bn,
could play an important part in opening up NE Asia and
speeding its economic integration and development.
In assessing the prospects for such cooperation Lu
Zhongwei outlines three favourable factors and three
obstac1es.32 The first favourable factor is the changed
diplomatic and ec.onomic strategies of countries of the
region:
After the break up of the Soviet Union, the
international situation underwent a tremendous
change and Nort heast As i a was more direct 1y
affected. Japan, Russia, China, North Korea, and
South Korea made new strides in diplomatic and
economic policies to strengthen the combined
nat ional forces and improve thei r own status. From
the overall perspective, they all hope to realise
the following goals: first, to change the 'cold war
sea' to a 'peacefu 1 sea' ; second, change the
'economic rust belt' to a 'magnetic field of
development'; and third, seek out seaports and
~~~~;e~i~:se.33eograPhiCal distance of major Pacific
As to individual states, Lu believes that forging the
disparate economies of the region into a single entity is
now an important link in Japan's major power diplomacy,
exemplifed by PM Miyazawa's 1992 speech to the South
Korean parliament calling for a prosperous and open
Northeast Asia, including Russia and China. Russia has
sought political and economic contacts with Asian-Pacific
nations; Japan remains its principle target as a a source
of loans and technology, with China and the NIE's its
second target, and NE Asia the primary area of its
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st rat egy. Even wi th the success of Ch ina's reform
programme the size of the country means that the pace and
direction of its development must further expand:
The vast size and population, the numerous
nationalities, and the long borders that
charact erise Ch ina demand that in its economi c
development China give consideration to coastal,
border, river basin, inland, overseas Chinese, and
defence economic characteristics. So Chinese
economic reform in 1990's and opening up will
realise an 'omnidirectional opening' situation.
Recently a line of thinking has been formed to open
up along the border. A 'south Shenzen, north
Heilongjiang' policy and a policy for transforming
operating machanisms for state run industries with
the nort heast as the ir cent re of obse rvat ion have
injected life into the economic and trade relations
of Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning ••34
North Korea has been actively seeking economic
cooperation with the outside world since the promulgation
of a Joint Venture law in 1984 and while they have met
wi t h little success, this has created favourable
conditions for further regional cooperation. South
Korea's 'northern diplomacy' has had some success its
economic relations with China and Russia are expanding.
The second favourab 1e fact or is the deve 1opment of
secondary regional cooperation, expressed as 'one big and
three small', namely the overall region and its three
subsets: the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea, and the Bohai
group. Several of the regional powers are taking steps to
increase economic links across under-developed contact
points: China's opening of the northern border cities;
Nort h Korea's des ignat ion of an free economi c and trade
zone at Najin and Shipo; Russia's establishment of FEZ's
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at Nakhodka, Sakhalin and Altai; South Korea's, plan for
development of its western coast from Inchon to Pohang.
This has encouraged the third favourable factor: an
upsurge in interest from enterprises and localities for
sub-regional development. The Japanese have perhaps been
most active in this respect with delegations from
Niigata, Toyama, Akita, Hakodate and Hokkaido exploring
the possibility of economic association with the Russian
Far East. Companies such as Mitsubishi, Kamatsu and
Toyota have also done feasibility studies. Japanese
enterprises have decided to participate in the second
phase of the Da1ian industrial region project and to
expand business on the Liaodong peninsula. South Korean
compan i es have invest ed in Shandong, Shangha i and J i 1in
in China and are involved in such areas as ship repair,
timber, mining and hotels in Russia.
Despite this progress there remain a number of
significant obstacles which must be overcome, notably the
1ow-1 eve 1 of deve 1opment of the cont i guous areas in the
various countries which lie outwith their national
product i on and i nf rast ruct u re zones. I n Ch ina t his means
the 'Nort heast phenomenon': the concent rat i on of st at e-
run heavy industry, with serious 10sse and low
product i vi t y. Bot h t he market deve 1opment and the 1eve 1
of its externally orientation of the Dongbei are lower
than the coastal region. More worrying still may be the
abscence of an ove ra 11 dynami c balance: in the
development of a regional economy there must be a lateral
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division of labour and an expansion of balanced trade.
Thus t he As ian-Pac if i c economy has grown by the
developing economies importing technology from Japan to
develop their own productive capacity and using the
resulting trade surpluses, particularly with the US, to
finance the deficit with Japan. It is clear that
Nort heast As i a does not yet have such a eye 1 i ca 1
mechanism.
This means that bi-lateral economic and political
re 1at ions become of paramount import ance yet he re t he re
remain significant problems. Relations between Japan and
Russia, between the two Korea's, between North Korea and
Japan and between South Korea and China are still
complicated by political problems. In strict economic
terms, Lu is less sanguine than some commentators that
the interests of the countries dovetail neatly: for Japan
and Sout h Korea finance, techno logy and market s are the
primary concern; for China it is surplus labour power and
susing its processing capabilities: for North Korea and
Russia it is improving their investment enviroment and
gaining credits. Lu cites the view of Japanese analysts
who believe that Russia's US$70bn external debt makes not
only commercial loans but also the use of state funds
risky while the development of Russian Far East resources
such as gas and timber all requi re long-term expendi ture
before results can be realised.
It seems likely, therefore, that there must




economic and political, in order to create a foundation
for sub-regional cooperation. This will be discussed
further in the following section on bi-lateral relations
but first consideration must be given of the sub-regional
economy in which China may feel most confident of
participating: a Chinese economic sphere.
Discussion of an economic community drawing together
the disparat eel ement s of the Ch inese stat e has been
impeded in the past by Hong Kong's uncertain status and
hostility between Beijing and Taipei. The increasing
discussion as to the feasibility of creating a Chinese
economic community is primarily the result of changed
economic factors, but it is as yet unclear how far these
have modified political circumstances. Of the changed
economic factors, the rapid expansion of the economy of
the Chinese mainland and its attractiveness to the other
members of the community is the most significant. Yang
Jiemian believes that there is considerable mutual
complementarity between mainland China, Hong Kong and
Taiwan. The latter have restricted markets, natural
resources and labour supply and are facing the threat of
international protectionism. They are already using ties
with the mainland to overcome these problems and the
basis of future cooperation is evident:
The mainland has many rich mineral and energy
resources, as well as being an enormous market
itse 1f. It must renovat e and upg rade its techno logy
and equ ipment. Ital so 1acks some resou rces. It; s
precisely in these respects that Taiwan and Hong
Kong excel. Furthermore the mainland lacks
experience in developing an externally oriented
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economy, and its admi n i st rat i on and management are
relatively backward.35
If the difficulties in establishing cooperative
activities with western countries, due to differences of
culture and pract ice, are taken into account then the
advantages of cooperation between the three Chinas
becomes even more apparent.
More difficult to assess are the prospects for
lowering the political barriers between the three Chinas.
The g rowt h of economi c cont act sand the i mminent ret urn
of Hong Kong and Macao to China has encouraged the belief
on the mainland that re-unification with Taiwan is
inevitable. However, much of the support in Taiwan for a
Chinese economic sphere is based upon expanding
integration outside the mainland in order to create an
effective counter-weight to Beijing. This is best
exemplified by Taiwan's desire to draw the Chinese
communities of Southeast Asia into the process, as
described by Yang:
While propagating 'Taiwan style' development on the
one hand, it's [Taiwan's] short-term goal with
regard to the mainland is promoting the 'Taiwan
experience'. Taiwan's authorities capital ise on
relatively quick economic development, intending to
resist the political threat of the mainland with as
many economies of Chinese people (naturally
encompass i ng market economi es) as poss i b 1e. At the
same time, by doing so, it can remedy a deficiency
in its lack of formal diplomatic ties to other
Southeast Asian nations. 36
There is 1 itt 1e doubt, howeve r , that the st rongest
resistance to such integration might be from the
Southeast Asian Chinese communities themselves.
Exemplified by Singapore, they are seeking to develop
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distinctive cultures of their own rather than be subsumed
within a larger external one. Moreover, these communities
while economically important in their respective states
often lack political power or are even the subject of
political restriction. Taiwan's political isolation and
the economic logic of the Chinese sphere may yet lead to
success for Beijing's strategy.
As to China's motives in supporting closer
cooperation between the three Chinas, these are political
as we 11 as economi c, and not mere 1yin the sense of
pu rsu ing nat iona 1 re-uni ficat ion. By const ruct ing a sub-
reg iona 1 economi c sphe re cent red upon itse 1f, it will
have the foundation capable of competing with any other
regional unit, i f Asia moves away from open
regiona1isation towards exc1usivist blocs, most obviously
with the creation of Japan-centred East Asian circle:
Trilateral Chinese cooperation will also encourage
Asian-Pacific cooperation to move in a healthy
direction •• Considered in global terms, more and
more regions are considering cooperation on
secondary regional bases, such as the 'Northeast
Asian Economic bloc', the 'Yellow River economic
bloc', ASEAN, etc. If cooperation among the three
Chinas comes to pass, then the Asian-Pacific region
will have a relatively complete regional economic
arrangement. Furthermore, people's fears about Japan
will diminish because there will be a counterweight.
Thus As ian-Pac ific peace and secu rity wi 11 be
further ensured. 37
In conclusion it can said that China's attitude to
Asian-Pacific cooperation is conditioned in the first
instance by an increasingly confident analysis of its
position within the region. Gu Yuanyang, of the Institute
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of World Economy and Politics, believes that four factors
lie behind China's rise to prominence:
First, China's portion of the world's GNP will
probably gradually increase so that the eighth place
it occup ied in 1980 wi 11 by t he year 2000 probaba 1y
rise to sixth or fifth. Second, the strength and
prosperity of China's economy is bound to accelerate
the shift to the East of the world's economic focus
and give impetus to achieving substantive progress
in Asian-Pacific economic cooperation. Third,
synch ron i sed, coord i nat ed ex pans i on of i ndust ry and
trade will gradually enable China to transform what
people regard as a 'latent market' to a market of
real significance, thus providing even more export
opportunities to countries in the region. Finally,
the expansion of China's industrialisation and
superiority of its export products mix will
undoubtedly further strengthen the complementary
economic trade ties between countries of the region,
promote the establishment of a more rational system
of int3rnational production and division of
labour .• 8
However, while it is confident of playing a major role,
China does not have a clear perception of what this will
be, not least because of the fluidity of the political
and economi c sit uat ion in t he reg i on. Thus the fact that
China does not have a blueprint for regional cooperation
at present is largely an extension of this uncertainty
regarding the future shape of its own power. Until this
is better defined China will resist attempts to create
fixed or closed regional blocs, particularly if these
pose political as well as economic threats. In the
immediate future, the greatest potential for exercising
its influence and meeting its own interests; particularly
attempting to rectify the imbalance in nat ional
deve 1opment, may 1 i e at the sub- reg i ona 1, rat he r than
regional, level. Even here, however, the continuing
interplay of political and economic factors creates an
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extremely complex picture. It remains to be considered
how Ch ina's economi c re 1at ions at t he most fundament a 1
level, bi-laterally, may effect this.
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iii China's bilateral economic relations in Asia.
Unlike Russia, where the lack of regional integration is
a reflection of the low level of bilateral economic
relations in Asia, much has already been said about
China's bilateral economic relations in Asia, through
discuss i on of it s trade st ruct ure, domest i c deve 1opment
policy, and perspectives on regional and sub-regional
integration in Asia. Therefore, rather than risk
repeating arguments presented previously, this short
section will concentrate on identifying the factors which
have formed China's bilateral ties.
The first factor is overwhelmingly geography. It is
pe rhaps Ch ina's paramount advant age that its size and
position at the heart of Pacific Asia mean that it can
conduct multi-directional bilateral relations within the
reg i on and use these as a foundat i on on whi ch to bu i1d
more complex structures of economic ties at the sub-
regional and regional level. On this basis, however, it
becomes somewhat arbit rary to try and separat e st ri ct 1y
bilateral relations from either the domestic or regional
context. Rather these should be thought of as
interlinking levels of economic activity.
Thus Jin Huongfan, the director of the Institute of
Asian-Pacific Studies of the Fujian Academy of Social
Science, puts forward a model which places China's
bilateral regional ties as an intermediary level between
the domest i c and i nt ernat i ona 1 economi es. 1 Th is is based
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on three concentric circles based on the Bohai sea, the
Yellow Sea and the Taiwan Straits which were then
expanded to incorporate, respectively, Northeast Asia,
including the Koreas and Russia, East Asia, including
Japan, and Southeast Asia, particularly ASEAN. Beyond
these lie the markets of the global economy.
Th is mode 1 is support ed by the fact that t he Ch i nese
economy does appear at present to be developing on
geographical lines, with South Korea and Japan, for
example, being chiefly active in Northeast China, Taiwan
in Fujian, and the Southern provinces interacting with
Hong Kong, and through it wit h Sout heast As i a. What is
most likely to change is the relative importance of these
economic spheres. The considerable emphasis being placed
on developing the Pudong project indicates that China
sees the East Asian circle developing to overtake the
Southeast Asian circle by the turn of the century.
Th ismay be a correct assessment of the poss i b 1e
limits to cooperation with the Southeast Asian countries,
whose markets may be too different from China's,
certainly in terms of scale, but whose economic
structures may be too similar. However, it must also be
based on improving the Sino-Japanese relationship. While
trade volumes between the two countries will continue to
rise, and in a more balanced way than in the past, real
economic interdependence wi 11 depend on capital and
technology transfers which will tie the two countries
together in the regional division of labour. As
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Christopher Howe has pointed out, the current situation
of high official loans and low private investment mean
that,
China simply does not fit into the recent pattern of
Japanese investment flows to Asia, a pattern in
which private flows have been particU~lY prominent.
This distortion appears to political ••
The future shape of the Si no-Japanese rel at ionshi p wi 11
also influence China's other Northeastern ties. The
establishment of official ties with South Korea and the
stable transition in relations with a post-communist
Russ ia has not on 1y inc reased t he prospect of expand i ns
economi c re 1at ions but has changed t he pol it i ca 1 balance
in the region. In economic terms, both Russia and the ROK
may be important in terms of technology transfer but as
has been suggested it is the need to address the problem
of the shadow economies of the region which may be most
pressing.
According Hao Yufan, Chinese perspectives on the
joint development of its North Eastern provinces amd the
Russian Far East, relate, firstly, to the opportunity to
increase trade and economic cooperation.3 Development of
the Russian Far East will mean increased demand for
agricultural and light industrial products; it will
create a new labour market; it will open a conduit for
the transfer of technology from Russia at levels and
prices more suitable for China than Western technology;
and it will be critical in the attempt to expand the Open
Door to inner Asia.
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Russia as a whole continues to have a shortage of
light industrial goods but the Far East in particular
lacks the means by which to convert its natural resources
into processed goods, whi 1e the Dongbei bad 1y needs to
diversify Us industrial base. Against a background of
grow; ng border trade, an inc reas i ng numbe r of condu it s
have been deve loped by road, rail, air and sea. Last 1y,
the development of the Northeast will also require a
large labour force which China is ideally placed to
provide given its rural unemp 1oyment and ex i st i ng
transient labour force. The major obstacle may be the
ava i 1ab i 1it y of resou rces but if Japan cont i nues to show
reluctance in opening up Northeast Asia the three states
may dec i de to proceed wi t hout it. One exp 1anat ion
proferred for Japan's reluctance is that it fears the
creation of a 'tripartite alliance' of China, Russia and
Korea aimed primarily against itself.4 While Chinese
analysts persist in saying that their bilateral relations
are not aimed aginst any third party, this indicates a
further determinant of China's bilateral relations: if
geography is the major defining factor behind the
structure of bilateral ties, then a principal cause of
China's improving relations is its changed political
status.
Thus in t he past the maj or 1i mi t at i on on the
development of economic relations at the bilateral level
was political and the current improvement in China's
bilateral relations has been due as much to a successful
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diplomacy, as to China's emergence as an economic power.
Building on ties established in the 70's with Japan,
Thailand, and Malaysia, recent years have seen the
restoration of relations with Indonesia; their
establishment with South Korea, Brunei and Singapore; a
more balanced development of ties in South Asia; and a
major push to build links with the new states of Central
Asia. Anther key element has been the normalisation of
relations with hostile socialist states- most obviously
Vietnam- in the wake of the normalisation of relations
with the Soviet Union. Since the final section of this
paper will deal with the political implications of the
foregoi ng discuss i on on Russ i an and Ch i nese pe rspect i ves
on the Asian economy detailed discussion of these changes
will be given there.
However, no discussion of the forces shaping China's
future bilateral ties would be comp 1et e wi t hout
consideration of the significance of Asia's central
characteristic: its transitional nature. This means that
while interpretations of China's current position may be
primarily sanguine, views of the longer term are less so.
Thus in an interview with Liu Guogang at the end of 1992,
an explanation was given as to why China was forging
ahead with its development despite the fact that this
carried the risk of instability.5 The first reason given
was the transitional nature of the current international
situation:
The key to wor 1d economi c deve 1opment is the sh i ft
to the Pacific rim, particularly East Asia. This
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trend will continue, probably into the next century.
China, Japan and the four little dragons are all in
this region. From the standpoint of the history of
world economic development, a given area cannot
always develop quickly. and it appears that this
regions's rapid development will only continue for
another 30 to 50 years. Therefore~ we must take firm
hold of this opportunity and not let it pass by. 6
Equa 11 y, howeve r, it was recogn i sed t hat Ch ina was not
alone in attempting to use the favourable regional
conditions to increase its national power:
It must also be recognised that in the present
competition between consolidated national powers,
many countries of the world, particularly some of
our neighbouring countries and regions, are all
accelerating growth. In the 1980's the four little
dragons had an average growth rate of 8%. Ours was
9%, slightly higher... The develoment of
neighbouring countries is threatening! Furthermore,
in the 1990's Hong Kong and Macao will return to the
mot he r 1and, and the main 1and wi 11 st rengt hen
economic and and cultural exchanges with Taiwan
which will also return to the motherland in the
future. This presents a problem of how to decrease
the disparity in economic growth rates so that we
can join smoothly together.7
Thus, China's bilateral economic relations do not exist
only within a complex structure that links domestic
development with regional growth and changes to the
international economy, but within a broad agenda that not
only ties economic and political policy together, making
it very difficult to determine where one begins and
another ends. As noted, however, the final section of
this paper will attempt to indicate the political
implications for Russia and China of their respective
analyses of the changes to the Asian-Pacific economy.
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VI Russian and Chinese Political Perspectives on Asia.
The final section of this paper will attempt to draw
conclusions as to the future of Russian and Chinese
pol it ica 1 relations in Asia by comparing their
perspectives on the politics and security of the region.
The out st and ing d i ffe rence when discuss i ng the economi c
and political futures of Asia is that while most Asian
states are optimistic and enthusiastic about
t ransnat i ona 1 economi c coope rat i on and i nt eg rat ion, they
view multi-lateral political and security structures with
mistrust and doubt. The reasons for this are outlined by
Tselishchev:
For the majority of Asian states.. it is
char act er i st i c that t hey are ext reme 1y guarded in
relation to proposals on multi-lateral, especially,
all-regional political mechanisms. In general, this
approach has an objective basis underlying it. When
not a few bi-lateral problems exist between these
countries, by which they are naturally affected,
fears often arise that multi-lateral structures may
be used to impose on them some kind of resolution
which does not suit them •• Added to this can be the
survival in many Asian countries of the notion that
almost any all-regional structure would by its
nature serve the hegemonic interests of the major
powers.1
The degree to which Asian states remain locked within a
complex matrix of predominantly bilateral relations has
been demonstrated by the contrast between changes in
Europe and in Asia following the demise of the bi-polar
orde r , Thus the abscence of fixed blocs and the
continuity of interests between the major powers- Russia,
the USA, China and Japan- meant there was no radical
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change in the regional order, but but only in the pace of
the on-going evolution of state-to-state relations.
For Russia and China this has found expression
primarily in the extension of relations across the former
divide, establishing ties, respectively, with South Korea
and ASEAN; and India, I ndones i a, Sout h Korea and
Si ngapore. For t he US and Japan the cont rad i ct ions of
their own bilateral relationship did not lift but merely
shifted, as the easing of Japan's vulnerability on
security also lessened America's leverage on the economic
re 1at i onsh i p and encou raged itt 0 seek coope rat i on wi t h
other powers, including Russia.
While the shifting matrix of bilateral relations
wi 11 cont i nue to predomi nat e t he As ian orde r, it cannot
be the purpose of this section simply to provide an
inventory of Russian and Chinese regional ties. Rather it
must endeavour to indicate the particular forces which
will shape those relations, especially those which may
result in the gradual development of intermediate (sub-
regional) and multilateral structures. This ultimately is
the just i f i cat i on for t he scope of the foregoi ns
discussion on the economic future of the continent:
economic relations are not important merely in themselves
but are the most likely basis on which inhibitions to
political multilateral ism can be overcome:
Drawing into the process of dynamic regional
development, new countries, lessening inner-regional
economic ruptures, raising the level of life helps
extinguish conflicts and mistrust, improving the
same political relations and extinguishing the
causes of arms races. In other words, the countries
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of the APR, multifaceted in their differences in
culture, tradition, and values, in the search for an
a1gorithim of cooperation proceed objectively from
the demands for economic development above all,
where they have much in common, and not from
political and philosophical doctrines. This, in
particular, differentiates the APR from Europe,
where in political thinki£g, and culture, traditions
are immeasurably greater.
The search for the balance of Russia and China's
relations in Asia thus lies between the pressures
encouraging economic cooperation and integration
discussed previously and the problems of political
division and contradiction which arise from Asia's
heterodox nature and the rise of competitive nationalism
in the region •
. There are two differing aspects to Russian and
Chinese perceptions of Asia's political future. Before
cons ide ring Ch ina and Russ ia's perspect ives on what are
thought of as the standard foci of external policy,
security and diplomacy, an attempt must be made to assess
their perceptions of their own position within the Asian
political order. How each power views its relationship
with Asia clearly forms the basis upon which foreign
policy itself is conducted, and these relationships are
in a state of some flux given the changes in the
international order, particularly those arising from the
demise of European communism.
Thereafter, consideration can be given to Chinese
and Russ ian assessment s of the pol itica 1 and secu rity
enviroment of Asia. This section will take the following
structure, therefore:
I Russia and Asia.
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i) Russia as a future Asian power.
ii) Russian perspectives on future Asian relations.
II China and Asia.
i) China as a future Asian power.
ii) Chinese perspectives on future Asian relations.
I Russia and Asia
i) Russia as a future Asian power.
Russia's ambiguous relationship with Asia- being part of
Asia and yet separate from it- has already been outlined
in the sections on historical and ideological
perspectives. However, the changes that have overcome
Russia, involving as they do both the demise of the
Soviet Union and the earlier imperial system upon which
it was built, have opened a new chapter in Russian
perceptions of the East. This is a complex process since
it involves changing attitudes to Asia's place in the
international order, particularly the economic order as
discussed previously, but also an attempt to define
Russia's new place in that order. Moreover, foreign
policy as a whole, and perhaps particularly that on Asia,
has been drawn into the on-going maelstrom of political
contention wHhin Russia in which competing definitions
of the nature of the Russian state are being used to
determine foreign policy priorities and orientation.
According to Alexei Arbatov, Director for the Centre
of Geopo lit ica 1 and Mi 1it ary Forecast sin Moscow, it is
possible to define four broad foreign policy positions,
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which vary in terms of number and influence, but span all
the major instituions engaged in policy formulation.3
Even within these groups, however, there is limited
uniformity and there can be consensus across groups, and
divisions within them, depending on the issue.
The failure of August 1991 coup propelled a pro-
west ern group to promi nence, headed by Forei gn Mini st er
Kozyrev and other members of the Presidential staff, and
with the support of sections of the Foreign Ministry and
parliament. The dominance of the foreign policy process
that this group enjoyed has been continuously eroded,
however, not least because of the perceived linkage
between a foreign pol icy which appears to have conceded
more to the Western powers than it has gained with the
failed radical marketisation of the domestic economy, as
supported by the West. Not all the critics of this
foreign polcy reject the validity of the Western economic
and political model, it is more that they question the
wisdom of assuming that Russian domestic and foreign
policy interests are identical to the interests of other
states.
This has led to the growing influence on the foreign
policy process of two centrist groups whom Arbatov
defines as moderate liberals and moderate conservatives.
The former, to which Arbatov himself belongs, see
t hemse 1ves as pragmat i st s who are seek i ng to deve lop a
distinctively Russian foreign policy based upon a
realistic assessment of its interests, including its
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geopolitical position. It favours the assertion of
Russian interests on a principled basis, including the
ri ght to challenge West e rn pol icy if necessary. It draws
support from within Parliament, including the head of the
Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee V.P. Lukin, and
the intellectual community.
The moderate conservatives represent important
ins tit uti 0na 1 for c e s with i nth emil ita r y h i gh command,
the i ndust ria 1 manage rs and the main segment s of the
federal bureaucracy. It also has supporters from inside
the political establishment both in parliament and the
Presidential staff. This group does not see the end of
the Soviet Union as leading inexorably to the end of
major power status. Russia should develop its sphere of
influence particularly in the near abroad and avoid
excessive dependence on the West. Russia should develop a
modern mi l t t ar y capability and diversify its relations,
particularly towards the new Asian powers, India, Iran
and China.
It is these two groups, particularly the
conservative institutional groups, which have gained most
in influence as the domestic reform process and the
alignment with the West has failed to produce the
expected results. The crisis situation in the country has
also encouraged extremist forces, however, which while
largely isolated from the policy process, continue to
ga in popu 1ar st rengt h. These inc 1ude neo-commun i st sand
ultra-nationalists who advocate a re-building of the
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superpower status of the country, including by military
means if necessary. They advocat e all i ances wi t h ot her
ant i-west e rn reg i mes and oppose concess ions under START
II, the CSCE, and UN multilateral ism.
The degree of contention within the foreign policy
debate is not due solely to the extension of domestic
political conflict to the foreign policy agenda but also
because of t he need to const ruct a forei gn pol icy and
value system to meet the parameters of the new state, or
in the case of the neo-communist and nationalist factions
to resu rrect t hose of t he past. The weaken i ns of the
Atlanticist policy can be viewed as a natural process
resu 1t i ng f rom a re-ad j ustment between t he pol icy
aspirations of the new government, which were derived
from the desire to end the country's exclusion from the
po 1it i ca 1 and economi c processes of West e rn capi tal ism,
and the domestic and external realities of Russia which
suggest that this may not be the automatic, and certainly
not the immediate, future of the country.
In attempting to define the country's foreign policy
many comment ators have been re 1uct ant to deve lop value
sys t ems as such since these evoked compari son wi t h the
ideologies of the past. Rather there has been an attempt
to approach the development of foreign pol icy by way of
non-normative criteria. First and foremost among these
has been the search for a definition of Russia's national
interests. A leading group of analysts from the Institute
of Canada and America proposed the following definition:
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The term 'national interest' is used by us in the
same way which it has long been applied in the whole
civilised world. The meaning of 'national' and
'state' in the sphere of foreign policy are in this
sense identical in as far as by state is understood
not the aggregate of political and social
institutions, but the concrete characteristics of
the country. In other words, our national interests
are the interests of the Russian Federation as a
Eurasian power, possessing a defining composition of
historical, cultural, socio-economic, geographic and
demographic indicators, the combination of which
also makes up the political phenomenon of Russia as
a single multi-national state.4
As this indicates one of the key components influencing
the development of the new foreign policy is Russia's
changed position in relation to Europe and Asia, or, as
it is most frequently expressed, as a Eurasian power.
The concept of Eurasia is far from being a new one
in Russian political culture, as t he sect i on on
historical perspectives on Asia indicated. It reached its
most deve loped e 1abo rat ion in t he work of a group of
Russian emigre's in the 1920's. A contemporary assessment
of the Eurasianists describes the basis of their thinking
and its current appeal:
The formulation of their geopolitical doctrine
aspired to a single truthful interpretation of
national ( to be exact, ethical ) traditions, the
name of which would be awarded to a new ideological
cu r rent. They proposed that Eu ras ian ism was a
special form or type of culture, thinking and state
policy ingrained from time immemorial in the space
of the greatest Eurasian state- Russia. This thesis
was founded mostly on non-traditional arguments
drawn from t he past, present and even fut u re. The
Eu r as ian i st s thought of t hemse 1ves as express i ns a
special world-view, orientated primarily on spatial
categories. The creation of their political
constructs was acquired, therefore, above all from
geo-political measurements.
Evidently, it is precisely this attribute of
the Eurasian world-view which gives it special
relevance to our time, when geo-political and
national-territorial problems are extremely acute,
when the concepts of Western and Eastern
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civilisation, European and Asian republics, 'the
turn to the East' are once more coming into common
usage.5
The current of geo-po1itica1 thought within Russia has
always remained subordinate to the official ideologies in
both the Tsarist and Soviet eras. The defence and
extension of the state was conducted under the premise of
imperial right and proletarian internationalism not
explicitly from geo-po1itica1 imperatives. Indeed it was
t hose who threat ened t he Russ ian st at e, most obvi ous 1y
Germany and Japan, who were moved by geo-po1itics, making
the concept anathema for most of the modern era. Yet
precisely because of these threats geo-po1itics
inevitably played a part in shaping foreign policy, and
equally important, military doctrine.
The deg ree to whi ch geo-po 1 it i ca 1 concerns shaped
the cold war only became open for discussion in the last
years of the Sovi et Union. Thus Ma1ashenko of the CPSU
International Department commented in 1990:
The confrontation of the continental power which
controls the heart of Europe, and the coalition
opposing it, is by no means confined, geo-
po 1 it i ca 11y, to a conquest between East and West,
socialism and capitalism (or 'totalitarianism' and
'liberal democracy' in western parlance), as it has
quite often been made out over the last few decades,
but is an element of genuinely global politics.
Properly speaking, the very terms 'East' and 'west'
also reflect in a way, if inadequately, the fact
that that it is not only ideological rivalry or even
a clash of social-political systems but also a 'de-
ideologised' geopolitical confrontation. 6
However, sustaining geo-po1itica1 stability became an
increasingly onerous burden for the Soviet Union:
A heavy price had to be paid for the preservation of
the 'monolithic unity' of the huge geopolitical
conglomerate. It was artificially isolated from the
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world economy, its scientific and technical level
and living standards were low. The protracted crisis
of the Sovi et economy is a nat u r a 1 consequence not
only of its anti-market character but also of its
submission to geopolitics in its classical imperial
interpretation. 7
From this perspective the collapse of the Soviet Union
should not be seen simply as implosion from internal
factors but also due to external pressure on the geo-
political boundaries of the state, in Europe and Asia.
The revival of the concept of Eurasia, similarly, derives
from the need to re-define the new geo-po1itical
boundaries of the state and its position in the global
order, with this process all the more explicit now that
the ideological vei ls of the imperial and communist eras
have been largely discarded.
The starting point for the new Eurasianism is the
changed geo-po 1it i ca 1 pos it ion since the demi se of the
Soviet Union. Despite the fact that the proportion of the
Russian Federation distributed between Europe and Asia
(25%:75%) is very close to that of the Soviet Union
there, is a perception that the balance of the country
has shifted eastward:
Russia cannot reproduce the military-strategic
phenomenon of the old Union- her geo-po1itical as
we 11 as geo-st rat egi c char-act eri st i cs have changed.
The population has shrunk, and so has the land, its
line of contact with the outside world is different.
Having recognised the independence of her neighbours
in the West, the country has involuntarily retreated
East. Accordingly, its stabilising function is
naturally converted from a predominantly European
one into properly a Eurasian one. 8
As this suggests, Russia has not lost the geo-politica1
interests of the Soviet Union. Rather these have changed
with the demise of the bi-polar order and the emergence
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of Europe and Asia as two pillars of the new multi-polar
order:
Russ ia has found g1oba 1 geopo 1itica 1 funct ions
(which, in essence, the Bolsheviks only widened and
modified) thanks to its intermediate position
between the traditional East and West. Abandoning
communist messianism, the Russian state has not lost
its paramount international role arising from,
firstly, the stabilising capacity it possesses
within the area of Eurasia, and, consequently,
globally; secondly, its connecting, integratory
function in relation to a united and well-
established Europe and what is still a poor and
disunited Asia; thirdly, its ability to partially
deprec iate and ext ingui sh the negat ive impul ses on
both sides, which are inevitable in the process of
rapid global changes, by laying a Eurasian bridge
through Russia.9
This description of Russia's geo-political role in the
new order is more prognosis than diagnosis, however.
Three years after the end of Soviet communism Russia's
external influence continues to decline rather than
increase, giving a rather different immediate scenario:
If the Soviet period can be characterised as a
simultaneous ideological confrontation with the west
and direct entry into Europe, by means of the Warsaw
pact, then the new period possibly will be
dist ingu ished by a comb inat ion of the absence of
ideological antagonisms with a consciousness of
geopolitical isolation. 10
There is considerable momentum, however, behind the
belief that Russia cannot afford to pursue an
isolationist path however much domestic issues will
dominate the political and economic agendas until the end
of the century, not least because economic reconstruction
will demand increasing interaction with the international
economy. Both the perceived geo-political shift, and the
potential for economic co-operation, to the East are
encouraging the promotion of Asia as an alternative
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direction of foreign policy orientation. But if Russia is
to develop as a genuinely Eurasian power- a political and
economi cent it y wh i ch has balanced re 1at ions wit h bot h
East and West - it wi 11 have to re- invent it se 1 f as such
rather than assume it will develop naturally from simple
geographic determinants. In particular, the ambiguous
attitude of European Russians towards Asia, the Asia
outside Russia and within it, must be challenged.
In terms of external relations, while centrist
1 i be r a 1s sup po r t the d i ve r si f i cat ion 0 f for e i gn po 1 icy
or i ent at i on on pragmat i c grounds, many conservat i ves do
so because of their empathy with the political
authoritarianism of certain Asian states, not least
China. The continued interplay of domestic politics with
foreign policy will re-inforce the position of those, and
this must be the implicit position of the group around
Foreign Minister Kozyrev, who view Europe as the natural
locus of the country's interests and Eurasianism with
scepticism:
There is no doubt that Russia has vital interests of
equal greatness both in Europe and in Asia. Our
country over centuries has developed as a Eurasian
power and it is hardly possible to dispute this
truth. However, one cannot here agree with those who
use this as a basis to speak of some kind of special
Eurasian nature of Russia. Is it not true that it
developed thanks to movement from West to East? And
our religion and our culture has, undoubtedly, a
European character. This is again an indisputable
truth. It is, of course, not deniable that Russia
has formed a special type of culture, and yes, of
nation ••• But ask any 'real Asian' what Russian
culture is like, in terms of ancestry and mentality.
The answer is always t he same one: "We are
Eu ropeans". 11
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This said, what is notable about the geo-political
argument at present is that it is be i ng advanced ac ross
the political spectrum. Eurasianism in the past was
conservative, chauvinistic, and isolationist, and indeed
it persists in this guise in some factions,12 but
according to liberal proponents, the new Eurasianism need
be none of these things. Geo-politics is way of removing
foreign policy from the ideological agenda not for
postioning it within that agenda.
Internally, the ambiguous position of Asiatic
Russia-Siberia and the Far East- in the country's
political and economic structure, and in the national
psyche, must be addressed. Asiatic Russia is
simultaneously the economic and strategic repository of
Russia's great power status but also its greatest
1i ab i1 it yin terms of defence and demand on resou rces;
geo-po 1it i cs is a t wo-edged sword in t his regard,
conferring status but demanding expenditure of resources
and will, as the predicament of the Soviet Union
demonst rat ed. The cu r rent process of economi c and
political de-centralisation in Russia is not the product
of reform and growth as in China, but of dislocation and
st agnat ion. European Russians are simultaneously
concerned about the dissolution of the Federation and
reluctant to commit limited resources to begin yet
another attempt to develop and integrate Russia's
prost ranst vo (expanses). Yet if economi c deve 1opment in
Asiatic Russia is not to come from within the Federation
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it will inevitably mean leaving the field to the Asian
economies, creating an external pull to match the
internal push of these regions turn away from Europe.
The question of the prostranstvo is, moreover, not
simply one of economics and politics but of psychology.
Some Russians perceive that the need to colonise and
defend the expanses has shaped the history of the country
and the bal ance of forces within it, including
politically and militarily. It is a short step from geo-
politics to outright geographic determinism:
Society must undergo a radical rethinking of the
established perception of the expanses and its role
in economic and social development. For too long we
unthinkingly repeated "the might of Russia will grow
out of Siberia and the Northern Ocean". At the same
time the expanses did not only open new
possibilities, but also demanded collosal efforts to
support it- the provision of communications,
infrastructure, defence and so on. Still at the
beginning of the 80's our well-known professor of
geog raphy V.M. Gokhman said that the expanses we re
our beach. We gave our boundless expanses more than
we received from them, they sucked juices out of the
organ ism of the count ry, as we cont inua 11y pushed
them on the path to extensive development. And if an
ocean lapped against the Urals, most probably Russia
would have been a long time ago already a legitimate
member of the society of civilised countries.13
At present, however, a commitment to Russia's great power
status remains a sine qua non of the foreign policy
debate, and that status will remain rooted, as it has
historically, in control and defence of territory. In
this sense the development of the concept of Eurasia can
be seen in a further perspective: as a means of binding
the country together against the internal and external
forces that may threaten its unity.
281
The rise of geo-politics in Russian foreign policy
at present is partly being driven by the conditions of
post-communism- the need to define the borders of the new
state and its spheres of interest and influence, the
absence of a consensus on foreign policy values and even
a desire for a de-ideologised foriegn policy. However,
even after the new parameters and role of Russia have
hardened in the national mind, many commentators believe
that geo-politics will remain a defining factor in
foreign policy given the country's location between
Europe and Asia. While a Eurasian state in reality rather
than rhetoric may take time to emerge, the balance of
national interests and external relations may make it
inevitable. For this reason, even liberal commentators
such as Abalkin, believe any attempt to place one
orientation ahead of another is unviable:
The geopolitical position of Russia makes a multi-
directional orientation of its foreign policy and
its inclusion in all enclaves of world society an
ob j ect i ve necess it y. Any at tempt to put at t he head
of the list its relations with one side or group of
countries is contrary to its state and national
interests. A multi-directional orientation is a
strategic principle and it must not be violated by
any con iunct i on of cons i derat ions or pressu res of
the moment.
Even the posing of the question as to the
priority of relations with this or that region or
g roup of count r i es- whet her t he near ab road, the
former CEMA countries, Southeast Asia, the US or
China- is incorrect. It is true, the question of the
geo-political priorities of many countries is
legitimate, but not for Russia as a great world
power. 14
ii) Russian perspectives on Asia's future political
relations.
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Change in Russian political perspectives on Asia did
not begin with the demise of the Soviet Union but rather
with the assumption of Mikhail Gorbachev to the position
of General Secretary of the CPSU in 1985. While the
changes in the physical and political parameters of the
state since 1991 have created the conditions for the
revision of the relationship between Russia and Asia
wHhin the national consciousness, foreign policy itself
towards Asia has been conducted with some degree of
continuHy between the two eras. This is partly because
of personnel- many of those who are responsible for
Russ ian fore ign po 1icy rose to promi nence in the
Gorbachev era- but it is predomi nant 1y due to cont inu ity
in the interests of state and the political and economic
realities of the country's position in Asia.
This is true even where the motivations behind the
two governments foreign policies differ. Thus while it
can be argued that the relative balance accorded to East
and west is not dissimilar in approximate terms- the
attempt to redefine the strategic relationship with the
Atlantic powers began under Gorbachev- it should be borne
in mind that the pace of change in Europe was as much the
product of the nature of the security and political
structures there as it was of the willingness of
governments to revise them. If Gorbachev's policy
ach ieved more in Eu rope than As ia it was because
conditions were more compatible with his diplomacy than
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in the complex and cont ent i ous c i rcumst ances of As i a.
Unlike the Russian government, whose initial Atlanticism
was unquestionably the product of political, economic and
ideo log i ca 1 pref erence, it can be argued that Gorbachev' s
diplomacy was at least as ambitious with regard to Asia
as it was with Europe, as was evident in the application
of the 'New Political Thinking' to Asia.
Beginning with the Vladivostok speech in July 1986,
and continuing through the signing of 'The Declaration of
Principles for a Nuclear-Weapon Free and Non-Violent
World' in New Delhi in November 1986, the Merdeka
interview in 1987, and the seven principles on East Asian
secu r it y out 1i ned at Krasnoyarsk in Sept embe r 1988, a
sophisticated intellectual structure was developed which,
while it ranged across a wide number of economic,
political and security issues, was principally aimed at
breaking down the Soviet Union's isolation in Asia, as
noted by Mikhail Nosov:
The USSR, the 1argest count ry in t he As i a-Pac if i c
region, is making efforts to guarantee the equal
security of the countries in the region, and to
accomplish the tasks involved in disarmament on the
basis of collective efforts. For the Soviet Union,
security guarantees in the Asia-Pacific region
represent a problem involving a combination of
political, military and economic issues. The
inability to present the USSR today as an 'alien
element' in the region's political life is revealed
by the fact that one third of Asia is within the
geographical limits of the country, but also by the
attention paid in Soviet policies to that vast and
dynamically developing region of the world.15
This said, it could be argued that there was little in
the new thinking on Asia that did not have intellectual
antecedents in earlier Soviet policy formulations. While
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there was greater recognition of the importance of
economic factors in Asian relations even the call for the
economic integration of Pacific Siberia into Asia could
be traced back to the optimism surrounding the Soviet-
Japanese economic relationship in the 1970's. Moreover,
as in that instance when there was an implicit anti-
Chinese motive, it could be argued that security concerns
continued to determine the Soviet agenda.
The primary proposals of the Gorbachev offensive in
t he East we re the creat i on of a new and comprehens i ve
security regime in Asia to replace the existing one based
upon arms compet it i on and cont end i ng all i ances; t he use
of multilateral cooperation to resolve regional
conflicts;and the introduction of a variety of
theconfidence-building measures to de-escalate
confrontation in the Pacific: limiting specific forms of
naval activity, initiating reciprocal Soviet and US
wit hd rawa 1 from ove rseas nava 1 bases, and enhanc i ng the
security of sealanes.16
Soviet diplomats argued that the new proposals could
not be compared to the old demand for Asian collective
secu r it y, not 1east because t hey were not aimed at any
one country or group of countries- in effect the China
factor had been removed by the weakening of the strategic
triangle and the role of the US was increasingly accepted
as stabilising rather than threatening. However, none of
t he count ri es of t he reg i on we re prepared to accept the
Soviet Union as a legitimate regional power prior to
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concrete changes in it's political and security posture.
The reversal of the Soviet Pacific military projection in
the East, externally in the case of Afghanistan,
Mongo 1i a, wit hd rawa 1 of support for t he Vi et namese in
Cambodia, and internally with regard to withdrawal of
ground forces from the Far East and the INF double global
zero, did produce an improvement in the Soviet security
and diplomatic enviroment in Asia. particularly at the
strategic level, as the MID noted in 1990:
The programme for peace, security and cooperation in
Asia put forward in Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk,
steps towards settling regional conflicts in
Afghanistan, Korea, normalising relations with China
and levelling up relations the Soviet Union and APR
count r i es as we 11 as reduc i ng ou r mi 1 it ary presence
in the region made it possible to appreciably
strengthen our positions there and to provide more
favourable conditions for maintaining our national
security. The main cause of concern- our being.
confonted in effect with all three leading powers in
the region, that is, 'ge United States, Japan and
China, has disappeared.
This said the improvement of the Soviet position was
primarily achieved by unilateral concessions rather than
through the proposed collective security system. The
failure to initiate a multilateral programme under the
V1adivostok-Krasnoyarsk initiatives was accounted for in
part by the unwillingness of the US, especially during
the Bush administration, to relinquish any of the
political and military superiority- Soviet analysts
cont i nued to argue that t he US en joyed an advant age of
2:1 in military terms- it enjoyed as a result of its
system of bilateral ties. America's allies, particularly
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Japan, similarly had little desire to dilute what they
perceived as the special relationship with the US.18
The predominance of bilateralism was not only
compatible with the interests of Asian powers, however,
but also reflected the considerable divisions between
them. Soviet analysts had increasingly to come to terms
with the fact that the regional disputes and rapid
militarisation, including the approach of several states
to nuclear status, that they had hoped to address through
collective security were actually the product of the
failure of multilateral ism, making the European security
model unviable. V.P. lukin, then Deputy Chief of the
Directorate of Evaluations and Planning of the MID, noted
in 1990 that the multi-faceted nature of inter-state
relations and the absence of any mechanisms for regional
arms limitations indicated
a greater complexity and a more contradictory nature
of the military strategic situation in the Asia and
Pacific region, and points to considerable
difficulties in finding ways of reducing the levels
of military confrontation. Although providing a
useful general example, the positive aspects of the
European experience are not app licable in the Asia
and Pacific region. What is required there is a
search for fundamentally new and innovative ways for
reducing the military threat and enhancing universal
security.19
Since the Soviet Union was faced with the pressing need
to re-adjust it's military posture to meet domestic
economic restraints the failure to promote a multilateral
mechanism meant their unilateral concessions came to take
on the appearance of a full retreat from superpower
status. Sergei Solodovnik, Senior Research Fellow at the
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Centre for International Studies of the Soviet foreign
Ministry Institute of International Relations, writing in
the spring of 1991:
Previously we approached security problems primarily
from the standpoint of the imperial perspective of
controlling territories and influencing populations
through ideologised aid and militarised ideology.
Many of our partners see the period of indecision
and uncertainty, or rather the six years when we had
no integral doctrine, as a continuous renunication
of an imperial policy in favour of its antithesis,
isolationism. The latter may also become a strategy
pref er red by mass consc i ousness ins ide t he count ry
as materialisation of the ideal of a low-cost
foreign policy, a result of the Afghan syndrome and
of giving top Rriority to the European sector in
foreign po1icy.20
As this suggests the most immediate impact of the
curtailment of Soviet power at the regional level was on
its allies, the socialist states of Mongolia, Vietnam and
North Korea and the leader of the non-aligned movement,
India.21 While the Soviet Union's decision to place its
economic relations with these states on a hard currency
basis from 1991 created inevitable dislocations within
the domestic and external economies of these states,22 it
was the change in the Soviet Union's political position
which was most indicative of the retraction of its
influence.23
The normalisation of relations with China in 1989
and South Korea in 1990 forced these countries to make a
re-assessment, firstly, of the regional balance. In the
case of Vi et nam and India this meant cautious
rapprochement wi t h Ch ina whi 1e seek i ng new sou rces of
regional stability- in ASEAN and the new states of
Central Asia, for example.
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For North Korea the
disappearance of the Soviet Union led to further
isolation, with the exception of increased, but
undesired, dependence on China. The brinkmanship over the
DPRK's nuclear programme can be seen as both a bulwark to
sust a in independence and a barga i ni ng count er for the
breaking down of this isolation.24
Soviet withdrawal at the regional level was matched
by the erosion of it's strategic influence. This was most
forcefully demonstrated by its role in the Gulf War. It
was not merely the abandonment of its primary Middle
Eastern ally to the Western-led coalition which heralded
its loss of status but the failure of its diplomacy as
both sides in the conflict effectively ignored its
attempt to promote a negotiated settlement. This was not
solely of concern to the Soviet Union's allies but even
to those who had been the most vigilent opponents of its
strategic role in Asia in the past. China in particular
exhibited concern at the demise of the Soviet Union's
ability to restrain Western activism in Asia.25
Thus the Soviet Union at the point of its
dissolution had much more balanced relations with Asia
than had seemed possi bl e at the time of the Gorbachev
success i on, but t his had been ach i eved by the d rast i c
curtailment of its strategic posture and the re-drafting
of its regional relations to meet the new circumstances.
This meant, firstly, that while the Russian state would
continue to espouse the merits of multilateral ism its
regional relations fitted the norm in that bilateral ties
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predominated. The most significant exceptions to this, in
explicitly political terms as opposed to in predominantly
economi c forums such as APEC and PECC, was its
achievement of observer status with ASEAN and
had,
whole
participation in UN peacekeeping in Cambodia.
Secondly, the scope of the new state's interests
in concrete terms, contracted from the APR as a
to being concentrated on two sub-regions- East
Asia, where the interests of the four major powers met,
and Central Asia, where Russia had to contend both with
the newl y independent st at es and the ambi t ions of
regional powers, notably Turkey and Iran, to gain
influence in them.
The ethnic and religious divisions
between the Central Asian states are the
traditional rivalries compounded by





and territory in neighbouring states. In religious terms
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are most inclined to assert
their Islamic roots, while Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are
more secu 1ar not 1east because of the i r more ba 1anced
ethnic composition, including many Russians. Overlayed on
the religious axis is the ethnic axis under which the
Uzbeks are promoting pan-Turkic nationalism while the
Tajiks are ethnically closest to Persia. This division
also accounts for the fact that Uzbekistan favours non-
religious government in the Turkic tradition while there
are significant areas of support in Central Asia for
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Shariah-based religious government in the Iranian mould,
not least among insurgents in the Tajik civil war.
These ant agon isms, and the dange r posed by t hem to
those ethnic Russians still living in Central Asia, would
ensure Russia's continued involvement in the region.26 In
this they would enjoy the support of most of the Central
Asian governments who for both security and economic
reasons have been among the st rongest supporters of a
cont i nued f ede rat i on of t he forme r Sovi et repub 1i cs in
the CIS. However, the ambition of external powers to gain
influence in the area and create a regional confederation
on either a national or re1igious- Turkic or Islamic-
bas is present s an even great er cha 11enge. Whi 1e g rowi ng
nationalism in the Central Asian states and the
continuing impact on Russian public opinion of the defeat
in Afghanistan make it extremely unlikely that Russia
will ever attempt to exercise imperial control over the
region, there is clear evidence that an attempt is being
made to place it inside a sphere of influence which
stretches the length of the southern periphery of the
state.27
It must be questionable, however, whether Russia is
able to be the sole guarantor of regional stability and
it is more likely that some form of collective security
will be sought. In formal terms this will be through the
CIS and in particular in conjunction with Kazakhstan
which, under Nursultan Nazarbayev, has shown considerable
willingness to act as a regional power. Informally, the
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prospect of an Islamic confederation is also disturbing
to China and India, who have moved quickly to establish
economic and political ties with the existing Central
Asian regimes. A collective secu rity underst and ing
between Moscow and either Delhi or Beijing would be an
important strategic support but it may not be possible to
create a tripartite understanding given the conflict of
interests between India and China.
Unlike India whose opposition to the continuing
extension into Central Asia of the influence of Iran and
Pakistan is likely to be an absolute,28 Beijing has
existing close ties with these countries and is not
opposed tot he ir eme rgence as reg iona 1 powe rs. Ch ina's
main concern is to prevent the spread of either Turkic
nationalism or Islamic fundamentalism to its own western
provinces but it will seek to prevent this by the
exercise of its own influence in Western Asia. It is this
influence that Russia may find it necessary to use, while
seeking to raise its current low-level of relations with
Tehran and Islamabad.
The major inhibition to the reconstruction of a
strategic understanding with India is the growth of
China's importance to Moscow, of which the Central Asian
component is only one factor.29 India is concerned about
the scale of Russian military transfers to China and the
fact that demarcation and demilitarisation of China's
northern border is allowing military concentration to the
south, where negotiation on border disputes shows little
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sign of progress. China's continuing military
relationship with Pakistan, particularly as it may be
effecting the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir and
the Pakistan nuclear programme, are other sensitive
areas. Russia's current South Asia diplomacy does little
to mitigate India's concerns: its criticism of India's
refusal to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty and support
of Pakistan's proposal to make South Asia a nuclear free
zone; its seeming desire to place relations with Pakistan
on the same basis as those with India, including in the
sa 1e of mi 1itary equ ipment; and the cance 11at ion of the
missile technology sale, all indicate India's lowered
status for Moscow since the days of the Soviet Union.30
If Russia's diplomacy to the South will continue to
retain importance because of the need to contain conflict
and instability it will not yield the economic and
political status that many Russians believe their country
merits: only through integration into the Pacific can the
pot ent ;a1 of the Eu ras ian concept be rea 1ised. The first
premise for the growth of the Russian position there has
been provided by the levelling of relations so that
Russia itself is not viewed, by most powers at least, as
a destabiHsing factor due to its pursuit of military
superiority and political alliances aimed at other
countries in the region.
Russia's principal aim will be to advance its
relations with all states in Asia in a manner compatible
with the maintenance of regional stability though this
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may prove to be a hazardous process demandi ng much more
attention, and competence, than has been demonstrated to
date.31 Even if Russian diplomacy can be raised to the
task, it wi 11 be continually confronted with the
complexity of Asian regional relations. The Asian
political order is best conceived of as a chess board in
which the movement of one piece affects the relationship
between allot her pieces. As on the chess board pieces
have differing individual strengths and patterns of
behavi ou r but these can be mod if ied by chang ing thei r
relationship to other peices.
Russia's concentration on East Asia is a factor of
geog raphy, as access tot he West and Sout h has become
constrained, but it is also the point at which its
interests merge with the other major players in the
Pacific- China, Japan and the US. The interplay within
this quadrilateral relationship and between it and other
Asian powers will go a long way in determining the future
political order. What can initially be said in favour of
Russia's diplomacy is that the modifications to the
st rengt hs and behav iou r of the reg iana 1 powers, to wh ich
the end of the Cold War contributed, has provided it with
a powerful ally which shares its objective of maintaining
stability: the US.
The strategic understanding which the US and Russia
have endeavoured to create since the demise of the Soviet
Union should not be thought as having implications solely
for Europe.32 The US is also in the process of shifting
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the balance of its interests and attention from the
Atlantic to the Pacific, particularly as regards the
pattern of its trade and investments. While enjoying a
far higher economic profile in the region than Russia it
is confronted with an increasingly disadvantageous
economic relationship with many Asian countries, not
least with regard to the imbalance in terms of
penet rat ion of domest i c market s. One out come has been a
reversal of American attitudes to multilateral economic
cooperation, notably through APEC, but economic diplomacy
can only be so effective. The weakening of US economic
influence can only be shoared up by the strengthening of
its political and security relations yet both the
comp 1ex i t y of reg i ona 1 prob 1ems and t he consequences of
economic decline make this impossible to achieve
unilaterally.33 Hence the need for security, as well as
economic, partners.34
Besides the bilateral benefits of the relationship,
a strategic understanding between Russia and the US,
aimed at sustaining regional balances and mediating in
regional conflicts, such as in Cambodia or over the
Spratly's, would not be viewed as threatening by all the
states of the region, such as those of Southeast Asia:
Would such an American-Russian partnership be
acceptable and desired by the countries of the
region? To us it seems, yes. It should be
remembered, for example, that the positive
deve 1opment of Sov i et -Amer i can re 1at ions at t he end
of the 80's did not arouse serious objections and
alarming premonitions in the leadership circles of
t he count r i es of ASEAN, not to speak of oppos it ion
on their part. Rather it was accounted a positive
occurrence favourable to the countries of the 'six',
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promising the cessation of needless rivalrY!3 thearena of which was the whole of Southeast Asia. 5
There are a number of 1imi tat ions on the deve 1opment of
the Russo-American strategic understanding in the
Pacific, however. The first is that the contraction of
the Russian strategic position in Asia means that it is
far from equal with that of America, in terms of scale
and influence. This factor, when combined with the
Eurocentrism of the early diplomacy of the post-communist
administration, was significant enough to arouse the
concern of the countries of Southeast Asia who felt
Russia's retreat to be de-stabilising in itself.36
However, the development of the Eurasian thesis clearly
has at its goal the establishment of Russia's major power
status in the Pacific. The question inevitably arises,
therefore, as to whether a Russian-American understanding
is not dependent on either the pro-Western stance of the
current government and the unequal relationships that
sustain this. There is already evidence of Moscow's
desire to pursue independent interests in the Pacific and
this trend can only increase, particularly if the
Eurasian concept continues to grow in influence.
Russia's pursuit of unilateral interest is already
evident in perhaps the sole area of regional activity in
which its participation has markedly increased since the
Soviet era: arms supplies. Sale of Soviet weaponry was
restricted by political considerations primarily to
Vietnam, North Korea and India, ensuring the predominance
of American arms in most other markets. Russia's de-
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ideologised foreign policy, its need for hard currency
and t he ex i st ence of sur p1us weapon ry at t he cor rect
price and technological level have served to propel
Russia to the forefront of suppliers in Asia's arms
race.37 In addition to seeking to maintain supplies to
former Soviet allies, Russia has expanded military sales
to China, Malaysia, South Korea and Indonesia, with the
purchase of advanced military aircraft by China and
Malysia attracting most attention.
Besides the damage done to American arms exports,
this has undoubted political implications with several
Asian countries making clear that their refusal to
continue purchasing American equipment was a conscious
response to American pressure on trade and human rights.
In effect the US is now seen as the power which is
attempting to force its political and ideological agenda
on the region, whereas Russia is seen as being largely
neutral in these areas. This said there must be limits to
Russia's ability to supply arms without bringing into
question its commitment to regional balance and security.
To date the only operation of an American veto was
applied over the proposed transfer of rocket equipment to
India but the persisteant undermining of the American
armaments supply role in the Pacific, and the political
influence that flows from it, must be more threatening to
Washington than an individual sale.
The final, and most significant, factor tempering
Russo-American understanding in Asia is the existence of
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other potential regional partners. As suggested,
relations between powers can be modified by the relative
position of other states. The role Russia will play in
Asia, including its ability to act independently, will be
determined by the relative position of China and Japan as
well as that of America. In one sense this is another
bond with America since both are non-Oriental cultures
whose i nt e rest bound on As i a but are not der i ved from
within it, or in Russia's case not until the role of the
As i at i c part of t he count ry ; s trans formed. In anot he r ,
however, it is a division between them since the
development of symmetrical relationships with the two
East Asian countries looks increasingly doubtful. Within
the quadrilateral relationship it is possible to discern
triangular ties whose emergence is being driven by strong
and weak attraction on differing poles: in America's case
toward Japan and away from China; and in Russia's case
away from Japan and toward China.
The change in what was perce i ved as t he nat u ra 1
balance of Russia's relations towards Japan and China is
perhaps the most conspicuous example of the failure of
the Russian government's initial assumptions about the
conduct of foreign policy between states of similar, and
differing, political and economic systems. There was a
clear expectation that Russia's conversion to democracy
and a market economy made ita nat u ra 1 part ne r for all
simi 1ar count ri es. That democ rac i es can have conf 1i ct ; ng
interests and that the need to gain popular approval can
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weaken rathe r than st rengt hen the conduct of dip 1omacy
have been most amply demonstrated with regard to Japan,
though the obstacles to Russo-Japanese understanding were
fairly evident to some commentators:
it is difficult to account for the Nipponocentrism
which seems to prevail in the current Russian
foreign policy in the APR. Japan is the only Asia-
Pacific nation we have a territorial dispute with.
Furthermore, it is evident that this dispute cannot
be so 1ved ina qu ick and elegant manne r because of
home considerations. It is also the only APR country
that even potentially has no viable prospects to
establish a mutually complementary economic
struc~~re with us because of a disastrous technology
gap. •
A further reason for the excessive concentration on Japan
in in the first years of the post -commun ist gove rnment
was the domination of the policy process by Japan
specialists. One such is the Deputy Foreign Minister
responsible for Asian affairs, G.F. Kunadze. It is
Kunadze's solution to the Kuri1es problem that has become
perhaps the most solid expression of the Russian position
on the issue, though other options have been voiced
depending on the level of domestic opposition to
concessions and the relative degree of support enjoyed by
Russia and Japan among the other major powers. This would
permit the transfer of the two smaller islands, Shikotan
and Habomai, to Japan upon the signing of a peace treaty,
and the commencement of a negotiatiing process over
Kunashir and Etorofu.39 This was essentially the position
endorsed by Yeltsin when, after two cancellations, he
eventually visted Japan in October 1993 and averred
Russia's commitment to agreements signed in the Soviet
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era, which was taken to include the 1956 declaration
which also proposed the immediate return of the two
smaller islands. This not only fell short of the Japanese
position, which requires recognition of their sovereignty
over all four islands as precondition for any
negotiations, but reinforced Japan's perception of the
continuity between the Soviet state and the new Russian
one.
Of all the deve loped count r i es Japan has been the
most reluctant to see the changes in the political and
economic system in the former Soviet Union as also
representing a decisive change in its external behaviour.
This stems in part from the Japanese appraisal of the
threat the Sovi et Uni on posed in East As i a whi ch was
seen, unlike that of the western powers, not as a balance
of political, ideological and military factors but as
predominantly arising from military projection and
territorial expansion into Asia. In this respect, Soviet
policies were also seen as having broad continuity with
those of the Tsarist era so the impression that Russia
may be currently reviving the policy considerations of
that age gives little comfort to the Japanese. Unlike the
Chi nese, moreover, t hey have, wit h t he except i on of the
short period between the Russo-Japanese war and the
Bolshevik revolution, no earlier model of compatible
relations on which to base contemporary ties. In these
circumstances even the drastic curtailment of the Russan
nava 1 presence in t he Pac if i c has not yet convi nced the
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Japanese that this fleet does not pose a threat to their
sealanes, while the failure of the Russians to concede to
Japanese demands on the Kuriles is taken as evidence of
the continuance of the principle of territorial control.
I n essence these are prob 1ems of hi st 0 ry and as
such are open to reinterpretation. Russia's problem is
that it is faced with a country that is not only
reluctant to reinterpret its, Russia's, behaviour but
finds it even more difficult to do so with its own. Thus
it clings to its interpretation of its historical right
to all the Kuriles even though the consensus among
international jurists might be that only the two smaller
islands are unquestionably
claim to the larger two
better.40
Settlement of this issue is further undermined
Japanese and that
is at least as good
Russia's
if not
because Russ i a must be ext reme 1y caut i ous wi t h regard to
using history as the criterion by which to settle
territorial disputes. There are many areas on its
periphery to which other states might make historical
claim and behind the juridicial, economic and security
mot i vat ion s tor eta i n i ng con t r 0 1 0 f the 1a r ge r i s 1and s
lies the fear of encouraging these claims. Clearly the
most sensitive in Asia would be the potential Chinese
claim to the Primorye but from the Russian standpoint the
successful demarcation of the Sino-Russian border and the
much improved economic and security situation in this
area currently symbolizes the solution to territorial
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problems: if political and economic relations between
states are good territorial disputes are nullified if not
ent i re 1y forgot t en. Russo-Japanese re 1at ions are provi ns
such a Gordian knot because economic and political
relations are so low that they encourage attention on the
islands issue which in turn becomes a major inhibitor of
better relations.
In these circumstances it is inevitable that Russia
will seek to use its relations with other states to
simultaneously pressure Japan into developing ties with
Russia and compensate for thei r current low-level. This
has been particularly evident in its ability to persuade
the G7 that t he est ab 1i shment of a st rat eg i c part nersh i p
with Russia should be a higher priority than the granting
of concessions to Japan. Equally important, however, will
be the pattern of relations in Asia.
As indicated in the section on bilateral economic
re 1at ions Russ i an hopes that Sout h Korea mi ght become an
effective economic and political substitute for Japan
have faltered on Russia's inability to meet its debt
repayment sand the sh i ft i ng reg i ona 1 balance of power. 41
The no rma 1 i sat i on of re 1at ions bet ween Seou 1 and Be i j i ng
was the product of both economic, and political,
interests. Having ceased the transfer of arms to North
Korea and supported the nuclear inspection process, there
seemed little more that Russia could provide South Korea
whe reas Ch ina's abi 1it y to i nf 1uence Pyongyang was seen
as ascendant.
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There remains, however, one pivotal issue which will
ensure Russia's continued importance for South Korea, and
that differentiates it from both China and Japan: its
support for Korean re-unification. There are no Asian
states which do not claim to support peaceful re-
unification but there are many less who view such a
development as actually being in their own interest. This
is particularly the case with Japan which would not only
face a new economic power freed from the social and
military costs of the division of the peninsula but would
lose one of t he key support s for its mi 1it ary-
technological relationship with the US. China's position
is more ambiguous because of its ideological ties with
Pyongyang. This said ideological unity may increasingly
take lower priority to other considerations. These would
include the emergence of an East Asian power which would
unquestionably wish to place limits upon Japan's
political and economic ambitions but most decisive might
be the perceived impact upon China's own re-unification.
Would such dramatic evidence of the end of Asia's Cold
War political division not provide irresistable impetus
toward the the re-unification of China, especially when
Taiwan found itself confronted with economic giants on
all sides? Beijing might well consider Korean re-
unification to suit the balance of its interests, with
much depend i ng on the manne r in whi ch it came about, in
particular that there was a orderly coalesence of the two
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systems rather a humiliating capitulation in the manner
of the GDR.
For Russia, matters are more straightforward: it
requ ires the de-esca 1at i on of a mi 1it ar y conf ront at ion
close to one of the most sensitive and least defensible
areas of its perimeter and the further opening of the
reg i on for economi c deve 1opment. Above all it needs a
power in the region capable of providing balance between
Japan and China, not only in the interests of regional
stability but also in order that its own relations can
have greater flexibility. It is worth noting in this
instance that Russian interests are closer to those of
China than Japan.
In terms of Russia's bilateral relations
consideration remains to be given to future political
relations between Russia and China in Asia. Since this
has been the core objective of this paper it will be
considered in the concluding chapter.
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II China and Asia.
i) China as a Future Asian Power.
To discuss China's perception of itself as an Asian power
may seem unnecessary. As the discussion on economic
models indicated there is a widespread understanding
within Chinese society that the culture of East Asia is
to a cons i derab 1e deg ree synonymous wi t h the cu lt u re of
China. Outwith official pronouncements, assertions of the
import ance of Ch i nese soc i et y to East As i a's past and
future can reach chauvinistic heights:
If we assert that the core of traditional Oriental
(East Asian) culture is Chinese culture, that
Japanese, Korean, and Vi et namese cult u res bas i call y
are derived from Chinese culture, and that Chinese
culture has come to exercise a major influence in
Southeast Asia through the wide dissemination of the
Ch i nese peop 1e, and a lt hough t he nat i ves of
Southeast Asia have been variously subjected to
other outside influences, .•..• there can be no doubt
of the central status of Chinese culture with
respect to the entire Asian-Pacific region or for
all of East Asia. Chinese culture is the one and
only domestically engendered, major primary culture.
Thus, at the cultural foundation level, the
development of the Asian-Pacific region, the coming
of the 'age of the Pacific' and the rise of the
'challenge of the Orient', though certainly
requiring a JOlnlng of forces, must include the
driving force of the rejuventation of Chinese
c u 1t u re ( namely, the d r i vi ng for ceo f the
readjustment and restructuring of Chinese culture
and of the raising of 'the challenge of China',
which developments occur and emerge as Chinese
culture is buffeted by the strong blows of
Westernisation and experiences baptism in
mode rn i sat ion. ) 1 [4]
Of course, such sentiments have not and cannot be
ex pressed by the gove rnment and 1eadersh i p of the PRC,
not least because such overt nationialism would be
extremely damaging to China's relations with its
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neighbours. While the five principles of peaceful co-
existence- respect for sovereignty; mutual non-
aggression; non-interference in internal affairs;
equa 1it y bet ween st at es; and peacefu 1 co-ex i st ence- are
now the basis for China's foreign relations with all
states, it should be remembered that they were originally
promulgated for China's relations with the other Asian
states, initially with India and thereafter through the
Bandung process. Similarly, China's opposit ion to
hegemonism has never been directed solely against other
states but has always contained an explicit rebuttal that
China itself would follow this path.
This persistent disavowal of China's past and
potential position as an Asian great power- in the sense
of being a state capable of imposing its will on others,
not merely as a state capable of defending its
considerable interests which it has never eschewed- is
evi dence of China's awareness of its neighbours
sensitivities. However, the lengthy process of
normalisation that China has had to undergo with certain
Asian states is proof of how much reassurance these
states require as to China's regional role. Thus the
resumption of relations with Indonesia in 1990 after a
break of 23 years was accompanied by the fullest
disassociation of China from the country's internal
affairs. Speaking in Indonesia at the time of the
resumption of relations President Yang Shangkun said,
t hat every count ry has the right to choose it sown
social system, ideology, economic model and the road
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of deve 1opment in 1ight of itsown cond itions,
adding that "the practices of international
relations have proved that countries with different
soc ia1 syst ems and ideo log ies can 1ive in peace and
harmony and attain common development." He re-
affirmed that China has no intention to, and will
never, impose its model on other countries and it
will respect the choice of the Indonesian people,
their social system and road of development.
Refering to the fear of some people that the
strengthened economic cooperation with China will
only serve to consolidate the economic status of the
people of Chinese origin in the ASEAN region,
President Yang pointed out that China does not
recognise dual nationality and regards all those who
have naturalised or who have acquired the
nationality of the country of their residence as
nationals of that country. "China strictly abides by
the principle of non-interefernce in the internal
affairs of other countries and has no intention
whatsoever to seek political or economic interests
through overseas Chinese."2
As this extract indicates China's relations with other
Asian states have not been influenced solely by cultural,
ethnic and geographic association but by China's
adherence to a distinctive political and economic system.
China does not view itself only, or in the past even
predominantly, as an Asian power but as a developing
Asian socialist country. The significance of these three
concepts lies not only in the fact that they tie China,
in the international context, into three different
groupings- the developing world, the Asian countries, and
the socialist states- but that in China's perception of
itself they are not separate but an amalgam. An obvious
example of this is China's claim to be building
'socialism with Chinese characteristics'- the merging of
a body of political thought and practice with the social
and economic conditions of China, including its
developmental level. As discussed in the section on
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ideological perspectives on Asia, it was the claim of
revolutionary Chinese leaders that this practice was not
solely specific to China but applicable to Asia given the
interelationship between the Chinese social and economic
syst em and t hat of ot he r As ian st at es, whi ch was one
source of international friction between them. Clearly,
therefore, current pronouncements that differing social
and economic systems are no inhibition to good foreign
relations are a significant change of interpretation.
The impetus behind this change stems, firstly, from
the need to rise to the challenge of economic development
on the international level as discussed previously, but
there have also been significant political pressures
encouraging it, as this assessment by Foreign Minister
Qian Qichen suggests:
China, a permanent member of the UN Security Council
is a developing socialist country. It is neither a
superpower nor a developed country. It is different
from other members of the Security Counci 1.
Therefore many countries hope that China will playa
greater role in settling regional conflicts. In
addition, since the 4 June incident, Western
countries imposed economic sanctions on us, halting
high-level contact with China. There was a need for
China to take the iniative on the international
st age by engag i ng in ext ens i ve cont act sand
exchanges of vi sit s to he 1p break the sanct ions. I
believe every visit had some effect on promoting our
country's foreign relations.3
China's diplomatic offensive in response to Western
sanctions was overwhelmingly concentrated within Asia.
General Secretary Jiang Zemin visted North Korea and
Chairman Wan Li, of the NPC Standing Committee, went to
Pakistan but most of the effort centred on Premier Li
Peng who visited Indonesia,
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Singapore, Thailand,
Malaysia, The Phillipines, Laos, and Sri Lanka in 1990
alone. The focus on the ASEAN states paid considerable
dividends, not least in the resumption of diplomatic
relations with Indonesia and Singapore. Even with those
countries with which immediate results could not be
expected- India and Vietnam- progress was visible.
Subsequent cross-recognition with South Korea and Vietnam
has created a regional climate described as the most
favourable for China in the 40 years since the founding
of the new republic. 4
What these changes in China's political and economic
relations with Asia demonstrate is not that China has
abandoned its self-image as a developing Asian socialist
count ry but that t he re 1at i ve balance bet ween the
concepts has shi fted due to the pressure of external
events. Whereas in the past China sought to project a
particular image of itself regionally, derived primarily
from internal conditions, the Open Door and the changing
pat tern of i nt e rnat i ona 1 forces has forced a re-
assessment of the relative value of the three concepts in
China's self-image. To assess the importance of Asia to
China, therefore, is also to consider China's view of
change in the developing world and the socialist states.
China's current assessments of the international
order are dominated by discussion of the end of the bi-
polar order and the rise of a multi-polar system. Chinese
analysts view the multi-polar system as arising due to
the relative decline of the US and the Soviet Union and
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the emergence of Europe and Asia. Asia is particularly
important in this process since the bi-polar order was
never as firmly established in Asia as in Europe, and the
new multi-polar order was evident there prior to the
changes in Eu rope. Chen Qi mao, Di rector of the Shanghai
International Studies Institute:
Although the United States and the USSR divided up
the Asian-Pacific region into spheres of influence
at the Yalta conference, no military blocs similar
to NATO and t he Warsaw Pact we re est ab 1 i shed aft er
the war in the Asian-Pacific region. The Chinese
revolution and the accompanying rise in national
liberation movements in Asia threw the old order
into confusion. The Korean war, the Vietnam war, and
t he Afghan war fu rt her great 1y weakened the
superpowers influence and ability to control the
Asian-Pacific region. The collapse of the old system
was already underway, and a multipolar structure was
already substanially in place in the region. This
gave us reason to expect that this region would
first cease to be a post -war area charact e ri sed by
bloc politics and hegemonism for the building of a
new international political order.5
China's calls for the creation of a new international
order pre-dated those of the West and were based on very
different assumptions, being effectively the promotion of
the five principles to a multilateral level. China's
first concern with the West's conception of the new order
is its similarity to that of the old. Tang Tianri,
Managing Editor of Xinhua:
The attempt by Western nations to establish a 'new
world order' dominated by capitalism, and the means
used by them to fulfill this purpose, are, in fact,
intended to impose Western values, social systems,
and political and economic formulas on other
countries. This is a typical expression of
hegemon ism and power pol it i cs under t he new
circumstances. This so-called 'new world order',
like the 'old international order' of the past, will
create international tension and conflicts, and
endanger world peace and tranquility. It violates
the universally recognised norm of international
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relations- 6the five principles of peaceful co-
existence.
For the majority of developing countries, the emergence
of this imbalanced political order is a reflection of the
failure to achieve structural change in the economic
order. The g rowt h of reg i ona 1 power cent res, the
increased prospect of prot ect i oni sm and t he advance of
the industrialised countries in science and technology,
are all likely to increase the gap between the richest
and poorest countries:
It can be predicted that the result of the
polarisation of Third World nations will be that by
the end of this century a few nations and regions
will come closer to the levels of the developed
nations and regions, but the economic disparity
between most Third World nations will widen
further ••• The impoverishment of the economies in
the majority of the Third World nations are not
being solved, the old international economic order
is not being reformed, and this is a de-stabilising
factor throughout international relations.7
Asia's importance at present is that several countries
within it have broken with this overall trend and have
demonstrated remarkab 1e success in development. In
ch inese assessment s t his success ; s due ; n part tot he
emergence of a new concept of nat i ona 1 power in whi ch
deve 1opment and secu r it y have been merged. Chen Hongb in,
editor of sh i i t e Jjngjj Daobao, for example, argues that
it is not sufficient to say that economic factors
influence national strength or even that science and
techno logy are key element s of nat i ona 1 st rengt h in the
modern world, as suggested by the Japanese model,
although they are deemed 'facilitators' in all other
components- economics, defence, population, and so on.
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Rat he r a syst em of ' comprehens i ve secur it y' is proposed,
implying the comprehensive use of all factors- political,
mi 1it ar y , economic, diplomatic and cu1tura1- in
coordination and complementing each other to guarantee
the security of the nation. Chen views the advantages of
this concept as outweighing any others:
This great systemic concept of national security
also has broad implications. It prevents people from
from one-sidedly viewing national security guarantee
as a mere military guarantee. It alerts people that
the possibility of a national security crisis not
only can come from an external military threat, but
can also come from internal economic, political and
even moral e cri sis. This ; s e s pe c ; all y t rue i n t he
modern world. The possibility of a nation to
collapse simultaneously from within and without from
internal corruption and divisiveness far exceeds the
possibility of collapse due to military conquest.
For this reason one definitely cannot feel safe and
sit back and re 1ax just because t he re is no
immediate threat of war. One must be mindful of the
threat, be prepared for it with comprehensive
counter-measures.8
Such a view of economic development as being
intrinsically bound up with political stability and
nat i ona 1 secu r it y has been re-i nforced by Ch i nese
assessments of the experience of the socialist countries
since 1989. While the CPC was highly critical of the
reformi st po 1i c i es pu rsued by the CPSU under Gorbachev,
the failure to recognise the comprehensive nature of
national security and address the challenge of change in
the domestic and international economies are seen as
being the primary internal causes of the collapse of
European communi sm. Du Gong of the Institute of
International Studies:
The Soviet system had its roots in the eras of the
revolutionary wars. It grew in stature during the
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pe r i od of hegt hen i ng class st rugg 1es and wars of
national defense. After World War II, guided by the
theory of two parallel markets, the countries became
increasingly isolated economically. Their system was
uniquely characterised by a high degree of
cent ra 1i sat i on of powe r, t he presence of on 1y one
ownership system, state monopoly of planning and
distribution where the state took responsibility for
enterprise profits and losses, and rejection of the
market and the law of value •••
The fundamental factor behind the changing
world order is the economic factor. It was the flaws
of the Soviet Union's and Eastern Europe's economic
syst ems whi ch tipped the balance of i nt ernat i ona 1
power in favour of the Western world, and in turn
that caused the collapse of the old bipolar order.~
[2-3]
While this created the prospect of a multi-polar order,
the imbalance between the poles in terms of national
strength is a destabilising factor. While Chinese
analysts continue to point out the contradictions this
creates between the major capitalist powers, the primary
cont rad i ct ion is between the deve loped and undeve loped
states and the socialist and capitalist countries:
In today's East-West, North-South relations, the
West is st rong and t he East is weak, the Nort his
strong and the South is weak. Historically, the
order of international relations has always been
det ermi ned by rea 1 st rengt hand i nt e rnat i ona 1 clout.
The soc i ali st nat ions and deve 1op ing nat ions wi 11 be
put in a disadvantageous position. As a result of
the upheaval in East ern Eu rope and the Sov i et
Union's decline, a new kind of power politics has
emerged. It is making the worldwide promotion of
Western value concepts- human rights, democracy,
freedom, p 1u ra 1 i sat ion, and market economy based on
t he pr i vat e owne rsh i p syst em- t he common nat i ona 1
P?61cy of the rich and powerful Western nations .•.
As applied to the socialist states this policy is known
as peaceful evolution, defined by Shu Vu as,
the promotion by capitalist countries of a change
from the inside in the character of political power
in socialist countries through political, economic,
cultural, ideological and other peaceful ways. So,
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in a sense, it is just a coup d'etat by other
means •• 11
Shu argues that the main aims of the capitalist powers
are changes in the political and economic system of
socialist states: marketisation of the economies and
democratisation of the political system; the Communist
Part y degenerat es and is unab 1e to def end the i nt e rest s
of the working class; Marxism-Leninism ceases to be the
guiding ideology. The main ways of achieving this have
developed over time since the confrontation of the early
Co1d War gave way to inc reas i ng economi c and cu Itura 1
ties. Western states seek to encourage bourgeois ,ideology
and the intellectual elites in the socialist states who
share this outlook; they proffer economic and technical
assistance on the condition that socialist countries
carry out necessary reforms; these actions are not
individual and accidental but co-ordinated. Wang Haibo
sees the failure to combat peaceful evolution as being
one of the primary external causes of the demise of
Soviet communism:
In 1985, after Gorbachev came to power, in a
situation where economic reform had failed and there
was no way out, he swi t ched to po 1 it i ca 1 reform.
This political reform was completely in accord with
the demands of hostile Western forces. A multi-
party, parliamentary system was greatly promoted,
while the leading position of Marxism and the
Communist Party as the party in power and the
dictatorship of the proletariat were all discarded.
This opened the door for the Soviet Union to restore
capitalism. Thus, the disintegration of the Soviet
Union was not the result of the reform of the
traditional structure but the result of the failure
to carry out reform for a long period, or not truly
car ry out ef fect i ve reform, and was t he out come of
political structural reform which completely goes
against the socialist orientation. In these
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respects, China's situation is essentially different
from the situation in the Soviet Union.12
The need to meet the intellectual challenge of the West's
peaceful evolution policy toward China during and after
1989 led to renewed vigilance in ideological and cadre
work within the CPC but perhaps the most interesting
defence of Chinese socialism appeared in the interviews
of He Xin with a number of Western journalists.13 How
representative He's opinion's are of either official or
popular thinking is unclear, 'being viewed as merely a
sophisticated apo7ogia by dissidents abroad and
controversial in some other regards by domestic critics,
as will be discussed below.
He argued that the US has long held to a global
strategy of creating an economic empire centred on
itself, and traced it's policy on China back to Spykman,
who argued that after the defeat of Japan the US must
guard against China becoming a strong, unified and
industrialised country. The promotion of Western
political and economic concepts within China was but one
tactic in the continuing pursuit of this end, with others
including the attempts to provoke division within the
country on ethnic grounds, for example in Tibet and
Xinjiang. As to the continuing importance of Marxism, He
argued that this meets the needs of China's modernisation
and has been deve loped domest ;ca 11y for that pu rpose. It
was, moreover, incorrect to say that China was not
democratic! it had democratic traditions historically and
cur rent 1y pract ices 'subst anti a1 democracy' ;n the sense,
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firstly, that legislation and law embody the fundamental
interests of the people, and secondly, that there exists
a responsive and orderly mechanism by which popular
aspirations and demands can be communicated. As to
economics, agriculture alone dictated that China will
never operate a free market. To leave the economic well-
being of over a billion people to the market would lead
to soci a 1 chaos and open t he count ry to dependency on
foreign powers:
The aim of those who want to export the Western
market myth to China is to ensure that China's
economic lifelines will ultimately depend on a world
market unde r the cont ro 1 of deve loped west ern
countries and put China at their beck and call like
many poor countries in Asia, Africa and Latin
America.14
More controversial was He's view that if China is to
res i st the economi c and pol it i ca 1 mode 1 of t he West it
s h0u 1d dos 0 by ali gn i ng with 0 the r As ian s tat e s , mos t
notably with Japan. Japan is faced with four choices in
He's view: it could pursue mi 1 itarism or imperial ism,
bot h of whi ch wou 1d provoke oppost i on and car ry
substantial risks, or it could ally with the US or with
China and the rest of the Asia-Pacific region. He
believes that the contradictions between Japan and Europe
and Ameri ca wi 11 worsen, and t hat Japan wi 11 have ever
greater need for economic partners in Asia, especially
China. This will not be a new form of the East Asia Co-
prosperi ty Sphere not 1east because Japan wi 11 be
confronted by a properous, unified and strong China. 15
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This thesis of a Sino-Japanese alliance against the
US was open to crHicism on several levels. An article in
the Hong Kong journal 'North and South' by Ting Ku016
pointed out the continuing importance of the US-Japanese











could find H t t le common cause. But the central failing
of the thesis was the misunderstanding of Japan's
at t It ude towards China, which would always be founded on
self-interest. In the past this meant pursuing its
designs on Chinese territory, now it meant gaining both
economic and political assistance from China. Thus,
whereas Japan has promoted its commodities vigourously in
China and proferred credits, it has been very
conservative in technological assistance in comparison
even to the Western powers. Similarly, Japan's motives in
lifting sanctions first was to prevent other countries
from establishing predominance in the Chinese market.
Besides economic self-interest the main motive behind
Japan's cooperation with China is to gain Chinese
acceptance of its political objectives, including
acquiescence in the expansion of its military
establishment and a re-adjustment of its relationship
w it h the US- the use of the China card in both its
economic and political relationship with America.
Ting believes that the fundamental motive behind
He's promotion of a Sino-Japanese alliance is that of an
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earlier era- "East resist West"- and if revived might
have similar consequences:
The strategic idea of combining China's manpower,
and political and military strength with Japan's
financial, economic and technical strength to oppose
the United States is fundamentally the age-old
product of hegemon ism and rac ism. •.. If J apanese-
Chinese cooperation t s established on the basis of
anti-Americanism, staking out parties and factions,
and widening East-West di fferences, it wi 11 lead to
a revival of the kind of situation that existed in
the ear 1y y~ ars 0 f this centu ry , be for e the two
world wars.17
While Ting may be correct in forseeing many obstacles to
an exclusive Sino-Japanese relationship, the foregoing
argument indicates that He's perception of the increasing
value of Asian regional relations for Chi na is
representative of a wider body of thought.
Thus it is possible to argue that the balance
between the relative components of China's perception of
itself as an Asian developing socialist state has, as a
result of the interplay of international and domestic
forces, moved in favour of an increased awareness of
regional factors. In particular, Asia's success in
bridging the gap between the developing and developed
world and the shrinking of the parameters of the
socialist movement, so that it is largely an Asian
phenemenon designed to meet Asian economic and political
ends, have increased reliance on Asian economic and
po l t t t cal processes. The end of the Cold War, which in
some Western assessments had diminished China's
importance given the demise of European communism and the
end of its intensive role as a balance between the
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superpowers, has been replaced by the growth of extensive
relations founded on Asian regional ties. While the
ultimate shape of this regional and international order
is unc 1ear, and wi 11 undoubt ed 1y present many cha 11enges
to China, most commentators believe that the
international conditions which have resulted from the end
of the bi-polar order are favourable to China. Thus Liu
Shan:
First, the end of the military confrontation between
the United States and the Soviet Union has enabled
our count ry to have a peaceful envi ronment for a
longer period. Second, the disintegration of the
Soviet Union and the unstable development of various
CIS states has indeed brought some problems to our
count ry; however, genera 11y speak ing, this has
improved our country's security enviroment and has
created conditions for our country to develop
political and economic realtions with neighbouring
countries. Third, the disturbances in Europe in
addition to the intensification of West-West
conflict have attracted the West's attention. Our
count ry has more room for manoeuvre in its
diplomatic activities, and the relations between our
country and the big Western powers are likely to be
further restored and developed. Fourth, the
political situation in East Asia and the Asia-
Pacific region is comparatively stable, and the
region ranks first in the world in terms of economic
development. this has provided our country with a
new opportunity for expanding opening to the outside
world. Fifth, amid the turbulent transformation of
the old pattern into the new one, China's role in
maintaining stability in the world and its regions
and the huge pot ent ia1 of the Ch inese market have
been recogni sed by more and more peopl e. A 1though
the development of the world's situation still has
an uncertain and unstable side, and our country will
not have a very smooth road ahead, after the
disintegration of the bi-polar pattern, China's
status and role will not be smaller than in the past
but can only be bigger. 18
ii) Chinese perspectives on Asia's future political
relations:
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As previous sections have suggested, Asia's
importance has been rising for China throughout the
reform era, as the Open Door has increased the
interaction of the People's Republic with the region and
the po 1itica 1 and economic processes underway therein.
There are many levels to China's perception of Asia's
future political relations, from the global to the sub-
regional but the foundation stone is undoubtedly the
changes to the international order which has seen the
rise of a multi-polar system. This transformation, and
its implications for Asia and China in particular, is by
far and away the most discussed aspect of Chinese
commentary on contemporary international relations. A
symposium on the international situation held by the
International Studies Centre of China in November of 1990
produced an assessment wh ich is wort h cit ing at 1engt h
since it is both typical and comprehensive in its scope:
The major characteristic [of the international
situation] was that the world pattern underwent the
largest change in the post war period. The symposium
participants expressed various opinions on this
issue. They in genera 1 ag reed that the 'Ya It a
structure' existing between the east and west for 45
years has dis int eg rat ed and the cont emporary wor 1d
is undergoing a period of transition from the old
pattern to the new one. Some scholars held that the
current situation can be rather accurately described
with the following two phrases- 'the old pattern has
been broken but has not been comp 1etely termi nat ed;
the new pattern is growing at an increasing speed in
a cert ain direct ion but has not taken shape yet.'
Some other scholars held that the change in the
world pattern can be traced back to the early
1960'S, and the uneven development of political and
military forces turned quantative changes into a
qualitative change. The change from multipolar
economic pattern to a multipolar political pattern
was completed between the late 1980's and early
1990' s. However most speake rs poi nted out the the
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change from a multipolar economic pattern to a
multipolar political pattern has not been completed
yet. Because the current change in the world pattern
is occurring peacefully there wi 11 be a rather long
transitional period in theory as well as in
reality.19
The Asia-Pacific Region is seen as being pivotal to the
process of mu1tipolarisation because it is the area in
which the interests of several of the major powers meet
and yet the prec i se demarcat i on of t hei r i nt erest sand
relationships are ill-formed. Tian Zhongqing:
The Asian-Pacific region is a region in which the
postwar political and military dividing lines
between East and West are none too clear. The
interests of great nations intersect and overlap and
conflicts o~ all sorts are complicated and difficult
to handle. 0
The Asia-Pacific region is, therefore, both a major
factor sustaining a multipolar order and the product of
that order. Changes within its internal structure will
influence global relationships, and vice versa. As
argued, part of Ch ina's response tot his has been to
diversify and deepen its regional relationships, seeking
political and economic advantage in terms of both
bilateral relations and the impact of these upon the
regional balance of power. Thus, in his 'Report on the
10th Year Programme and the Eighth Five Year Plan'
submitted at the 4th Session of the 7th NPC in 1991, Li
Peng devoted considerable time to China's regional
relations, as reported by Hong Kong's Wan Wei Po:
Premier Li Peng talked at length in summarising
China's accomplishments in developing good
neighbourliness in a significant way with our
neighbouring countries. There must be some work foci
in China's diplomacy. Such foci are encouraging good
neighbourliness with our neighbouring countries,
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cultivating peaceful and friendly borders, and
augment ing economi c coope rat ion. In the wake of his
analysis of the sound diplomatic situation in
China's relations with Korea, Burma, the ASEAN
countries, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Sri
lanka, he also mentinoned the USSR and stressed non-
intervention in each other's affairs, showing
respect for other people's choices and strictly
abiding by the Sino-Soviet Communique.
li Peng placed the development of friendly and
cooperative relations with Japan in a rather eminent
place: Japan is an Asian country and China's
friendly neighbour. In the coming ten years, there
is an increasing possibility for Asian countries to
build a region of economic cooperation to deal with
the situation characterised by competition between
international economic alliances. Sino-Japanese
cooperation is advantageous to China's economic
development and a great impetus to Asian stability
and economic renovation as well.21
As the above indicates China's regional relations are far
from be ing of equa 1 import ance at eve ry 1eve 1. Rat he r it
is the interaction between the major states as global
actors and regional powers that is seen as contributing
most to the future structure of Asian political
relations, and, having discussed China's developing
bilateral relations elsewhere, this section wi 11
concentrate primarily on the interacton between the major
powers within Asia, and between them and the other states
of the region.
The new political structure of the region is seen as
emerging first and foremost from the changes in the
relative status of the major powers, with most emphasis,
prior to the demise of the Soviet Union, being placed on
the rise of Japan. Xia Liping in 1990:
Since the early 1970's, the course of politics in
the Asian-Pacific region has been determined by the
trilateral relationship between China, the United
States and the Soviet Union. The trilateral
relationship in the Asia-Pacific region between
China, the Unites States and the Soviet Union has
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been evolving into a four-party relationship between
China, the Unites States, the Soviet Union and
Japan, as Japan's economic, political and military
strenth has grown, US-Soviet relations have relaxed,
and US-Japanese tensions have heightened.22
With the demise of the Soviet Union this process has
acce 1erat ed, chang i ng t he re 1at i onsh i p between t he four
powe rs but also inc reas i ng t he room for manoeu rvre for
mid-level regional powers. The overall pattern of
relations are characterised as being pluralistic and more
stable than the previous regional order:
As the Soviet Union has dissolved, as the bipolar
system has died, and as the role of Japan is rapidly
growing, a new, pluralistic situation in which many
forces coexist and constrain each other and in which
the United States, Japan, Russia, and China are the
major actors, is taking place in the Asia-Pacific
region. At the same time, the ASEAN, Vietnam,
Australia and others are also becoming important
forces in the region that arouse attention. In
short, because of the pluralistic developments, the
various forces in the region have formed, in a
preliminary way, a relatively stable strategic
balance based on mutual constraint. From a security
perspective, this situation is much better than the
situation in the Cold War era.23
However, it can be argued that such positive
interpretations are based upon fortuitous and transitory
political circumstances, which disguise potential sources
of conflict. The first of these is the continuing
possibnityof regional conflict. The re-structuring of
t he re 1at i onsh i p between the maj or powe rs has not ended
the possibility of internal conf1ict- or even ended the
existing civil wars in Afghanistan and Cambodia- but
rather altered the extent to which these impinge upon the
relationship between the major powers. Pluralism means
that there is no automatic positive or negative charge
associated with regional conflicts and little possibility
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of unilateral intervention but the new order remains
highly sensitive to shifts in the regional balance
occasioned by internal change or external conflict. Thus,
with crucial issues like the Korean peninsula the
possibility for peaceful settlement has increased but the
advantage to be derived for the powers achieving this on
terms favourable to themselves remains the same.
From this perspective the changing roles of the US
and Russia, while reducing the possibility of conflict
between themse 1ves, has inc reased the pot ent ia1 for
conflicts of interest between Asian states. Lu Lin:
the instrinsic of the Asian Pacific problems in the
1990's basically has nothing to do with the US-
Soviet global contention. The economic problems the
region faces should certainly be looked at and
reso 1ved ;n the cont ext of the g1oba 1 economy. But
its security and political problems basically
originate within nations in the region, and the
easing of US-Soviet relations does not imply that
the region's peace and security will necessarily be
guarant eed. On the cont rar y , if in the 1990' s these
Asian nations fail to find an effective way to
control potentially unstable factors, then a reduced
US and Sovi et mi 1;tary presence may resu 1t ;n an
arms race among these nat ions themse 1ves. If this
happens, the region's traditonal sense of mutual
d ist rust wi 11 eme rge once again, economi c
development will be hindered by an arms race, and in
turn the region will be mired in political
upheaval.24
Amongst other consequences of 'unrestrained pluralism'
will be the prospect of mid-level regional powers playing
a more active role in their own sub-regions. This applies
first and foremost to Sout hand Sout heast As ia, whe re
India, ASEAN and Vietnam can be expected to play more
prominent roles unrestrained by their alignment with one
or other side of the Cold War.
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The possibility of regional conflict and the
pro1 i ferat ion of regional power cent res has rai sed the
issue of collect ive security to the forefront of
discussion among the major powers. This was impossible
during the Cold War when collective security arrangements
were inevitably construed as alliances aimed at the
opposing power but while Asian security mechanisms are no
longer viewed as necessarily adversarial the fact remains
that any such mechanisms must meet the diverse interests
of many states. In particular, Chinese commentators are
sceptical as to the applicability of a security mechanism
that is not derived from Asian circumstances. Yan
Xiangjun:
With the end of the cold war, military confrontation
between East and West has disappeared, and a certain
amount of prog ress has been made in 1arge nat ion's
arms reduct ions. For var i ous reasons (most 1y se 1f-
defense) the development of armaments in the Asia-
Pacific region will tend to escalate. According to
statistics in the Swedish Stockholm Institute
International Peace Institute's Military Yearbook,
"In 1991, Asian countries accouted for 34% of all
arms imports in the world replacing the Middle East
as the largest market for regular arms". The
building of a new security system has been placed on
t he agenda. Howeve r, because of t he reg i on's
historical, cultural, political and economic
background, as well as the fairly great differences
in security interests, the European security
conference model cannot be copied wholesale. It will
be necessary to use po1 it ica 1 negot i at ions for the
gradual establishment of bilateral and multilateral,
multi-level and multi-channel systems for security
dialogues. 25
As this suggests diverse and, in some cases, conflicting
interests remain the major inhibition to a pan-Asian
co 11ect ive secu r it y syst em. What is. most comment ed on by
Chinese analysts is that since the demise of the Soviet
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Union the major conflict of interest may prove to be
between the US and Japan. Van Xiangjun once more:
As the situation develops, the strength of the four
powers is fluctuating and changing. Today it appears
that Japan's power is rising fastest, and Russia has
become the weakest. As Japan's power increases, the
contest for dominance in the Asia-Pacific region
between the United States and Japan wi 11 gradually
intensify. The future situation in the Asia-Pacific
reg ion wi 11 deve lop around con~ead ict ions and
struggles between the US and Japan.
Thus, key aspects of Chinese perspectives on future Asian
relations are derived from interpretations of the
changing US-Japanese bilateral relationship.
A considerable amount of effort has gone into
assessing the readjustment of US policy in the Pacific
dating from the time of the Bush adminsitration. Guo
Xiangang's assessment is characteristic:
During the 1970's and 1980's, the overriding primary
goal of the US strategy toward Asia and the Pacific
was to join forces with most of the Asian-Pacific
countries in countering Soviet expansion in the
region. After Bush moved into the White House, he
read just ed the US st rat egy toward the reg ion and
stopped regarding the Soviet Union as the main
enemy. However, he still insisted on preserving the
"forward defense" system with a view to playing a
geopolitical balancing role in the Asia-Pacific
region and to serving as "an honest broker". This is
the role of the so-called "balancing wheel". It
marks a return to the traditional ba1ance-of-power
theory in US Asia-Pacific strategy following the
disappearance of the Soviet threat. 27
Where Chinese assessments tend to differ is over the
desirability and capability of the United States pursuing
this role. As to the desirability of the US retaining a
leading role in the Asia-Pacific the division is between
those who see the US as a stabilising force and those who
see it as pursuing a hegemonistic path. Chen Qimao,
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writing in 1991, indicated the important role the USSR
had in allowing the US to control Japan and the dangers
of a precpitate US withdrawal from Asia:
In order to contain the USSR and prevent Japan from
becoming a new major military power, the United
States plans to maintain mi 1itary bases and forces
in Japan, and wants Japan to share more of the
expenses of stationing forces there. However, should
a peace treaty be signed between Japan and the USSR,
and if maj 0 r advances are made in t he reduct i on of
forces in the Asia-Pacific region, there will be no
need for the US to station forces in Japan for a
long time, and it will gradually be forced to
withdraw them. The relative economic decline of the
US and of its forces in the Asia-pacific region will
bri ng about a correspondi ng reduct i on of US
influence in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same
time, it will damage the existing balance in this
region and cause the appearance of new imbalance and
a "political void" that leads to changes in the
~gternational structure of the Asian-Pacific region.
An oppos i ng vi ew is put by Chu Yuan shang • Tak i ng James
Baker's article in Foreign Affairs, Winter 1991, as his
text, Chu argues that the basis of the US position in the
Asia Pacific region rests on three principles. Firstly,
t he advancement of common va 1ues of pol it i ea 1 democ racy
and the market economy for the region:
These principles are basic to the US domestic and
politial and economic systems, and constitute the
main content of the US advocated new political
order. It is clear, therefore, that the US intends
to apply and propagate its domestic sytem in the
Asia-Pacific region, and to use the Asia-Pacific
community as a test of the US strategy to establish
a new order throughout the world.29
Secondly, the centre of the Asia-Pacific community is to
be America itself, with the alliances the US created
during the cold war serving as the main conduits of
interaction. Thirdly, the organisational structure for
the regional community would be provided by APEC, which
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would become the vehicle for market growth and trade
liberalisation. Chu comments:
From this, we can see that in the post-Cold War era,
the fun dam ental pr inc ip1es oft he USA sia-Pac ific
policy have not changed, and that the US still
considers its primary objectives as gaining access
to the Asian market and preventing any anti-US
count ry or group of count ries from deve lop; ng in
Asia. In other words, the US still seeks a hegemonic
position in the Asia-Pacific region. 30
What has changed is the means by which this is to be
achieved. Firstly, the US is placing far more emphasis on
economic competitiveness, hoping to halt the relative
decline of its economic power both in relation to Asia,
and, by harnessing Asia's growth, in relation to Europe.
Secondly, regional security structures are to be
realigned in pursuit of the new aim of pursuing
collective security:
With the end of the bi-level defense structure and
the corresponding decline in US power, the US is
giving increased emphasis to establishing a certain
collective security system in the Asia-Pacific
region. This contrasts clearly with the past when
the US emphasized and relied on bilateral
relationships to handle regional security issues. 31
Lastly, the US is putting new emphasis on developing
partnerships with Asian-Pacific powers, most obviously
Japan. The US will encourage Japan to further expand its
economic and political power, at both the regional and
global level, but will seek to trade this in exchange for
fixed limits to Japan's military expansion. This desire
to place limits on Japan's status wil mean continuing
tension between the two powers:
From now on, and for a considerable period of time,
the major contradiction in the Asia-Pacific region
is the US-Japan contradiction, not the Sino-US
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contradiction. The US will use all measures to make
Japan accomodate or serve us interests, and there
!~ll be no true equality in the "equal partnership".
As to the capacity of the US to administer such a system,
scepticism derives not only from the United states'
declining economic power and military retrenchment but to
the changing attitudes of Asian states to the governance
of the region. As Guo Xiangang points out there is little
ent hus iasm among the nat iona 1ist states of As ia for the
us to have an arbitrating role in their affairs, while
the system of "forward defence" runs counter to the
desire of many states to operate their own security.33
A consequence of this declining capacity to order
events in the Pacific, including the relationship with
Japan, is to make the US more dependent on its strategic
ties with other powers. Thus, Van Xiangjun points out,
while the strategic need for China has declined with
regard to the USSR, the US st i11 sees Ch ina as maj or
balancing factor in the Asia-Pacific, as is also the case
with Russia.34 The extent to which both of these factors-
the push for sovereignty in external policy by the Asian
states and the dependence on the other major powers-
effect the US capacity to shape the regional order will
be influenced to a considerable degree by the behaviour
of Japan. If the US-Japanese relationship is seen as
bei ng mutua 11 y constraining this will allow more
flexibility to other states of the region, including the
formation of ties aimed at resisting a joint US-Japanese
condominium. If Japan seeks to free itself from the
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alignment with the US or to substitute its own version of
a regional order for that of the US, this will increase
the United States ability to gain strategic partners in
the region. A good deal, therefore, depends on where
Japan is heading.
No other country receives more
Chinese analysts than Japan. This is
attention from
a product of the
past - of cu lt u re and of recent and d i st ant hi story- but
ultimately it stems from concern with the future. There
is an implicit understanding that the Sino-Japanese
relationship will be central to the shape of the future
political order in Asia, and, if Asia continues to rise
in international importance, to the global order as well.
A good or bad relationship between China and Japan will
certainly go a long way to determining the relationship
between China and the rest of the region.
Given the importance of this relationship what is
per hap s mos t sur pr i sin g i s the de g re e 0 f d iff ere nc e i n
assessing Japan's motives and intentions with regard to
its foreign policy. In some senses this is a mirror image
of the debate over the role of the US: there is a
division between those who see Japan's rise to major
power status as a boost for the economic and political
sovere i gnt y of As ian st at es and a check upon non-As ian
states capacity to intervene in the region; and those who
see such a rise to prominence as destabilising and
threatening. At least part of the difficulty arises in
that Japan's rise to power is increasing in pace with
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changes to the economic and political order. Zu Rongzhen,
Director of the Tokyo Branch of Xinhua:
The relaxation of Soviet-US relations, the drastic
changes in the Soviet Union and East Europe and the
ad j ustment of East and West Eu rope have provi ded an
opportunity and posed a challenge for Japan, but the
opportunity is bigger than the challenge. In Japan's
op in i on t he weaken i ng of t he present mi 1 it ary
confrontation, the important role of economy,
sc i ence and techno logy, and economi c request s made
of Japan by many countries have provided Japan with
a good opportunity for expansion. It is trying what
it can to exploit this opportunity to expand its
influence, to alleviate its frictions and conflicts
wi t h ot he r count r i es and reduce its own pressu res
and unfavourable factors. Japan's basic strategic
target is this: to play an important role in Asia,
to strive to be a pole in the course of world mUlti-
polarisation, to display its role around the world
and advance towards a oolitically, or even
militarily, powerful country.35
Accord i ng to Chen J i ehua t he changes tot he reg i ona 1
order have pr-ov ided Japan wi t h opport un i ties to expand
its political influence in a cross-shaped strategy. The
vertical axis is that between Europe and Australasia
whi ch is assumi ng cons ide rab 1e import ance but it was the
withdrawal of the Soviet Union from along the horizontal
ax is between Sout hand Sout heast As i a t hat afforded the
greatest opportunities to Japan:
US-Soviet relations have eased, and Sino-Soviet
re 1at ions have norma 1i sed; t he changes in East ern
Europe rivet the gaze of all countries on Europe;
and a powe r vaccuum has occu r red in scut h As i a and
Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union's economic support
for and political influence in India, Afghanistan,
and the Indochina peninsula have deteriorated to an
un precedent ed ext ent. Changes in the g 1oba 1 powe r
structure have led to a slackening and
disintegration of the opposing power structure long
the horizontal axis. The provides an unprecedented1y
favourable opportunity for Japan to become involved
there. 36
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From this perspective it is Japan which has been the main
beneficiary of the demise of the Soviet Union's strategic
position in Asia, not the United States. However, this
disguises the fact that while its economic diplomacy in
terms of aid programmes and economic ties are well
advanced its political diplomacy is in its infancy. As
Chen points out there is a marked discrepancy between
Japan's desire to speak for Asia at the highest levels
and the actual influence it wields in key regions such as
South and Southeast Asia.37 The fear of many commentators
is that Japan will attempt to bridge this gap by
developing a military capability to match its economic
power:
Japan will not change its policy of military
expansion. It military expenditures will rise at an
annual rate of 6%. to stand at US$30bn, only next to
the USa nd the So vie t "'Un ion i n t e rms 0 f milt a r y
spending. Japan has bluntly denied its intention to
turn itself into a militarily powerful country but
viewing its economic strength and political strategy
Japan deems its necessary and possible to build
itself into a militarily powerful country. Now
Japan's high technology that can be shifted for
military use is speedily developing. There is a
large capacity and potential in this respect.38
The major constraint upon the expansion of Japan's
military and political role remains the alliance with the
United States, embodied in the 'Japan-US Security Treaty'
but this is clearly weakening. Japan's adherence to the
Treaty was determined by the need to gain US mi 1 itary
protect ion and to use the "mutual defence" framework to
dispel the anxieties of other Asian states as to its
mi 1 it ary bu i 1d+up , The demi se of the Sovi et Uni on has
lessened the threat to Japan's security, though as argued
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elsewhere Japan persists in regarding the Russian
military prescence in East Asia as excessive, and the us
retrenchment is encouraging Japan to develop new concepts
of regional security. In some Chinese views the days when
the US could constrain Japan's ambitions is passing.
Huang Suan:
Japan has no doubt that one of the main reasons why
it has not become a political and military power and
why it s i nt ernat i ona 1 st at us is not more bef it t i ng
of it s economi c st rengt his because it is unde r the
thumb of the United States. Japan also has no doubt
that t he reason it must make many economi c
concessions to the us is because, politically and
militarily, it is dependent on us guardianship and
protection. Thus if Japan wants to become a
political and military superpower, the first
condition is to win political and miltary
independence from the United States. If Japan does
indeed become a pol it ical and mi 1itary superpower,
not only will it trouble many of its neighbouring
~~~n~~ ~~:~ s\tat:! ~139const it ut e a se r i ous threat to
As this suggests China is not alone in having an
ambivalent attitude to Japan's rise to global prominence.
It would welcome a demonstration of Japan's independence
from American influence in political terms but is wary of
any Japanese at tempt to make As i a its sphe re of
influence, either independently, or in conjunction with
t he US. Chen Qi mao gives a balanced assessment of the
options open to Japan:
Japan as an independent soverei gn count ry needs a
ce rt a in amount of nat i ana 1 def ence forces and t his
is understandable, but the development of these
forces shou 1d not go beyond t he scope of defensi ve
pu rposes. Trade i mba 1ances are t he product of
i mba 1ances in economi c deve 1opment • The met hod of
exterting pressure on Japan to make it increase its
mi 1 itary expenditure and buy more weapons in order
to solve the problem of the trade imbalance would be
detrimental to the peace and stability of the Asian-
Pacific region, and thus would be highly unwise.
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Politically, Japan hopes to become a great
i nt e rnat i ona 1 powe r, and people have expressed
understanding of this hope. In fact, Japan has
already become a great political power with an
important right to speak on international affairs.
But some people in Japan are striving to establish a
Japanese-US joint dominance system in the Asian-
Pacific region. This would run counter to the demand
for the establishment of a new international order.
The reality of the multipolar pattern formed in the
Asian-Pacific region, as well as the trend for the
Asian-Pacific people to insist on acting
independently and on lseir own initiative are also
incompatible with it.
Clearly one way in which China could avert the dangers of
either an unrestrainedly independent Japan or a US-
Japanese condominium is to raise the level of its own
bilateral relations with Japan, subst it ut i ng Si no-
Japanese i nt e rdependence for t hat wi t h t he US. In the
eyes of some commentators the Sino-Japanese relationship
is a lot 1ess cont rad i ct 0 ry than t he US-Japanese one. Lu
Zhongwei:
Looking ahead to the next 10 or 20 years, there are
broad prospects for cooperation between China and
Japan. In the East Asian region, there is an
objective similarity between the strategic interests
of China and Japan. Japan feels that China and Japan
are 1arge 1y ; n ag reement regard i ng the st rat egy for
achieving stability and development in Asia and that
China's advocacy of calming down 'hot spot'
conflicts and its promotion of regional economic
cooperation are appropriate conditions for Asia.41
Perhaps the key words here are "the next 10 or 20 years".
Can China afford to gamble on the stability of Sino-
Japanese re 1at ions beyond that 1 i mi t? The answer seems
no. Beyond the development of its own national power
China will seek assurances for regional security in two
sources: strategic understandings with other powers and
in some measure of collective security.
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Ch i na' s deve 1opment of st rat eg i c unde rst and i ng wi t h
other powers is cloaked by it's persistant disavowal of
any concept of alliance in its diplomacy. According to
this, China's foreign policy is always independent and no
aspect of its relations with one power is aimed at a
third. Rather its strategic interests coincide to a
greater or lesser degree with those of other states, as
if by happy, or less than happy, coincidence. This
argument is advanced by Lu Zhongwei when considering the
interplay of relations between the US, China, Japan,
Russia and the ROK in Northeast Asia, the area where
their interests meet and where sources of counter-
balancing regional stability may most obviously be
sought.42 According to Lu there are four potential
sources of contention involving the alignment of the
powers, each of which he is at pains to dismiss. Firstly,
the possibility of a tripartite alliance between RUSSia,
China and the ROK. This assumes that the history of the
1ast cent u ry when Ch ina and Russ i a bot h fought wars to
limit Japanese penetration of the Asian mainland is
repeating itself. Lu argues that this is not an objective
assessment of cont emporary re 1at ions and that the





directed against any third party.
question" in Sino-ROK relations;the
comment ators in bot h Japan and Sout h Korea saw in the
establishment of relations between China and the ROK an
attempt to "join hands to pin down Japan". Lu argues
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rather that the strategic interests of the three
Nort heast As i an count r i es are i dent i ca 1 and t hat Ch ina
does not seek alliances with any country:
In particular, China's guiding ideology for
international relations does not lie in forming
strategic alliances but rather in living in
friendship with all its neighbouring countries, and
China also makes this its long-term po1icy.43
Thirdly, the "US Question" in Sino-Japanese relations, or
put anot her way, t he "eh i nese quest ion" in US-J apanese
relations. Lu accepts that the relations between any two
of these states effects the thi rd party and thus the
dept h of deve 1opment of Si no-J apanese re 1at ions is
restricted by US-Japanese relations and Sino-US
relations. In particular, if Sino-US relations are not
good, Sino-Japanese relations wi 11 suffer. While
recognising that each country is essentially different in
terms of syst ems and values, Lu argues that st rat eg i c
interests bound the countries together during the cold
war and shou 1d do so now in the i nt e rest of domest i c
construction and the stability of the new international
order. Lastly, there is the "US-Japanese question" in
Sino-Russian relations. Lu argues:
The new deve 1opment of Si no-Russ i an re 1at ions has
its own basis and its own conditions for maturity.44
These are the de-ideologisation of relations and the
pot ent i a 1 for economi c cooperat ion. Ch i nese 1eaders have
insisted, however, that the Sino-Russian relationship
cannot be construed as being either strategic nor an
alliance but solely good-neighbourly relations which are
not aimed at any third party.
339
China's denial of the need, or the possibility, of
alliances with other powers in the Asia-Pacific region is
the product of its desire to be independent in its
dip10macy- alliances place constraints upon diplomacy
after all, as well as providing support- and the
conditions of pluralism in the region, in which to form
an alliance in one direction is to invite a similar
response from another. However, this does not mean that
China is unaware of the role that common interests
between certain states can play in influencing others-
good ne i ghbou rs can have a rest ra in i ng in f 1uence on bad
ones.
An alternative to bilateral
undest andi ngs between st at es is some
or sub-regional
form of call ect ive
sec uri t y whi chi s be i ng mor e wid ely dis cus sed as res u It
of the eme rgence of t he new reg i ona 1 ba 1ance, comb i ned
the continuation of regional disputes and arms
proliferation. As noted the major inhibition to the
creation of a collective security mechanism is the
diversity of interests that must be encapsulated which is
matched by the diversity of conceptions as to the
security mechanism itself. Yuan Xiangjun offers a
assessment of the preferences of the major players
involved followed by a exposition of China's
perspective.45
- The US is conduct i ng a process of ad j ustment in its
regional relations and is more inclined to view
mulit1atera1 coordination more favourably; but it wishes
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to base this consultation on its existing bilateral ties
and thus proposes that the ASEAN foreign ministers
meeting, at which it has a high profile, be expanded to
consider all-region security consultation. The Clinton
administration outlined four security challenges in the
APR on taking office: trade deficits; the fragility of
certain bilateral relations; arms proliferation; and the
ex istence of fou r out of the five remain ing commun ist
states in the region.
- Japan accepts the concept of using the ASEAN structure
in the current stage but favours the creation of a CSCE-
type organisation eventually. Many Japanese governmental
and non-governmental policy units are in the process of
p1ann ing such a mechan ism- wh ich had its clearest
expression during Miyazawa's premiership- but it
continues to face the problem of the US opposition.
-Russia also favours the creation of a security mechanism
but it is primarily concerned with Northeast Asia:
The SOy iet Un ion had long been propos ing the
establishment of an Asian Security System. After the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia, as the
Soviet Union's "successor state", has readjusted its
policies on the Asia-Pacific region. Russia is
seeking to create a favourable international
env ironment for deve 1op ing the Far East reg ion and
for economi c coppe rat ion in Nort heast As ia, on the
basis of seeking to establish a "partnership"
between the United States and Russia" strengthening
the friendly relations between Russia and China, and
improving relations between Russia and Japan, and
between Russia and the ROK. It is now mainly
conce rned wit h the secur ity of the Nort heast As ian
region, and has proposed that as a first step
mulitlateral consultations be carried out on the
security of Northeast Asia. 46
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-ASEAN is trying hard to make its foreign ministers
meeting the basis for a wider cooperative structure. In
February 1993 ASEAN and Japan discussed a regional
security mechanism for the fi rst time. China, Russia,
Laos and Camboda are all likely to become "official
participants" at the talks on Asia-Pacific security.
-Kazakhstan has proposed an ambitious scheme to duplicate
the CSCE process in Asia through a number of stages.
-the ROK, under Roh Tae Woo, proposed a four-plus-two-
the four big powers plus the two Koreas- Consultation
Conference on Security in Northeast Asia. Russia, in
part icul ar , support ed this concept, but Roh made clear
that he did not approve the Japanese concept of
collective security, given the differing security
interests of the countries of the region.
-Australia has proposed a meeting of heads of major
governments- a G7 of the Asia-Pacific- but clearly this
does not meet the approval of smaller nations.
As to China's role and attitude to Asian-Pacific
security, Van asserts that China has made an active
contribution to the stability of the region by
invo 1vement in reg iona 1 set t1ement sand the expans ion of
its diplomatic ties. This does not mean that China is
pursuing regional dominance:
Some people in the west have intent iona 11y spread
the ideas that there is a "China threat" and that
"China is filling a vaccum" in an attempt to use
such theories as an excuse to step up the efforts to
establish an Asia-Pacific security mechanism. Such
theories are totally groundless and only serve to
sow dissens ion, and damage the re1at ions, between
China and other Asian-Pacific countries. 47
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China's modernisation of its defence forces is purely to
sa f eguard its sove re i gnt y and independence and is
subordinate to the task of economic construction. China's
mi 1it ar y budget has inc reased on a year 1y bas is but at
US$6bn ($US5 per capita) it is markedly less than Japan
($30bn) or t he US ($300bn). Ch ina wi 11 seek to reso 1ve
all outstanding disputes with its neighbours by peaceful
means and on such matters as the Nansha over which China
has sovereignty it favours joint development for mutual
benefit.
As to the security mechanism to be employed in the
region China wishes to establish this under the
principles of peaceful co-existence: friendly relations
between ne i ghbou ring count r i es on the
for different system and equality of
bas is of respect
nations- "no big
power should be allowed to seek special status or spheres
of influence"; respect for sovereignty and non-
interference in internal affairs; peaceful settlement of
disputes by means of negotiation: no resort to arms;
mutual benefit and cooperation: oppo s t t ion to the
formation of trade protectionism and the creation of
exclusive economic blocs.
As regards the functions and form of the collective
syst em Van proposes fou r funct ions and fou r 1eve 1s of
activity. The four functions are: to enhance political
dialogue at the bilateral level, with supplementary
multilateral negotiations; expand economic cooperation;
develop exchange of military information and contacts to
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increase transparency; full consultation on security
issues and regional disputes. The four levels are:
First, non-governmental, informal, and non-regular
bilateral multilateral or regional dialogues; second
dia1gues at semi-official, regular or nonregu1ar,
and mulitlatera1 or regional, forums; third,
regularised subregional official formal dialogues;
and, fourth, an institutionalised collective
security system for the region as a whole. 48
Howeve r , Van does not cons ide r t hat such a syst em wi 11
emerge overnight rather than evolve through time and
practice from low-level to high-level collaboration:
Currently, conditions are not ripe for the
establishment of an instituiona1ised Asia-Pacific
collective security system for the region as a
whole. There are power centres in the Asia-Pacific
region which have very different interests, and the
political situation is complex. Countries have
different views on the security issues facing the
subregions and the region as a whole, and are
focusing their attention on different issues.
Therefore, a long time will be needed for full study
and consu 1t at; on. The proposa 1 conce rn i ng the
establishment of a CSCE-like all-Asia collective
security system is obviously unrealistic, because
the situations in Europe and Asia are very
different.49
From Van's assessment it can be seen that China's view of
multilateral coordination is derived from the same
premises which influence its attitude to bilateral
relations. It favours collective measures only in so far
as these promote, and do not constrain, its own diplomacy
and are not t he means by whi ch any powe r, 0 r g roup of
powers, can compromise its national interests, domestic
or external. The gradualist approach outlined above is to
ensu re that these i nt e rest s are prot ect ed at every st age
and that the process as a whole can be 1 imited to such
activity as does not contravene them. An immediate
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instance of this is evident in China's insistence that
Taiwan, as an integral part of China, would not be
entitled to separate representation in any security
mechanism. Thus, both the structure and the operation of
the collective mechanism will be subordinate to China's
interpretation of its national interest. Since this is
a 1so t rue of every ot he r count ry t he prospect s for the
regional security mechanism must be viewed with caution.
It was stated above that, in Chinese appraisals at
1east, Japan had bene fit t ed most from t he erne rgence of
t he new reg i ona 1 order. It mi ght be added t hat Ch ina had
gained no less, certainly if account is taken of China's
late entry into full membership of the economic and
political order in assessing the disparity in the two
state's regional positions. The change in the relative
positions of the four major powers has created a more
stable and secure enviroment for China's economic and
political policy and allowed it considerably greater
felxibility in how that policy is conducted. This is
important not only because of China's ambitions as a
major Asian and· global power but also because of its
liabilities in terms of domestic development. The purpose
of this paper, however, was not to consider China's
position as an Asian power per se but of Asia's role in
China's changing relationship with Russia, on which some
conclusions may finally be drawn.
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A central premise of this thesis was that strategic
opposition between the Soviet Union and China arose from,
and was sustained by, regional confrontation. This was a
complex process since political and economic processes in
Asia lay outwith the control of the major powers.
Stability between the two states in future will depend,
therefore, not only on the condition of the bilateral
relationship but on compatible regional perspectives,
including strategic relationships as they operate within
Asia.
A major factor influencing Sino-Russian relations at
all three leve1s- bilateral, regional and strategic- is
the impact of Asian economic modernisation. This is
changing the relationship between Asian states, including
between planned and market economi es, and bet ween As i a
and t he rest of the g 1oba 1 economy. A cent ra 1
consideration of the paper was, therefore, to assess the
degree to which the Asian modernisation imperative would
affect relations between states, including between Russia
and China.
If economic modernisation was the primary variable
influencing the Sino-Russian relationship, the primary
const ant may be sa id to be the cont i nued adherence of
Russia and China to a culturally distinctive perspective
on Asia, as indicated in the sections on the imperial and
revolutionary eras. However, the difference in the
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perceptions of Asia derived from the differing political
cultures of the two states did not prevent them from
sharing common political and economic interests in the
past, and was not the sole factor behind the periods of
cont ent i on between t hem when these arose, at t he end of
the Qing empire and during the Sino-Soviet cold war.
Rather it was the conjunction of differing national
perceptions with external factors, particularly the
regional balance of power, that led to a deterioration in
relations. That both states have now claimed to have de-
ideologised their foreign relations does not mean that
they do not retain distinctive value systems in relation
to regional relations. As in the past, it is the
relationship between these value systems and the regional
balance of power which will condition future relations
between them.
However, Russia and China are not alone in retaining
elements of continuity in their regional perspectives.
Perhaps the major source of instabi 1 t t y in Asia is the
persistance of ethnic, religious and national differences
within, and between, states. As argued economic
development is receiving so much attention not merely
because of the prodigious growth in the regional economy
but because it is seen as providing the stability and
unity of interest lacking in political relations. This
cannot be a simple positive/negative equation, however-
differences of economic interest can be as divisive as
those of politics. It is, therefore, a question of
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balance. Do the positive factors derived
deve 1opment out wei gh the negat i ve factors




character? Russian and Chinese responses to this question
have been taken as provi ding ev i dence of the deg ree of
compatibility between their regional perspectives.
Clearly, a crucial element shaping those responses
is Asia's role in their own domestic development. At
first glance these appear to be entirely disparate. China
has achieved remarkable growth rates by integrating
sectors of its economy in the economic processes of the
APR and using this as a foundation for a transformation
of its position in the international economy as whole.
Asia and China are gaining in importance for one another
as economi c i nt erdependence proceeds, and wi 11 cont i nue
to do so. By contrast the collapse of the planned economy
has propelled Russia into an economic crisis which has
strained both internal and external relations, including
between the centre and Asiatic Russia, and between Russia
and Asia. However, there are points of comparison between
the fut u re domest i c deve 1opment of. t he Russ i an and
Chinese economies, beyond the immediate purpose of
sh i ft i ng the balance bet ween st at e and pr i vat e sect ors
while retaining a degree of control over macroeconomic
factors.
Firstly, the relationship between centre and regions
is of paramount importance for both states, though the
separat i on of economi c i nt e rest between cent re and
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regions is arising from opposing causes- economic success
and economic collapse. The relationship is so important
because the increasing autonomy of the regions has
extended beyond the economic sphere- economic self-
management is inevitably giving rise to pressures for
po 1it i ca 1 se 1f-management, whi ch in Russ i a's case have
been recogn i sed to some deg ree in t he new const it ut ion.
Given the social problems inherent in the imbalance in
China's development continued devolution of authority to
provincial and regional level may also be inevitable.
Second 1v . as t he reg ions have ga i ned the powe r to
conduct foreign economic relations directly the
penet rat i on of the domest i c economy by ext e rna 1 fo rces-
not only corporations and trade agencies but the economic
and social cultures that sustain them- has increased.
This means that neither Russia nor China are any longer
closed societies and that the regions push away from the
centre will be matched by a pull from abroad. In China's
case this means a return to a time when Chinese society
interacted with Asia, and not merely the Chinese state.
Though to a lesser degree, this will also be true of
Asiatic Russia. Russians have always assumed that the
Eu r as i an concept wou 1d be const ruct ed by Russ i a's ent r y
into the East. It may yet be the case that ·the East will
tire of waiting for European Russia to overcome it's
schizophrenia and draw Asiatic





Regard ing Chi nese and Russ ian pe rspect ives on the
As ian economy itse 1f three aspect s we re exami ned- the
Asian economic model; Asian economic regionalism; and
bilateral ties.
With regard to the emergence of a distinctively
Asian economic model, there were several points of
convergence between Russian and Chinese assessments. Both
noted that there were common and individual factors
operating in most Asian economies. The common factors
related to specific economic processes, such as joint
ventures and export orientation, and to the overall
mechan ism in many As ian economi es, wh ich was recogn ised
as being based on achieving a dynamic balance between the
planned and private sectors, between national priorities
and the priorities of the market. Individual factors
related to the history and geography of particular
countries, such as that of post-war Japan or contemporary
China.
The most contentious area for analysts was that the
economic model could not be separated from political and
cultural models. For Russians this meant recognition of
the ir cult ura1 dis tin ctiveness but a deg ree 0f am big uity
on the question of whether closed or open political
systems were most conducive to economic modernisation.
Chinese analysts conversely tended to play down cultural
factors behind economic development and stressed instead
their political distinctiveness- economic convergence
with Asia did not imply political convergence. Thus while
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differing on the basis of their individuality both states
seemed re 1uct ant to commit t hemse 1ves to pu rsu it of a
common model, preferring to adopt those methods best
suited to their particular development needs. The
principal feaure they would appear to share would be a
continuing commitment to state intervention as a factor
in economic development.
On the central issue of the development of an Asian
regional economy there are similar points of convergence
and dive rgence. Bot h Chi ne s'e and Russ i an analyst s
recognise the primary external and internal factors
driving the creation of a regional economy: the pressure
from regionalisation elsewhere in the developed economies
and the growt h of i nt ra-reg i ona 1 trade, investment and
technology transfer within a structure sustained by
coordination between states and transnational
corporations. There is also recognition of the positive
and negative factors behind regionalisation: that it is
as much the product of bitter competition between states-
the US and Japan being the most obvious example- as of
the benefits of cooperation, and that the needs of less-
deve loped count r i es are frequent 1y ignored. The cent ra 1
differences between Russian and Chinese interests emerge
from discussion as to the structure and operation of the
potential regional or sub-regional economies.
Russia's perception is shaped by its location
between Europe and Asia. This means it has the option of
joining with Europe and risks promoting the creation of
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closed economic, and conceivably political, blocs, or of
seeking to balance its relations between East and West.
The rise of the concept of Eurasia, for which there is a
reasonable economic foundation, would seem to indicate a
more balanced approach to foreign economic relations but
nevertheless Russia will, because of this dual nature,
continue to be perceived as being in Asia, rather than of
Asia. As a result, Russia will favour economic
cooperation at the sub-regional level, especially in
Nort heast As i a, and at t he pan-Pac if i cleve 1 but wi 11
remain opposed to the emergence of an exclusively Asian
regional economy whether this is based upon East Asia or
a Chinese, Japanese or Southeast Asian subset. This
stance is the economic basis for the strategic alignment
with the US in the Pacific, though as argued it is one
which arises
position and
largely from the weakness of the Russian
can be expected to change with time.
Russia's major problem is that it lacks common interests
with the core economy of the region, Japan, at every
level- bilateral, sub-regional and multilateral- and that
t his i s imp art i ng an; mba 1an c e to; t sec 0nomi c
development, and its diplomacy as a whole.
China conversely, while being equally enthusiastic
about sub-regional development, is unable to separate
economic alignment from political alignment. China's
preference for bilateral relations and scepticism about
multilateral ism derives from the fact that the former












bodies. While China's growing interdependence with Asia
means that it cannot stand outside any multilateral body,
such as APEC, the gradualist approach to multilateral
cooperation is to ensure sufficient checks and balances
to prevent this becoming a vehicle for forces threatening
to China's national interests- US-Japanese hegemonism
being a commonly cited danger.
Chinese perspectives on exclusively Asian regional
and sub-regional integration similarly differ from those
of Russia. While also favouring an open international
economy, China is not averse to Asia demonstrating
protectionist tendencies in response to those of Europe
and North America. Its reaction to the EAEG was a case in
point- broadly neutral with the cautionary note that such
proposa 1s were premat u re. The prospect of c reat i ng sub-
regional economies, as opposed to sub-regional
cooperation, are replete with opportunities and dangers
for China. China's major aspiration in sub-regional
integration is undoubtedly the economic re-unification of
the Three Chinas presaging national re-unification.
Equally, it's major fear is that the economic structure
linking Japan, the NIC's and Southeast Asia is developing
into a closed system from which China will be excluded.
In both instances, differing political interests between
the proposed participants will be the major inhibition to
the emergence of integrated economies.
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Thus Russia and China share a broad commitment to an
open pan-regional economy which reflects the common
interest of economic development of member states. They
will both oppose exclusivist blocs within Asia but with
China reserving the right to pursue regional and sub-
regional integration if international and national
i nt e rest s demand it. The tendency towards closed blocs
will be that much weaker if Russia persists in
maintaining an independent stance between Europe and
Asia. There is only limited symmetry in the two powers
economic relations with the United States and Japan, and
not only because of the difference in scale of economic
relations. The low level of Russian economic interests in
Asia mean that it's political interests tend to
predominate and these greatly favour the US over Japan.
China conversely while having important economic
relations with both powers appears to have set course to
wean Japan from US influence, both to prevent the
cont i nuance of t he US-Japanese all i ance i nt 0 t he next
cent u ry and to ba 1ance Japan's econom i c i nt e rdependence
with the US with its own. This is a further aspect in
which Russia and China find common accord- neither
favours an East Asian economy built around Japanese
interests.
If relations between the four powers lack symmetry,
there is compensation in shared economic
regard to other third parties in Asia





Chinese economic interests are compatible with regard to
other East Asian states, notably South Korea, and Central
Asia. Most improvement needs to be made by the expansion
of ties across former political divisions in South and
Southeast Asia: Russia with ASEAN and Pakistan; China
with India and Vietnam. The bilateral relationship
ret a ins import ance beyond norma 1 forms of economi c
exchange such as trade and investment. Experience,
in format ion. techno logy and 1abou r resou rces can all be
transferred with mutual gain, not least in relation to
the less-developed regions of both countries.
How do these perspectives on the economic future of
Asia relate to Russian and Chinese political
perspectives? As argued the divisions within the Russian
policy process have influenced the external orientation
of the new state. This said the growing recognition that
t he new ideo logy of democ racy and market economi cs is a
no better guide to foreign relations than the old
ideology is leading to a consensus that Russia must make
its national interests the basis of its diplomacy. How
those national interests should be defined w i l l remain a
sou rce of domest i c and ext e rna 1 cont ent ion, howeve r, and
not on 1y because t hey are inc reas i ng 1y vi ewed as
extending beyond the actual boundaries of the state. In
the wake of the retreat from superpower status in
economic, military and political terms, Russia has thrown
itself back upon an age-6ld source of authority- control
of territory. Inherent in the concept of Eurasia is the
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belief that Russian dominance of the northern expanses of
the two continents is the foundation of its major power
status. In Russian terms this dictates a multi-
directional foreign policy which both differentiates
Russia from Europe and Asia, and gives it fundamental
interests in both.
However, other st at es reactions to Russia's
determination to revive its international status must
also be taken into consideration. It seems clear that on
both continents there will be those who welcome a strong
and independent Russia capable of providing regional
balance, and those who view Russia's return to major
power status as threatening and an inhibition to the
their own ambitions. To say that in Asia, China was an
example of the former and Japan the latter would both
exaggerate the difference in the policy position of the
two Asian states and project into the future the current
state of relations between the powers in an unjustified
way given their fluid character. Nevertheless, the seeds
of such a division of interest are already apparent and
must at some point be consciously averted if they are not
to come to fruition.
China's claim to great power status within Asia is
no less evident but unlike the Russian claim which is
modified by conditions of geography, China's is modified
by its political and social distinctiveness. As argued,
China does not view its self-conception as an Asian power
ass epa rat e from its soc i a 1 ch a r act e r i s tic san d , i nth e
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interpretation of official or semi-official commentators
such as He Xin at least, its adherence to a socialist
comprehensivepo 1 it ica 1
denial of
affairs of
and economic system. China's




implication, acknowledgment of the potential influence of
China in Asia. It is not merely the traditional sources
of national power that the Chinese state wields-
territory, population, military and economic might- that
concerns China's neighbours but also that Chinese society
has been one of the most successful and irresistable
systems of cultural transmission in human history.
China's increasing interaction with the region as a
result of political and economic change domestically and
internationally seems to create the conditions for a
resumption of its natural role at the centre of the East
Asian order.
The ambivalent attitude of many Asian states to
Japan has its roots in the need to set limits to China's
power at the same time as not appearing to encourage
Japan to repeat the mistakes of history. How sustainable
a regional balance between China and Japan will be
remains to be seen. Certainly, the Japanese themselves
have the i r doubt s. I n a su rvey conduct ed in many
countries in 1994, respondents were asked to nominate the
major global power of the mid-21st century alongside the
US. I n Eu r 0pea nd Ame ric a the res po n se s we rev a r yin 9 1y
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Japan, Germany or Europe. In Japan, China predominated,
with three times as many nominations as Japan itself.
Thus there are similarities between Russia and
China's self-conception as Asian powers. Neither view
t hemse 1ves exc 1us i ve 1y as As ian powe rs but neve rt he 1ess
this is one element in their self-conception which is
currently expanding as a result of changes to the
international order and the pattern of domestic reform.
This said, the balance of thei r influence in Asia has
changed markedly since the time of normalisation. China
has greatly expanded its regional economic and pol t t ic a l
ties as a consequence of the decline of strategic
interest with the West and the vacuum left by Soviet
withdrawal. Russia remains preoccupied by domestic
upheaval and its commitment as an Asian power is an
aspiration rather than a reality beyond the points in
Central and East Asia where its interests meet those of
other powers. Given this more equal foundation for their
relations in Asia, how compatible are their regional
interests?
In Central Asia, they have resumed their traditional
roles of joint guarantors of regional stability. Neither
power has an interest in the emergence of Islamic or
Turkic nationalist states and both favour stable and
economically beneficial relations. In South Asia the end
of the Soviet strategic alignment with India has created
conditions for much more balanced relations between
Russia, China, India and Pakistan. The internal potential
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fo r con f 1i ct has on 1y abat ed somewhat but Russ i an and
Chinese perspectives on regional relations are now closer
than at any time since the early 1950's. Similarly in
Southeast Asia the demise of the Soviet Union has opened
a new era in which Russian political and economic
engagement is encouraged. China also proclaims its
unde rst and i ng of ASEAN' s aims and commi tment to peacefu 1
set t 1ement of reg i ona 1 d i sput es but t he re is no doubt
that China is a primary factor behind the Southeast Asian
nation's desire to gain a Russian contribution to
regional stability. This said there are as yet no major
conflicts of interest between Russia and China in the
region.
It is in the complex and contentious circumstances
of Northeast Asia that Sino-Russian relations will face
the great est pressu re. The re is at 1east some deg ree of
compatibility surrounding the major unresolved problem of
the cold war era- the division of the Korean peninsula.
Russia and China both have ideological interests in the
dispute but these are secondary to achieving military de-
escalation and conditions for orderly, and presumably
gradual, re-unification. Though rarely explicitly stated,
especially by China, the interests of Russia, China and
South Korea are fairly close in this regard, as they are
on t he consequences for t he US-Japanese re 1at i onshi p of
the end of the Korean confrontation, one of the original
pillars of their alliance.
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Attempting to chart the future balance of relations
between the four major powers in Asia is extremely
hazardous and yet this will clearly have a significant
influence on the nature of the Sino-Russian regional
relations. The alignment of the powers is perhaps best
considered by means of the best and worst scenarios of
China and Russia. China's worst scenario is undoubtedly a
tripartite policy of containment by the US, Russia and
Japan. China's concern for Russia and Japan to adopt
independent foreign policies, which it believes it
discerns, stems from this source, while the continuing
failure to close the triangle- to place Japanese-Russian
relations on the same level as US-Russian and US-
Japanese- is clearly no great disappointment. China's
major policy aim will be to construct balancing
relationships with both Japan and Russia in order to
achieve both regional and strategic stability- its best
scenario. The possibility that relations might
deteriorate with one power is not a considered a threat
provided it is counter-balanced by the other- a US-
Japanese alignment balanced by China and Russia, or a US-
Russian alignment balanced by China and Japan. Neither of
these is thought more likely than a continually shifting
pattern of interests between the four powers.
For Russia the worst scenario may we 11 be
isolationism - that internal division will neutralise its
ability to use foreign relations to close the gap in
deve 1opment that is open i ng once more bet ween it se 1f and
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the major capitalist powers. The need to break out of
iso 1at ion ism is one sou rce of the cu rrent dependency on
the US, but it is also sustained by the two powers
comparable posit ion with regard to the new cent res of
power in the multipolar order- Europe and Asia. Both
Russia and America have vital interests in the two
continents but are aware that there are forces seeking to
resist the operation of their influence therein- to
externalise them. But the fact that their positions are
comparable does not inevitably make their interests
identical- a point increasingly being made in the foreign
policy debate in Russia. There is, moreover, the question
of Russian pride which does not sit easily with the role
of junior partner. Russia will, therefore, seek to reduce
the dependency on the US and to pursue its partial
interests. In Asia this would ideally involve
const ruct ing independent and count er-ba 1anc ing re 1at ;ons
with China and Japan. As argued, however, this is not
what is currently developing. The imbalance in relations
between Russia and China and Russia and Japan is one that
will have to be addressed eventually, since neither
Russia nor Japan wish to see Sino-Russian relations reach
a point where they begin to affect the regional balance.
This said the balance of interests between the three
states- in terms of economics, diplomacy, and geo-
political position- seem to favour the Sino-Russian
relationship over the Russo-Japanese.
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There is also the factor of history. To use history
to attempt to define future relations between states is a
risky business but it is possible to make the argument
that China and Russia have enjoyed common political and
economic interests for much of their diplomatic history.
The instability in their relationship originated from the
time of the imperialist powers penetration of Asia which
instigated a system of competition for regional power
into which both states were drawn. This system persisted
into the era of the Asian cold war and the ethos of
competitive nationalism remains the basis of relations
between states today. What has altered is the relative
distribution of power among states. The periods of crisis
in modern Asian international relations were induced by
unequal distribution of power or attempts to achieve
this. Today there is not only relative equilibrium
between the major powers but the distribution of power
within the region is much more broad-based, constraining
attempts at radical re-distribution of influence, in what
the Chinese have rightly characterised as a pluralistic
system.
While many factors have contributed to the emergence
of this new order, the predominant one is unquestionably
economics. This is the true implication of economic
modernisation for Asian international relations. Not that
economics is creating a common bond between Asian states
which over-rides political differences, though it does
have this effect in particular instances. But that, under
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the principle of the unity of economic and political
power, it is effecting a more equal distribution of power
between states, and thus establishing a more balanced and
stable regional order.
It is this return to a stable regional context which
imparts most positive potential to the Sino-Russian
relationship, influencing as it does both their bilateral
relationship and their perspectives on strategic
alignment.
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SOVECON I:Trado aa a Proportion of National Income 1952-1990
Source: Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR 1990
(Billion Roubles)
Year National Income Trade Percentage
1952 58.9 6.46 10.97"
1953 70.9 8.09 11.41";
1954 74.8 &.47 11.32"
1955 78.& 10.98 13.93"
1956 83.2 10.87 12.32";
1957 90.& 10.45 11.51"
195& 111.& 12.87 11.51"
1959 122.8 14.93 12 .16";
1960 III 12.84 10.52"
1961 99.6 9.08 9 .12"
1962 93.4 8.09 8.76";
1963 100 &.57 &.57"
1964 116.6 9.75 8.36"
1965 138.7 11.84 8.54";
1966 158.6 12.71 8.01"
1967 148.7 11.22 7.55"
1968 141.5 10.85 7.67"
1969 161.7 10.7 6.62"
1970 192.6 11.29 5.86"
1971 207.7 12.09 5.82";
1972 213.6 14.69 6.88"
1973 231.8 22.05 9.51";
1974 234.8 29.23 12.45";
1975 250.3 29.04 11.60"
1976 242.7 26.41 10.88"
1977 264.4 27.25 10.31";
1978 301 35.5 11.79";
1979 335 45.46 13.57";
1980 36&.8 57 15.46";
1981 394.1 73.53 18.66"
1981 425.8 77 .13 18.11"
1983 473.6 86.01 18.16";
1984 565.2 120.1 21.25"
1985 578.5 105.3 18.20"
1986 587.4 101.4 17.26"
1987 599.6 97.1 16.19"
1988 630.8 98.7 15.65"
1989 673.7 109.7 16.28"
1990 700.6 113.4 16.19"
SOVECON2: Soviet Union's Share of World Trade, 1979-91
IMP Direction of Trade Statistics 1985; 1992
(tUS Billion)
World Trade Growth Soviet Trade Growth Share1979 3092.9 54.2 1.8"
I 1567.7 28 1.8"X 1525.2 26.2 1.7"
1980 3803.8 23.0" 67.6 24.7" 1.8"
I 1928.1 23.0" 35.2 25.7" 1.8"
X 1875.7 23.0" 32.4 23.7" 1.7"
1981 3754.9 -1.3" 71.6 S.9" 1.9"
I 1912.1 -0.8" 38.6 9.7" 2.0"
X 1842.8 -1.8" 33 1.9" 1.8"
1982 3503.7 -6.'" 70.6 -1.4" 2.0"
I 1793.8 -6.2" 36.9 -4.4" 2.1"
X 1709.9 -7.2" 33.7 2.1" 2.0"
1983 3412.2 -2.6" 68.9 -2.4" 2.0"
I 1737.4 -3.1" 35.9 -2.'" 2.1"
X 1674.8 -2.1" 33 -2.1" 2.0"
1984 3625.7 6.3" 87.1 26.4" 2 .4"
I 1844.3 6.2" 46.3 29.0" 2.5"
X 1781.4 6.4" 40.8 23.6" 2.3"
1985 3688.7 1.'" 97.9 12.4" 2.7"I 1886.2 2.3" 54.1 16.8" 2.9"
X 1802.5 i ,2" 43.8 7.4" 2.4"
1986 4026.5 9.2" 95.6 -2.3" 2.4"
I 2052.9 8.8" 52.3 -3.3" 2.5"
X 1973.6 9.5" 43.3 -1.1" 2.2"
1987 4751.7 18.0" 101.4 6.1" 2.1"
I 2410 17.4" 54.5 4.2" 2.3"
X 2341.7 18.'" 46.9 8.3" 2.0"
1988 5446.2 14.6" 112 10.5" 2.1"2762.4 14.6" 62.5 14.7" 2.3"
X 2683.8 14.6" 49.5 5.5" 1.8"
1989 5910.6 8•.5" 118.7 6.0" 2.0"I 3001.4 8.'" 68.5 9.6" 2.3"
X 2909.2 8.4" SO.2 1.4" 1.'"
1990 6763 14.4" 115.3 -2.9" 1.'"
I 3432.7 14.4" 65.1 -5.0" 1.9"
X 3330.3 14.5" 50.2 0.0" loS"
1991 7032.1 4.0" 100.8 -12.6" 1.4"3577.7 4.2" 54.2 -16.'" 1.5"
X 3454.4 3.7" 46.6 -7.2" i ,3"




SOVECON3: Soviet Asian Trade 1960-1980
Source: VT SSSR 1960-1980
(Million RbIs)
Year Trade Asia Percentage
1960 10072 2216.3 22.0"
1961 10643.3 1777.2 16.7"
1962 12136.1 1830.1 IS.1"
1963 12898.1 1791.7 13.9"
1964 13876.2 17S4.4 12.6"
1965 14S97.9 1812.4 12.4"
1966 15078.6 1827.1 12.1"
1967 16366.6 1736.2 10.6"
1968 18039.9 1819.7 10.1"
1969 19784 1965.9 9.9"
1970 22085.2 2114.7 9.6"
1971 236S6.S 2005.1 8.5"
1972 26037.4 2487.5 9.6"
1973 31342.6 2953 9.4"
1974 39S72.2 4013.1 10.1"
1975 50698.8 4269.2 8.4"
1976 56752.9 4830.1 8.5"
1977 63353.3 5578.9 8.8"
1978 70224.4 5645.1 8.0"
1979 80290.3 6658.1 8.3"
1980 94097.3 8330.2 8.9"
SOVECON4: Direction of Trade 1981-90
SOurce: Vneshnaya Torgavlia 1981-91
(1 Mn RbIs)
Country 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
[1]
Afghanistan 655.8 5.11 691 5.01 675.2 5.01 898.7 6.11 873.2 5.41
I 316.6 UI 278.5 4.01 274.2 UI 304 4.11 323 4.01
X 339.2 5.21 m.5 5.91 401 5.91 594.7 8.21 550.2 6.61
Bangladesh 53.4 0.41 54.9 0.41 83.1 0.61 45.1 0.31 16.4 0.51
I 24.7 0.41 27.3 0.41 33.6 0.51 17 0.21 3409 0.41
X 28.1 0.41 27.6 0.41 50.1 0.71 28.1 0.41 41.5 0.51
Burna 31.4 0.21 9.9 0.11 1.8 0.01 2.4 0.01 6.6 0.01
I 22.1 0.31 1.1 0.01 1 0.01 0.5 0.01 6.6 0.11
X 9.3 0.11 8.8 0.11 0.8 0.01 1.9 0.01 0 0.01
Cambodia 61.6 0.51 55.1 0.41 71.8 0.51 81.4 0.61 100.2 0.61
I 1.9 0.01 2.3 0.01 4 0.11 5.2 0.11 9.1 0.11
X 59.7 0.91 53.4 0.81 67.8 1.01 76.2 1.01 91.1 1.11
China 176.8 1.41 223.5 1.61 488.2 3.61 977.8 6.61 1604.9 9.81
I 94.2 1.51 103.4 1.51 232.6 3.51 509.9 6.81 826.1 10.31
X 82.6 1.31 120.1 1.71 255.6 3.71 467.9 6.41 178.8 9.41
Cyprus 42.5 0.31 49.1 0.41 36.4 0.31 56.2 D.41 33.1 0.21
I 16.7 0.31 19.6 0.31 15.2 0.21 14.6 0.21 11.7 0.11
X 25.8 0.41 29.5 0.41 21.2 0.31 41.6 0.61 21.4 0.31
DPRK 529.2 4.11 681 4091 587.4 4041 712.8 UI 1051.2 6.41
I 250.3 3.91 318.5 UI 325 4091 365.6 UI 402.8 5.01
X 278.9 4031 362.5 5.21 262.4 3.81 347.2 UI 648.4 7.81
India 2397.9 18.51 2514 18.21 2322.6 17 .3X 2809.2 19.11 3072.2 18.81
I 1333.8 20.81 1473.8 21.41 1051 16.01 1271.8 17.11 1499.6 18.71
X 1064.1 16.21 1040.2 15.01 1211.6 IUS 1537.4 21.11 1572.6 19.01
Indonesia 93.1 0.71 53.8 0.41 58.3 0.41 55.9 0.41 94.2 0.61
I 59 0.91 19,4 0.31 36.1 0.51 51.3 0.71 90.5 1.11
X 34.1 0.5~ 34.4 0.51 22.2 0.31 5.6 0.11 3.7 0.01
Iran 678.5 6.81 766 5.51 936.5 1.0l 484.1 3.31 341.9 2.11
I 469.5 7.31 188.7 2.71 377.3 5.71 242.4 3.31 144.1 1.8~
X 409 6.21 577 .3 8.31 559.2 8.21 241.1 3.3~ 203.8 2.51
Iraq 909.4 7.01 994.1 7.21 753.9 5.61 941.7 6.41 824.2 5.11
I 3.9 O.IS 18.2 0.3S 382.5 5.8s 668.8 9.0S 556.7 6.9s
X 905.5 13.8S 975.9 14.1s 371.4 5.4S 272.9 3.71 267.5 3.2S
Japan 3029.5 23.41 3682.4 26.61 3004 22.4S 2894.3 19.61 3214.9 19.71
1 2212.1 34.51 2925.8 42.51 2175.5 33.11 2054.3 27.61 2286.9 28.SS
X 816.8 12.SS 756.6 10.9S 828.5 12.1s 840 l1.5S 928 IUS
Jordan 20.9 0.2s 90.7 0.71 68 0.5s 33.4 0.2S 9.6 O.IS
I 0.5 O.os 0.2 O.Os 0.3 O.OS 0.1 O.OS 0.1 O.os
X 20.4 0.3S 90.5 1.3S 67.7 LOS 33.3 O.Ss 9.5 O.ls
Kuwait 18.2 O.IS 6.1 O.os 5.7 O.OS 4.8 O.os 3.6 O.OS
I 5.5 O.lS 0 O.OS 0.6 O.OS 0.6 O.OS 0.4 O.os
X 12.7 0.2S 6.1 O.lS 5.1 O.IS 4.2 O.IS 3.2 O.os
Laos 37.1 0.3S 66.2 O.SS 77.8 0.6S 67.1 O.SS 87.8 0.5S
I 0.9 O.os 2 O.OS 2.3 O.OS 2.1 O.Os 2.3 O.OS
X 36.2 0.6S 64.2 0.9s 75.5 LIS 65 0.9S 85.5 LOS
Lebanon 22.9 0.21 23.9 0.2S 22 0.2s 43.1 0.3s 12.4 O.lS
I 8.1 O.ls 6.4 O.lS 5.8 O.lS 8 O.IS 0.2 O.OS
X 14,8 0.2S 17.5 0.3S 16.2 0.2S 35.1 0.5s 12.2 O.IS
Malaysia 190 1.5S 250.6 1.81 259.2 1.9S 228.8 1.61 191.2 1.21
I 175 2.7s 234. 7 3.4s 247.2 3.8s 214.8 2.9s lS0.4 2.2S
X 15 0.2s 15.9 0.2S 12 0.2s 14 0.2s 10.8 O.IS
Mongo 1ia 1035.9 8.0S 1232.7 S.9S 1344.3 10.0S 1402 9.5S 1500.2 9.21
I 24S.6 3.9S 313.8 UI 351.1 5.3S 387.4 5.21 386.6 UI
X 787.3 12.0S 918.9 13.3S 993.2 14.SS 1014.6 13.9S 1113.6 13.4S
Nepal 22 0.2s 23.8 0.2S 13.4 O.IS 15.4 O.ls 20.9 O.ls
I 2 O.Os 1.7 O.os U O.OS 3.6 O.OS 5.2 O.lS
X 20 0.3S 22.1 0.3S 12 0.2S 11.8 0.2S 15.7 0.21
Pakistan 124.6 LOS 142 LOs 145.6 LIS 123.5 O.SS 117.6 0.7S
[ 48.3 0.8S 70.6 LOS 67.5 1.0S 46.2 0.6S 59.1 0.7S
X 76.3 1.2S 71.4 LOs 78.1 LIS 77.3 LIS 58.5 0.7S
Phi lli pi nes 151.5 1.2' 93.6 0.1X 60.6 0.51 62.6 0.41 39.7 0.21
I 157 2.4S 80.5 1.2X 55 0.8S 51.9 0.8S 28.8 0.41
X 0.5 O.OS 3.1 O.OS 5.6 O.IS 4.7 0.11 10.9 O.lS
Saudia 25.5 0.21 14.3 0.11 169.4 1.31 317.1 2.21 393.9 2.41
I 156.5 2.41 292 3.91 378.8 UI
X 25.5 UI 1403 0.21 12.9 0.21 25.1 0.31 15.1 0.21
Singapore 117.2 0.91 71.4 0.51 88.8 0.71 227.4 1.51 90.3 0.61
I 68.2 1.11 40.8 0.61 65.6 1.01 203.1 2.11 79.6 1.01
X 49 0.71 30.6 0.41 23.2 0.3S 24.3 0.3S 10.7 O.IS
Sri lanka 24 0.2S 21.1 0.2S 38.7 0.3S 65 0.4S 38.1 0.2S
I 21.2 0.31 18 0.3X 35.7 0.5X 62.8 0.8X 29.8 0.41
X 2.8 O.OS 3.1 O.OS 3 O.OS 2.2 O.OS 8.3 0.11
Syria 530 4.1S 511.6 3.7S 504.9 3.8S 468.8 3.2S 508.3 3.1S
I 251.5 3.9S 300.8 4041 299.9 4.61 219.5 2.91 188.8 2.4S
X 278.5 4.2S 210.8 3.0S 205 3.01 249.3 3.41 319.5 3.9S
Thai land 320.4 2.5S 141.8 LOS 62.5 0.5S 73.9 0.5S 67.9 0.41
I 312.4 US 132.9 1.9S 54.7 0.8S 62.6 0.8S 54.5 O.7S
X 8 O.lS 8.9 0.11 7.8 O.lS 11.3 0.21 13.4 0.2S
Turkey 448.4 3.5S 248.2 1.8S 212.8 1.61 258.4 1.8S 315.6 1.91
I 130 2.0S 95.4 1.4S 83 1.31 122.2 1.6S 153 1.9S
X 318.4 4091 152.8 2.21 129 1.91 136.2 1.9S 162.6 2.OS
Vietna. 891.8 6.91 1010.7 7.3S 1139 8.51 1261.9 8.61 1446.1 8.91
I 167.2 2.6S 206.5 3.0S 234.9 3.61 257.9 3.51 280.8 3.5S
X 72U 11.01 80402 11.6S 904.1 13.21 1004 13.81 1165.3 14.11
ARY 22.9 0.2S 3404 0.2S 41.8 0.31 10.9 O.lS 15.2 O.lS
I 0.4 O.OS 0.3 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1 O.OS 0.1 O.OS
X 22.5 0.3S 34.1 O.ss 41.7 0.61 10.8 0.11 15.1 0.2S
PDRY 98.9 0.81 73 0.51 141 LIS 116 0.81 151.3 0.9S
I 6.1 O.lS 5.9 O.lS 5 O.lS 5.8 O.lS 8.4 0.11
X 92.8 1.4S 61.1 LOS 136 2.0S 110.2 1.51 142.9 1.7S
Asia Trade 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Total 12967.3 [21 13831.5 13415.3 14740.7 16308.7
Illport Trade 6408.3 49.41 6887.1 49.81 6574.6 49.0~ 7452.1 50. 6~ 8028.9 49.2~
Export Trade 6559 5D.61 6934.4 50.11 6839.9 51.01 7288.6 49.41 8279.8 50.81
Balance 150.7 47.3 265.3 -163.5 250.9
Asia as a region [3]
World Total 109739.2 11.81 119576 11.61 127476 10.51 139711 10.6S 141565.6 l1.5S
Illport Total 52631.4 12.21 56411 12.2S 59585.4 11.01 65327.3 11.41 69101.9 l1.6S
Export Total 57107.8 11.51 63165 11.0S 67890.6 10.1S 74383.7 9.8S 72463.7 11.41
Balance m6.4 6754 8305.2 9056.4 3361.8
Asia Subregions [41
Soc.Stat. Total 3310.3 25.51 3810.3 27.5S 4036.5 3~. IS 4539.9 30.8S 5210 31.9S
Illport Tota 1 991.6 15.51 1127.5 16.4S 1196.5 18.2S 1328 17.8S 1413 17.61
Export Total 2318.7 35.4S 2682.8 38.7S 2840 41.5S 3211.9 44.11 3797 45.9S
Ba lance 1327.1 1555.3 1643.5 1883.9 2384
M.East Total 3018.1 23.3S 2811.4 20.31 2892.4 21. 6s 2734.5 18.61 2615.1 16.0S
Illport Total 892.2 13.9S 635.5 9.2S 1326.2 20.2S 1574.1 21.1S 1442.3 18.0S
Export Total 2125.9 32.41 2175.9 31.4S 1565.4 22.9S 1160.4 15.9s 1172.8 14.2S
Balance 1233.7 1540.4 239.2 -413.7 -269.5
ASEAN Total 878.2 6.8S 611.2 Us 529.4 3.9S 649.6 Us 483.3 3.0s
Illport Tota 1 771.6 12.01 508.3 7.4S 458.6 7.0S 589.7 7.9S 433.8 5.4S
Export Total 106.6 1.6S 92.9 1.3S 70.8 LOS 59.9 0.8S 49.5 0.6S
Balance -665 -m.4 -387.8 -529.8 -384.3
Usia Total 3277.7 25.31 3446.8 24.9S 3279.2 2US 3956.9 26.8s 4198.4 25.7S
Illport Total 1746.6 27.3s 1869.9 27.21 1463.4 22.3S 1705.4 22.91 1951.6 24.3S
Export Total 1531.1 23.31 1576.9 22.7S 1815.8 26.5S 2251.5 30.9S 2246.8 27.11
Balance -215.5 -293 352.4 546.1 295.2
Notes
[1] Percentage of Asia total trade, imports and exports.
[2] Imports/Exports expressed as percentages.
[31 Asia trade, illports and exports as percentage of all trade.
[4] Subregion's share of Asia's total trade, imports and exports.
Socialist states defined as: Afghanistan, Cambodia, DPRK, Laos
Mongolia, Vietnal, and the PORY.
1986 [1] 1987 1988 1989 1990
Afghanistan 786.7 5.3' 771.9 5.3' 663.2 4.1S 583.8 3.1S 460.5 2.4S
I 244.6 3.5S 234.7 3.6S 18U 2.5S 79.3 0.8S 89.6 0.9S
X 542.1 6.9S 537.2 6.6S 478.4 5.4S 504.5 S.4S 370.9 4.OS
Bangladesh 67.7 O.SS 60 0.4S 74.2 O.SS 77.1 0.4S 53.1 0.3S
I 11.8 0.3S 27.1 0.4S 21.9 0.3S 25.8 0.3S 27.6 0.3S
X 49.9 0.6S 32.3 0.4S 52.3 0.6S 51.3 0.5S 25.5 0.3S
Burla 21.2 O.IS 6 O.OS 0.5 O.OS No figures after 1988
I 20 0.3S 5.2 O.IS 0.4 O.OS
X 1.2 O.OS 0.8 O.OS 0.1 O.OS
Cambodia 122.7 0.8S 123.2 0.8S 130.4 0.8S 140.8 0.7S 109.4 0.6S
I 8.7 O.IS 56.6 0.9S 13.1 0.2S 12.3 O.IS 14.3 O.lS
X 114 1.5S 11.2 O.lS 117.3 1.3S 128.5 1.4S 95.1 I.OS
China 1822 12.3S 1474.9 10.lS 1850.1 l1.5S 2412 12.8S 3038 15.7S
I 911.7 13.1S 724.3 I1.2S 844.9 l1.6S 1083.5 11.4S 1660.3 16.4S
X 910.3 l1.6S 750.6 9.3S 1005.2 11.4S 1328.5 14.2X 1377.7 15.0S
Cyprus 23.1 0.2S 29.3 0.2S 32.9 0.2S 52.6 0.3X 64.1 0.3S
I 11.5 0.2X 12 0.2S 9 O.IS 20.3 0.2S 23.9 0.2S
X 11.6 O.lS 17.3 0.2S 23.9 0.3S 32.3 0.3S 40.2 0.(1
DPRK 1207.9 8.2X 1232.1 8.5S 1601.7 10.0S 1502 7.9X 1499 1.7S
I 450.7 6.SS 431.9 6.71 539.5 7.4S 561.5 5.9S 612.4 6.0S
X 757.2 9.7S 800.2 9.9S 1062.2 12.0S 940.5 10.0S 886.6 9.6S
India 2191.2 14.8X 2178.5 15.0S 2252 14.0S 2917.8 15.4X 3207.3 16.6S
I 1233.6 17.7S 1073.1 16.6S 1123.3 15.5S 1770.6 18.6' 2021.5 19.9S
X 957.6 12.2S 1105.4 13.71 1128.7 12.8S 1147.2 12.2S 1185.8 12.9S
Indonesia 45.4 0.3X 67.8 0.51 40.4 0.31 94.5 0.5X 70.9 0.4S
I 42.3 0.6S 56.6 0.9S 24.3 0.3S 68.2 0.7S 53.9 0.5S
X 3.1 O.OS 11.2 0.11 16.1 0.2S 26.3 0.3S 17 0.2S
Iran 76 O.SS 159.9 LIS 196.2 1.2S 186.6 LOS 195.4 LOS
I 18.2 0.3S 49.5 0.8S 77 LIS 61.2 0.6S 114.3 1.1S
X 57.8 0.71 110.4 1.4S 119.2 US 125,4 1.3S 81.1 0.9S
Iraq 638.6 US 1112.6 7.6S 1270.5 7.9S 1231.3 6.51 826.2 4031
I 345.6 5.0S 788.3 12.21 961.4 13.2S 975.9 10.2S 542.6 5.3S
X 293 3.7S 324.3 tOs 309.1 3.SS 255,4 2.7S 283.6 3.11
Japan 3185.3 21.SS 2600.7 17.9S 3135.1 19.5S 3481 18.41 353504 18.3S
I 2205.4 31. 6S 1628.2 25.3S 1950.9 26.9S 2138 22.41 2100.6 20.7S
X 979.9 12.5S 972.5 12.0S 1184.2 13.4S 1343 14.3S 1434.8 15.6S
Jordan No figures recorded after 1985
I
X
Kuwait No figures recorded after 1985
I
X
Laos 67.3 O.SS 87.6 0.6S 86 O.SS 89.3 O.SS 90.1 O.SS
I 5.1 0.11 9.4 0.11 11.4 0.2S 15.6 0.2S 16.4 0.2S
X 62.2 0.8S 78.2 LOS 7U 0.8S 73.7 0.8S 73.7 0.81
Lebanon 9.2 O.IS 19.7 O.IS 48.8 0.3S 53.7 0.3S 15.8 0.41
I 8.2 O.IS 5.9 O.IS 23.1 0.3S 24.2 0.3S 37.9 0.4S
X 1 O.OS 13.8 0.2S 25.7 0.3S 29.5 0.3S 37.9 0.4S
Malaysia 104.2 0.71 115.8 0.81 99.1 0.61 165.6 0.91 116.5 0.6S
I 96.6 1.4S IOU 1.6S 81.4 1.11 152.7 1.6S 93,4 0.9S
X 1.6 0.11 11 0.11 17.7 0.2S 12.9 0.11 23.1 0.3S
Mongol ia 1547.4 10.41 1540.6 10.6S 1537 9.6S 1402.5 7.4S 1424.1 7.4s
I 409.9 S.9S 440.7 6.8S 406 5.6S 391.3 4.2S 433.9 US
X 1131.5 14.5S 1139.9 14.1S 1130.8 12.8S 1005.2 10.7S 990.2 lo.TS
Nepal t.3 O.os 3.5 O.OS 6.6 O.OS No figures after 1988
I 1.2 O.OS 1.4 O.OS 1.1 O.OS
X 0.1 O.OS 2.1 O.OS 5.5 O.IS
Pakistan 85 O.SI 115.1 0.81 115.8 0.71 150.2 0.81 192.4 1.0S
I 47.9 0.7S 67.6 LOS 72 LOS 73.1 0.81 89.8 0.9S
X 37.1 0.51 47.5 0.6S 43.8 O.SS 77.1 0.8S 102.6 LIS
Ph illipines 17.4 O.ts 27.1 0.21 24.6 0.21 21.6 O.ts 23.6 0.11
1 10 O.IS 15.8 0.2S 11.3 0.2S 16.1 0.2S 11.5 O.IS
X 7.4 O.IS 11.3 O.ts 13.3 0.2S 5.5 O.ts 12.1 O.ts
Saudia 193.7 1.31 12,4 0.11 25.4 0.2S 10.5 0.11 14.7 0.11
I 175.1 0 0.01 12.6 0.2S 0 0.1 O.OS
X 18.6 0.2S 12,4 0.2S 12.8 0.11 10.5 0.11 14,6 0.21
Singapore 62.6 0.41 85.3 0.61 61.5 0.4S 158.6 0.8S 265.2 1.41
1 35.9 0.5S 48.1 0.71 35.9 O.SS 10D.2 1.11 208.1 2.11
X 26.7 0.3S 37.2 0.51 25.6 0.31 58.4 0.61 57.1 0.6S
Sri lanka 25.1 0.21 15.8 0.11 7.8 0.01 13.6 0.11 32.7 0.21
I 12.2 0.2S 11.9 0.2S 7.4 0.11 12.9 0.11 31.5 0.3S
X 12.9 0.2S 3.9 O.OS 0.4 0.01 0.7 0.01 1.2 O.OS
Syria 472.5 3.21 440.6 3.0S 409.6 2.SS 912.5 US 936.2 4.8S
I 171.4 2.5S 190.5 3.0S 239.1 3.3S 70U 7.41 787 7.8S
X 295.1 3.8S 250.1 3.ts 170.5 1.9S 207.9 2.2S 149.2 1.6S
Thailand 90.9 0.6S 54.8 0.41 6U 0.41 256.6 1.41 125.5 0.6S
I 80.7 1.21 30.8 0.5' 40.2 0.6S 220.7 2.31 67.6 0.7'
X 10.2 O.ts 24 0.3S 24.2 0.3S 35.9 0.41 57.9 0.61
Turkey 220.5 1.5S 310.8 2.ts 395.1 2.5S 844.6 4051 1037.4 5.41
I 99.3 1.41 110.7 1.7S 178.3 2.51 495.6 5.21 401.8 4.0S
X 121.2 1.51 200.1 2.51 216.8 2.5S 349 3.71 635.6 6.91
Vietna. 1612.7 10.91 1773.4 12.21 1782.2 11.11 1910.6 10.1S 1801.1 9.31
I 294,3 US 318.9 US 388.6 5.41 519.7 5.51 703.5 6.9S
X 1318.4 16.8S 1454,5 18.0S 1393.6 15.81 1390.9 IUS 1104.2 12.01
ARY 10.1 0.11 12.4 0.11 12.1 0.11 244.3 1.3S 161.2 0.8S
I 0.1 O.OS 0.1 O.OS 0 O.OS 6 0.11 3.6 0.01
X 10 0.11 12.3 0.21 12.1 0.11 238.3 2.51 157.6 1.71
PDRY 107.2 0.71 116.1 0.8S 165.6 1.01 Yemen after 1988
I 5.2 0.11 2.5 O.OS 2.8 O.OS
X 102 1.31 113.1 1.41 162.8 1.81
Asia Trade 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Total 14814,9 [2] 14547,9 16088,8 18913,7 19362,4
Illport Trade 6969,2 47.0S 6447,2 44,3S 7261,7 45, IS 9535,3 SUS 10147,1 52.4S
Export Trade 7845,7 53.0S 8084,8 55,6S 8826,9 54.9S 9378,4 49,6S 9215,3 47,6S
Balance 876,5 1637,6 1565,2 -156,9 -931.8
Asia as a region [3]
World Total 130934 l1.3S 128882,6 11.3S 132155,5 12.2S 140878,6 13.4S 131881,1 14.7S
Import Total 62587.1 11,lS 60740,8 10,6S 65040,1 11.2S 72137 13.2S 70854,3 14.3S
Export Total 68346,9 l1.5S 69141,8 11,7S 67115,4 13.2S 68741.6 13,6% 61026,8 15, IS
Balance 5759,8 8401 2075,3 -3395,4 -9827.5
Asia Subregions [4]
Soc,Stat. Total 5451.9 36,8S 5644,9 38,8% 5966,1 37, IS 5629 29,8S 5390,8 27.8S
Illport Total 1418,S 20,4S 1494.7 23,2S 1546,2 21.3% 1585.7 16.6S 1870,1 18.4S
Export Total 4033,4 51,4S 4134.3 51, a 4419,7 50, IS 4043,3 43,11 3520,7 38,2S
Balance 2614,9 2639,6 2873,S 2m,6 1650.6
M,East Total 1750.9 I1.8S 2213,8 15.2S 2556.2 15,9S 3536.1 18.7S 3311 I1.1S
Illport Tota 1 840,6 12.1S 1159,S 18,OS 1503.3 20.71 2287,8 24.0S 1911.2 18.8S
Export Total 910.3 11.61 1053.8 13.0% 1052.9 11,9% 1248.3 13.3% 1399.8 15.2S
Balance 69.7 -105.7 -450,4 -1039.5 -511.4
ASEAN Total 320.5 2.21 350.8 2.41 290 1.8S 696.9 3.71 601.7 3.a
Illport Total 265.5 3.81 256.1 4.01 193.1 2.11 557.9 5.91 43405 4,3S
Export Total 55 0.71 94.7 1.21 96,9 1.1S 139 1.5S 167.2 1.8S
Balance -210.5 -161,4 -96.2 -418,9 -267.3
S,Asia Total 3157 21.31 3144,8 21.6S 3119,6 19.4S 3742.5 19.81 3946 20,41
Illport Total 1557.3 22.3S 1416,4 22,OS 1410,S 19.4% 1961.1 20,6S 2260 22.3S
Export Tata 1 1599.7 20.4S 1728.4 21. 41 1709.1 19.41 1780.8 19.0S 1686 18.3S
Balance 42,4 312 298,6 -180.9 -574
Notes
[1] Percentage of Asia total trade, illports and exports.
[2] Illports/Exports expressed as percentages.
[3] Asia trade, illports and exports as percentage of all trade.
[4] Subregion's share of Asia's total trade, imports and exports,
Socialist states defined as: Afghanistan, Cambodia, DPRK, Laos
Mongolia, Vietna., and the PORY.
SOVBCONS: Sino-Soviet Trade. 1979-91
Source: IMP Direction of Trade Statistics, 1985; 1992.
($ US .ilUons)
China Trade Soviet Share Soviet Trade China Share
1979 29332 492 1.7" 54320 470 0.9"
I 15675 250 1.6" 28061 242 0.9"
X 13657 242 1.8" 26259 228 0.9"
1980 37644 492 1.3" 67689 468 0.7"
19505 264 1.4" 35263 228 0.6"
X 18139 228 1.3" 32426 240 0.7"
1981 43107 277 0.6" 71670 263 0.4"
I 21631 154 0.7" 38641 123 0.3"
X 21476 123 0.6" 33029 140 0.4"
1982 40785 386 0.9" 70709 363 0.5"
18920 243 1.3" 36969 142 0.4"
X 21865 143 0.7" 33740 221 0.7"
1983 43409 760 1.8" 68968 720 1.0"
I 21313 441 2.1" 35964 319 0.9"
X 22096 319 1.4" 33004 401 1.2"
1984 50777 1255 2.5" 87216 1253 1.4"
I 2.5953 670 2.6" 46393 644 1.4"
X 22824 585 2.6" 40823 609 1.5"
198.5 69809 2054 2.9" 98093 2065 2.1"
I 42480 1017 2.4" 54107 1141 2.1"
X 27329 1037 3.8" 43986 924 2.1"
1986 74614 2702 3.6" 95699 2691 2.8"
I 43247 1472 3.4" 52335 1353 2.6"
X 31367 1230 3.9" 43364 1338 3.1"
1987 82686 2538 3.1" 101585 2545 2.5"
I 43222 1291 3.0" 54512 1372 2.5"
X 39464 1247 3.2" 47073 1173 2.5"
1988 103015 3278 3.2" 112200 3261 2.9"
55352 1802 3.3" 62549 1623 2.6"
X 47663 1476 3.1" 49651 1638 3.3"
1989 112054 3996 3.6" l18738 3637 3.1"
I 59140 2147 3.6" 68506 1869 2.7"
X 52914 1849 3.5" 50232 1768 3.5"
1990 118949 4261 3.6" l15479 4265 3.7"
I 54449 2213 4.1" 65195 2253 3.5"
X 64500 2048 3.2" 50284 2012 4.0"
1991 135943 3969 2.9" 100874 3963 3.9"
I 63957 2109 3.3" 54239 2046 3.8"
X 71986 1860 2.6" 46635 1917 4.1"
Sovecon6: Soviet-Japanese Trade 1979-91
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, 1985; 1992
($ us .illions)
Soviet Trade Japan Share Japan Trade Soviet Share
1979 54320 4166 7.7" 212126 4338 2.0"
I 28061 2443 8.7" 109833 1895 1.7"
X 26259 1723 6.6" 102293 2443 2.4"
1980 67689 4499 6.6" 271719 4669 1.7"
35263 2796 7.9" 141284 1873 1.3"
X 32426 1703 5.3" 130435 2796 2.a;
1981 43553 5359 12.3" 294368 5273 I.8"
I 22026 3523 16.0" 142868 2020 1.4"
X 21527 1836 8.5" 151500 3253 2.1"
1982 70709 5410 7.7" 270009 5561 2.1"
I 36969 3893 10.5" 131566 1668 1.3"
X 33740 1517 4 .5" 138443 3893 2.8"
1983 68968 4147 6.0" 273502 4280 1.6"
I 35964 2822 7.8" 126520 1458 1.2"
X 33004 1325 4.0" 146982 2822 1.9"
1984 87216 4028 4.6" 305890 3903 1.3"
I 46393 2766 6.0" 136142 1388 1.0"
X 40823 1262 3.1" 169748 2515 1.5"
1985 98093 4356 4.4" 307705 4210 1.4"
I 54107 3049 5.6" 130516 1438 1.1"
X 43986 1307 3.0" 177189 2772 1.6"
1986 95699 5303 5.5" 338378 5166 I.5"
I 52335 3496 6.7" 127660 1988 1.6"
X 43364 1807 4.2" 210718 3178 1.5"
1987 101585 4997 4.9" 382239 4955 1.3"
I 54512 2845 5.2" 150907 2368 1.6"
X 47073 2152 4.6" 231332 2587 1.1"
1988 112200 5964 5.3" 452444 5903 1.3"
62549 3444 5.5" 187483 2772 1.5"
X 49651 2520 5.1" 264961 3131 1.2"
1989 118738 6440 5.4" 484232 6059 1.3"
I 68506 3376 4.9" 209635 2990 1.4"
X 50232 3064 6.1" 274597 3069 1.1"
1990 115479 5883 5.1'1; 522985 5933 1.1"
I 65195 2819 4.3" 235307 3370 1.4"
X 50284 3064 6.1" 287678 2563 0.9"
1991 100874 5345 5.3" 551525 5435 1.0"
I 54239 2329 4.3" 236633 3318 1.4"
X 46635 3016 6.5" 314892 2117 0.7"
SOVECON7: Direction of Trade by Bloc.
Source: VT 1980-89
(I Nn Rbis)
Total Trade CMEA Share Ind/Nation Share Dev/Nation Share
1979 80307.3 41654.5 51.9" 25753.8 32.1'1; 9480.6 11.8"
37881.2 21444.4 56.6" 13247.5 35.0" 3189.3 8.4"
X 42426.1 23628.5 55.7" 12506.3 29.5" 6291.3 14.8"
1980 94097.3 45776.7 48.6" 31583.1 33.6" 11961.7 12.7"
I 44462.8 21437.7 48.2" 15721.3 35.4" 5092 11.5"
X 49634.5 24339 49.0" 15861.8 32.0" 6969.7 14.0"
1981 109739.2 52185.3 47.6" 35358.7 32.2" 16446.6 15.0"
I 52631.4 23618.9 44.9" 18111.7 34.4" 7777.3 14.8"
X 57107.8 28566.4 50.0" 17247 30.2" 8669.3 15.2"
1982 119576 58702.3 49.1" 37741.4 31.6" 16882.6 14.1"
56411 27552.4 48.8" 18892.4 33.5" 6702.8 11.9"
X 63165 31149.9 49.3" 18849 29.8" 10179.8 16.1"
1983 127476 65257 51.2" 38371.7 30.1" 17698.4 13.9"
I 59585.4 30807.7 51.7" 18718.8 31.4" 7174.7 12.0"
X 67890.6 34449.3 50.7" 19652.9 28.9" 10523.7 15.5"
1984 139711 72788.8 52.1" 40923.5 29.3" 18461.2 13.2"
I 65327.3 34621.5 53.0" 19574.1 30.0" 7533.2 11.5"
X 74383.7 38167.3 51.3" 21349.4 28.'" 10928 14.7"
1985 141565.6 77692.8 54.9" 37847 26.7" 17225.1 12.2"
I 69101.9 37639.4 54.5" 19268.2 27.9" 7624.2 11.0"
X 72463.7 40053.4 55.3" 18578.8 25.6" 9600.9 13.2"
1986 130934 79953.1 61.1" 28962.4 22.1" 14444.4 11.0"
I 62587.1 37796 60.4" 15853.2 25.3" 4894.3 7.8"
X 68346.9 42157.1 61.7" 13109.2 19.2" 9550.1 14.0"
1987 128882.6 79552 61.7" 28058.4 21.8" 14503.3 11.3"
I 60740.8 40696 67.0" 13872.9 22.8" 4746.7 7.8"
X 69141.8 38856 56.2" 14185.5 20.5" 9756.6 14.1"
1988 132155.5 78879.2 59.7" 30986.2 23.4" 14911.1 11.3"
I 65040.1 39830.1 61.2" 16320.6 25.1" 5346.2 8.2"
X 67115.4 39049.1 58.2" 14665.6 21.9" 9564.9 14.3"
1989 140878.6 78545.7 55.8" 36889.5 26.2" 17108.2 12.I"
I 72137 40588.1 56.3" 20497.1 28.4" 6985.7 9.7"
X 68741.6 37957.6 55.2" 16392.4 23.8" 10122.5 14.7"




Fuel/Electric Foodstuffs Ores/Metals Total Machinery Consumer Goods Total
1979
I 3.8 21.9 11.2 36.9 38 11.4 49.4
I 42.2 2.6 9.1 53.9 17.S 2.3 19.8
1980
I 3 24.1 10.8 38 33.9 12.1 46
I 46.9 1.9 8.8 51.6 15.8 2.5 18.3
1981
I 3.6 27.7 10 41.3 30.2 12.9 43 .1
I 50.2 2 8 60.2 13.7 1.8 15.s
1982
I 4.6 23.1 9.9 38.2 34.4 12.7 47.1
I 52.3 1.6 7.4 61.3 11.9 1.9 14.8
1983
I S.6 20.5 8.8 34 .9 38.2 11. S 49.7
I 53.1 1.5 7.5 62.7 12.5 1.8 14.3
1984
I 6.1 22.5 8.3 36.9 36.6 11.7 48.3
I H.4 1.5 1.2 63.1 12.5 1.8 14.3
1985
I 5.3 21.2 8.4 34.9 37.2 12.4 49.6
I S2.8 1.5 7.S 61.8 13.6 2 IS.6
1986
I 4.6 17.1 8.3 30 40.7 13.4 54 .1
I 41.3 1.6 8.4 57.3 15 2.4 17.4
1987
I 3.9 16.1 8.1 28.1 41.4 13 54.4
I 46.S 1.6 8.5 56.6 15 oS 2.6 18.1
1988
I 4.4 15.8 8 28.2 40.9 12.8 53.7
I 42.1 1.1 9.5 53.3 16.2 2.8 19
1989
I 3 16.6 1.3 26.9 38.5 14.4 52.9
I 39.9 1.6 10.5 52 16.4 2.6 19
CHIECON 1: Trade as a Proportion of National Income- 1952-91
Source: SYC 1992; (1,000,000,000 yuan)
Year National Income Trade Percentage
1952 58.9 6.46 10.97"
1953 70.9 8.09 11.41"
1954 74.8 8.47 11.32"
1955 78.8 10.98 13.93"
1956 88.2 10.87 12.32"
1957 90.8 10.45 11.51"
1958 111.8 12.87 11.51"
1959 122.8 14.93 12.16"
1960 122 12.84 10.52"
1961 99.6 9.08 9.12"
1962 92.4 8.09 8.76"
1963 100 8.57 8.57"
1964 116.6 9.75 8.36"
1965 138.7 11.84 8.54"
1966 158.6 12.71 8.01"
1967 148.7 11.22 7.55"
1968 141.5 10.85 7.67"
1969 161.7 10.7 6.62"
1970 192.6 11.29 5.86"
1971 207.7 12.09 5.82"
1972 213.6 14.69 6.88"
1973 231.8 22.05 9.51"
1974 234.8 29.23 12.45"
1975 250.3 29.04 11.60"
1976 242.7 26.41 10.88"
1977 264.4 27.25 10.31"
1978 301 35.5 11.79"
1979 335 45.46 13.57"
1980 368.8 57 15.46"
1981 394.1 73.53 18.66"
1982 425.8 77.13 18.11"
1983 473.6 86.01 18.16"
1984 565.2 120.1 21.25"
1985 702 206.67 29.44"
1986 785.9 258.04 32.83"
1987 931.3 308.42 33.12"
1988 1173.8 382.2 32.56"
1989 1312.5 415.59 31.66"
1990 1438.4 556.01 38.65"
1991 1611.7 722.93 44.86"
Chiecon2: China'. Share of World Trade 1979-92
IMP Direction of Trade Statistics 1985; 1993
(tUS Billion)
World Trade Growth China Trade Growth Share
1979 3092.9 29.2 0.9"
1567.7 15.6 1.0"
X 1525.2 13.6 0.9"
1980 3803.8 23.0" 39.2 34.2" 1.0"
1928.1 23.0" 19.5 2S.0" 1.0"
X 1875.7 23.0" 19.7 44.9" 1.1"
1981 3754.9 -1.3" 43 9.7" 1. 1"
1912.1 -0.8" 21.6 10.8" 1.1"
X 1842.8 -1.8" 21.4 8.6" 1.2"
1982 3503.7 -6.7" 40.7 -5.3" 1.2"
1793.8 -6.2" 18.9 -12.5" 1.1"
X 1709.9 -7.2" 21.8 1.9" 1.3"
1983 3412.2 -2.6" 43.4 6.6" 1.3"
I 1737.4 -3.1" 21.3 12.7" 1.2"
X 1674.8 -2.1" 22.1 1.4" 1.3"
1984 3625.7 6.3" 50.7 16.8" 1.4"
I 1844.3 6.2" 25.9 21.6" 1.4lIi
X 1781.4 6.4" 24.8 12.2" 1.4"
1985 3688.7 1.7" 69.7 37.5" 1.9"
I 1886.2 2.3" 42.4 63.7" 2.2"
X 1802.S 1.2" 27.3 10.1" I.S"
1986 4026.5 9.2" 74.8 7.3" 1.9"
I 2052.9 8.8" 43.2 1.9" 2.1"
X 1973.6 9.5" 31.6 15.8" 1.6"
1987 4751.7 18.0" 82.6 10.4" 1.7"
I 2410 17.4" 43.2 0.0" 1.8"
X 234t.7 18.7" 39.4 24.7" 1.7"
1988 5446.2 14.6" 102.9 24.6" 1.9"
2762.4 14.6" 55.3 28.0" 2.0"
X 2683.8 14.6" 47.6 20.8" 1.8"
1989 5914.2 8.6" 112 8.8" 1.9"
I 3002 8.7" 59.1 6.9" 2.0"
X 2912.2 8.5" 52.9 It.1" 1.8"
1990 6763 14.4" 118.9 6.2" 1.8"
3432.7 14.3" 54.4 -8.0" 1.6"
X 3330.3 14.4" 64.5 21.9" 1.9"
1991 7032.1 4.0" 135.8 14.2" 1.9"
I 3577.7 4.2" 63.9 17.5" 1.8"
I 3454.4 3.7" 71.9 11.5" 2.1"
1992 7529.7 7.1" 167.9 23.6" 2.2"
I 3840.9 7.4" 81.7 27.9" 2.1"
I 3688.8 6.8" 86.2 19.9" 2.3"




Chiecon3: Asia Trade as a proportion of Total Trade 1950-80
with and without Hong Kong (excluding Middle East)
Source: sye 1981;1990 (S 1,000,000 US)
Year Total Trade Asia Percentage Hong Kong Asia-HK
1950 1130 299.3 26.5" 163.6 12.0"
1951 1960 724.8 37.0" 624.2 S.l"
1952 1940 447.5 23.1" 303.8 7.4"
1953 2370 467.3 19.7" 289.7 7.5"
1954 2440 445.8 18.3" 218.1 9.3"
1955 3140 464.5 14.8" 189.4 8.8"
1956 3210 581.1 18.1" 200.4 11.9"
1957 3110 526.4 16.9" 200.4 10.5"
1958 3870 587.7 15.2" 239.4 9.0"
1959 4380 473.5 10.8" 211.5 6.0"
1960 3810 486.3 12.8" 214.9 7.1"
1961 2940 511.8 17.4" 201.6 10.6"
1962 2660 596.7 22.4" 237.6 13.5"
1963 2920 768.2 26.3" 308.8 15.7"
1964 3470 1117.7 32.2" 419.9 20.1"
1965 4250 1371 32.3" 479.3 21.0"
1966 4620 1708.6 37.0" 596.7 24.1"
1967 4160 1572.7 37.8" 509.1 25.6"
1968 4050 1500.4 37.0" 542.8 23.6"
1969 4030 1619.6 40.2" 58'S.I 25.6"
1970 4590 1880.3 41.0" 617.7 27.5"
1971 4850 2047.8 42.2" 670.5 28.4"
1972 6300 2572.5 40.8" 912.1 26.U
1973 10980 4612.1 42.0" 1715.9 26.4"
1974 14570 5987.2 41.1" 1712.1 29.3"
1975 14750 6743.8 45.7" 1754 33.8"
1976 13440 5867.2 43.7" 1845.6 29.9"
1977 14800 6658 45.0" 2148.5 30.5"
1978 20640 8864.8 42.9" 2742.3 29.7"
1979 29340 12219.8 41.6" 3762.3 28.8"
1980 38140 16587.1 43.5" 5173.6 29.9"
CHIECON4: Direction of Trade 1981-90
Source: sye 1981-1992; (USS 1 million; figures for 1981-83 converted from Rmb
using average eIchange rate of the year issued by the Bank of Chinal
Country 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Afghanistan 0.6 O.OS S.1 O.OS 1.1 O.OS 8.18 O.OS 18 O.OS
I 0.1 O.OS 3.S O.OS 0.2 O.OS 0.01 O.OS 0.26 O.OS
I 0.5 O.OS 2.2 O.OS 7.5 O.ts 8.11 O.OS 11.74 O.IX
Bahrain 22.1 0.11 14.4 O.IS 33.9 0.11 28.01 0.11 26.11 o.n
I 23.1 0.3S 19.6 0.21 19.14 o.u
X 22.1 0.21 14 .4 O.IS 10.8 O.IS 8.41 O.OS 7.03 O.OS
Bangladesh 128.3 O.SS 119.3 O.SS 89.8 0.41 120.08 0.41 87.98 0.21
I 21.8 0.21 28.7 0.41 24 0.31 9.09 o.n 11.1 r.n
I 106 oS 0.71 90.6 0.6S 6S.8 0.41 110.99 0.6S 16.88 0.41
Brunei 0.4 O.OS 4.5 O.OS 3.8 o .OS 3.37 0.01 2.95 O.OS
I 0.01 O.OS
X 0.4 O.OS 4.S O.OS 3.8 0.01 3.37 O.OS 2.94 0.01
BUfma 52.1 0.21 47.S 0.2S 47.7 0.2S 41.93 0.2S 82.04 0.2S
I 16.9 0.21 15.3 0.21 15.9 0.21 15.62 e.n 45.78 0.21
X 35.8 0.21 32.2 0.21 31.8 0.21 32. 31 0.2S 36.26 0.21
Cambodia 1.6 O.OS 3 O.OS 0.8 0.01 0.32 0.01 0.64 0.01
I 1.2 O.OS 2.5 O.OS 0.2 O.OS 0.32 O.OS 0.62 0.01
X 0.4 O.OS 0.5 O.OS 0.6 O.OS 0.02 0.01
Cyprus 10.8 0.01 9.2 O.OS 6 0.01 12.21 O.OS 8.9 0.01
I O.S 0.01 0.3 0.01
I 10.3 0.11 8.9 0.11 6 O.OS 12.27 O.ts 8.9 0.01
DPRI 542.3 2.31 601.3 2.71 S3I. S 2.3S 529.87 1.11 488.39 1.21
I 236.3 2.61 312.2 4.41 256.1 3.01 288.73 2.21 256.92 1.21
X 306 2.11 289.1 1.9S 275.4 1.91 241.14 1.41 231.47 1.21
Hong Kong/Macao 6957.1 29.51 6916.5 31.51 1847.1 33.3S 10219.01 33.51 1230S. 69 30.41
I 1216.9 14.21 13S2.S 19.11 1738.4 20.01 2981.48 22.91 4850.94 22.41
X 5680.2 39.01 5564 31.31 6108.7 41.11 1231.59 41.41 1454.75 39.71
India 165.1 0.7S 119.1 o.n 74 0.31 64.19 0.21 123.91 0.3S
I 82.2 0.9S 75.4 LIS IS.4 0.21 26.02 0.21 38.78 0.21
I 83 .s 0.6S 103.7 0.11 58.6 0.41 38.17 0.21 85. I3 0.5S
Indonesia II9.3 OJI 200.1 0.91 199.4 0.8S 304.44 1.01 451.05 t. IS
I 63.8 0.11 153.4 2.2S 150J 1.71 229.95 1.81 332.03 1.51
X SS.S 0.41 46.7 0.31 48.9 0.31 14 .49 0.41 125.02 0.71
Iran 167 0.11 129.5 0.61 268.9 I. II 162.06 0.51 91.93 0.21
I 1.7 0.01 86.7 1.21 0.16 O.OS 8.05 O.OS
X 165.3 1.1S 42.8 0.31 268.9 1.81 161.9 0.91 83.88 0.41
Iraq 199.7 0.8S 132 0.6S 45.7 0.2S 65.76 0.2S 135.88 0.31
I 4.3 O.OS 7.S O.IS 10.6 O.IS 8.16 o.IS 6.81 O.OS
X 19S.4 1.3S 124.S 0.8S 35.1 o .2S S7.6 o.n 129.01 o.n
Japan 11161 47.3S 8913.2 40.SS 10084.6 42.n 13921.S8 45.61 21144.01 52.31
I 6293.5 69.n 3992.6 56.31 5S35.4 63.8S 8503.72 65.1S 15035.04 69.41
X 4869.5 33.4S 4920.6 33.0S 4549.2 30.6S 541'.863I.OS 6108.91 32.6S
Jordan 459 I.9S 1349.4 6.1S 1555.3 6.6S 1330.75 4.41 1003.27 LSS
I 6.8 o.IS 5.4 O.IS 21.6 o .3S 29.89 0.21 17.84 0.11
X 452.2 l.1S 1344 9.0S 1527.7 10.3S 1300.86 7.51 985.43 5.n
lunit 134.6 0.6S 136.1 0.6S 149.6 0.6S 118.39 0.4S 92.91 0.2S
I 9.6 0.1S 23.1 O.lS SO 0.61 29.21 0.2S 19.43 0.11
X 125 0.9S 113 0.8S 99.6 0.11 89.18 OJS 73.48 0.41
Laos 9.2 O.OS 6.9 O.OS 46.4 0.21 S.S 0.01 9.63 O.OS
I 8.4 O.IS 6.9 O.IS 46.4 O.SS 50S O.OS 9.63 O.OS
I 0.8
Lebanon 42.2 0.21 30.2 o .IS 29.4 O.IS 24.61 o .IS 17.4S O.OS
I 0.01 O.OS
X 42.2 0.3S 30.2 o.a 29.4 0.2S 24.61 o.IS 11.44 D.n
Malaysia 317.8 1.3S 344.8 1.6S 403. 4 1.7S 411. 45 1.31 388.32 1.OS
I 121.9 1.41 159.9 1.31 216.2 1.SS 20S. 58 1.6S 200.3 0.9S
X 195.9 1.3S 184.9 1.21 187.2 1.31 20S. 87 1.2S 188.02 1.01
Maldives 0.8 O.OS 0.2 O.OS 0.4 O.OS 0.38 O.OS 0.23 O.OS
I 0.01 O.OS
X 0.8 O.OS 0.2 O.OS 0.4 O.OS 0.38 O.OS 0.22 O.OS
Mongolia 4.6 O.OS 4.2 O.OS 4.3 O.OS 4.49 O.OS 6.25 O.OS
I 2.1 O.OS 1.9 O.OS 2.1 O.OS 2.34 O.OS 1.98 0.01
X 1.5 O.OS 2.3 O.OS 2.2 O.OS 2.15 O.OS 4.27 0.01
Nepal 14.6 O.IS 25.1 o .IS 28 oS e.n 1509S O.ts 19.84 0.01
I 4.3 0.01 3.4 o .OS 2.8 O.OS 4.H 0.01 2.37 0.01
X 10.3 O.IS 21.7 O.IS 25.7 0.21 11.41 0.1l 11.47 s.n
Oun 14.9 o.n 11.4 0.1l 9.5 0.01 13.28 O.OS 9.4 O.OS
I 1.71 O.OS
X 14.9 O.IS 11.4 o .IS 9.S e.n 11.57 O.IS 9.4 e.n
Pakistan SSJ 2.ll 35I.4 1.61 385.7 1.61 322.9 1.11 245.12 0.61
I 337.9 3.a 145.2 2.0S 160.3 1.8S 51.06 0.4S 57.9 D.n
X 21501 !.SS 206.2 1.4S 225.4 !.SS 271.84 1.6S 187.22 1.01
Phillipines 377.2 1.61 379.9 1.71 189.2 O.SS 33I.H 1.11 414.21 1.01
I 118.6 1.31 139.9 2.01 45.2 O.SI 86.0S 0.7S 98.32 O. n
X 258.6 1.81 240 1.6S 144 1.01 245.49 1.41 315.89 I.7S
Qatar 28.4 e.n 60 0.31 48.9 0.21 72.8 0.21 39.55 o.n
I 19.8 0.21 51.9 0.7S 43.1 O.SI 66.S o.n 3S.97 0.21
X 8.6 i.n 8.1 0.11 5.8 0.01 6.3 0.01 3. 58 O.OS
Saudi Arabia 237.9 1.01 196.1 0.91 168.9 0.7S 170.08 0.61 156.67 0.41
I 12.7 e.u 10.2 D.ts 18.8 0.21 29.76 0.21 22.H e.n
I 225. 2 LSI 18S.9 1.21 ISO.I 1.01 140.32 D.SS 134.13 o.a
Singapore 792.4 3.41 751.8 3.41 685.3 2.91 1446.67 4.7S 2322.88 5.7S
I 115.7 1.31 105.9 !.SS 114.5 I.3S 160.02 1.21 242.5 I.ts
I 676.7 4.61 645.9 4.n 570.8 3.SS 1286.65 7.4S 2080.3811.1S
Sri Lanka 87.4 0.41 4503 o.a 38.5 0.21 92.17 0.31 76.21 0.2S
I 56.3 0.6S 7.2 O.IS 15.2 0.21 60.71 O.SS 13.04 0.11
I 31.I 0.2S 38.I o.n 23.3 0.21 31.46 0.2S 63.17 0.31
Syria 126.7 D.5S 77 0.4S 186.8 O.SS 372.17 1.2S 70.95 0.21
I 35.4 0.41 3.6 e.n 19.8 0.21 10.4 0.11 5.32 O.OS
X 91.3 0.6S 73.4 o .sS 166.8 I. IS 361.77 2.1S 65.63 0.31
Thailand 390.9 1.71 522.9 2.41 331.6 I.4S 449.53 !.SI 378.85 0.9S
I 156.6 1.71 353.1 5001 135.7 1.61 183.81 1.41 261.79 1.21
I 234 .3 1.61 169.8 I.ts 195.9 I.3S 265.72 US 117.06 0.6S
Turkey 46.2 0.21 . 44 0.2S 30.1 o.IS 43.17 o.IS III.03 0.31
I 44 .8 O.SS 42.4 0.6S 26.4 O.ll 40.56 O.lS 40.26 o.a
X 1.4 0.01 1.6 0.01 3.7 0.01 2.61 0.01 70.77 0.41
OAf 104 0.41 81.2 0.4S 68.8 O.3S 80.03 O.lS 8S.62 o .2S
I Il.67 o.n 21.32 O.tS
I 104 0.71 81.2 O.SS 68.8 O.SS 66.36 0.41 64.3 0.31
ARY 400.7 1.71 333 I.5S 81.8 O.ll 60.34 o.a 38.86 0.11
I 2.7 0.01 1.9 O.OS 0.09 O.OS 0.1l O.OS
X 398 2.a 331.1 2.ll 81.8 OJS 60.25 O.ll 38.74 0.21
PDRY 38.7 0.21 40.4 o.a 53.5 0.21 39.86 e.n 28.96 e.n
I 3.7 0.28 O.OS 0.33 O.OS
I 3S 0.21 40.4 0.31 53.S 0.41 39.58 0.2S 28.63 0.2S
Asia Trade 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985Total 23585.1 21989.6 23550 30521.08 40418.8Import Total 9021.1 38.21 7088.9 32.21 8674.1 36.81 13060.2 42.81 21651.14 53.61Export Total 14564 61.81 14900.7 67.81 14875.9 63.21 17460.88 57.21 18767.66 46.41Balance 5542.9 7811. 8 6201. 8 4400.68 -2883.48
Asia as a region
,arid Total 44021 53.61 41641 52.81 43616 54.01 53548 57.01 69616 58.11Iliport Total 22014 41.01 19293 36.71 21390 40.61 27409 47.61 42252 S1.2SExport Total 22007 66.21 22348 66.71 22226 66.91 26139 66.81 27364 68.61Balance -7 30SS 836 -1270 -14888
Asia- Hong long
Total 16628 37.81 15073.1 36.21 15702.9 36.01 20302.01 37.91 28113.11 40.41I.port Total 7744.2 35.21 5136.4 29.71 6935.1 32.41 10012.72 36.11 16800.2 39.8SExport Total 8883.8 40.41 9336.7 41.81 8767.239.41 10229.29 39.11 11312.9141.31Balance 1139.6 3600.3 183U 156.s7 -5481.29
Other Regions:
Africa 1380 3.11 1558 3.a 1205 2.81 1234 2.31 880 1.31Europe 7994 18.21 7167 17.21 9101 20.91 9935 18.61 14238 20.SSLatin Allerica 1549 3.51 1543 3. a 2034 4.71 1653 3.11 2568 3.71North A.erica 1683 1'.SS 7633 18.31 6305 14.51 1866 14.71 8836 12.11Oceania 1218 2.81 1364 3.31 1031 2.41 1399 2.61 ISH 2.21Otbers 611. 9 1.41 386.4 0.91 390 0.91 939.92 1.81 1123.2 1.61
Asia Subregions
M.East Total 2032.9 8.61 2643.9 12.01 2131.111.61 2593.64 8.51 1917.sS 4.71Import Total 142 1.61 233 3.31 219.4 2.SS 249.99 1.91 191.14 0.91Export Total 1890.9 13.01 2410.9 16.21 2511.5 16.91 2343.65 13.41 1120.41 9.21Balance 1748.9 2171.9 2298.1 2093.66 1523.21
ASEAH Total 1991.6 8.51 2199.s 10.01 1808.9 1.71 2943.63 9.61 3961.3 1 9.81I.port Total 516.6 6.41 912.2 12.91 662.1 1.61 865.41 6.61 1134.94 LlIExport Total 1421 9.81 1287.3 8.61 1146.8 7.71 2078.22 11.91 2826.37 15.11Balance 844.4 375.1 484.7 1212.81 1691.43
S.Asia Total 950.4 4.01 726.1 3.31 624 .6 2.71 623.85 2.01 511. 29 1. 41Import Total 502.6 5.61 263.4 3.71 217.9 2. SI 151.49 1. 21 123.46 0.61Export Total 447.8 3.11 462.7 3.11 406.7 2.71 472.36 2.71 447.83 2.41Balance -54.8 199.l 188.8 320.87 324.37
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990Afghanistan 69.55 0.21 23.96 O.IS 2S.OS O.OS 11.4 O.OS 22.58 O.OS
I 0.28 O.OS 0.1 O.OS 0.05 O.OS 0.28 O.OS 0.19 O.OS
X 69.27 0.4S 23.86 O.IS 2S.OS o .IS 11.12 O.OS 22.39 o .IS
Bahrain 11.42 O.OS 13.94 O.OS 11.86 O.OS 11.68 O.OS 8.28 O.OS
I 3.14 O.OS 4.08 O.OS 3.03 O.OS 3.48 O.OS
I 8.28 O.OS 9.86 O.OS 9.86 O.OS 9.18 O.OS 8.28 O.OS
Bangladesh 132.61 0.3S 98.75 0.21 129.18 0.2S 226.54 0.3S 111.09 o .lS
I 28.89 0.11 17.32 O.IS 30.28 O.IS 34.99 O.IS 17.81 O.IS
X 103.72 O.SS 81.41 0.31 98 0.31 191.55 O.SS 153.28 0.41
Brunei 2.11 O.OS 4.54 O.OS 9.01 O.OS 11.92 O.OS 11.83 O.OS
I 0.01 O.OS 0.77 O.OS 5.88 O.OS 8.37 O.OS 3.11 O.OS
I 2.16 O.OS 3.11 O.OS 3.13 O.OS 3.SS O.OS 8.12 O.OS
Buna 95.38 0.21 163.72 o .3S 270.11 O.SS 31J. 72 O.SS 327.62 O.SS
I 57.55 0.3S 95.06 0.41 137.1 O.SS 126.06 0.4S 104.08 0.41
X 37.83 0.2S 68.66 0.31 133.61 0.41 181.66 O.5S 22L H o .sS
Cnbodia 0.14 O.OS 0.28 O.OS 0.6 O.OS 2.95 O.OS 3.24 o .OS
I 0.01 O.OS 0.17 O.OS 1.02 O.OS 0.18 O.OS
X 0.14 O.OS 0.27 O.OS 0.43 O.OS I.93 O.OS L06 O.OS
Cyprus 14.3 O.OS 15.91 O.OS 14.68 O.OS 19.17 O.OS 39.95 O.IS
1 1.45 O.OS 0.63 O.OS 1.76 O.OS 4.86 O.OS 1.44 O.OS
X 12.85 O.IS 15.28 0.11 12.92 O.OS 14.31 O.OS 38.51 O.IS
DPRl 509.39 1.3S 513.3 LIS 579.02 LOS 562.72 0.9S 482.14 0.71
1 276 l.n 236.19 LIS 233.61 0.9S 185.35 0.7S 124.58 o .SS
X 233.39 1.21 277.11 l.1S 345.35 I.IS 371.31 I.OS 358.16 0.81
Bong long/Nacao 15790.31 39.8S 22750.8 41.9S 30830.3 SI.4S 35072.62 S4.1S 41571.27 60.sS
1 5690.1928.0S 8545.74 39.7S 12119.76 H.U 12687.66 H.BS 14415.33 ss.n
X 10100.1252.41 14205.06 H.6S 18710.54 57.7S 22384.96 61.31 27156.04 63.41
India 121.48 0.31 111.46 0.21 246. J3 0.41 271.19 0.41 264.11 0.41
I 38.53 0.2S 29.62 O.IS 97.71 0.41 102.48 0.4S 97.35 0.41
X 88.95 O.SS 87.84 o.n 148.62 O.SS 168.11 O.SS 166.16 0.41
Indonesia 466.71 1.2S 779.22 1.61 917 .96 I.5S 805.22 I.2S 1182.26 I.7S
I 324.22 I.6S 591.1 2.7S 681.52 2.SS 582.34 2.IS 803.24 3.1S
I 142.49 0.71 188.12 0.7S 236.44 0.7S 222.88 0.6S 379.02 0.9S
Iran 50.31 0.11 99.2 0.21 239.7 0.41 179.01 0.3S 361.96 O.SS
1 0.25 O.OS 4.75 O.OS 17.02 0.11 47 .21 0.21 41.53 0.21
X 50.12 o .3S 94.45 0.41 222.68 0.7S 131.86 0.41 318.43 0.71
Iraq 155.31 0.41 74.85 0.21 88.72 0.11 153.07 0.21 118.16 o.a
I 5.03 0.01 0.9 0.01 13.52 0.01 85.05 o.n 80.31 o.n
I 150.28 0.81 13.95 0.31 15.2 0.21 68.02 0.21 31.85 0.11
Japan 17217.92 43.41 16472.48 34.a 18979.1631.61 18896.96 29.11 16599 24.11
I 12438.47 61.11 10074.2 46.81 11057.08 40.21 10534.5 37.U 7581.97 29.31
I 4119.45 24.81 6398.28 24.61 7922.08 24.41 8362.46 22.91 9011.03 21.01
Jordan 1052.51 2.11 1389.83 2.91 163.33 1.31 3SI.63 0.51 109.36 0.21
I 21.59 0.11 45.54 0.2S 38.38 0.11 32.45 o.n 34.27 0.11
I 1020.92 5.31 1341.29 5.U 724.95 2.21 319.18 0.91 75.09 o.a
hili t 99.03 0.21 135.46 0.31 206.14 0.31 191.22 0.31 119.25 o.a
I 26.28 0.11 41.31 0.2S 74.81 0.31 51.5 0.21 42.66 o.a
I 12.75 0.41 94.09 0.41 131.33 0.41 133.72 0.41 16.59 0.21
Laos 9.8 0.01 11.28 0.01 20.8 0.01 16.3 0.01 16.19 O.OS
I 9.17 0.01 10.68 0.01 11.84 0.11 12.66 0.01 6.22 0.01
I 0.03 0.01 0.6 0.01 2.96 0.01 3.64 0.01 9.91 0.01
Lebanon 21.74 0.11 19.67 0.01 28.13 0.01 26.8 0.01 27.89 0.01
I 0.01 0.01 0.11 O.OS 0.01 0.01
I 21.73 0.11 19.56 O.IS 28.12 0.11 26.8 0.11 21.89 0.11
Malaysia 383.01 l.01 556.63 l.21 871.08 1.51 1044.6 I.61 1183.07 La
I 180.32 0.91 302.21 1.41 568.88 2.11 692.39 2.41 835.35 3.21
I 202.69 1.11 254.42 1.01 308.2 1.01 352.21 1.01 340.79 0.81
Maldives 0.11 0.01 0.7 0.01 0.36 0.01 0.39 0.01 0.54 0.01
I 0.01 0.01 0.6 0.01 0.23 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.29 0.01
I 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.29 0.01 0.25 0.01
Mongolia 13.08 0.01 24.88 0.11 24.93 0.01 28.53 0.01 41.02 0.11
I 3.76 0.01 4.61 0.01 7.95 0.01 8.61 0.01 11.21 0.01
I 9.32 0.01 20.27 0.11 16.98 0.11 19.86 0.11 29.81 0.11
Nepal 19.61 0.01 21.57 0.01 24.73 0.01 32.79 0.11 47.14 0.11
I 3.44 0.01 1.08 0.01 3.02 0.01 5. 31 0.01 5.23 0.01
X 16.17 0.11 20.49 0.11 21.71 o.n 27.48 0.11 41.91 0.11
Oun 9.79 0.01 7.6 0.01 73.92 e.n 150.8 0.21 133.21 0.21
I 0.04 0.01 0.9 0.01 67.15 0.21 144.11 0.51 125.49 0.51
I 9.75 0.11 1. SI 0.01 6.77 0.01 6.63 0.01 1.18 0.01
Pakistan 231.55 0.61 337.72 0.71 385.11 0.61 592.41 0.91 584.86 0.91
I 24.92 0.11 37.96 0.21 55.22 O.U 224.36 0.81 90.06 0.31
X 206.63 1.11 299.16 1.21 329.95 1.01 368.05 1.01 494.8 1.21
Phiiiipines 293.43 0.71 38S.S o.n 404.57 0.71 340.02 O.SS 29s.t3 0.4X
I 136.5 0.7X 139.69 0.6X 135.07 O.SS 82.88 0.31 85.03 0.31
X 156.93 D.n 245.81 0.9X 269.s o.n 257.14 o.n 210.1 O.SX
Qatar 32.34 D.IX 30.1S o .IX 54.54 O.IX 49.7 e.n 27.2 O.OX
I 27.47 o.a 21.15 o.n 47.S7 0.2X 44 .67 0.21 21.32 O.IX
X 4.87 O.OX 9.6 O.OX 6.97 O.OX 5.03 0.01 5.88 0.01
Saudi Arabia 185.63 O.SX 354.62 0.71 425.12 0.71 319.27 O.SX 418.56 0.6X
I 52.14 0.3X 107.23 O.SX 195.25 0.71 70.17 0.2X 81.21 0.31
X 1ll.49 o.a 247.39 I.OX 229.87 0.71 249.1 o.a 337.35 o.n
Singapore 17S9.3 4.4X 1945.34 4.a 2503.4S 4.21 3191.73 4.9X 2825.24 4.11
I 553.04 2.71 611.81 2.91 1018.38 3.71 1498.9 5.31 851.51 J.n
X 1206.26 6.3X 1321.41 S.IX 1485.01 4.61 1692.83 4.61 1974.66 4.61
Sri Lanka 91.53 0.21 70.23 e.n 92.04 0.21 73.21 0.11 102.32 0.11
I 22.81 0.11 19.78 0.11 24.14 0.11 4.02 0.01 I. 86 0.01
I 74.72 0.41 50.45 0.21 61.9 0.21 69.19 0.21 100.46 0.21
Syria 319.45 0.81 386.73 o.n 188.09 o.n 46.46 e.n 137.21 0.21
I 0.33 0.01 4.42 0.01 4.IS 0.01 0.08 0.01 4.29 0.01
X 319.12 1.71 382.31 1.51 183.94 0.61 46.38 o.n 132.92 0.31
Thailand 445.08 1.11 109.75 I.SS 1142.28 1.91 1256.16 1.91 1194.46 1.71
I 286.24 1.4X 404.62 1.91 632.46 2.n 756.27 2.71 371.01 1.41
X 158.84 0.81 305.13 1.21 509.82 1.61 499.89 1.41 823.45 1.91
Turiey 193.06 O.SI 207.91 0.41 289.62 0.51 256.09 0.41 90.2 o.n
I 119 0.61 119.11 0.61 119.25 0.41 199.36 o.a 40.94 0.21
X 74.06 0.41 88.16 0.31 90.37 0.31 56.73 0.21 49.26 0.11
UAE 99.61 0.31 151.61 o.n 255.1 0.41 303.9 0.51 310.08 o ,SI
I 10.04 0.01 28.58 0.11 70.51 0.31 59.58 0.21 37.81 0.11
X 89.S7 0.51 123.03 0.51 184,59 0.6S 244.32 0.71 272.27 0.61
ART 25.31 0.11 17.15 0.01 27.86 0.01 35. 57 O.IS 73.84 o.n
I 0.8 O.OS 0.31 O.OS 0.28 0.01 1.72 0.01
I 25.31 0.11 17.07 0.11 27.55 0.11 3S .29 o.n 72.12 0.21
PDRY 20.68 0.11 24.98 0.11 37.09 o.IS 27.23 O.OS
I 1.21 0.01
X 20.68 0.11 24.98 o.n 37.09 o.n 26.02 O.IS
Asia Trade 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Total 39635.88 47530.99 59979.14 64827.58 68763.71
hport Total 2034 t.J9 51.31 21504.42 45.a 21474.98 45.81 28298.6 43.71 25928.9137.71
Export Total 19284.49 48.71 26025.12 54.81 32424.34 54.11 36528.96 56.31 42834.9 62.31
Balance -1056.9 4520.7 4949.36 8230.36 16905.99
Asia as I region
'orld Total 73846 53.71 82652 57.51 102791 58.41 111678 58.01 115436 59.61
I.port Total 42904 47.41 43215 49.81 55251 49.71 59140 47.91 53J45 48.61
Elport Total 30942 62.31 39437 66.01 41540 68.11 52538 69.51 62091 69.01
Balance -11962 -3178 -7711 -6602 8746
As ia- Bong long
Total 23845.57 n.lI 24780.19 30.01 29148.84 28.41 29754.96 26.61 27192.44 23.61
I.port Total 14651.2 34.11 12958.68 30.01 15355. 22 27.81 15610.94 26.41 11513.58 21.61
Export Total 9184.37 29.71 11820.06 30.01 13713.8 28.81 14144 26.91 15678.86 25.31
Balance -5466.83 -1138.62 -1641.42 -1466.94 4165.28
Other regions
Afr ica 1009 1.41 1620 2.01 2172 2.11 1164 1.01 1664 1.41
Europe 19460 26.41 19070 23.11 21838 21.11 23509 21.11 22160 19.21
Latin America 2086 2.81 1733 2.11 2516 2.SI 2968 2.7S
North America 8665 11.71 9615 11.71 12256 11.91 13143 12.31
Oceania 1901 2.61 1938 2.31 1964 1.91 2285 2.01
Others 1089.12 1.S1 1085.01 1.31 2005.86 2.01 3181.42 2.81
Asia Subregions
M.East Total 2290.57 5.81 2929.61 6.21 2704.5 4.51 2122.66 3.31 1975.21 2.91
Import Total 266.11 1.31 319.63 1.81 652.12 2.41 750.01 2.71 514.99 2.01
Elport Total 2013.8 10.41 2548.53 9.81 1972.81 6.11 1312.51 3.8S 1460.22 3.41
Balance 1747.0J 2168.9 1320.09 622.5 945.23
ASEAN Total 3341.53 8.41 4376.44 9.21 5845.34 9.a 6631.13 10.21 6680.16 9.7S
Import Total 1480.32 1.3S 2055.49 9.6S 3036.31 11.1S 3612.18 12.8X 2952.14 II.4S
Elport Total 1867.21 9.7S 2320.95 8.91 2809.03 8.7S 3024.95 8.31 J728.02 8.11
Balance 386.89 265.46 -227.28 -587.83 775.88
S.Asia Total 618.44 1.11 610.39 1.41 902.86 1.5S 1201.93 I.9S 1192.64 1.71
Import Total 118.88 0.61 106.46 0.5S 210.65 0.8S 311.54 US 212.19 0.81
Elport Total 559.56 2.91 563.93 2.21 691. 36 i.n 836.39 2.lX 979.85 2.31
Balance 440.68 457.47 480.71 464.8S 767.06
Chiecon5: The Role of Hong Kong



















































































































































































































































































































































































Chiecon6: Sino-Japanese Trade 1980-92
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, 1985; 1992.
(S US mi Ilions )
China Trade Japan Share Japa.n Trade China Share
1980 37644 9201 24.4" 271719 9455 3.5"
I 19505 5169 26.5" 141284 4346 3. 1"
X 18139 4032 22.2" 130435 5109 3.9"
1981 43107 10930 25.4" 294368 10359 3.5"
I 21631 6183 28.6" 142868 5283 3.7"
X 21476 4747 22.1" 151500 5076 3.4"
1982 40785 8708 21.4" 270009 8838 3.3"
I 18920 3902 20.6" 131566 5338 4.1"
X 21865 4806 22.0" 138443 3500 2.5"
1983 43409 10012 23.1" 273502 10007 3.7"
I 21313 5495 25.8" 126520 5089 4.0"
X 22096 4517 20.4" 146982 4918 3.3"
1984 50777 13212 26.0" 305890 13142 4.3"
I 25953 8057 31.0" 136142 5943 4.4"
X 22824 5155 22.6" 169748 7199 4.2"
1985 69809 21269 30.5" 307705 19124 6.2"
42480 15178 35.7" 130516 6534 5.0"
X 27329 6091 22.3" 177189 12590 7•1"
1986 74614 17542 23.5" 338378 15663 4.6"
I 43247 12463 28.8" 127660 5727 4.5"
X 31367 5079 16.2" 210718 9936 4.7"
1987 82686 16479 19.9" 382239 15865 4.2"
I 43222 10087 23.3" 150907 7478 5.0"
X 39464 6392 16.2" 231332 8337 3.6"
1988 103015 19108 18.5" 452444 19347 4.3"
55352 11062 20.0" 187483 9861 5.3"
X 47663 8046 16.9" 264961 9486 3.6"
1989 112054 18929 16.9" 484232 19560 4.0"
59140 10534 17.8" 209635 11083 5.3!,
X 52914 8395 15.9" 274597 8477 3.1"
1990 118949 16866 14.2" 522985 18202 3.5"
J 54449 7656 14 .1" 235307 12057 5.a:
X 64500 9210 14.3" 287678 6145 2. 1"
1991 135943 20344 15.0" 551525 22853 4.1"
I 63957 10079 15.8" 236633 14248 6.0"
X 71986 10265 14.3" 314892 8605 2.7"
1992 167959 25374 15 •1" 572938 28939 5.1"
I 81739 13683 16.7" 232947 16972 7.3"
X 86220 11691 13.6" 339991 11967 3.5"
CHIECON 8: Commodity Composition of Imports and Exports, 1981-91
Source: 8ye 1982-92
($U8 Billion)
Primary Goods Change Share Manufactures Change Share
1981 8.03 36.5" 13.98 63.5"
X 10.25 46.6" 11.76 S3.U
1982 7.6S -4.7" 39.6" 11.68 -16.5" 60.4"
X 10.07 -1.8" 45.0" 12.32 4.8" 55.0"
1983 5.81 -24.1" 27.1" 15.59 33.5" 72.9"
X 9.63 -4.4" 43.3" 12.61 2.4" 56.7"
1984 I S.2 -10.5" 19.0" 22.2 42.U 81.0"
X 11.93 23.9" 45.7" 14.2 12.6" 54.3"
1985 5.29 1.7" 12.5" 36.96 66.5" 87.5"
X 13.84 16.0" 50.6" 13.52 -4.8" 49.4"
1986 I 5.64 6.6" 13.1" 37.25 0.8" 86.9"
X 11.2 -19.1" 36.3" 19.67 45.5" 63.7"
1987 6.91 22.5" 16.0" 36.3 -2.6" 84.0"
X 13.23 18.1" 33.6" 26.2 33.2" 66.4"
1988 I 10.06 45.6" 18.2" 45.18 24.5" 81.8"
X 14.43 9.1" 30.4" 33.11 26.4" 69.6"
1989 I 11.75 16.8" 19.9" 47.38 4.9" 80.1"
X 15.07 4.4" 28.7" 37.46 13.1" 71.3"
1990 I 9.85 -16.2" IS.S" 43.49 -8.2" 81.5"
X 15.88 5.4" 25.6" 46.2 23.3" 74.4"
1991 I 10.83 9.9" 17.0" 52.95 21.8" 83.0"
X 16.2 2.0" 22.5" SS.69 20.S" 77.5"
Chiecon9: Foreign Capital Used 1979-91
Source: SYC 1986-92
($ US millions)







1984 Total 2704.5 26.8"
Foreign Loans 1285.6 17.2"
Direct Invest 1418.8 35.4"
1985 Total 4462.1 39.4" 1016.4 22.8" 1591 35.7" 2647.1 59.3"
Foreign Loans 2505.9 48.7" 60.7 2.4" 1275.9 50.9" 1351.9 53.9"
Direct Invest 1956.2 27.5" 955.7 48.9" 315.1 16.1" 1295.2 66.2"
1986 Total 7258.3 38.5" 1572.8 21.7" 2897.8 39.9" 4585.9 63.2"
Foreign Loans 5014.5 50.0" 244.1 4.9" 2634.4 52.5" 2968.1 59.2"
Direct Invest 2243.7 12.8" 1328.7 59.2" 263.3 11.7" 1617.8 72. 1"
1987 Total 8451.5 14.1" 2091.2 24.7" 2859.6 33.8" 5211. 7 61. 7"
Foreign Loans 5804.9 13.6" 282.2 4.9" 2593 44.7" 3099.1 53.4"
Direct Invest 2313.S 3.0" IS98.269.1" 219.7 9.5" 1854.8 80.2"
Other 333.1 210.8 63.3" 46.9 14. 1" 257.8 77.4"
1988 Total 10226.4 17.4" 3109.4 30.4" 3354.4 32.8" 6628.5 64.8"
Foreign Loans 6486.7 10.5" 681.4 10.5" 2756.1 42.5" 3555.6 54.8"
Direct Invest 3193.7 27.6" 2095.2 65.6" 514.5 16. 1" 2652.4 83.1"
Other 546 39.0" 332.8 61.0" 83.8 15.3" 420.5 77.0"
1989 Total 10059.1 -1.7" 2912.8 29.0" 3002.6 29.8" 6034.5 60.0"
Foreign Loans 6285.7 -3.2" 571 9.1" 2595 41.3" 3181.8 50.6"
Direct Invest 3392.6 5.9" 2077.6 61.2" 356.3 10.5" 2534.8 74.7"
Other 380.8 -43.4" 264.2 69.4" 356.3 93.6" 317.9 83.5"
1990 Total 10289 2.2" 2431.7 23.6" 3020.7 29.4" 5792.2 56.3"
Foreign Loans 6534.5 3.8" 313.2 4.8" 2500.2 38.3" 2840 43.5"
Direct Invest 3487.1 2.7" 1913.5 54.9" 503.4 14.4" 2724 78.1"
Other 267.7 -42.2" 205 76.6" 17.1 6.4" 227.67 85. 0"
1991 Total 11554.1 10.9" 2924 25.3" 1894 16.4" 5426.93 47.0"
Foreign Loans 6887.5 5 .1" 263.1 3.8" 1284.5 18.6" 1587.7 23.1"
Direct Invest 4366.3 20.1" 2486.9 57.0" 532.5 12.2" 3574.01 81.9"
Other 300.3 10.9" 175 58.3" 77 25.6" 264.4 88.0"
ChieconlO:The Impact of Sanctions On Trade
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, 1985; 1992.
($ US millions)
China Trade Change Percentage -Hongkong Change Percentage
1986 Total 74614 59266
I 43247 37675
X 31367 21591
1987 Total 82686 8072 10.8" 60485 1219 2. 1"
I 43222 -25 -0. 1" 34785 -2890 -7.7"
X 39464 8097 25.8" 25700 4109 19.0"
1988 Total 103015 20329 24.6" 72771 12286 20.3"
I 55352 12130 28.1" 43347 8562 24.6"
X 47663 8199 20.8" 29424 3724 14.5"
1989 Total 112054 9039 8.8" 77598 4827 6.6"
I 59140 3788 6.8" 46600 3253 7.5"
X 52914 5251 11 •0" 30998 1574 5.3"
1990 Total 118949 6895 6.2" 77221 -377 -0.5"
I 54449 -4691 -7.9" 39884 -6716 -14.4"
X 64500 11586 21.9" 37337 6339 20.4"
1991 Total 135943 16994 14.3" 86382 9161 11.9"
I 63957 9508 17.5" 46506 6622 16.6"
X 71986 7486 11.6" 39876 2539 6.8"
Sanctions by Region
Industrial Countries Asia
(inc. Japan) (exc. Japan and M.East)
1987 Total 41089 28123
I 26500 10915
X 14589 17208
1988 Total 48041 6952 16.9" 38059 9936 35.3"
I 30S71 4071 15.4" 15700 4785 43.8"
X 17470 2881 19.7" 22359 5151 29.9"
1989 Total 50790 2749 5.7" 43667 5608 14.7"
I 31767 1196 3.9" 16842 1142 7.3"
X 19023 1553 8.9" 26825 4466 20.0"
1990 Total 48761 -2029 -4.0" 55727 12060 27.6"
I 26860 -4907 -15.4" 21204 4362 25.9"
X 21901 2878 15.1" 34523 7698 28.7"
1991 Total 56572 7811 16.0" 67516 11789 21.2"
I 31544 4684 17.4" 26508 5304 25.0"
X 25028 3127 14.3" 41008 6485 18.8"
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